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This research examines the relationship of initial public offer (IPO) underpricing and 
intrinsic value in the Australian fixed-price setting.  The first stage of the research 
contains a review of major underpricing theories (asymmetric information, 
institutional explanations and theories of ownership and control) and relates these 
theories to the Australian institutional setting.  A baseline model of underpricing is 
developed from analysis of Australian empirical IPO literature.  The second stage of 
the research is the disaggregation of underpricing into mispricing (MP) and 
misvaluation (MV) components.  MP captures the extent of the issuer‟s influence on 
underpricing and is measured as the difference between the intrinsic value of an IPO 
share and its offer price.  MV captures the extent of investors‟ influence on 
underpricing and is measured as the difference between the intrinsic value of an IPO 
share and its market price at listing.   
 
Mispricing is modelled with issuer-related variables that have hypothesised 
associations with offer price.  Results show a proxy for IPO market sentiment and the 
size of the IPO relative to industry median market capitalisation make significant 
contributions to the explanation of mispricing.  Misvaluation is modelled with 
investor characteristics that have hypothesised associations with market price.  A 
proxy for general market sentiment and the level of mispricing make significant 
contributions to the explanation of misvaluation.  The third stage of the research 
integrates results from the disaggregation of underpricing with the baseline model.     
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results.  First, with respect to mispricing, 
issuers incorporate their knowledge of current IPO market conditions when 
establishing offer price, with more positive mispricing observed during hot IPO 
markets.  Further, issuers taking relatively larger companies public tend to overprice 
their issues.  This result persists even after controlling for potential scale effects.  
Second, with respect to misvaluation, overpriced issues (i.e. positive mispricing) are 
also overvalued by the market.  This result provides an indication that price is not a 
suitable proxy for value.  Third, prior Australian research [Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty 
(2005) and How, Lam & Yeo (2007)] reports a negative association for mispricing 
and underpricing.  Consistent with US results (Zheng, 2007), no relationship is 
 observed for this sample.  Overall, the results from this research indicate that investor-
related factors are the primary drivers of underpricing. 
 
This research makes eight major contributions to the body of knowledge.  The first is 
the novel approach of disaggregating underpricing into mispricing and misvaluation 
components.  Second, mispricing is modelled and it is demonstrated that previously 
hypothesised issuer-related factors do not explain mispricing.  Third, misvaluation is 
modelled, providing some interesting insights into the role of market sentiment in the 
underpricing context.  Fourth, the relationships of mispricing, misvaluation and 
underpricing are investigated.  Fifth, the Australian institutional setting is compared to 
that of the US and implications for future research are identified.  Sixth, the baseline 
model of underpricing consolidates variables developed from prior Australian 
literature, providing a yardstick for comparison in future underpricing research.  
Seventh, evidence shows issuers exploit high market sentiment with positive 
mispricing in the fixed-price setting.  The final major contribution relates to the role 
of institutional investors in the fixed-price setting.  Contributions to the IPO literature 
on ownership and control, signalling, asymmetric information theories of ex ante 
uncertainty and agency theory are also made with tests of key variables in the 
mispricing and misvaluation models.  Finally, evidence on the role of institutional 
investors in the fixed-price setting and on the role of demand (informed and total) 
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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate issuer- and investor-related factors 
associated with the underpricing
1
 of Australian fixed-price
2
 initial public offers 
(IPOs).  This involves the disaggregation of underpricing into mispricing (MP) and 
misvaluation (MV) factors.  MP captures the extent of the issuer‟s influence on 
underpricing and is measured as the difference between the intrinsic value
3
 of an IPO 
share and its offer price.  MV captures the extent of investors‟ influence on 
underpricing and is measured as the difference between the intrinsic value of an IPO 
share and its market price at listing.  
 
Figure 1.1 shows the potential relationships of intrinsic value (V), offer price (OP) 
and market price (P) for fixed-price IPOs.  
 





This dissertation asks: 
                                                 
1
 Underpricing refers to the phenomenon of offering an IPO at a lower offer price than the price that the 
shares trade for at the end of one day‟s trading (i.e. post listing on the stock exchange). 
2
 Fixed-price issues are those where the offer price is established prior to publication of the prospectus. 
This and the alternate bookbuild approach to setting the offer price are discussed in chapter 2. 
3
 The intrinsic value of a security is normally defined as the present value of the security‟s expected 
future cash flows, or the „fair‟ value of the security. Intrinsic value cannot be measured by observation. 
  
market price (P) offer price (OP) 
intrinsic value (V) 
extent of underpricing 
extent of mispricing (MP) extent of misvaluation (MV) 
2 
 
Is underpricing due to mispricing (i.e. issuer-related factors), misvaluation 
(i.e. investor-related factors) or a combination of these? 
 
To answer this fundamental question, the following sub-questions are examined: 
 1 Which factors identified in the extant literature explain underpricing in 
Australia?  
 2 Which issuer-related factors determine the level of IPO mispricing? 
 3 Which investor-related factors determine the level of IPO misvaluation? 
 4 To what extent do issuer-related mispricing and investor-related 
misvaluation factors contribute to the explanation of underpricing? 
 
1.2 Motivation 
In addition to facilitating the transfer of ownership, markets exist to allocate resources 
where they will be used most efficiently. The efficient allocation of resources is 
critical to sound performance of an economy. The underpricing phenomenon is 
inconsistent with the efficient allocation of resources as  
a) issuers sell their companies too cheaply, or  
b) investors purchasing shares at listing pay too much, or  
c) some combination of a) and b). 
 
Therefore, the motivation for this research is to gain greater understanding of the gap 
between offer price and day one market price (the underpricing puzzle).  Extant 
underpricing research tends to focus on specific factors that are either demand- or 
supply-side-driven (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2004).  Rather than focussing on „a 
model‟ of underpricing, this research disaggregates underpricing with models of 
mispricing and misvaluation to gain a clearer picture of the potential sources of 
underpricing.  By contributing to the understanding of how market price is determined 
(relative to the proxies for intrinsic value) for earnings forecasting IPOs this research 
will assist share vendors and their advisors (investigating accountants, auditors, 
underwriters and brokers) when setting the selling price for the firm.  By contributing 
to the understanding of the setting of offer prices (relative to the proxies for intrinsic 
value), this research will assist investors and their advisors (accountants and brokers) 




Australian institutional features provide a natural setting for the separate investigation 
of issuer and investor valuations.  Differences in the contractual selling mechanisms 
used by floating companies, the characteristics of companies and institutional 
constraints were identified by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) as having the 
potential to contribute to the underpricing puzzle.  Major underpricing theories [c.f. 
Rock (1986); Titman & Trueman (1986); Benveniste & Spindt (1989); Tinic (1988); 
Shultz (1993)] tend to be developed to explain underpricing in markets where the 
bookbuild pricing mechanism dominates and underwriters provide price support.  
Bookbuilt offer prices do not provide clear indicators of the issuer‟s valuation of the 
firm as they are set with reference to the market‟s assessment of the IPO‟s value.   
 
In contrast, offer prices established via the Australian fixed-price mechanism reflect 
the valuation of the issuer and underwriter or sponsoring broker and these valuations 
are determined without the explicit canvassing of demand.  Price support results in the 
contamination of market price by creating a price floor. As underwriters cannot 
provide price support in the Australian fixed-price setting
4
, market prices that are 
equal to offer price reflect the aggregate of investors‟ assessments of IPO value rather 
than the trading activities of underwriters.  Thus, Australian data facilitate tests of 
issuer-related and investor-related influences on underpricing.  
 
Further, 58% of Australian industrial IPOs provide management earnings forecasts 
during the sample period.  This institutional feature facilitates earnings-based proxies 
for intrinsic value which can be used to estimate mispricing and misvaluation.  While 
Kim and Ritter (1999) report measures of IPO value based on analysts‟ earnings 
forecasts, US research is typically constrained by the use of pre-floatation earnings 
and capital structure data [Purnanandam & Swaminathan (2004); Zheng (2007)].  
  
1.3  Contribution to the literature 
On average, IPOs have mean and median prices at the end of the first day‟s trades that 
are significantly higher than the offer prices of the issues.  Persistent average 
                                                 
4
 ASIC is responsible for the administration of the Corporations Act 2001 and they consider that 
market stabilisation activities by underwriters could result in contraventions of one or more of the 
following sections of the Act - s1041A (market manipulation), s1041B–1041C (false trading and 
market rigging), s1041H (misleading and deceptive conduct) or s1043A (insider trading) (ASIC, 2005).   
4 
 
underpricing of new equity issues is documented for the major world markets and for 
many smaller equity markets since the 1970s [c.f. Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist 
(1994); Jenkinson & Ljungqvist (2001)].  Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter noted in 1988 
that   
… a number of hypotheses have been offered to explain … underpricing, 
but to date there is still no persuasive, widely accepted, and test-supported 
explanation of IPO underpricing (p. 37).   
 
In the two decades since they made this statement, the number of hypotheses has 
increased and considerable academic effort has been directed toward resolving the 
underpricing puzzle.  An underpricing theory that is widely accepted and is capable of 
explaining underpricing in different institutional settings is yet to emerge.  A 
fundamental question that has yet to be answered is if underpricing is due to offer 
prices being too low (the decision of the issuer and advisors) or market prices being 
too high (the aggregate of investor decisions).  The novel approach of modelling 
mispricing and misvaluation as two separate components of underpricing is adopted 
here to address this question. 
 
This research builds on the current IPO mispricing (MP) literature by modelling MP.  
It extends the extant misvaluation (MV) literature by examining MV in the IPO 
setting. To date, there is no available research that attempts to ascertain how much 
underpricing can be attributed to issuer-related factors (evidenced by MP) and how 
much is due to investor behaviour (evidenced by MV). This question is examined by 
incorporating insights from the disaggregation of underpricing into a baseline model 
of underpricing developed from the literature.  Further, results in this dissertation 
provide the first evidence on the relationships between mispricing and misvaluation 
and between misvaluation and underpricing.   
 
In their review of recent IPO literature, Ritter and Welch (2002) state that 
investigation of share allocation procedures and non-rational explanations will 
increase understanding of underpricing.  In this dissertation, the share allocation 
process is investigated as a potential mispricing factor while the disaggregation 
process allows for the non-rational influence of sentiment on market price to create 
misvaluation.  Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) call for research that documents 
regulations and issuing procedures for IPOs.  They identify features such as the 
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advance payment for shares, allocation methods, how offer price is set and how long 
the process takes as areas of specific interest.  Further, Ritter (2003) identifies limits 
to arbitrage as one of the building blocks of behavioural research.  This dissertation 
documents these features for the Australian IPO institutional setting.  The 
implications arising from differences in institutional settings for theories of 
underpricing are discussed.  Further, documentation of the Australian institutional 
setting will assist international researchers in the identification of other markets 
suitable for exploring underpricing with the disaggregation approach. 
 
Behavioural theory allows for investor emotions in decision-making processes and, 
hence, a role for investor sentiment in asset pricing.  Market valuation errors are 
positively related to proxies for market sentiment (Brown & Cliff, 2005).  In the IPO 
context, underpricing has been related to the level of investor sentiment via its 
influence on day one market price (Derrien, 2005); setting offer price (Ljungqvist & 
Wilhelm, 2002); and on the timing of issues (Loughran, Ritter & Rydqvist, 1994).  
This dissertation contributes to the literature via the inclusion market sentiment 
variables in the mispricing and misvaluation models to determine how sentiment 
affects underpricing. 
 
The investigation of the role of institutional investors in the underpricing phenomenon 
[c.f. Derrien (2005); Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006); Ellul & Pagano (2006)] is a 
recent theme in the literature.  This research contributes to that literature with the 
investigation of role of institutional investor participation in mispricing and 
underpricing in the fixed-price setting.  Finally, contributions to the IPO literature on 
ownership and control, signalling, asymmetric information theories of ex ante 
uncertainty and agency theory are made with tests of key variables in the mispricing 
and misvaluation models.  Further contributions are made with the investigation of 
demand proxies and the participation of institutional investors.   
 
1.4 Scope of the research 
There are three main delimitations of scope placed on this research.  First, only 
„industrial‟ companies are included in the sample.  Given their particular 
characteristics, the results of this research may not be generalisable to mining 




Second, the sample period commences in 1997 as electronic data required for the 
measurement of some variables is scant for earlier periods.  Therefore, to avoid any 
bias that could potentially arise from systematic factors associated with data 
availability, the approach has been to constrain the sample period rather than omit 
many observations from a longer sample period.  
 
Third, only fixed-price IPOs are examined in this research.  This delimitation is 
essential for the identification of issuer-related factors in the disaggregation of 
underpricing.  The results may not, therefore, be generalisable to IPOs where offer 
price is established using other pricing mechanisms such as bookbuilding or auctions. 
  
1.5 Organisation of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 reviews the three broad groups of underpricing theories (asymmetric 
information, institutional explanations and theories of ownership and control) and 
discusses their relevance in the Australian institutional setting.  Extant Australian tests 
of these theories are then discussed.  The baseline model of underpricing is developed 
from this literature via the identification of factors which consistently contribute to the 
explanation of underpricing in the Australian context. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the rationale for selecting the test sample.  A number of different 
screens are applied in the selection of the sample and these are justified and described.  
This chapter also provides some preliminary description of the sample data used to 
test the baseline model.  Chapter 4 addresses the first research sub-question by 
presenting the empirical tests of the baseline model.  
 
Chapter 5 explores alternative proxies for the unobservable construct of intrinsic 
value.  The comparable firms PE is selected as the primary proxy for V and the EBO 
model is identified as an appropriate proxy for robustness tests.  Chapter 6 identifies 
the factors that determine IPO mispricing while chapter 7 identifies factors that 




The final research sub-question is addressed in chapter 8.  Here, the baseline model is 
re-estimated with the constrained sample of earnings forecasters employed for testing 
the misvaluation model.  These results are compared to those for the full sample 
presented in chapter 4.  To explore the incremental explanatory power of mispricing 
and misvaluation, models that include each of these variables are then tested.  
Extended models of underpricing are then identified and tested to determine if issuer- 
and investor-related factors contribute to the explanation of underpricing.  Chapter 9 
then concludes by answering the question:  is underpricing due to issuer- or investor- 
related factors or to a combination of these? 
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORY, LITERATURE AND THE BASELINE UNDERPRICING MODEL 
 
2.1 Introduction 
To determine if additional insights to the underpricing puzzle can be gleaned by 
analysis of mispricing (MP) and misvaluation (MV), it is first necessary to identify 
from the literature those factors that contribute to the understanding of underpricing. 
The underpricing model developed in this chapter is based on the extant Australian 
literature which, in turn, has considered international literature. This model will then 
form the baseline for assessing the contribution of variables identified from the 
mispricing and misvaluation models developed in later chapters.   
 
The main theories of underpricing are briefly discussed in the next section. Section 
2.3 outlines the differences in the Australian institutional setting that have the 
potential to impact on theories developed in other institutional settings.  Section 2.4 
then discusses the expected impact of institutional differences on each of the main 
underpricing theories.  Section 2.5 analyses the Australian underpricing literature and 
develops the baseline underpricing model by including those factors which 
consistently contribute to underpricing in this market.  Section 2.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Theoretical frameworks 
The majority of underpricing theories are based on the concept of market efficiency – 
that the market reflects the intrinsic value of a share without bias.  This traditional 
approach results in the conclusion that „… IPOs are underpriced relative to their fair 
value‟ (Zheng, 2007 p 287) and the implication that issuers misprice issues by setting 
the offer price too low.  Hence, under the assumption of market efficiency, mispricing 
is viewed as the only cause of underpricing. 
 
Theories of underpricing can be broadly categorised into three groups: asymmetric 
information, institutional explanations and ownership and control (Jenkinson & 




2.2.1 Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information theories are the most prevalent in the literature. They can be 
grouped as theories of adverse selection, signalling, information revelation and 
principal-agent models (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). 
 
Adverse selection theories of underpricing are based on the concept of a discounted 
offer price as compensation for investors. Rock (1986) posits that the issuer and the 
underwriter are uninformed about the true value of the firm. Some investors are fully 
informed and only bid for underpriced IPOs. Uninformed investors bid for all IPOs 
but the application of discretionary share allocation procedures ensures the 
uninformed receive more allocations in overpriced (and correctly priced) offerings 
where informed investors do not compete – hence this is an example of the winner‟s 
curse
5
.  Valuation becomes more difficult as ex ante uncertainty increases, providing 
an incentive for more investors to become informed and, thus, increases the winner‟s 
curse (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Greater ex ante uncertainty causes investors to demand 
an estimation risk premium (Wolfe & Cooperman, 1990), with underpricing as 
compensation for this additional risk.  Proxies for ex ante uncertainty in the literature 
include gross proceeds, trading volume and volatility and the number of risk factors 
disclosed in the prospectus (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).  
 
In contrast to adverse selection, signalling theory relies on the concept that the firm, 
rather than potential investors, has more knowledge about its true value.  To maximise 
vendors‟ wealth in subsequent share issues, high-quality firms use costly signals that 
are difficult for lower-quality firms to replicate (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). 
Leyland and Pyle (1977) view the level of retained ownership as a signal of firm 
value.  Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) posit that issuers use underpricing and the level of 
retained ownership as costly signals to convey the value of the firm to investors.  
Quality firms with relatively higher levels of risk will choose to issue options with 
shares at the IPO rather than rely on the more expensive signal of retained earnings 
(Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997). 
                                                 
5
 In the IPO context, Rock (1986) identifies underpricing as a necessary compensation to encourage the 
participation of uninformed investors in issues.  He argues that uninformed investors subscribe to all 
IPOs indiscriminately so receive larger allocations in overpriced issues than they do in underpriced 
issues.  Uninformed investors receive only small allocations in underpriced IPOs where issues are 
oversubscribed due to the participation of informed investors and allocations are rationed. 
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Welch (1989) and Allen and Faulhaber (1989) view underpricing as a signal of firm 
quality.  These authors argue that issuers consider future capital raisings in their 
pricing decisions.  Thus, quality firms use underpricing to convince the market they 
have good prospects that will allow them to recoup the cost of this signal.  Issuers 
with superior future cash flow prospects signal these to the market by disclosing 
earnings forecasts in the prospectus (Clarkson et al., 1992). Titman and Trueman 
(1986) argue that issuers use underwriter and auditor reputation as certification of the 
quality of the IPO to reduce information asymmetry and, therefore, the required level 
of underpricing. Signalling via certification is supported in the US setting for 
underwriters (Carter & Manaster, 1990) and auditors (Datar, Feltham & Hughes, 
1991).   
 
Compared to issuers, investment bankers or underwriters are better informed about 
the state of the capital market in the principal-agent model of asymmetric information.  
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) consider that underwriters have conflicting 
incentives with respect to underpricing – more underpricing increases the demand for 
the issue while less underpricing increases the underwriting fee received.  Investment 
bankers can provide three services to the issuer: underwriting, advising and 
distribution (Baron, 1982). The more uncertain the issuer is about the value of the 
firm the more valuable the underwriter‟s advice.  Hence, the issuer will delegate the 
pricing decision to the underwriter with the result of higher underpricing (Baron, 
1982).  Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) tested Baron‟s theory on a sample of 
investment banks that were self-underwritten.  They found significant underpricing 
even when the underwriter would not have an information advantage over the issuer. 
 
Information revelation theory argues that while issuers know more about the true 
value of the firm, institutional investors know more about the demand for the issue, 
the industry and market factors that affect that demand. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) 
argue that the investment bankers and underwriters handling the issue become most 
informed as they have access to information from issuers and investors during the 
bookbuild process. The pricing mechanism is an important institutional difference 
between the Australian and US IPO markets and is discussed below in section 2.3.  
While an issuer only participates in the IPO market once, investment bankers and 
underwriters have the capacity to „bundle‟ issues for their clients, giving them 
11 
 
favourable allocations of the more underpriced issues in return for information and for 
taking shares in some less underpriced issues (Benveniste & Spindt, 1989).  
 
2.2.2 Institutional explanations 
Institutional explanations of underpricing include the legal insurance hypothesis and 
the provision of price support by the underwriter (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). 
Tinic (1988) argues that underpricing provides an insurance to issuers and investment 
bankers against legal liability and subsequent damages claims.  Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994) do not find any evidence to suggest higher underpricing in the more 
litigious US market than in other markets.  Tinic (1988) himself acknowledges that 
his results in support of the legal insurance hypothesis are also consistent with 
asymmetric information explanations of underpricing. 
 
Explanations of underpricing associated with the theories of asymmetric information, 
ownership and control (see next section) and Tinic‟s legal hypothesis are predicated 
on deliberate underpricing by issuers and their advisors (Ljungqvist, 2004).  Ruud 
(1993), in her institutional explanation of underpricing, argues that issuers and their 
advisors do not deliberately underprice issues.   Rather, she posits that the right skew 
of the distribution of initial returns is attributable to the reduction of negative returns 
associated with underwriter price support activities. 
 
2.2.3 Ownership and control theories 
Theories of ownership and control view underpricing as either a means of minimising 
or encouraging monitoring by shareholders. Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that 
issuers choose to underprice to ensure oversubscription. Share allocations are rationed 
in this scenario to constrain the size of outside shareholder blocks.  The cost of 
underpricing is offset by the benefits to original owners from maintaining control.  
This concept has evolved into the more encompassing Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
measure of underpricing as „wealth loss to owners‟ rather than „money left on the 
table‟.  Conversely, the rationale in Stoughton and Zechner (1998) is that firms with 
higher agency costs will, ceteris paribus, require more underpricing to make a 
successful float. Here, large blockholders are encouraged by lower offer prices 
relative to those paid by small investors (Stoughton & Zechner, 1998).  Pham, Kalev 
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and Steen (2003) extend this stream of the literature by suggesting a trade-off exists 
between post-listing liquidity and control, where liquidity is a requirement of small 
investors.  
 
When tested empirically, none of these theories provides an unequivocal explanation 
of underpricing for Australian industrial IPOs. Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996), for 
example, test Rock‟s (1986) information asymmetry theory and find that it explains 
11.28% of the variation in underpricing. How, Izan and Monroe (1995) extend Rock‟s 
(1986) theory with the inclusion of a proxy for underwriter quality and report an 
adjusted R-squared of 20% (the highest explanatory power for an Australian sample 
of industrial IPOs). The explanatory power of Australian underpricing models cannot 
logically be compared to those developed in markets such as the US where 
bookbuilding is the dominant issue mechanism.  The specific Australian institutional 
factors that limit the applicability of the foregoing theories of underpricing are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.3 Institutional setting 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the Australian institutional setting for IPOs has some 
important differences from other IPO markets. The results for Australian empirical 
IPO research indicate that theories of underpricing developed in the US institutional 
framework do not easily transfer to the Australian institutional setting. In this section, 
four fundamental institutional differences between the Australian and US IPO markets 
are investigated. The implications for theories developed in the US setting are then 
considered in section 2.4.  The institutional differences that are of relevance to the 
baseline model of underpricing are the capacity to incorporate demand into the offer 
price via the pricing mechanism, differences in underwriting contracts, the capacity of 
underwriters to provide price support and discretion in the allocation method. Other 
institutional differences are discussed in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
2.3.1 Pricing mechanisms 
Offer prices are established with differing input data determined by the choice of 
selling mechanism.  Bookbuilding, fixed-pricing and auctions are the three main 
contractual selling mechanisms used by IPOs internationally (Sherman, 2005).  The 
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choice of pricing mechanism has a major implication for determining the offer price 
for the issue – the issuer has much more information available when offer price is set 
from a bookbuild issue compared to other pricing mechanisms.   
 
Bookbuilding is used by US IPOs [Jenkinson & Ljungqvist (2001); Busaba (2006)].   
The final price is set after bids from institutional investors are received and price-
setting usually occurs the night before selling starts [Ellis, Michaely & O‟Hara 
(2000); Busaba (2006)].  Thus, the bookbuilt offer price includes investors‟ valuations 
and the results of the formal canvassing of demand (Benveniste & Busaba, 1997).  
2.3.1.1 Bookbuilding in Australia 
In 2005, the ASX reviewed current practices in Australian bookbuild issues via 
industry consultation (ASX, 2006a). They report that the aims of the bookbuild 
include obtaining an optimal final price with a covered book, the desired spread 
between retail and institutional shareholders and to provide „a sound basis for the 
secondary market‟ (ASX, 2006a, p. 9). As in the US institutional setting, the 
bookbuild price is set after considering the valuations of and demand from 
institutional investors. Thus, the final offer price reflects „… aggregate investors‟ 
beliefs that would otherwise be manifest in the post-offering trading price‟ (Busaba, 
2006).  General marketing of the offer occurs while the book is being built (ASX 
2006a). 
 
Australian bookbuild offers normally involve a book of institutional investors and an 
offer to retail investors with a reduced retail offer price determined in relation to the 
final price established by the institutional book. A second variation is the addition of a 
„broker firm offer‟ where specified brokers bid on behalf of their retail clients. These 
brokers receive an amount of shares which they then allocate to their clients (ASX, 
2006a).  
 
The ASX (2006a) reports that some brokers have difficulties receiving pricing 
instructions from each of their retail clients during the bookbuilding process while 
other brokers can incorporate the bids of their retail clients. While institutional 
investors have the opportunity to change or withdraw their bids, those of the brokers‟ 
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offer retail clients are normally binding (ASX, 2006a). The final institutional and 
retail prices are announced by pre-quotation disclosures to the ASX (ASX, 2006a).   
2.3.1.2 Fixed-price offers in Australia 
The dominant pricing mechanism in Australia is fixed-pricing. Data presented in the 
next chapter show that 95% (by number) of Australian issues during the sample 
period used the fixed-pricing mechanism.  In contrast to a bookbuild prospectus that 
contains a „price range‟, the fixed-price prospectus states the price at which the shares 
are offered. Thus, while the bookbuild price is set close to the listing date, the fixed-
price offer sets the price, on average, about 54 days before the share is traded on the 
exchange (see chapter 4). The offer price is published in the prospectus and potential 
investors are invited to subscribe for the number of shares they would like to receive 
at the offer price. While indications of demand for an issue are non-binding when the 
bookbuild pricing mechanism is used, applications from the prospectus of a fixed-
price offer must be accompanied by payment for the desired subscription.  Advance 
payment increases the costs of ordering, especially when investors receive fewer 
shares than they applied for (Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996).  
 
Australian issuers (and their underwriters or sponsoring brokers) set the fixed-price 
with reference to the price-earnings (PE) multiple of comparable firms, making 
adjustments for the additional risks associated with an IPO, differences in retained 
ownership, firm size, growth prospects and leverage (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 
2005). Thus, the procedure involves setting the offer price without receiving formal 
indications of demand from potential investors (Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1996).   
 
2.3.2 Underwriting contracts 
Differences in the nature of underwriting contracts offered to US and Australian 
issuers are discussed in this section.  While Australian underwriters contract for a 
„stand-by‟ arrangement to purchase any unsold shares (Finn & Higham, 1988), 
investment banks offer US issuers the choice between „firm commitment‟ 
underwriting contracts and „best efforts‟ contracts to market the issue (Ogden, Jen & 
O‟Connor, 2003).  The vast majority of contracts in the US are on a firm commitment 
basis [Chalk & Peavy (1987); Jenkinson & Ljungqvist (2001); Busaba (2006)] where 
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all of the IPO shares are sold to the underwriter at a fixed price and then on-sold to the 
underwriters‟ clients (Ogden, Jen & O‟Connor, 2003). The „spread‟ is the difference 
between the price paid for the IPO shares by the underwriter and the price at which 
the underwriter on-sells the shares (Smart, Megginson & Gitman, 2004).  
 
Best efforts contracts set the offer price early in the IPO process and the price cannot 
be adjusted to incorporate investor demand (Booth & Chua, 1996). These contracts 
are much less popular than firm commitment contracts in the US (Smart, Megginson 
& Gitman, 2004) and they are generally not included in US underpricing studies 
(Fama & French, 2004).  Under a best efforts contract, the investment bank acts more 
like a sponsoring broker in the Australian setting. The logistics of the issue are 
handled by the bank but there is no underwriting agreement to ensure the full 
subscription of the issue. US IPOs using best efforts contracts tend to be more 
underpriced than firm commitment offers (Smart, Megginson & Gitman, 2004). As 
best efforts contracts are effectively fixed-price issues that are not underwritten, we 
could expect Australian IPOs without underwriters similarly to have higher 
underpricing. 
 
In contrast to the US firm commitment contracts (where the underwriter purchases all 
issue shares) and best efforts contracts (that are not underwritten), Australian 
underwriters use a standby arrangement. Australian underwriters only purchase shares 
when the issue is not fully subscribed [Finn & Higham (1988); How & Yeo (2000)].  
Unlike their US counterparts, Australian underwriters face the risk of capital loss 
when they are required to take up shares (How & Yeo, 2000). 
 
2.3.3 Price support in the aftermarket 
Participants in US bookbuilds may choose to purchase in the aftermarket rather than 
act on their non-binding indications of interest made during the process or sometimes 
renege on firm orders (Shultz & Zaman, 1994).  To minimise these activities, 
underwriters provide an implicit put option to investors (Shultz & Zaman, 1994).   
Shultz and Zaman (1994) argue this put option provides the rationale for high 
underwriting fees, some level of underpricing and for underwriters to trade in the 
aftermarket to ensure that the share price does not fall below the IPO offer price.  
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Investors do not make indications of interest in the Australian fixed-price setting, nor 
can they renege on orders after they have applied for shares as all share applications 
must be accompanied by payment for the full price of the shares. Further, the 
underwriter of an IPO listing on NASDAQ will normally take the role of market 
maker for the share when trading commences (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001). In 
contrast to the US system where the market maker provides a bid and offer for the 
share, the trading system adopted by the ASX matches bids and offers directly. 
 
Almost all US IPOs include an over-allotment (or „green shoe‟) option that allows the 
underwriter to increase the sale of shares by up to 15 percent over the amount being 
offered by the issuer (Aggarwal, 2000).  The underwriter takes a naked short position 
when demand for the issue is expected to be weak, repurchasing the excess shares on 
market and maintaining the share price.  Where demand for the issue is strong, the 
underwriter exercises the over-allotment option that requires the listing company to 
issue additional shares. Over-allotment options, combined with the US underwriters‟ 
ability to trade as market makers, allow US underwriters to provide price support to 
their IPO clients when the company lists. 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) define price support 
(or market stabilisation) as the 
… purchase of, or the offer to purchase, securities for the purpose of 
preventing, or slowing, any fall in the market price of those securities 
following an offer of those securities. (ASIC, 2005) 
 
ASIC describes the benefit of market stabilisation as the provision of a more-orderly 
secondary market that in turn results in increased investor confidence and the 
facilitation of company fundraising (ASIC, 2005).  However, the capacity for 
underwriters to offer market stabilisation services is severely constrained by 
Australian legislation. ASIC is responsible for the administration of the Corporations 
Act 2001 and they consider that market stabilisation activities by underwriters could 
result in contraventions of one or more of the following sections of the Act - s1041A 
(market manipulation), s1041B–1041C (false trading and market rigging), s1041H 
(misleading and deceptive conduct) or s1043A (insider trading) (ASIC, 2005).  
Underwriters can apply to ASIC to obtain a „no-action letter‟ that is, in effect, 
conditional permission to conduct market stabilisation activities (ASIC, 2005).  No-
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action letters were issued on a case by case basis during the sample period for this 
dissertation (ASIC, 2000).  
 
ASIC‟s Interim Guidance on Market Stabilisation (IROO-031) outlines the necessary 
conditions for obtaining a no-action letter for price support activities. These include 
disclosure of the „nature and effect‟ of the stabilisation arrangement in the prospectus, 
advance notification to the ASX of the arrangement and continuous disclosure to the 
ASX of the stabilisation trades (all of which must be conducted through the ASX‟s 
electronic trading system (SEATS) (ASIC, 2000)).  Stabilisation bids must be no 
higher than the offer price of the shares (ASIC, 2000).  Aggarwal (2000) notes that 
the price stabilisation activities of US underwriters lack transparency. As Australian 
underwriters disclose details of their stabilising trades to the ASX but not to market 
participants at large, the same can be said of stabilisation in Australia. 
 
ASIC (2000) identifies underwriter negotiation of an over-allotment option as the first 
step in the market stabilisation process. Over-allotment options are largely confined to 
privatisations in the Australian IPO market (Aitken et al., 2005). Further, ASIC (2000, 
p. 2) identifies „imperfections in the pricing and allocation of shares derived from the 
book build process‟ as a rationale for allowing price support.  No over-allotment 
options were granted to the underwriters of the fixed-price offers in the sample for 
this research. 
 
2.3.4 Allocation methods 
Many investors are excluded from the bidding process in US bookbuilds and only 
bidding investors receive allocations (Sherman & Titman, 2002).  In addition to this 
exclusivity, a benefit of choosing the bookbuild method in the US is that it allows the 
investment banker discretion in allocating shares (Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001).  
The underwriter‟s capacity to allocate shares to bidders is critical for eliciting accurate 
information (Sherman, 2000).   
 
There are no legal requirements that specify how shares are to be allocated in 
Australia (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, 1998).  Therefore, 
Australian issuers have the capacity for preferential share allocation without using 
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bookbuilding.  The capacity to use discretionary allocation for fixed-price offers is 
unusual – other countries specify how shares are to be allocated and frequently favour 
allocations to small investors (Sherman & Titman, 2002).  Discretion in allocation 
procedures in the fixed-price setting is normally allowed only on the basis of order 
size (Sherman, 2000).  
 
Section 711(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 contains the requirement for disclosure 
of the terms and conditions of the offer. Thus, the share allocation policy is disclosed 
in Australian prospectuses.  Most Australian fixed-price issuers indicate that shares 
are allocated at their (or the underwriter‟s) discretion (see chapter 6). Specific groups 
receiving priority allocations (broker firm offers, customers or employees, for 
example) and the maximum size of these are also identified in the prospectus. The 
allocation policy choices available to Australian issuers may, in part, explain why 




As shown in the foregoing discussion, the Australian institutional setting exhibits 
major differences from the US market with respect to the dominant pricing 
mechanism (and related allocation methods), the nature of underwriting contracts and 
the provision of market stabilisation services by underwriters. The following section 
discusses the implications of these institutional features for the main underpricing 
theories identified in section 2.2. 
 
2.4 Implications of the Australian institutional setting for underpricing theories 
Potential impacts arising from institutional differences in the Australian IPO market 
compared to the US are discussed in this section.  Each of the main theory groups - 
asymmetric information, institutional explanations and ownership and control - are 
discussed with reference to the Australian institutional setting.  The results of 
Australian tests of these theories are also analysed. Table 2.1 relates the Australian 
                                                 
6
 Busaba (2006) investigates the value of the option for the issuer to withdraw from a US bookbuild 
offer.  He considers that the value of this option can exceed the cost of underpricing required to elicit 
truthful responses from investors in the bookbuild process.  Australian fixed-price offers can be 
withdrawn prior to the allocation of shares, granting the withdrawal option to all issuers, not only those 
using bookbuilding.  This option to withdraw negates another benefit for US bookbuilds in the 
Australian institutional setting.  
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research to each of the main theories and identifies which of the theories enjoy 
empirical support in this market. 
 
As discussed in section 2.2, the asymmetric information theories can be categorised as 
theories of adverse selection, signalling, the principal-agent model and information 
revelation.  Each of these is discussed with reference to the Australian institutional 
setting in the following four subsections. 
 
2.4.1 Adverse selection theories and the Australian institutional setting 
Rock‟s (1986) winner‟s curse relies, in part, on the issuer having the capacity to 
allocate more shares to uninformed investors when issues are overpriced.  As 
mentioned earlier, one reason US IPOs choose the bookbuild pricing mechanism is to 
gain discretion in the allocation method for shares.  Australian issuers have the 
capacity to choose their allocation method with a fixed-pricing mechanism as there 
are no legal restrictions on this choice in Australia. While the pricing mechanisms 
chosen in Australia and the US differ, issuers in both markets can effectively structure 
their issues to achieve the objective of discretionary allocation. There is no specific 
role for the underwriter or investment banker in adverse selection theory, so 
institutional differences in underwriting contracts and the provision of price support 
have no apparent capacity for influence here. Therefore, institutional differences will 
not negate the potential for adverse selection to explain underpricing in Australia.  
 
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) consider that the Australian institutional setting will 
create market conditions that are consistent with Rock (1986). Using Australian data, 
Finn and Higham (1988) do not find support for the winner‟s curse.  Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996) attribute this finding to the winner‟s curse phenomenon being 
„overwhelmed‟ by institutional factors specific to the sample period of that study.  
They find support for the winner‟s curse using a later Australian sample period. How, 
Izan and Monroe (1995) also find support for the winner‟s curse using a sample of 
industrial IPOs and How (2000) finds support for the theory with resource IPOs.  No 




The winner‟s curse theory relies on the existence of a group of investors willing to 
engage in the costly process of information production.  Beatty and Ritter (1986) posit 
that more investors will engage in information production when valuation uncertainty 
is higher.  Support for a positive association between the level of ex ante uncertainty 
and underpricing is found in the Australian context [James, How & Izan (1995); How, 
Izan & Monroe (1995); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996)].  These studies typically use a 
number of proxies for this unobservable variable.  As discussed in section 2.5 below, 
the different proxies exhibit uneven performance.    
 
2.4.2 Signalling theories and the Australian institutional setting 
Signalling models are based on the notion that information asymmetry is reduced by 
using costly signals that cannot be replicated by lower quality firms.  The signals 
discussed in the literature are independent of the pricing mechanism, the nature of the 
underwriting contract and the provision of price support.  With the exception of 
signalling firm quality by issuing options with shares in the IPO (How & Howe, 
2001), persuasive support for signalling is not found in Australian data (see table 2.1).  
The capacity for an issuer to choose the share allocation method (independently of the 
pricing mechanism) is an issue that has yet to be addressed in the signalling literature.  
Given the role played by discretionary allocation in the winner‟s curse, the 
requirement for issuers to disclose their allocation method in the prospectus affords an 
opportunity to examine the issuer‟s selection of allocation method as a signal of firm 
value.  This issue will be investigated in chapter 6.   
 
2.4.3 Principal-agent models and the Australian institutional setting 
Institutional differences in underwriting, price support and allocation methods are not 
expected to have an impact in the principal-agent model.  Baron‟s (1982) model is 
developed in a fixed-price environment, so differences in the price-setting mechanism 
do not affect this theory.  Most likely attributable to the fact that this theory did not 
perform well when tested in the US context where it was developed, principal-agent 






Table 2.1  Summary of Australian empirical tests of underpricing theories  
 
 Theory source Predicted relationship Australian test Empirical support 
Theories of information asymmetry 
Adverse 
selection 
Rock (1986) Underpricing compensates 
uninformed investors for the winner‟s 
curse 
 
Finn & Higham (1988) 
How, Izan & Monroe (1995) 
James, How & Izan (1995) 
Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) 
No  
Yes  
No – trust IPOs 
Yes  
 Beatty & Ritter 
(1986) 
Underpricing compensates investors 
for the greater ex ante uncertainty 
about market price 
James, How & Izan (1995) 
How, Izan & Monroe (1995)  
Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) 
Yes – trust IPOs 
Yes  
Yes  
 Wolfe & 
Cooperman 
(1990) 
Higher underpricing for small startups 
to compensate for greater ex ante 
uncertainty 
How, Izan & Monroe (1995) 
Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) 
No – issue size (p = 10%) 
No – issue size, total assets 




Higher retained ownership signals 
value – lower underpricing 
Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) 




 Welch (1989) 
Allen & 
Faulhaber (1989) 
Higher underpricing for quality firms 
– they can afford to underprice 
How & Low (1993) 
 
Mixed – result depends on 
measure of firm value  
 Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri (1997) 
High risk quality firms signal with 
options rather than the using more 
expensive retained earnings 
How & Howe (2001) Yes – industrials and mining 







Lower underpricing for high 
reputation auditors and underwriters.  
 
 
James, How & Izan (1995) 
 
How, Izan & Monroe (1995) 
 
 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004)  
Chang et al. (2008) 
No (auditor, trustee) – trust IPOs   
Yes (underwriter) – trust IPOs 
Yes (underwriter reputation) 
No (investigating accountant, 
experts) 
No (investigating accountant)  






 Theory source Predicted relationship Australian test Empirical support 
Signalling 
(continued) 
Clarkson et al 
(1992) 
Higher market valuations for firms 
providing earnings forecasts 





Baron (1982) Higher underpricing results from 
information asymmetry between the 
underwriter and the issuer 






Higher underpricing by underwriters 
to compensate for information 
revelation 





How, Izan & 
Monroe (1995) 
Low retained ownership firms have 
higher agency costs so disclose more 
information. This results in lower ex 
ante uncertainty and lower 
underpricing 




Tinic (1988) Underpricing is ex ante compensation 
to reduce the probability of a law suit 
No testing – see institutional setting  
Price support Ruud (1993) The distribution of UP returns has 
right skew because price support 
reduces negative returns 
No testing – see institutional setting  
Ownership and control 
Monitoring Brennan & 
Franks (1997) 
Underpricing is used to achieve a 
broad ownership base 
Pham, Kalev & Steen (2003) Yes  
Agency costs  Shultz (1993)   
 
Higher underpricing for firms making 
share issues packaged with options  
How & Howe (2001) 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004) 
 
 
No – industrials and mining 
Yes – for the total combined 






2.4.4 Information revelation and the Australian institutional setting 
Information revelation theories that predict preferential allocations to large investors 
[Benveniste & Busaba (1997); Benveniste & Spindt (1989)] for revealing information 
could well apply to Australian bookbuild offers, but they do not easily translate to the 
Australian fixed-price setting.  Booth and Chua (1996) argue that fixed pricing results 
in higher information costs for investors because the issuer cannot adjust the offer 
price to compensate for their information purchases.    
 
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) argue that the Australian institutional feature of fixed 
pricing with no formal pre-selling negates Benveniste and Spindt‟s (1989) rationale.  
While discretionary allocation is permitted in the Australian fixed-price setting, the 
revelation of costly information theory relies on the collection of information from the 
bookbuild process.  Only five percent of Australian IPOs by number during the 1997-
2006 period were bookbuilds. Given the low proportion of Australian IPOs that 
choose this pricing mechanism, it is unsurprising that no published Australian test of 
the information revelation theory could be found.    
 
Neither of the institutional explanations of underpricing is relevant in the Australian 
setting. The low risk of an issuer being sued in Australia [Lee, Taylor & Walter 
(1996); Lee et al. (2003)] removes the imperative for „legal insurance‟. As discussed 
in section 2.3.3, price support is not a factor in Australian fixed-price offers, so it 
cannot explain underpricing in this setting. There are no published Australian studies 
that test these institutional explanations of underpricing. 
 
The availability of alternatives for allocating shares is important for control-based 
theories. The Brennan and Franks (1997) model remains valid with the fixed-price 
mechanism with discretionary allocation.  Stoughton and Zechner‟s (1998) model, on 
the other hand, requires a two-stage selling process that allows the investment banker 
to price shares for blockholders lower than shares for small investors. While 
Australian fixed-price prospectuses sometimes indicate that some investor groups 
(employees, for example) will receive a discounted offer price, none disclose a 
reduced offer price for investors who have the potential to become large blockholders.  
Corporate control has a significant economic influence on the choice between a public 
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float and a private placement in the Australian institutional setting (Sharpe & Woo, 
2005).  Private placements are a more appropriate mechanism for firms seeking 
monitoring shareholders in the Australian context. In Australia, underpriced IPOs 
have greater breadth of ownership and higher liquidity (Pham, Kalev & Steen, 2003).  
Differences in the nature of underwriting contracts and the provision of price support 
are not relevant to theories of ownership and control.   
 
In addition to the implications for the application of US theories to the Australian 
context, the Australian institutional setting creates an interesting opportunity to 
investigate of the roles of supply and demand in the underpricing puzzle.  Demand is 
not incorporated in the offer price as is the case for bookbuild pricing so the offer 
price is expected to provide a relatively unbiased assessment of the issuer‟s (and 
underwriter‟s or sponsoring broker‟s) assessment of value.  The absence of market 
stabilisation activities by underwriters in the Australian fixed-price setting has an 
important implication for the market price of IPO shares at the end of the first day of 
trading.  The market price is set by supply and demand without trades by underwriters 
that effectively put a floor at the offer price.  In this sample, IPOs with zero 
underpricing indicate an offer price that corresponds with the market‟s assessment of 
the value of the firm.  Conversely, IPOs with negative underpricing indicate that the 
issuer‟s valuation is higher than the market‟s valuation of the firm. Thus, market price 
is expected to provide a relatively unbiased assessment of investors‟ assessments of 
value.  
 
In conclusion, the institutional differences between Australia and the US discussed in 
this section have an important implication - the Australian IPO market affords a 
„cleaner‟ setting for identifying the core factors that contribute to underpricing. 
Information revelation theories are invalid in the Australian fixed-price IPO setting.  
Conditions necessary to support the institutional explanations of the legal hypothesis 
and price support do not exist in the Australian fixed-price market. Further, the 
Australian institutional setting provides natural controls to test theories of adverse 
selection, signalling and ownership and control, all of which were developed in a 





2.5 The baseline underpricing model  
The underpricing model developed here is based on the extant Australian literature 
which has, in turn, been based on the theoretical and institutional aspects discussed 
above. While small compared to the number of IPO studies conducted in the US, there 
has been considerable research into underpricing in Australia.    However, as shown in 
table 2.2 and discussed below, the results of these studies are frequently inconsistent.  
In addition to the discussion about these prior Australian IPO studies presented in this 
chapter, they are referred to and discussed further in several of the other chapters in 
this dissertation.  For example, chapter 4 presents a comparative analysis of the 
reported underpricing from these studies.  
 
The first hypothesis in this dissertation relates to the first research sub-question and 
investigates the factors that explain underpricing in Australia.  The variables included 
in the model are selected because they are usually found to have a significant 
association with underpricing in the Australian institutional setting. 
 
H01 Underpricing in Australia is unrelated to time from prospectus issue to listing, 
the level of retained ownership, ex ante uncertainty, the participation of an 
underwriter and the inclusion of options at floatation. 
 
UP = β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5OPT + ε  baseline model 
 
For ease of exposition, this first model will be referred to as the „baseline model‟.  
Table 2.3 contains a summary of independent variable measurement for the baseline 





Table 2.2 Summary of explanatory variables for Australian underpricing 
 




 Other variables 
Finn & Higham 
(1988) 
1966-78   n.a. logDELAY 
SIGMA 
log issue size 
log firm size 
How, Izan & 
Monroe (1995) 
1980-90 Model 1  
Underwriting fee % 





Model 2  




























Investigating accountant dummy 
No. of years of financial statements 
Growth options 
Leverage 
Market conditions dummies 
 
log issue size  
Investigating accountant dummy 
No. of years of financial statements 
Growth options 
Leverage 
Market conditions dummies 








(n = 220) 
 
Earnings forecast dummy 
OPT 
Underwriter reputation 







Years of financial statements 











(n = 200) 
 
Underwriter reputation 
log post listing equity (size) 








 Other variables 
Lee, Taylor & 
Walter (1996) 








log issue size 
log total assets 
σ monthly returns 
Growth options 
Lee, Lee & 
Taylor (2003) 
1976-94 DELAY 




(n = 394) 
OPT 
OWN  
Operating history in years 
log issue size 
Growth options 
log total assets 
How & Howe 
(2001) 
1979-90 log DELAY 






(n = 396) 
log issue size 
SIGMA 
log days from incorporation to listing 
Auditor reputation 
Underwriter reputation 
Dummy for second board listing 




1994-99 Market sentiment 
Packaged options 
UW 








(n = 358) 
Offer price 
log issue size 
EPS yield 
Investigating accountant‟s reputation 
OWN  
Dividend reinvestment dummy 
Franking credit forecast dummy 
























 Other variables 
How, Lam & 
Yeo (2007) 
1993-2000 Model 1 - raw UP 




































Chang et al. 
(2008) 
1996-2003 Big 4 auditor 
log pre-IPO assets 
σ monthly returns 













(n = 371) 
log Age 
log Issue size 
reciprocal of offer price 
log number of risk factors in prospectus 
current assets 
return on assets 
loss in year prior to listing 
retained ownership 












DELAY proxies for the level of informed demand.  DELAY 
is captured by the number of days from prospectus 
date to listing date. 
 
negative 
OWN is the level of retained ownership.  OWN is 
measured by (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / 
number of shares at listing) x 100. 
 
indeterminate 
SIGMA proxies for the level of ex ante uncertainty.  
SIGMA is defined as the standard deviation of 
daily returns for days 2 to 20 from listing date. 
 
positive 
UW indicates the participation of an underwriter in the 
issue.  UW is defined as a dichotomous variable 
equal to one if the issue is underwritten. 
 
indeterminate 
OPT indicates IPOs that include attaching options.  
OPT is defined as a dichotomous variable equal to 




2.5.1  Level of informed demand (DELAY) 
Based on Rock‟s (1986) theory of information asymmetry, the number of days from 
prospectus date to listing (DELAY)  is used as a proxy for the level of informed 
demand [Finn & Higham (1988); How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How (1996); Lee, 
Taylor & Walter (1996); How & Howe (2001); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); Cotter, 
Goyen & Hegarty (2005); How, Lam and Yeo (2007)]. The negative relationship 
between DELAY and underpricing is often interpreted as evidence of the winner‟s 
curse. With two exceptions [Finn & Higham (1988); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005], 
DELAY is significant for explaining underpricing in published Australian models that 
include this variable.  The relationship between underpricing and DELAY is expected 
to be negative in the baseline model. 
 
2.5.2  Retained ownership (OWN) 
Australian empirical studies do not consistently support signalling theory‟s predicted 
relationship between retained ownership (OWN) and underpricing.  Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996) and How (1996) both find a positive relationship between retained 
ownership and underpricing for industrial IPOs.  No significant relationship between 
retained ownership and underpricing is reported by How and Howe (2001), Lee, Lee 
and Taylor (2003), Dimovski and Brooks (2004), Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) 
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or Chang et al. (2008).  In their investigation of the role of venture capitalists in 
Australian underpricing,  da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen and Walter (2003) find IPOs with 
the about the same level of retained ownership experience about the same level of 
underpricing.  
 
The conflicting results for the role of retained ownership justify testing the OWN 
variable in the more recent data set used in this dissertation.  Given the results of prior 
studies, a directional relationship between underpricing and OWN is not specified a 
priori. 
 
2.5.3  Ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA) 
There is some support for adverse selection theory where return volatility   (SIGMA) 
is used as a proxy for the speed of resolution of ex ante uncertainty. First used in the 
US context by Ritter (1984a), some Australian studies show this variable provides 
significant explanatory power for underpricing [How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How 
(1996); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How, Lam & Yeo (2007); Chang et al. (2008)]
7
. 
Other Australian studies do not find a relationship [Finn & Higham (1988); Lee, 
Taylor & Walter (1996); How & Howe (2001)].   
 
Another proxy for ex ante uncertainty tested on Australian samples is issue size [Finn 
& Higham (1988); How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How (1996); Lee, Taylor & Walter 
(1996); How & Howe (2001); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); Dimovski & Brooks (2004); 
Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); Chang et al. (2008)].  Fewer than half of these 
[How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How & Howe (2001); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty 
(2005)] found a significant relationship for issue size and underpricing.  Other proxies 
for ex ante uncertainty are the inclusion of earnings forecasts in the prospectus [How 
(1996); Dimovski & Brooks (2004)] and offer price (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004). 
Neither of these proxies makes a significant contribution to the explanation of 
underpricing.  There is some mixed evidence for firm age with Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996) and Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) reporting a significant 
relationship between firm age and underpricing while most do not find any 
                                                 
7
 The standard deviation of post-listing share prices from days 2 to 10 is highly significant in the Italian 
fixed-price IPO context (Cassia et al, 2004).  
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relationship [How, Izan & Monroe (1995); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How & Howe 
(2001); How, Lam and Yeo (2007); Chang et al. (2008)].   
 
Overall, prior Australian research using different proxies indicates that SIGMA is the 
most consistent proxy for the unobservable level of ex ante uncertainty. Therefore, 
SIGMA is included in this model.  A positive relationship between underpricing and 
SIGMA is predicted. 
 
2.5.4  Underwriter participation (UW) 
As discussed below, underwriter reputation has received considerable attention in the 
literature.  In light of mixed results for underwriter reputation measures, this research 
uses a dummy variable (UW) to assess the association between underwriter 
participation and underpricing.  
 
Citing the underwriter reputation literature as a justification, Dimovski and Brooks 
(2004) use a dummy variable to indicate underwriter participation and find 
underwritten issues are more underpriced.  This positive relationship between 
underpricing and underwriter participation would be expected if underwriter 
participation is perceived by the market as a signal the issue will be underpriced. 
 
Brokers play an active role in determining the offer prices for Australian fixed-price 
IPOs (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005) and underwriters negotiate with the issuer to 
price underwritten issues (How & Yeo, 2000). If underwriters are demonstrating 
superior skills in pricing offers and are acting in the best interest of issuers, one would 
expect a negative association between the participation of an underwriter and the level 
of underpricing. A positive association is consistent with agency conflict with issuers 
[Loughran & Ritter (2002); Reuter (2006)] or with underwriter activities to increase 
the market value of the IPO (Chemmanur & Krishnan, 2008).  Cotter, Goyen and 
Hegarty (2005) do not find a statistically significant difference in offer prices of 
underwritten issues and those that are not underwritten.  As this model was estimated 
on four years of data their result may be a function of the specific time period 




In contrast to underwriter participation, underwriter reputation is posited to have a 
negative association with underpricing attributable to the reduction of ex ante 
uncertainty [Carter & Manaster (1990); How, Izan & Monroe (1995)].  Unexpected 
positive relationships for underwriter reputation and underpricing are reported for 
Australian trust IPOs (James, How & Izan, 1995) and for an Australian sample of 
mining and industrial IPOs (Chang et al., 2008).  How, Izan and Monroe (1995) find 
the expected negative relationship for industrial IPOs when reputation is measured as 
the percentage of IPO proceeds represented by underwriter fees.  Underwriter 
reputation measured as the number of IPOs in sample using the same underwriter 
[How (1996); How & Howe (2001)] or the proportion of proceeds underwritten 
(How, Lam & Yeo, 2007) does not contribute to the explanation of underpricing.   
 
Australian studies investigating the relationship between underpricing and underwriter 
reputation group issues that are not underwritten with non-prestigious underwriter 
issues.  This classification system may contribute to the lack of consistent results 
across studies using an underwriter reputation variable.  While the dichotomous 
variable (UW) alleviates the problem of grouping issues that are not underwritten with 
non-prestigious underwriter issues, it is not possible to make an a priori specification 
of a directional relationship between underpricing and UW. 
 
2.5.5  Attaching options (OPT) 
The inclusion of options with the IPO share issue is explained by the agency cost 
hypothesis (Shultz, 1993) where „packaged‟ issues of shares and options are expected 
to experience more underpricing than share only IPOs (How & Howe, 2001).  
Alternately, options packaged with the IPO shares can be viewed as a signalling 
mechanism (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1997) resulting in no expected difference in 
underpricing for packaged and share only issues (Lee, Lee & Taylor, 2003). Again, 
the Australian evidence is inconsistent.  Several studies find no significant difference 
in underpricing [Howe & Howe (2001); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How, Lam & Yeo 
(2007)], another finds no difference in underpricing in two models but a positive 
relationship in a third model (How, 1996) while another reports a significant negative 
relationship (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004). These inconsistent results justify the 
investigation of the role of packaging options with shares in this later data set.  Again, 
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given the reported results in the literature, no directional relationship between 
underpricing and OPT is specified a priori. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Before this research attempts to improve the explanatory power of underpricing 
models in the Australian context, it is first necessary to examine the theoretical 
underpinnings of this research.  Thus, the broad categories of underpricing theory 
have been reviewed in this chapter.  Following Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), 
underpricing theories are categorised as asymmetric information, institutional 
explanations and theory of ownership and control.  The large information asymmetry 
literature is divided into subcategories of adverse selection, signalling, principal-agent 
models and information revelation. 
 
These theories have been developed in different institutional settings and do not 
provide unequivocal explanations of underpricing in Australia.  There are four key 
areas of difference in the Australian institutional context compared to the US setting 
where the majority of underpricing theory has been developed.  Differences in the 
pricing mechanism, the nature of underwriting contracts, the provision of price 
support by underwriters and the capacity to choose discretionary share allocation 
methods were discussed in section 2.3.  Each of the main underpricing theories was 
discussed with reference to the Australian institutional setting in section 2.4.   
 
Australian empirical underpricing research was reviewed and the baseline model of 
underpricing developed in section 2.5.  The model includes variables that are usually 
found to have a significant relationship to underpricing in Australia. This model 
provides the baseline for assessing the relative performance of the underpricing 
models developed in chapter 8.  The sample used for testing this model is described 
and sample descriptives are presented in the next chapter.  Testing and results for the 
model are discussed in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The baseline model of underpricing was developed in the previous chapter and will be 
tested in the next chapter.  This chapter presents the rationale used for selecting the 
test sample and provides preliminary description of the sample data that will be used 
to test the baseline model. 
 
The first section of this chapter includes the identification and justification for the 
sample period.  Next, the rationale for exclusions from the sample is presented.  
Descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for 
five size measures and leverage are given in section 3.3 to contextualise the sample.  
 
3.2 Sample selection 
In this section, the sample period is identified and the annual numbers of IPOs are 
compared to the mean number of annual IPOs for a prior period.  The sample 
selection process is constrained to include IPOs for corporations offering ordinary 
shares only or ordinary shares and attaching options.  Grounds for exclusion from the 
sample are then discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Sampling period 
The sample period is 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006.  The choice of sample 
period is largely a matter of data availability
8
.  Whilst the sampling timeframe is not 
constrained by the data requirements of the model developed in chapter 2, the models 
developed in later chapters require data sourced from the financial press and from 
announcements made by companies to the ASX.  Electronic coverage of the financial 
press in the ten-year sample period has greater depth compared to that in years prior 
to the sample period.  Further, data for the exact number of shares issued are only 
available electronically from February 1998.  
                                                 
8
 A summary of data sources and variable measurements for all models in this dissertation is presented 




Figure 3.1 shows the number of corporate listings on the ASX for 31 years from 1976 
to 2006.  The data for figure 3.1 were sourced from the DatAnalysis database.  The 
mean (median) number of annual corporate listings is for the 21 years prior to the 
sample period is 67 (39).  The mean (median) for the sample period is 104 (93).   
 























Comparison of the number of IPOs in the sample period to a prior period is important 
for determining if the sample period is dominated by hot issue market years.  Prior 
research characterises hot markets as those with high underpricing at the start of the 
period followed by high IPO volume (Ritter, 1984a).  In their investigation of the 
underpricing of Australian resource IPOs, Suchard and Woo (2003) find a systematic 
relationship between hot market periods and the explanatory power of risk factors for 
underpricing.  
 
The data in figure 3.1 show that annual listing activity during the sample period is, on 
average, greater than in the previous two decades raising the possibility that the 
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sample includes one or more hot market periods.  In six of the ten sample years, the 
annual mean number of listings is higher than that of the 21 years prior to the sample.  
The remaining four sample years (1997, 1998, 2001 and 2002) have fewer listings 
than the mean for the prior period.   
 
A brief discussion of the overall growth in the Australian equities market during the 
sample period helps to contextualise the data in figure 3.1.  Market capitalisation grew 
from approximately $A420 billion in June 1997 (ASX, 2008a) to $A1 390 billion in 
December 2006 (ASX, 2008b) representing a nominal increase of 230%.  The RBA‟s 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) data shows a 30% rate of inflation for the same period, 
so real growth in market capitalisation is around 200%.   This real growth rate in 
market capitalisation casts doubt on the validity of categorising the sample period as a 
hot issue market based solely on comparison with the numbers of IPOs in the previous 
two decades.  The determination of hot markets is discussed further in chapter 6. 
 
Table 3.1 shows the number of new corporate listings (IPOs) on the ASX for each of 
the sample years.  The number of exclusions for each category is shown for each of 
the sample years.  Total exclusions from the sample for each exclusion reason are 
shown in the final column.  The final row of the table shows the number of issues for 
each year that will be used to test the baseline model in the next chapter. The 
following sections contain the rationale for each category of exclusion from the 
sample.   
 
3.2.2 Exclusions from the sample 
A diverse array of entities seek listing on the ASX each year. This research, however, 
draws its sample from the 1 165 corporate equity listings over the period from 1997 to 
2006.  Consistent with prior research [Brailsford, Heaney & Shi (2001); Shi (2003); 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004)], debt and hybrid security issues are not included in the 
sample as these securities are fundamentally different from ordinary shares.  CHESS 
Units of Foreign Securities (CUFS) are electronic depository receipts that represent 
beneficial ownership of foreign securities (ASX, 2007a). CUFS are not ordinary 





Table 3.1 Sample selection 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
            
Corporate listings 60 52 117 174 66 72 96 168 170 186 1 161 
Exclusions            
Stapled securities and other multiple security type offers 5 3 3 4 1 5 4 6 20 8 59 
Bookbuilds and privatisations 2 3 9 9 5 1 8 5 9 4 55 
Extractive industry IPOs 11 7 2 16 16 34 42 67 74 109 378 
Listed managed funds 1 3 5 8 3 2 10 11 4 3 50 
Demutualisations and listing co-operatives 1 3 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 1 10 
Cross listing or foreign currency financial reports 3 0 7 12 3 2 3 6 3 11 50 
Previously listed on regional exchange 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 2 8 
Relisting in same industry 2 3 4 2 1 2 0 2 4 3 23 
Restructuring 2 1 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 10 
Listing without public share sale 0 3 1 2 4 1 4 4 2 1 22 
Total exclusions 27 26 32 55 36 50 72 104 120 143 665 
            




Listed trusts hold a portfolio of investments on behalf of the trust security holders 
(ASX, 2007b).  The trust structure is quite different from the corporate structure and 
there are different legal issues for trusts. Given that trusts are systematically different 
from corporates in their nature and in their observed pattern of underpricing, they are 




To meet the research objective outlined in chapter 1, it is necessary to exclude 
categories of corporate equity issues with specific characteristics that have the 
potential to confound the results of the model developed in chapter 2.  With this 
objective in mind, these listings are excluded:  stapled securities and other types of 
multiple security offers; bookbuild issues and privatisations; companies operating in 
the extractive industries; listed managed funds; demutualised entities; listed co-
operatives; cross-listings where trading has already occurred on a foreign exchange; 
listings on the ASX after having been listed on an Australian regional exchange; 
companies relisting on the ASX in the same industry; corporate restructurings without 
a capital raising for new entity and listing without an offer of shares.  
3.2.2.1 Stapled securities and other multiple security offers 
In total, 59 issues of stapled securities and multiple security offers are excluded from 
the sample.  Stapled securities involve the concurrent purchase of a trust unit or debt 
security with a related equity interest in a company.   The Residential Land Partners 
Group IPO, for example, sold one share of Residential Land Partners Ltd stapled to 
one unit of the Residential Land Partners Trust.  Valuation of stapled securities is 
complex as the unit or debt securities cannot be traded separately from the share.  The 
non-equity securities have different cash flow patterns and rights in the event of 
liquidation compared to equities. Even when the value of the debt security is partially 
determined by the value of the firm‟s equity as is the case with convertible notes, 
these securities are debt rather than equity until it is highly probable that notes will be 
converted (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001).  The complexities associated with 
                                                 
9
 In contrast to the majority of corporate IPO research, James, How & Izan (1995) find no significant 
relationship between DELAY and underpricing for a sample of Australian unit trust IPOs. They also 
find trusts are less subject to underpricing when compared with ordinary equity issues.  Investment 
trusts and real estate investment trusts are excluded from prior Australian underpricing research [How 
& Low (1993); How & Yeo (2000); Brailsford, Heaney & Shi (2001)].   
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valuing two instruments together could potentially mask the underlying determinants 
of underpricing, so stapled securities are excluded from this sample. 
 
In addition to the exclusion of stapled securities, Brailsford, Heaney and Shi (2001) 
remove firms issuing packages of shares and options (termed „unit offerings‟ in the 
US) from their sample due to the inherent difficulty of valuing the package 
components individually. How and Howe (2001) use the term „PIPOs‟ to refer to 
packages of shares and options offered in the prospectus. The three approaches to 
offering options in the prospectus are to sell options independently of the issue of 
shares, to allow investors to purchase options in proportion to the number of shares 
they apply for and to allot options with shares without charging a discrete price for the 
options. 
 
Some issuers offer shares and options separately in the same prospectus although this 
is rare during the sample period.  The 2001 offer of Safe Effect Technologies Ltd, for 
example, offers options at $0.005 and does not require a share application for 
participation in the option offer.   More common but still infrequently, issuers include 
a discrete offer price and allow applicants to make an application for options in 
addition to the purchase of shares.  Here, the number of options the applicant can 
apply for depends on the pre-specified ratio of shares needed to purchase one option.  
The 2001 prospectus of Heartlink Ltd, for example, allows investors to subscribe for 
an option priced at $0.01 with each share. Investors subscribing for shares do not have 
to purchase the offered options.  
 
The third and most common approach is for the issuer to allocate a pre-specified 
number of options with each share.  These issues are described as having „attaching‟ 
options in the prospectuses.  In these cases, issuers do not raise any funds by the issue 
of options per se, but appear to be using the options as a signalling or marketing tool 
to attract investors.  The options are described as „free‟ to investors and phrases such 
as „options for no further consideration‟ are used to create the impression that 
investors are receiving extra value from the issuer.  The 2006 prospectus of Oz 
Brewing Ltd, for example, offers „one free attaching option for every two shares 
subscribed for‟.  While attaching options can only be acquired by the purchase of 
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shares from the prospectus, the options trade separately from the shares on listing with 
a discrete ASX security code.   
 
Two separate investment decisions are made by investors when the prospectus offers 
options for sale either with or without the requirement to purchase shares.  The first is 
the decision to purchase the IPO shares and the second relates to the choice to 
purchase options.  Only one investment decision is made by applicants for offers of 
attaching options – the decision to apply for shares or not.  For IPOs offering „sold‟ 
options, the initial return for an investor depends on their investment decision with 
respect to the option purchase.  All investors participating in the offer generate the 
same initial return for IPOs with attaching options.  IPOs offering options for sale are 
excluded from this sample to avoid potentially confounding influences on initial 
returns that could arise from the choice investors have to participate in the option 
offer.  IPOs offering attaching options will be included in this study as all investors 
receive an allocation of options when they participate in the issue.  This definition of 
package issues is consistent with that of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) in their 
signalling theory of IPO option issuance. 
3.2.2.2 Bookbuild issues and privatisations 
The fundamental differences in the bookbuild and fixed-pricing mechanisms were 
discussed in chapter 2.  Sharpe and Woo (2005) exclude bookbuilds when 
investigating factors affecting the choice of a private or public issue immediately prior 
to listing. Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) exclude bookbuilds from their study of 
offer price. Only fixed-price offers are included in the sample in order to avoid any 
potentially confounding impact of incorporating market demand into the offer price.   
 
In addition to the fundamental differences between the bookbuild and fixed-pricing 
methods, bookbuild issues present a practical difficulty for measuring underpricing in 
the Australian context.  As discussed in chapter 2, Australian bookbuild issues consist 
of an institutional component and a retail component, each of which attract a different 
offer price.  Calculation of the initial return requires one offer price and one market 
price and the level of underpricing for the same issue will be different for institutional 
and retail investors.  A total of 55 bookbuild issues that occurred during 1997-2006 
are excluded from the sample. 
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A privatisation is the transfer of publicly-owned assets by sale of a business to the 
private sector (RBA, 1997). Privatisations typically experience much higher 
underpricing than other types of IPOs [Paudyal, Saadouni & Briston (1998); Ariff, 
Prasad & Vozikis (2007)]. Jones et al. (1999) find a relationship between the 
underpricing of privatised IPOs and the level of income inequality in a country and 
the political objectives of the privatising government.  These factors will not explain 
the underpricing of non-privatisation IPOs.  Further, asymmetric information will play 
little or no role in explaining the underpricing of privatised IPOs (Jones et al., 1999).  
How and Yeo (2000) and Sharpe and Woo (2005) exclude privatised public entities 
from their Australian IPO samples.  As is typical of Australian privatisations, the 
three that occurred during the sample period used a bookbuild process to establish the 
offer price.   
3.2.2.3 Extractive industries 
The valuation of resource firms is fundamentally different from the valuation methods 
used for non-resource firms. The prospective nature of many resource firms means 
their valuations are heavily dependent on geological reports rather than current or 
forecast earnings. Ritter (1984a) argues that the valuation issues associated with 
resource stocks, relatively higher levels of information asymmetry and relatively 
higher levels of business risk mean resource stocks have inherently higher risk. 
Resource stocks exhibit significantly higher average underpricing than industrials and 
display different behaviours from industrials in the market post-listing (How, 2000). 
Eight of the ten most underpriced issues from a sample of Australian IPOs over the 
period 1976 to 1997 were resource stocks (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001).  
 
Resource firms are systematically smaller with lower average offer prices compared 
to industrials (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001). Australian mining firms, however, 
have relatively higher firm values than their non-extractive counterparts (How & 
Low, 1993). These differences between extractive and non-extractive IPOs have the 
potential to confound results if both types of firm are included in the same model of 
underpricing.  Further, earnings forecasts are the critical component in the estimation 
of intrinsic value in chapter 5 and very few extractive companies provide earnings 
forecasts.  The focus in this research is thus on non-extractive or „industrial‟ IPOs and 
378 resource IPOs are excluded from the sample. 
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3.2.2.4 Listed managed funds 
Listed managed investments, like listed trusts, manage a portfolio of assets on behalf 
of security holders (ASX, 2007b).  Index funds aim to mirror the performance of 
some particular share market index to provide diversification benefits to equity 
investors. While index funds take a passive investment approach, hedge funds adopt 
an aggressive strategy by selecting securities that provide some absolute level of 
return to equity investors (ASX, 2007b). Licensed investment companies (LICs) also 
purchase the equities of other companies (ASX, 2007a).  Pooled development funds 
(PDFs) combine funds from equity participants for investments in a portfolio of listed 
and unlisted shares (ASX, 2007a).   
 
Index funds, hedge funds, LICs and PDFs all derive their values from the net value of 
the securities in which they invest and the investment style of the fund manager given 
the current market conditions. As such, these investments are fundamentally different 
from typical corporate IPOs and 50 such issues are excluded from the sample.  
3.2.2.5 Demutualisations and co-operatives 
Ownership of mutuals and co-operatives is obtained by membership rather than an 
equity investment and the ownership interest cannot be traded (RBA, 1999).  
Demutualised insurance IPOs provide benefits to policyholders upon listing as they 
experience significantly higher underpricing than their non-mutual counterparts in the 
US market (Krupa, 2006).  Demutualised building society IPOs in the UK are 
underpriced in an institutional setting where underpricing theories based on 
management incentives, relative risk, relative size and a requirement to raise 
sufficient funds are negated (Shiwakoti, Hudson & Short, 2005).  Given these 
differences in the nature of demutualisations, such IPOs are excluded from the 
sample. As the nature of co-operatives is similar to that of mutuals, these are also 
excluded.  Although it had a corporate structure prior to listing, AWB Ltd is also 
excluded as it was effectively operating as a growers‟ co-operative.  AWB Ltd 
„privatised‟ in 1999 when the Wheat Industry Fund was transferred to the newly 
established company and shares were issued to grain grower „members‟ who held 






Cross listing occurs when a company establishes a second listing on a foreign 
exchange (Bedi & Tennant, 2002).  How and Low (1993), How and Yeo (2000), and 
Brailsford, Heaney and Shi (2001) exclude any foreign-based company from their 
studies as these are normally listed on foreign exchanges prior to seeking listing in 
Australia. Companies that are already listed are not IPOs, even if the company is 
making its first offer of shares to the Australian investing public. A company listed 
overseas has an observable market price available, albeit in a foreign currency, that 
should influence both the offer price and the market price upon listing in Australia. 
 
In this dissertation, cross-listed issuers (rather than foreign-based issuers) are 
excluded from the sample based on the foregoing discussion.  The Australian 
company Cash Converters International, for example, listed in the UK a year prior to 
applying for listing in Australia, so is excluded on the basis of that prior listing rather 
than included because it is an Australian company.  Companies disclosing their 
intention to list on a foreign exchange concurrently or after the Australian listing are 
included in the sample. One concurrent listing in the sample period was excluded on 
the basis of the potential leakage of market information given the earlier opening of 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange than the Australian market.   
 
Irrespective of any cross-listing status, foreign companies that use a reporting 
currency other than Australian dollars in the prospectus are excluded as their financial 
statements are not comparable to other firms in the sample.  In total, 50 IPOs are 
excluded from the sample as cross lists or for foreign-currency reporting. 
3.2.2.7 Listed on regional exchanges  
Brailsford, Heaney & Shi (2001) exclude companies transferring from the Second 
Board to the Main Board of the ASX as these are not unseasoned issues. The market 
has access to trading price histories for seasoned issues. This price information affects 
the establishment of both the offer price and the market price on the first day of 
trading on the ASX.  The Second Board did not exist at the commencement of the 
sample period for this dissertation. However, the re-emergence of regional exchanges 
in the Australian market creates a setting similar to the operation of the Second Board.  
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Eight companies were excluded from the sample as they had been listed on the 
Newcastle Stock Exchange prior to seeking listing on the ASX. 
3.2.2.8 Relistings 
Some companies raise new capital after they are removed from the ASX lists and seek 
to relist.  Amlink Ltd, for example, was delisted in 1992 after a five-year suspension 
of trading of its shares.  A rights issue was made to Amlink shareholders in 1997 to 
provide sufficient capital to acquire assets and proceed to a public issue.  The 
company relisted at the end of 1998 after the successful public issue.  Relisting can 
also occur on the same day as delisting.  The shareholders of Telecasters North 
Queensland Ltd, for example, exchanged their shares for shares in a new entity, Ten 
Network Holdings Ltd.   Telecasters North Queensland Ltd was removed from the 
ASX lists on the same day Ten Network Holdings listed after raising additional 
capital.  Such issues are seasoned as a history of trading prices is available for these 
firms.  Twenty three relistings are excluded from the sample as these companies 
continue operations in the same industry.  
3.2.2.9 Restructuring 
Capital restructurings of existing listed companies are not unseasoned issues and are 
typically excluded from Australian underpricing studies [How & Low (1993); How & 
Yeo (2000); Brailsford, Heaney & Shi (2001)]. The restructured company may be 
identified as a new listing by the ASX but no prospectus is available unless the 
restructure is accompanied by a new capital raising.  Westfield Group Ltd‟s 2004 
listing was the result a merger of three associated listed entities: Westfield Holdings 
Ltd, Westfield Trust and Westfield America Trust.  As an observable market price is 
available for the company immediately prior to restructuring, ten such companies are 
excluded from the sample. 
 
A spin-off is a form of corporate restructuring that involves the divestiture of a line of 
business to create a new listed entity. Shareholders of the original company receive a 
pro-rata allocation of shares in the new company (Durand, Woodliff & Richards, 
2003).  Sonic Health Ltd, for example, listed its subsidiary Scigen Ltd without raising 
any new capital. Spin-offs without any public capital raisings are excluded from the 
sample because they represent transactions between the current owners.  Spin-offs 
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normally involve the allocation of shares to the parent company‟s shareholders and 
make a public capital raising prior to listing (Durand, Woodliff & Richards, 2003).  
These are included in the sample – although the price of the original company can be 
observed in the market prior to the IPO, the price of the line of business that creates 
the new company cannot be objectively determined. 
3.2.2.10 No public offer of shares 
Twenty two companies in the sample period listed without a public capital raising.  
These were mostly spin-offs (see previous section) where shares were allocated to 
existing shareholders (BHP‟s spin-off of Onesteel Ltd, for example) or where only 
existing shareholders could apply for shares in the new company (MyCasino‟s spin-
off of Rox Ltd, for example).  Issues raising capital by private placement then listing 
are excluded as they are not „public‟ offers and no prospectus is available for analysis. 
 
In conclusion, 665 of the 1161 corporate listings that occurred during the period from 
1997 to 2006 are excluded as they fall into one of the ten categories discussed above.  
As shown in table 3.1, the total number of IPOs included in the underpricing sample 
is 496.  The sample represents 43% of the corporate listings that occurred during the 
period from 1997 to 2006.  The following section discusses the underpricing sample 
that will be used to test the baseline underpricing model developed in chapter 2. 
 
3.3 Describing the sample 
While industry classification is normally an important element in contextualising 
sample firms, such descriptive statistics are difficult to interpret for this sample 
period.  Section 5.4.2 provides details of the change to the industry classification 
system used in Australia that occurred in 2002.  This change has necessitated the 
application of the ASX system of industry classification to companies listing prior to 
May 2002 and classification using the General Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) for the remaining sample firms.  The absence of a single classification system 
for the sample period hampers meaningful inter-industry comparison of firms. 
Therefore, descriptive statistics for two measures of firm size, three measures of issue 
size and leverage are used to contextualise the sample.   
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As discussed in section 3.2.1, the CPI rose 30% during the sample period.  Consistent 
with How and Howe (2001) and Balatbat, Taylor and Walter (2004), dollar amounts 
are expressed in end-of-sample period dollar equivalents.  The dollar values are made 
comparable by adjusting them to 4
th
 quarter 2006 dollars using the Consumer Price 
Index.  The 4
th
 quarter of 2006 represents the end of the sample period.  CPI data were 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of Australia website.  
 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for market capitalisation, total assets, issue 
size, gross proceeds to the company, gross proceeds to existing owners and leverage.  
These measures are not included in the baseline underpricing model but are presented 
to provide an indication of the size of IPOs during the sample period and to facilitate 
some preliminary analysis of the sample.   
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics for the sample of 496 Australian non-extractive 
IPOs between 1997 and 2006 (end 2006 A$‟000 equivalents) 
 
 Mean     Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p-value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
Market cap 64 540 35 031 92 170 2 825 1 209 988 (0.000) 5.617 53.233 
Total assets  44 165 18 577 118 380 189 2 283 654 (0.000) 14.375 261.240 
Issue size  21 680 9 322 39 119 0 585 058 (0.000) 7.544 91.604 
Gross to company  15 179 8 090 30 896 0 585 058 (0.000) 13.243 235.295 
Gross to owners  7 603 0 24 721 0 264 500 (0.000) 5.607 40.793 
Leverage % 24.397 16.480 23.083 0 96.444 (0.000) 0.873 -0.095 
         
 
Market cap (market capitalisation) = minimum number of shares on offer multiplied by the offer price 
($‟000). Total assets = total assets from the pro-forma balance sheet ($‟000).  Issue size = minimum 
subscription size ($‟000).  Gross to company (gross proceeds to company) = minimum received from 
the sale of new shares ($‟000).  Gross to owners (gross proceeds to owners) = minimum received from 
the sale of vendor shares ($‟000).    Leverage % = [total liabilities from the pro-forma balance sheet / 
total assets from the pro-forma balance sheet]*100.   
 
Share price data for the calculation of market capitalisation are primarily obtained 
from Float.com.au and are screened for data entry errors.  The largest underpricing 
and overpricing returns are cross-checked with share prices on the SIRCA DataDisk 
and the financial press.  Data for the number of shares on offer, new and vendor 
shares offered, total assets and total liabilities are hand-collected from the 
prospectuses.  To minimise data entry errors, these data are entered into a spreadsheet 
that calculates a verification figure.  For example, new shares and vendor shares are 
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added together and compared to the number of total shares offered entered from the 
prospectus. 
 
All prospectuses contain disclosure of the maximum and minimum number of shares 
that will be issued
10
.  Sixty-eight percent of sample firms offer a fixed number of 
shares (i.e. they have a maximum subscription amount that is equal to the minimum 
subscription amount).  The number of shares that will be issued cannot be definitively 
ascertained from the prospectus for the remaining 32% of the sample where a variable 
number of shares are offered.  In prior Australian research, IPO size measures are 
frequently based on the number of shares offered [Finn & Higham (1988); Lee, 
Taylor & Walter (1996); Lee et al. (2003); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How & Howe 
(2001); How, Izan & Monroe (1995); Da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen & Walter (2003); 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); Bayley, Lee & Walter, 
(2006)].  None of these, however, indicate if the minimum or maximum number of 
shares offered is used in the size measure.   
 
To clarify whether the maximum or minimum number of shares offered is the more 
probable indicator of final offer size, data from ASX announcements
11
 were examined 
to determine the level of oversubscriptions for sample IPOs.  Announcements were 
available for 144 of the 159 sample IPOs offering a variable number of shares.  The 
ASX announcements identify the total number of shares listed for the first day of 
trading.  For those IPOs that were subject to the ASX‟s escrow requirements, the 
number of escrowed shares was added to the number of listed shares.  The maximum 
offer size and the number of shares listed on the ASX were equal for 28% of the 
variable offer IPOs examined.  Therefore, as the majority of IPOs offering a variable 
number of shares do not issue the maximum possible number of shares, market 
capitalisation, total assets, issue size and gross proceeds are measured using the 
minimum subscription specified in the prospectus. 
                                                 
10
 Terminology indicating the maximum amount of shares to be issued varies in the prospectuses.  
Some issuers simply refer to this as the „maximum‟ subscription while others refer to any amount 
greater than the minimum subscription as „oversubscriptions‟.  In this dissertation, the term 
„oversubscription‟ will be reserved for applications in excess of the maximum number of shares offered 
in the IPO and „maximum‟ subscription is used to identify the maximum number of shares that the 
issuer is offering.   
11
 Announcements were obtained from the ASX website at http://www.asx.com.au 
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Mean-inflation adjusted market capitalisation for the sample is $64 540 000 while the 
typical (median) IPO has a market capitalisation of $35 031 000.  The mean market 
capitalisation for companies already trading (including the „materials‟ industry 
category) on the ASX is around $1 billion
12
.  However, the median is much smaller at 
approximately $35 million.  Thus, the typical IPO is about the same size as the typical 




The inflation adjusted mean (median) amount of total assets is $44 165 000  
($18 577 000).  The range of total assets for issuers is $189 000 to $2 283 654 000 
and the distribution exhibits highly significant positive skewness and kurtosis.  Total 
assets are disclosed in the pro-forma balance sheet included in the prospectus.  The 
pro-forma balance sheet represents the financial position of the company upon 
completion of the IPO.  One set of figures is presented for the 68% of sample IPOs 
offering a fixed number of shares.  If these companies are not underwritten and do not 
receive applications for the number of shares offered, the issue is withdrawn.  The 
pro-forma balance sheets for the remainder of the sample include several sets of 
figures to indicate the financial position of the company if the minimum subscription 
is received, if the target subscription is received and if the maximum subscription is 
received.   
 
The mean (median) issue size for the sample is $21 680 000 ($9 322 000).  The 
largest issue is Babcock & Brown‟s 2004 float which raised $585 058 000 while the 
next largest issue (Flexigroup Ltd in 2006) raised less than half this amount with  
$264 522 096.  While seeking to raise funds from the prospectus, eight issuers in the 
sample period stated that no funds or new shareholders were required to meet the 
listing requirements of the ASX.  Each of these issuers therefore had a minimum 
subscription amount of zero.  They all offered new shares only and specified a non-
zero maximum subscription amount. The variable offer size IPOs tended to have 
                                                 
12
 Market capitalisation ($A 2006) for each ASX listed company was sourced from the FinAnalysis 
database.  NZX listed companies were removed from the dataset.  Only the Australian listed 
component of market capitalisation was included for cross-listed companies.  After excluding the 
„materials‟ industry category, the mean (median) market capitalisation is $970 million ($42.3 million) 
13
 The distribution of market capitalization for ASX listed firms is extremely leptokurtic (kurtosis = 
334.99).  Table 3.2 shows that, while still highly leptokurtic, the distribution of market capitalization 
for sample IPOs has a relatively lower level of kurtosis (53.23).  Sample IPOs also display relatively 
less skewness (5.62) compared to all listed firms (21.54). 
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lower CPI-adjusted market capitalisation and lower CPI-adjusted total assets than 
those specifying a fixed subscription amount in the prospectus
14
.   
 
Gross proceeds to the company is measured as the CPI-adjusted amount raised from 
the sale of new shares. The minimum number of new shares to be issued and the offer 
price are disclosed in the prospectus.  Gross proceeds are calculated as the minimum 
number of shares multiplied by the offer price.  Sample issuers offered only new 
shares (75.6%), only shares sold by existing owners (3.6%) or a combination of new 
shares and vendor shares (20.8%).  Average (median) gross proceeds to the company 
for the sample is $15 179 000 ($8 090 000).  Those IPOs that offer only vendor shares 
have zero gross proceeds to the company.  The largest value for gross proceeds for the 
company is $585 058 000 raised by Babcock & Brown Ltd, followed by Flexigroup 
Ltd who, again, have less than half this amount.  
 
Gross proceeds to owners represents the amount that is received from the sale of the 
minimum number of vendor shares offered.  The prospectus identifies how many of 
the shares offered are new and how many (if any) are being sold by the existing 
shareholders.  Mean gross proceeds to the owners in the sample is $7 603 000.  As 
75.6% of sample IPOs do not offer vendor shares, the median gross proceeds to 
owners is zero.  The largest inflation-adjusted amount of funds to existing owners is 
the $264 500 000 received by Flexigroup Ltd‟s shareholders in 2006. Vendor shares 
were offered by 121 (or 24.4%) of the sample IPOs.  Vendor shares are offered by 
larger issuers who expect to be able to raise sufficient funds to meet the needs of the 
company and allow the owners to realise some of the value in their holdings
15
.   
                                                 
14
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests reported in table 3.2 show market capitalisation (p = 0.000) and 
total assets (p = 0.000) are not normally distributed.  Therefore, the Mann-Whitney U test is used to test 
for differences in the distributions of market capitalisation and total assets for issuers who choose to 
offer a fixed number of shares and those who offer a variable number of shares.  Results show IPOs 
offering a variable number of shares have significantly smaller CPI adjusted market capitalisation 
(Mann-Whitney U = 18 231, p = 0.000) and CPI adjusted total assets (Mann-Whitney U = 18 241,  
p = 0.000). 
 
15
 Mann-Whitney U tests are used to explore any differences in the distributions of gross proceeds to 
the company and size for this group compared to those offering only new shares.  Those IPOs offering 
vendor shares in addition to or in place of new shares have significantly higher CPI adjusted total assets 
(Mann-Whitney U = 13 160, p = 0.000) and CPI adjusted market capitalisation (Mann-Whitney  
U = 10549, p = 0.000). Interestingly, there is no significant relationship between the gross proceeds 
raised by issuing new shares in the company and the sale of vendor shares (Mann-Whitney  
U = 21 284.5, p = 0.306).   
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Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Balatbat, Taylor & 
Walter, 2004). The mean and median leverage for the sample are 24.4% and 16.5% 
respectively.  Roughly 5% (24) sample IPOs had no liabilities in the pro-forma 
financial balance sheet, resulting in zero leverage for these firms. The highest 
leverage was reported by Neverfail Springwater, with Mobile Innovations next at 
96.26%.   
 
Examination of the descriptive statistics in this section shows considerable variability 
in the size of issuers even after exclusions are made to homogenise the sample.  
Comparing the proportions of new-share-only issues to vendor-share-only issues and 
the combination of new and vendor shares provides evidence that most Australian 
fixed-price issuers (three quarters) go public with the objective of raising new funds 
for the company.  Analysis of the measures in this section shows size is related to the 
issuer‟s decision to offer a variable number of shares and to offer vendor shares.  
While some issuers have very high leverage, a small proportion does not include debt 
in the financial structure at listing.   
 
3.4 Conclusions 
The sample period for this research is 1 January 1997 to 31 December 2006.  
Approximately 43% of total corporate listings over the sample period are included in 
the sample.  Exclusions from the sample are made to decrease heterogeneity in the 
issue method (fixed-price), types of securities offered (shares or shares with attaching 
options), nature of operations (non-extractive and not investment companies), 
ownership structure prior to listing (no demutualisations or co-operatives) and the 
amount of share price information available to the market (no cross listings, prior 
Australian listings or restructurings). 
 
Having developed the baseline model in chapter 2 and identified and described the 
testing sample in this chapter, chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis of the model.  
The results from testing the baseline model will be used to develop extended models 
of underpricing in chapter 8 after the disaggregation of the components of 
underpricing in chapters 6 and 7. 
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CHAPTER 4  
TESTING THE BASELINE UNDERPRICING MODEL 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the empirical testing to answer the first research sub-question:  
which factors explain underpricing in Australia?  The rationale for the specification of 
the dependent variable is presented in the first section of this chapter.  Prior literature 
was examined in chapter 2 to ascertain which variables contributed to the explanation 
of underpricing in Australia.  The hypothesised relationships for these independent 
variables and underpricing are presented with the empirical model (or „baseline‟ 
model) in section 4.3.  This section also includes discussion on the measurement of 
each of the independent variables.  Section 4.4 provides descriptive statistics and 
analysis of correlations between variables.  The rationale for using regression analysis 
is given and results are presented in section 4.5.  The final section presents 
conclusions. 
 
4.2 Measuring underpricing 
Underpricing is the return to an investor who purchases a share from the prospectus at 
the offer price and sells at the market price at the end of trading on the day of listing 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001).  This section commences with the analysis of three 
different specifications of the underpricing measure.  The different underpricing 
measures are then compared using the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test to assess 
differences in distribution.  Sample IPOs are categorised as overpriced, correctly 
priced and underpriced to examine potential differences in classification that are 
reliant on the choice of underpricing measure.  The section concludes with a 
comparison of underpricing in this sample to underpricing in prior Australian 
literature. 
 
Three main issues arise in the determination of the underpricing measure.  The first 
and most fundamental concerns the question whether underpricing is viewed from the 
investors‟ or the issuers‟ perspective.  The second relates to the opportunity cost to 
investors attributable to the lag between paying for shares and being able to realise a 
return.  The third is the inclusion of the return on options in the underpricing measure 
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for packaged issues.  These three aspects of measuring underpricing are discussed in 
sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. 
 
4.2.1 Investor versus vendor return   
Underpricing is frequently discussed in terms of „return to investors‟ [c.f. Ritter 
(1991); Booth & Chua (1996)].  Alternately, underpricing can be analysed as the 
wealth loss to issuers (Barry, 1989). Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) argue a gain to the 
investor does not represent a symmetric opportunity loss to the issuer. In their study 
of Australian underpricing, da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen and Walter (2003) develop 
three further measures of underpricing based on Habib and Ljungqvist‟s concept of 
wealth loss to owners. The first of these adjusts for the level of retained ownership, 
the second standardises this wealth loss measure of underpricing by the market value 
of the firm while the third captures the loss to owners standardised by the value of the 
firm based on the offer price. 
 
As the objective here is to ascertain if the explanatory power of previously-tested 
variables persists, the dependent variable will be measured from the investors‟ 
perspective.  This approach facilitates comparison with the results of the majority of 
Australian studies. 
 
4.2.2 Raw versus market-adjusted returns 
Raw underpricing (RUP)
16
 is the change from offer price to closing price at the end of 
the first day‟s trading divided by the offer price (c.f. Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1996).  
Market-adjusted underpricing (MAUP) is calculated by subtracting the return on the 
market index (from prospectus date to listing date) from the raw return (c.f. How, Izan 
& Monroe, 1995).  The zero-one version of the market model with the All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index is typically used to measure market-adjusted return (c.f. Lee, 
Taylor & Walter, 1996).  
 
US investors bid for the number of shares they wish to acquire, then pay for the 
number of shares they are allocated up to five days after receiving their allocations 
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(Shultz & Zaman, 1994).  The capacity for market movements to impact on the US 
IPO investor‟s return is negligible as listing occurs within days or hours of price 
setting in the US [Ellis, Michaely & O‟Hara (1999); Draho (2004); Ljungqvist, 
(2004)]. Thus, raw underpricing is used as the dependent variable in US studies 
(Ljungqvist, 2004).   
 
In contrast, we saw in chapter 2 that investors in Australian fixed-price offers pay the 
full price for the number of shares they apply for at the time of making the 
application.  The average number of days from prospectus issue to listing in fixed-
price offers is around eight weeks [Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); Cotter, Goyen & 
Hegarty (2005)].  The payment by potential investors and the relatively long lag to 
listing introduces an opportunity cost for funds that is not experienced by investors in 
the US. Market-adjusted underpricing reflects the opportunity cost to the investor in 
fixed-price issues.  Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996, p. 1196) choose market-adjusted 
underpricing to avoid „… overstating the “abnormal” returns to IPO subscribers‟. 
 
The majority of Australian IPO research reports both raw and market-adjusted 
underpricing.  Of those studies that model underpricing, most use a market-adjusted 
measure as the dependent variable [Finn & Higham (1988); How, Izan & Monroe 
(1995); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); How & Howe (2001); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty 
(2005)].   
 
In contrast, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) use raw underpricing as their dependent 
variable and include the change in the market index from the prospectus date to listing 
date as an independent variable to capture market sentiment.  While return on the 
market index reflects an element of sentiment, it does not differentiate between a 
change in sentiment and a change in the level of systematic risk. Changes in 
systematic risk (or the risk premium) should not be confused with a measure of 
market sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2006). Raw returns are also used by How 
(1996).   
 
Ljungqvist (2004) considers that it „makes sense‟ to adjust for market movements in 
fixed-price settings where more time elapses between price setting and trading.  The 
use of raw underpricing as the dependent variable disregards any opportunity cost 
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borne by investors who must pay the subscription amount when they apply for the 
shares.  Market-adjusted returns are used most frequently in Australian underpricing 
research and are the more theoretically-consistent measure of return.  
4.2.2.1 Selecting the market adjustment method 
The approach in this dissertation is to acknowledge that the benchmark for 
opportunity cost should consist of alternative investments that are as similar as 
possible to the sample firms.  Some of the main Australian share price indices are 
investigated in this section to achieve this objective. 
 
The S&P/ASX indices available for the Australian market are weighted by market 
capitalisation (ASX, 2008c) so large-company returns drive the return on the index
17
.  
Analysis of the relative size of Australian fixed-price IPOs compared to ASX-listed 
companies undertaken in chapter 3 revealed that both groups have similar medians 
(both about $35 million) but very different means ($65 million and $1 billion 
respectively).   
 
The S&P/ASX 300 includes 300 companies selected primarily by market 
capitalisation with additional criteria for liquidity and investability (ASX, 2008c).  
The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Accumulation Index (SOAI) includes the smallest 
(by market capitalisation) 200 companies in the S&P/ASX 300 (ASX, 2008c).  The 
mean market capitalisation of companies in the SOAI is roughly $748 million 
compared to a mean of about $3 billion
18
 for the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index.  
 
During 2006, the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index covered 
approximately one third of listed companies by including the largest 500 while 
representing 98% of total market capitalisation
19
.  The SOAI is used in this research 
to provide a benchmark market return that excludes the influence of returns 
                                                 
17
 The FinAnalysis market capitalisation data (discussed in chapter 3) show the largest ten listed 
companies, for example, represented 47.6% of market capitalisation in 2006. 
18
 The means are approximated by sorting market capitalization by size and calculating the means for 
the largest 500, 300 and 100 companies.  As the SOAI consists of the S&P/ASX 300 minus the 
S&P/ASX 100, the mean for the SOAI is approximated by the mean of 200 companies that 
immediately follow the largest 100.  
19
 This percentage is determined by approximating the market capitalization of the largest 500 
companies and comparing this to total market capitalisation. 
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experienced by the largest listed companies.  Index data for market adjustments are 
obtained from Datastream. 
 
4.2.3 Including option returns in underpricing 
As discussed in chapter 2, issues with attaching options are included in this sample 
while those with sold options are excluded.  The justification for this approach is that 
the return on the separable option forms part of the return to the investor.  Therefore, 
the argument in this research is for the inclusion of the return on attaching options in 
the underpricing measure.   
 
In her investigation of earnings forecasts and underpricing, How (1996) includes the 
return on options in the measure of underpricing and reports a positive relationship for 
underpricing and an indicator variable for packaged issues.  The role of options in 
Australian IPOs is specifically examined by How and Howe (2001) and Lee, Lee and 
Taylor (2003).  How and Howe (2001) use the market value of both issued shares and 
options in their measure of size and discuss offer price in terms of „securities issued‟.  
Although they do not make an explicit statement about the inclusion of options in 
their measures of underpricing, their discussion of associated measures suggests that 
offer and market prices have been included.  How and Howe (2001) find no 
difference in the level of underpricing for packaged issues when they model 
underpricing. 
 
Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) also include options in the determination of the offer price 
while making no explicit statement about the inclusion of the option‟s market price at 
listing in their measure of underpricing.  Again, no difference in the level of 
underpricing for packaged issues is reported. 
 
In their model of Australian underpricing, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) report 
significantly lower underpricing for packaged issues.  This result is not directly 
comparable with those How and Howe (2001) or Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) as the 
measure of underpricing includes the return on options but does not utilise a market 
adjustment.   
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Section 4.2.1 identifies the focus in this research on underpricing as the return to the 
investor rather than as a loss to the owners.  Section 4.2.2 makes the case for market-
adjusted returns in the Australian context and section 4.2.3 argues for the inclusion of 
the return on attaching options in the measure of return to the investor.  Thus, from 
the theoretical perspective in the context of underpricing as the return to the investor, 
the dependent variable for the baseline model should be measured as market-adjusted 
returns that include the return on attaching options.  Except for the studies of How and 
Howe (2001) and Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003), the baseline model has been developed 
from literature that uses market-adjusted returns that do not include the return on 
options.  The baseline model will use market-adjusted returns to facilitate 
comparability with prior research.  The model will also be tested using the more 
rigorous specification of underpricing that includes both a market adjustment and the 
return on options.  The next section further explores the alternate measures of the 
dependent variable with discussion of the choice of underpricing measure and its 
impact on the identification of underpriced issues.   
 
4.2.4 Comparing raw, market-adjusted and package underpricing 
Underpricing measures relate offer price to market price at the end of trading on the 
listing date.  Thus, descriptives for the underpricing measure commence with a 
discussion of offer and market prices. 
 
Offer prices are obtained from the prospectus for each IPO.  As shown in table 4.1, 
the mean (median) offer price for sample firms is $0.75 ($0.50).  The lowest offer 
price in the sample is $0.20 and the largest offer price is $5.  IPOs with offer prices 
below the mean are significantly lower market capitalisation at listing than those with 
offer prices above the mean
20
.  Consistent with observed mean underpricing, market 
price has a higher mean ($0.95) and median ($0.74) than offer price.  The standard 
deviations indicate that market prices are more variable than offer prices.  The lowest 
market price ($0.05) was recorded for one of the issues with the lowest offer price 
                                                 
20
 The K-S test shows that distribution of offer prices in this sample represent a significant departure 
from the normal distribution (p = 0.000).  Mann-Whitney U tests reveal that the 286 IPOs with offer 
prices below the median of $0.50 have significantly lower CPI adjusted total assets (p = 0.000) and CPI 
adjusted market capitalisation (p = 0.000).   
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($0.20).  The highest market price ($7.98) was experienced by the issuer with the 
highest offer price. 
 
Table 4.1  Descriptive statistics for underpricing measures - 496 Australian IPOs 
between 1997 and 2006 
 
 Mean     Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p- value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
OP $ 0.75 0.50 0.573 0.20 5.00 (0.000) 2.072 8.350 
P $ 0.95 0.74 0.875 0.05 7.98 (0.000) 3.161 17.757 
         
RUP (%) 26.05 10.00 56.673 -80.00 504.00 (0.000) 3.489 18.668 
MAUP (%) 25.02 10.48 56.190 -74.18 504.19 (0.000) 3.559 19.185 
PUP (%) 26.89 11.68 57.953 -74.18 504.19 (0.000) 3.679 20.149 
         
 
OP = offer price = subscription price per share.  P = market price = observed trading price at the end of the listing date.  RUP = 
raw underpricing = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = market-adjusted underpricing = RUP – return on 
the market index.  PUP = packaged underpricing = market-adjusted underpricing including the return on any attaching options.   
 
 
Prior to analysis of the underpricing measures, the data are screened and the highest 
and lowest five percent of observations are checked for potential data errors.  Each of 
the three measures of underpricing identifies the same companies as the most 
overpriced and the most underpriced.  Emitch Ltd‟s 2000 IPO is the most underpriced 
generating a raw initial return of 504%. Epitan Ltd‟s 2001 IPO is the most overpriced 
with an 80% loss to investors purchasing from the prospectus and selling at the end of 
the first trading day.  
 
The expected difference between raw and market-adjusted underpricing depends on 
the market conditions during the period from prospectus date to listing.  A falling 
market will result in higher market-adjusted returns while a rising market will be 
associated with lower market-adjusted returns, ceteris paribus. Including the return on 
attaching options in market-adjusted underpricing will necessarily result in the former 
return being higher than the latter as the options are free to investors and the 
minimum possible return on them is zero.  The means, medians and standard 













Frequency histograms overlayed with the corresponding normal curve are shown for 
each of the three measures of underpricing in figure 4.1.  As reported in table 4.1, 
these distributions are leptokurtic and exhibit positive skew, consistent with the 
typical non-normal distributions of returns data (Brooks, 2002).  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests reported in table 4.1 confirm that the distributions are significantly non-
normal.  Therefore, the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test is used to 
examine differences between the underpricing measures.  The null hypothesis for the 
Wilcoxon test is no difference in distributions for the two groups (Siegel & Castellan, 
1988).   
 
Results from the Wilcoxon tests reported in table 4.2 show that RUP and MAUP have 
significantly different distributions.  The number of negative ranks show RUP is 
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higher than MAUP in around 58% of the sample IPOs while the positive ranks show 
RUP is lower in the remaining 42%.  Package underpricing is, as expected, 
significantly higher than market-adjusted underpricing
21
.   
 
Table 4.2   Comparing underpricing measures 
 
 RUP & MAUP MAUP & PUP 
Negative ranks 285 0 
Positive ranks 211 63 
Ties 0 433 
Z statistic -4.543 -6.902 
Significance 0.000 0.000 
   
 
RUP = raw underpricing.  MAUP = market-adjusted underpricing.  PUP = market-adjusted underpricing including the 
return on options. 
 
The differences in distributions of the three underpricing measures have implications 
for the determination of which IPOs are underpriced, overpriced or correctly priced.  
Sample IPOs are categorised for each year and each measure of underpricing in table 
4.3.  The numbers of underpriced, overpriced and correctly priced issues are shown 
for each underpricing measure and each sample year.  %UP indicates the percentage 
of issues classified as underpriced each year for each of the three underpricing 
measures.   
 
For comparability with the majority of Australian underpricing literature, MAUP is 
used here as the yardstick measure of underpricing.  Thus, the following analysis 
compares RUP and PUP to MAUP to determine misclassification of IPOs.  The 
results for MAUP, presented in Panel A, show 28% of issues are overpriced. 
 
Panel B of table 4.3 demonstrates the impact of omitting the return on the market 
index from the calculation of the initial return.  In 2006, for example, the RUP 
measure classifies three IPOs as underpriced and a further five as correctly priced 
when these are classified as overpriced using MAUP. This measure of underpricing 
classifies 22% of issues as overpriced.  The final row in Panel B shows that the RUP 
measure of underpricing misclassifies 16% of sample firms.  Some issues are 
classified as overpriced when they are underpriced (with respect to MAUP), some as 
                                                 
21
 Parametric t-tests for difference in means confirm the results of the Wilcoxon tests. 
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underpriced when they are overpriced and some as correctly priced when they are 
either over- or underpriced.  Further, the proportion of firms that are misclassified 
varies between years from a low of 6% in 1997 to a high of 46% in 1998. 
 
Table 4.3  Underpricing and overpricing 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
 
Panel A: Market-adjusted  underpricing measure (MAUP) 
            
Underpriced 30 18 66 84 20 17 16 42 33 29 355 
Correct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Overpriced 3 8 19 35 10 5 8 22 17 14 141 
%UP  91 69 78 71 67 77 67 66 66 67 72 
 
Panel B: Raw underpricing measure (RUP) 
            
Underpriced 31 12 69 77 14 16 17 46 34 30 346 
Correct 0 4 5 10 5 1 3 3 4 5 40 
Overpriced 2 10 11 32 11 5 4 15 14 6 110 










6 46 18 17 40 9 33 22 15 34 16 
 
Panel C: Market-adjusted  underpricing including return on options (PUP) 
            
Underpriced 31 19 67 87 20 18 18 44 34 29 367 
Correct 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Overpriced 2 7 18 32 10 4 6 20 16 14 129 










6 8 2 5 0 9 17 6 4 0 5 
            
Packaged 2 5 10 14 7 6 5 7 4 3 63 
a The number and percent of misclassified IPOs identifies the deviations from the classification of issues as under-, over- and 
correctly priced relative to the market-adjusted return. 
  
The market-adjusted package underpricing results are shown in Panel C.  Using 
MAUP as the yardstick for underpricing results in 26% of issues classified as 
overpriced.  Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) report around one third of their sample is 
overpriced using Australian data for the earlier period from 1976 to 1989.  Comparing 
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these two sample periods, it appears that the distributions of underpriced and 
overpriced issues vary over time.   
As mentioned previously, 71 (14%) of the sample firms issued attaching options.  The 
final row of panel C identifies the number of issues each year that have attaching 
options traded on the listing day.  The options for seven packaged IPOs were not 
traded on the listing date and no return on the option component of the issue has been 
included in the initial return for these firms.  In contrast to the RUP measure, only 5% 
of issues are misclassified when the PUP measure is applied.  This result is 
attributable to both MAUP and PUP including adjustments for movements in the 
market during the time from prospectus date to listing.  However, comparing PUP to 
MAUP shows that more issues are classified as underpriced when the return on 
options is considered.  Omitting the option component of return understates the 
number of underpriced IPOs. 
 
The underpriced, overpriced and correctly priced trichotomy is often utilised in 
underpricing research.  Whilst the above analysis demonstrates differences in 
classification dependent on the choice of underpricing measure, there are also 
important implications for measuring the extent of underpricing.  There is zero 
underpricing, for example, in the 40 IPOs (or 8% of the sample) that RUP classifies as 
correctly priced.  Using the MAUP measure, most of these IPOs will experience 
negative returns while some will display positive returns. 
 
In summary, results in this section indicate significant differences for MAUP 
compared with RUP and for MAUP compared with PUP.  Consistent with the 
statistically-significant differences between the three underpricing measures, the 
classification of issues as overpriced, correctly priced and underpriced (and hence, the 
extent of underpricing) is partly reliant on which underpricing measure is utilised.  
The next section examines reported underpricing in Australian IPO studies. 
 
4.2.5 Underpricing in Australian literature 
For comparative purposes, a summary of reported underpricing from prior Australian 
studies is included in table 4.4.  Most Australian studies report both raw and market- 
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adjusted underpricing [How & Howe (2001); How & Low (1993); How (1996); How, 
Izan & Monroe (1995); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); Wong (2005)].   
 








Industrials All firms Industrials 
Finn & Higham (1988) 1966-78    29.2%  
Lee, Taylor & Walter 
(1996) 
1976-89  16.4%   11.86% 
Lee et al. (2003) 1976-89    11.8% 
Balatbat, Taylor & 
Walter (2004) 
1976-93  15.5%   
Lee, Lee & Taylor 
(2003) 
1976-94    15.16% 
How & Low (1993) 1979-89  16.4%*  16.1%* 
How (1996) 1979-90  21.8%  22% 
How & Howe (2001) 1979-90 49.98%  49.8%  
Brailsford, Heaney & 
Shi  (2001) 
1976-97 37.09% 23.3%    
How, Izan & Monroe 
(1995) 
1980-90  19.74%   8.72%  
Sharpe & Woo (2005) 1983-95 28% 
60%✣ 
   
Da Silva Rosa, 
Velayuthen & Walter 
(2003) 
1991-99 25.47%    
How & Yeo (2000) 1980-96  18%   









Shi, Bilson & Powell 
(2008) 
1990-97 23%    




27%    
Cotter, Goyen & 
Hegarty (2005) 
1995-98  11.87%   9.49%  




 33%   




26.72%    
Chang et al (2008) 1996-
2003 
15%    
 
* natural log of underpricing 
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• issues are underwritten 
•• issues with an offer price lower than AUD$ 1 
••• issues with an offer price greater than or equal to AUD$ 1 
✣ issues made by private placement prior to listing 
 
Examination of table 4.4 shows underpricing varies with the selected sample period.  
The highest level of market-adjusted underpricing for industrial companies (29.2%) is 
reported from Finn and Higham‟s (1988) sample for the 1966-1978 period while the 
lowest (8.72%) is reported from How, Izan and Monroe‟s (1995) sample period from 
1980 to 1990.  Variation in underpricing is also found over time in the US.  
Ljungqvist (2004) reports average raw underpricing of 19% for the 1960-2004 period 
but finds annual average underpricing at a low of 12% for the 1960s and a high of 
40% for the years from 2000-2004. 
 
How and Low (1993) and How and Howe (2001) draw their samples from very 
similar time periods but report large disparities in their measures of raw and market-
adjusted return.  These differences are attributable to the application of different 
measures of return. The first study uses the natural log of the unadjusted return and 
the natural log of the market-adjusted return, while the second study does not use 
logarithms. There is also a difference in sample selection for the two studies. The 
second study (n = 396) required that a hardcopy prospectus be available, while the 
second study (n = 523) only required that the IPO be traded on the twentieth day 
following listing. It is unlikely that there is some systematic underpricing factor 
associated with the availability of printed prospectuses.  
 
Mean market-adjusted underpricing of 25.02% is reported for the 1997-2006 sample 
employed in this dissertation.  This provides support for the assertion that market-
adjusted underpricing varies over time.  The annual comparisons in table 4.3 show the 
number of issues classified as over- or underpriced also varies across time irrespective 
of the choice of underpricing measure.  
 
Although not directly comparable to any other sample time frame, the lower 
underpricing reported in Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) would appear to be 
attributable to sample selection. Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) include only those 
industrial IPOs that provide earnings forecasts in their prospectuses. Thus, forecasting 
earnings may systematically reduce underpricing.  With the discussion of the 
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measurement of the dependent variable now complete, the next section presents the 
measurement of independent variables. 
 
4.3 The baseline model and independent variables 
The hypothesised relationships for underpricing and the independent variables 
identified from the prior literature are shown in HO1.   
 
H01 Underpricing in Australia is unrelated to time from prospectus issue  
to listing, the level of retained ownership, ex ante uncertainty, the  
participation of an underwriter and the inclusion of options at floatation. 
 
The empirical model used to test the hypothesis (the baseline model) is given as 
follows: 
 
UP = β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5OPT + ε  (baseline model) 
 
Differing measures for the same independent variable are identified from the prior 
research used to develop the baseline model. In this section, differences in 
measurement are identified and discussed with a view to selecting the more 
appropriate measure for inclusion in the underpricing model.  
 
4.3.1 Time to listing 
DELAY, as the proxy for the level of informed demand, is measured as the number of 
days from prospectus registration to listing on the exchange. Lee, Taylor and Walter 
(1996) and Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) use a simple count of days.  The natural 
logarithm of the number of days is used by Finn and Higham (1988), How, Izan and 
Monroe (1995), How (1996), and How and Howe (2001).  In this dissertation, the 
choice between a simple count and the natural logarithm of the count will be 
determined after the examination of the distributional properties of the variable in 
section 5. 
 
The issue date for the prospectus is hand collected from each of the sample IPO 
prospectuses.  The listing date is initially obtained from the float.com.au website.  
Listing dates are then cross-checked in the financial press.  The data are then screened 
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and the prospectus dates are rechecked for the longest and shortest five percent of 
observations. 
 
4.3.2 Retained ownership 
Retained ownership is measured as the percentage of equity retained by the issuers in 
How (1996), Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996), How and Howe (2001) or Lee, Lee and 
Taylor (2003). Dimovski and Brooks (2004) use the proportion of retained ownership 
to net proceeds.  In keeping with the majority of Australian studies, retained 
ownership is calculated in this research as the proportion of shares held by the original 
owners at the completion of the issue.   
 
OWN = Number of shares retained (4.1) 
  Number of shares at listing  
 
The number of shares retained by the original owners and the number of shares at 
completion of the issue are hand-collected from the prospectus. Consistent with the 
analysis undertaken in chapter 3, retained ownership is calculated using the minimum 
proposed issue size and the associated number of shares at completion of the issue for 
those IPOs offing a variable number of shares.  The data are screened and the number 
of shares issued and the number of shares retained are rechecked for the highest and 
lowest five percent of observations. 
 
4.3.3 Information asymmetry 
SIGMA is measured as the standard deviation of the first 10 days of returns data 
(excluding the initial day‟s trading) by Finn and Higham (1988)22.  Some later studies 
calculate SIGMA using returns for 20 days post listing, but exclude day one [How, 
Izan & Monroe (1995); How (1996); How & Howe (2001)]. How, Lam and Yeo 
(2007) use 40 daily returns excluding day one.  Others use monthly returns (including 
the first month) for 12 months post listing [Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); Lee, Lee & 
Taylor (2003)] but do not explain why the longer period is chosen.  The choice 
between the alternative measures of SIGMA is made by selecting the measure that is 
most often found to explain underpricing in prior research.  Therefore, as shown in 
                                                 
22
 Finn and Higham do not find a significant relationship for SIGMA and underpricing. 
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equation 4.2, SIGMA is calculated as the standard deviation of the first 20 daily 
















   (4.2) 
The observations for SIGMA are then screened using the procedure discussed earlier. 
 
4.3.4 Underwritten and packaged issues 
Underwriter participation (UW) is a dummy variable that indicates the issue is 
underwritten.  Analysis of prior Australian underpricing literature in chapter 2 
identifies five different measures of underwriter reputation.  With the exception of 
How (1996), no relationship between underwriter reputation and underpricing is 
found. These results suggest that results are either sample-specific or reliant on how 
underwriter reputation is measured.  UW is used in this model to investigate the 
contribution to underpricing of the functions performed by underwriters.  Unlike 
underwriter reputation variables, UW is readily observable and free of contentious 
measurement issues.  The prospectus is used to identify which issues are underwritten. 
 
The association between underpricing and the issuer‟s choice to make a packaged 
offer has been tested using a dummy variable to indicate which issues are packaged 
[How (1996); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); Dimovski & Brooks (2004); How, Lam & 
Yeo (2007)] and the number of options issued (How & Howe, 2001).  While results 
are mixed for the association between the dummy variable and underpricing, the 
number of options issued was unrelated to underpricing.  In this dissertation, a 
dummy variable is used to indicate which issues are packaged.  The prospectus is the 
source of data for this variable.  The next section provides descriptive statistics for the 
baseline model‟s independent variables. 
 
4.4   Describing the data 
Theoretical justifications for the inclusion of the independent variables were presented 
in chapter 2.  Measurement issues were discussed in the previous section.  This 
section now provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables, examines 
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their distributions and analyses bivariate relationships between each of the 
independent variables and the three specifications of the dependent variable. 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
As shown in table 4.5, the mean (median) number of days from prospectus date to 
listing (DELAY) is 54 (48).  The shortest period for the sample firms of 13 days was 
for Sanford Ltd‟s 2000 IPO.  Labtech Sytems Ltd‟s 2006 IPO experienced the longest 
time to listing with 270 days.   
 
Existing shareholders retain an average of 62% of total shares at listing (median = 
65%).  The original owners sold all of their shares in six of the sample firms.  The 
highest level of retained ownership (99.52%) is for One.Tel Ltd‟s 1997 IPO.  
Unsurprisingly, the level of OWN is significantly lower for issuers offering vendor 
shares for sale (Mann-Whitney U = 15 990, p = 0.000). 
 




Panel B:  Dichotomous variables 





DELAY = number of days from prospectus registration to listing on the exchange.  OWN = shares retained by pre-IPO owners / 
number of shares at listing.  SIGMA = standard deviation of the first 20 daily returns (excluding the day one return).  UW = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when an issue is underwritten OPT = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is 
packaged with options. 
 
The mean (median) level of SIGMA is 5% (4%).  The minimum value for SIGMA is 
0.4% while highest (27.1%) is experienced by CogState Ltd‟s 2004 IPO.  The 
dichotomous variables indicate that 69% of sample IPOs are underwritten while 
attaching options are used by 14% of the sample.  
 
Panel A:  Continuous measures 
 
 Mean     Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p-value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
DELAY  54 48 26 13 270 (0.000) 3.143 15.770 
OWN (%) 62.142 64.656 19.756 0 99.520 (0.006) -0.934 0.931 
SIGMA  5.043 4.116 3.442 0.407 27.098 (0.000) 1.856 5.575 
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Descriptive statistics from prior Australian research for the independent variables 
used in the baseline model are replicated in appendix B. Means are reported first with 
medians (where available) reported in parentheses below.  The reported percentage of 
the sample is shown for the dichotomous variables UW and OPT.  Comparing the 
descriptives for this sample with those in table 4.5 indicates that IPO firms in this 
dissertation are not dissimilar to those of samples used in prior Australian 
underpricing research.   
 
4.4.2 Variable distributions 
Variable distributions are examined in this section.  The analysis commences with the 
decomposition of the sample descriptives by listing year presented in table 4.6.  The 
annual means (medians) for the independent variables do not reveal any obvious time-
dependent trends when the sample is split according to calendar year.  The difference 
between the lowest annual mean MAUP (2.24% in 2001) and the highest (42.11% in 
1999) shows the considerable variation in underpricing across years. 
 
Table 4.6  Inter-year analysis of mean (median) statistics - 496 IPOs  
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Issues 33 26 85 119 30 22 24 64 50 43 
           
RUP 28.02 9.87 45.07 34.16 0.65 22.90 21.73 23.57 10.88 17.36 
 (12.50) (0.00) (22.00) (6.00) (0.00) (10.00) (16.25) (13.00) (5.75) (15.00) 
MAUP 28.42 9.32 42.11 37.10 2.24 24.28 17.68 20.05 8.46 11.70 
 (14.27) (2.54) (17.91) (12.78) (4.15) (14.53) (10.40) (8.61) (5.69) (7.39) 
PUP 29.33 12.32 44.12 39.47 5.25 28.03 19.78 21.12 9.32 12.47 
 (14.28) (4.02) (23.18) (13.26) (4.71) (15.96) (16.35) (10.57) (7.92) (10.66) 
           
DELAY 57.22 64.04 48.72 51.88 66.93 50.91 60.67 50.12 54.60 59.05 
 (49) (64) (47) (44) (56.50) (46) (49.50) (47) (46) (42) 
OWN 57.41 62.33 59.57 66.10 68.56 57.17 59.08 60.24 61.04 63.69 
 (62.48) (64.67) (61.59) (68.06) (68.34) (59.20) (63.19) (63.68) (63.28) (67.39) 
SIGMA 3.47 5.45 5.35 6.23 5.44 5.05 4.89 4.36 4.15 3.97 
 (3.22) (3.37) (4.47) (5.66) (4.88) (4.33) (3.80) (3.36) (3.47) (2.85) 
           
UW% 82.00 69.00 92.00 74.00 53.00 73.00 46.00 50.00 58.00 60.00 
OPT% 6.00 19.00 13.00 13.00 37.00 27.00 21.00 11.00 10.00 9.00 
 
RUP = raw underpricing = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = market-adjusted underpricing = RUP – 
return on the market index.  PUP = packaged underpricing = market-adjusted underpricing including the return on any attaching 
options.  DELAY = number of days from prospectus registration to listing on the exchange.  OWN = shares retained by pre-IPO 
owners / number of shares at listing.  SIGMA = standard deviation of the first 20 daily returns (excluding the day one return).  
UW = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when an issue is underwritten OPT = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the 




Figure 4.2  Distributions for continuous independent variables 
 








Skewness in regressors is another potential source of heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 
2003).  Data transformation can be used to remove undesirable characteristics (Hair et 
al., 1998) including skewness and kurtosis. 
 
The distributions for the transformed variables are shown in Panel B of figure 4.2.  A 
logarithmic transformation is frequently applied to produce normality in distributions 
exhibiting severe positive skew and kurtosis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). DELAY 
and SIGMA are suitable candidates for log transformation as these variables do not 
take on zero or negative values (Brooks, 2002).  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic 
shows the logarithmic transformation of SIGMA (lnSIGMA) does not make a 
significant departure (p = 0.81) from the normal distribution.  The transformed 
DELAY variable, while improved, still exhibits sufficient skewness and kurtosis to 
depart from the normal distribution
23.  A square root transformation for „moderate‟ 
skewness
24
 is applied to the OWN distribution after the data are reflected
25
 to adjust 
for the negative nature of the skew (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic (p = 0.60) confirms that transformed OWN (tOWN) takes a normal 
distribution. 
 
As discussed in section 4.2.4, the three specifications of the dependent variable (RUP, 
MAUP and PUP) are distributed as non-normal with significant skew and kurtosis.  
The baseline model includes the dependent variable linearly as there is no theoretical 
reason to suggest it take some other functional form.  Therefore, to avoid a potential 
model specification error, the dependent variable is not transformed (Gujarati, 2003). 
 
4.4.3 Correlations 
Correlations for the continuous independent variables and each of the three 
specifications of the dependent underpricing variable are shown in table 4.7.  Pearson 
correlations can be calculated for a continuous and a dichotomous variable only when 
the two categories for the dichotomous variable are approximately equal (Coakes, 
                                                 
23
 K-S p = 0.001   
24
 To assist in the choice between the log and square root transformations, each was applied to DELAY, 
SIGMA and reflected OWN.  The transformation that resulted in the closest fit to the normal 
distribution was then chosen. 
25
 The largest value of the variable is increased by one and used as the constant from which each 
observation on OWN is subtracted prior to the application of the square root transformation. 
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Steed & Dzidic, 2006). Spearman‟s rho requires data that are at least ordinal (Sprent, 
1993).  Therefore, the dummy variables UW and OPT are analysed in section 4.4.4 
and are not included in table 4.7.  Pearson correlation coefficients are shown on the 
right hand side of the matrix with p values shown in brackets below.  Spearman‟s rho 
coefficients are on the left-hand side.  Panel A shows the correlations for the raw data 
while Panel B shows the correlations for the transformed independent variables.   
 
Table 4.7  Correlations for the sample of 496 non-extractive IPOs  
 
Panel A – raw data 
 RUP MAUP PUP DELAY OWN SIGMA 
RUP  0.994** 0.986** -0.148** 0.034 0.188** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.450) (0.000) 
MAUP 0.958**  0.991** -0.167** 0.027 0.191** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.552) (0.000) 
PUP 0.949** 0.986**  -0.158** 0.030 0.210** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.499) (0.000) 
DELAY -0.351** -0.372** -0.359**  0.190** 0.197** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN 0.008 -0.013 0.001 0.205**  0.105* 
 (0.854) (0.781) (0.990) (0.000)  (0.019) 
SIGMA 0.023 0.017 0.046 0.196** 0.139**  
 (0.617) (0.697) (0.308) (0.000) (0.002)  
Panel B – transformed data 
 RUP MAUP PUP lnDELAY tOWN lnSIGMA 
RUP    -0.182** -0.035 0.175** 
    (0.000) (0.440) (0.000) 
MAUP    -0.198** -0.028 0.176** 
    (0.000) (0.541) (0.000) 
PUP    -0.185** -0.032 0.195** 
    (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) 
lnDELAY -0.351** -0.372** -0.359**  -0.214** 0.192** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
tOWN -0.008 0.013 0.000 -0.205**  -0.136** 
 (0.854) (0.781) (0.990) (0.000)  (0.002) 
lnSIGMA 0.023 0.017 0.046 0.196** -0.139**  
 (0.617) (0.697) (0.308) (0.000) (0.002)  
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  PUP = Market-adjusted 
underpricing including the return on any attaching options.  DELAY = days from prospectus date to listing date.  lnDELAY = 
natural logarithm of DELAY.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  tOWN = square root 
of the reflected value of OWN.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  lnSIGMA = natural logarithm 
of SIGMA. 
 
Pearson correlational analysis assumes the two variables are normally distributed and 
are homoscedastic.  As discussed in the previous section, examination of the raw data 
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shows that none of the baseline model variables are normally distributed.  Scatterplots 
of the variables also indicate heteroscedasticity.  Thus, the following analysis of raw 
data uses the non-parametric Spearman‟s rho as the measure of association.   
 
SIGMA and OWN show no association with any of the underpricing measures.  
Indicative of lower underpricing for IPOs that take longer to list, DELAY shows 
significant negative associations with each of the three specifications of the dependent 
variable.  This result provides support for the use of DELAY as a measure of demand 
(informed or otherwise). 
 
The significant positive association between DELAY and OWN indicates that issues 
with higher levels of retained ownership take more time to complete.  SIGMA and 
OWN show a positive association that indicates higher levels of retained ownership 
are associated with higher levels of ex ante uncertainty.  Taken together, these results 
suggest two different interpretations of OWN as a signal of firm value.  The first is 
that investors do not heed a signal of quality indicated by higher levels of OWN.  The 
alternate explanation is that high levels of retained ownership are responsible for 
levels of information asymmetry.  Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this 
research and is suggested as a potential area for future research. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, SIGMA and DELAY are included in the baseline 
underpricing model as proxies for ex ante uncertainty and the level of informed 
demand for an issue respectively.  The significant positive association between 
SIGMA and DELAY suggest that these two proxies for information asymmetry 
reinforce each other. Although highly significant, the low absolute values of the 
associations suggest multicollinearity is not a problem in this model.
26
.     
                                                 
26
 Results of unreported Spearman‟s rho analysis show that the size measures (issue size, total assets 
and market capitalisation) have significant associations with each other but not with any of the three 
measures of underpricing.  Gross proceeds to owners and gross proceeds to the company are not 
associated with each other nor with the measures of underpricing but have significant associations with 
the other size measures.  Leverage has significant but low association with the size measures and with 
each measure of underpricing.  Smaller and less leveraged IPOs are associated with longer time to 
listing (DELAY).  Larger and more highly levered firms are associated with lower levels of information 
asymmetry. 
Offer price is not associated with RUP or PUP and has a very low correlation with MAUP (ρ 
= 0.016, p < 0.05).  In contrast, market price has a rho of at least 0.4 (p < 0.001) with each of the three 
measures of underpricing.  Lower offer and market prices are associated with longer DELAY. 
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Panel B shows correlations for the transformed data remain substantively the same as 
those reported for the raw data
27
.  The transformed variables, tOWN and lnSIGMA, are 
distributed as normal and the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates the same 
significant negative association between these two variables as that identified in the 
raw data.  Therefore, the underlying relationships between variables are not altered by 
transforming the data.  Whilst lnSIGMA is normally distributed the three measures of 
underpricing are not.  Therefore, the Pearson and Spearman coefficients for lnSIGMA 
and the underpricing measures show different results.  
 
4.4.4 Dichotomous independent variable associations 
As noted in the previous section, the UW and OPT variables in this model do not meet 
the requirements for correlational analysis.  The Cramér coefficient (V) is an 
appropriate measure of association between two categorical variables because it does 
not assume any underlying distribution or continuity for the variables (Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988).  Cramér‟s V gives a measure of nominal association and takes a 
value between 0 and 1 (Mendenhall, Reinmuth & Beaver, 1982).  
 
There is a significant association between UW and OPT (V = 0.196, approximate  
p = 0.000).  The Cramér‟s V statistic does not provide an unambiguous measure of the 
strength of the association, so cannot be interpreted in the same way as a correlation 
coefficient (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).  Examination of the proportions of issuers 
using underwriters when the sample is split on the basis of OPT shows about 46% of 
packaged issues are underwritten.  This proportion increases to 72% for the no-
options group and suggests a negative relationship between the incidence of 
underwriting and issuing options. 
 
Table 4.8 presents Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in distributions where the 
data are categorised by the presence of an underwriter (Panel A) and making a 
packaged issue (Panel B)
28
.  Underwritten issues experience higher underpricing
                                                 
27
 The sign on rho reverses on correlation coefficients for tOWN as the OWN variable is reflected in the 
transformation process. 
28
 Point biserial correlations were considered as a potentially useful measure of association for the 
nominal (UW and OPT) and continuous variables.  As discussed in section 4.4.2, with the exception of 
lnSIGMA and tOWN, all continuous variables follow distributions other than the normal distribution.  
Therefore, Mann-Whitney U and median tests are conducted for differences in distribution and median 







Table 4.8  Differences in distributions where data are grouped on UW and OPT 
 
 RUP MAUP PUP DELAY OWN SIGMA lnDELAY tOWN lnSIGMA 
UW group median 13.000 13.677 13.617 45 62.500 3.838 3.801 6.166 1.345 
No UW group median 5.000 2.413 4.890 60 71.834 5.295 4.094 5.356 1.667 
Mann-Whitney U 21 213 19 694 20 656 16 762 18 891 19 883 16 762 18 891 19 883 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Median test (2-tailed) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
OPT group median 2.500 -0.660 n.a. 55 70.553 5.440 4.007 5.474 1.694 
No OPT group median 11.667 13.000 n.a. 46 63.694 3.920 3.829 6.068 1.366 
Mann-Whitney U 10 019 9 573 n.a. 10 397 12 583 10 267 10 397 12 583 10 267 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) (0.000) (0.000) n.a. (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) 
          
Median test (2-tailed) (0.001) (0.001) n.a. (0.003) (0.015) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.015) 
          
 
n.a.  No comparison is made for PUP with a sample split made on the issue of options as PUP is the measure of underpricing that includes the return on options.   
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  PUP = Market-adjusted underpricing including the return on any attaching options.  DELAY = days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.   lnDELAY = log of DELAY.   tOWN = 
transformation of OWN.  lnSIGMA = log of SIGMA.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  OPT = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue includes attaching options.   
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(irrespective of how underpricing is measured), fewer days to listing (DELAY & 
lnDELAY), lower levels of retained ownership (OWN & tOWN) and have a lower 
median level of post-listing volatility (SIGMA & lnSIGMA).  These results suggest 
some level of association between UW and underpricing and with each of the 
continuous independent variables.   
 
Vendors choosing to make packaged issues take longer to list (DELAY & lnDELAY) 
and they experience higher post-listing volatility (SIGMA & lnSIGMA) and have 
higher median retained ownership (OWN & tOWN).  Again, these results suggest 
some level of association between OPT and each of the continuous independent 
variables.   
 
Packaged issues are less underpriced when RUP and MAUP are used as measures of 
the dependent variable.  These results support the analysis of measures of 
underpricing and the resultant classifications of issues as over- and underpriced 
presented in section 4.2.4.  With the investigation of relationships between the 
variables now complete, the next section tests the baseline model. 
 
4.5 Testing the baseline model 
This section provides the rationale for using regression analysis.  The process of 
identifying outliers and their treatment is discussed.  Empirical results for the model 
are presented.  Finally, the rationale for the selection of the definitive baseline model 
is presented.  
 
4.5.1 Ordinary least squares regression 
Consistent with prior Australian underpricing research [How, Izan & Monroe (1995); 
How (1996); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How & Howe 
(2001); Dimovski & Brooks (2004); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); How, Lam & 
Yeo (2007)], ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to estimate the baseline 






Multivariate outliers are discrepant data cases where unusual pattern of scores are 
identified when two or more variables are considered together (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1996).  Multivariate outliers can exert excessive influence that results in a shift in the 
regression line (Hair et al., 1998).  Therefore, Mahalanobis distance is used to identify 
which multivariate outliers to exclude.  Mahalanobis distance is calculated with a 
discriminant function that weights unusual combinations of scores heavily so cases 
with a Mahalanobis distance greater than the relevant chi-squared critical value are 
significantly different from the centroid of other cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
Analysis of the Mahalanobis D
2
 identifies nine significant (p = 0.001) outliers and 





Table 4.9 reports the results for three versions of the baseline model, each using a 
different specification of the dependent variable.  Raw data are used here and 487 
observations are included (i.e. 9 outliers have been omitted).  The adjusted R-squared 
(AR
2
) for the models ranges from 11% (with RUP as the dependent variable) to 12.2% 
(where MAUP is the dependent variable).  Even though the R
2
s for cross sectional 
data are typically lower than those found using time series data (Kennedy, 1985), the 
baseline model AR
2
s would generally be considered to be poor fits.  These AR
2
s are, 
however, within the range of those reported in prior Australian underpricing research 
(see table 2.2) and F tests show the regressions are significant.  The low explanatory 
power suggested by the AR
2
s for the baseline model could be taken as an indication 
that the model suffers a specification error (i.e. some important variables have been 
omitted)
30
.  This issue is explored further in section 4.5.4. 
 
                                                 
29
 The chi-squared critical value is determined as p = 0.001, d.f. = 5.  The multivariate outliers, their 
listing dates and industries are as follows: Australian International Carbon Ltd (1998, miscellaneous 
industrials); Queste Communications Ltd (1998, telecommunications);  AquaCaretone Ltd (1999, 
healthcare & biotechnology); ST Synergy Ltd (2001, miscellaneous industrials); CogState (2004, 
healthcare & equipment); Medical Therapies Ltd (2005, pharmaceuticals & biotechnology); Labtech 
Systems Ltd (2006, healthcare & equipment); Richfield International Ltd (2006, transportation) and 
BigAir Group (2006, telecommunications). 
30
 One potential alternative explanation for a low R
2
 is a high variance in the error term (Kennedy, 
1985). 
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Examination of the prior Australian literature in chapter 2 provides the rationale for 
specifying directional relationships for some independent variables in the baseline 
model.  As a proxy for the level of informed demand, DELAY is expected to have a 
negative relationship with underpricing.  SIGMA is the proxy for the speed of 
resolution of ex ante uncertainty so a positive relationship is expected for SIGMA and 
underpricing.  As such, the p values shown for DELAY and SIGMA in table 4.9 are for 
one-tailed tests. 
 
Table 4.9  Regression results (raw data) for 487 IPOs  
    
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables RUP MAUP PUP 
constant coefficient 5.280 3.521 3.494 
 t-stat 0.345 0.233 0.202 
 p (0.731) (0.816) (0.840) 
DELAY coefficient -0.383# -0.391# -0.394# 
 t-stat -2.043 -2.116 -2.026 
 p (0.083) (0.070) (0.087) 
OWN coefficient 0.174 0.160 0.170 
 t-stat 1.335 1.242 1.259 
 p (0.182) (0.215) (0.209) 
SIGMA coefficient 5.247** 5.412** 5.593** 
 t-stat 4.054 4.241 4.023 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 11.977* 13.866* 13.297* 
 t-stat 2.180 2.563 2.165 
 p (0.023) (0.011) (0.031) 
OPT coefficient -23.694** -23.736** -10.247 
 t-stat -3.565 -3.641 -1.286 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.199) 
AR
2
  0.110** 0.122** 0.100** 
JB  7 501** 8 172** 7 559** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.601 1.648 1.601 
RESET F 4.815* 6.136* 10.1723** 
 p (0.029) (0.014) (0.000) 
     
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed for OWN, UW and OPT and one-tailed for DELAY and SIGMA) 
* Significant at <5% (two-tailed for OWN, UW and OPT and one-tailed for DELAY and SIGMA) 
# Significant at <10% (two-tailed for OWN, UW and OPT and one-tailed for DELAY and SIGMA) 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  PUP = Market-adjusted 
underpricing including the return on any attaching options.  DELAY = days from prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares 
retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  
UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  OPT = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue 
includes attaching options.   
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As reported in chapter 2, Australian studies do not find the theorised negative 
relationship between OWN and underpricing.  While some Australian studies report a 
positive relationship, others find no significant relationship.  Theory provides the 
justification for a negative relationship between underwriter reputation and 
underpricing, but either a positive or negative relationship between the participation 
of an underwriter (UW) can be theoretically justified. Similarly, a positive or negative 
relationship can be theoretically justified for the use of packaged issues.  Therefore, 
no directional relationship is specified for OWN, UW and OPT in the baseline models.  
The p-values reported in table 4.9 for these variables are for two-tailed tests. 
 
DELAY is in the expected direction but has only marginal significance for the 
explanation of underpricing.  This result is in contrast to prior Australian research 
[How, Izan & Monroe (1995); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); How & Howe (2001); 
Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003)] where DELAY is found to be highly significant.  The 
highly significant (p < 0.001) positive relationship of SIGMA to underpricing 
(irrespective of the measurement of the dependent variable) provides support for the 
results of How, Izan & Monroe (1995), How (1996) and Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003) 
rather than for those of Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) and How and Howe (2001).  As 
the proxy for ex ante uncertainty, this positive relationship suggests investors are 
compensated with greater underpricing when the IPO is more difficult to value. 
 
The level of retained ownership (OWN) is not significant for any measure of the 
dependent variable.  This result is consistent with the majority of the Australian 
literature [Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); How & Howe (2001); Lee, Lee & Taylor 
(2003); How & Howe (2001); Dimovski & Brooks (2004)].  The significant 
relationship between retained ownership and underpricing reported by How (1996), 
and Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996) is not supported in this more contemporary sample. 
 
The presence of an underwriter (UW) is significantly (p < 0.05) and positively 
associated with underpricing. As discussed in chapter 2, several studies include 
underwriter reputation in their underpricing models but the results of those studies are 
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not comparable with UW
31
.  Logue (1973) provides a rationale for this observed 
positive relationship between UW and underpricing.  He argues that, in the absence of 
mitigating factors
32
, underpricing minimises underwriters‟ costs and risks and only 
reduces the demand from new issuers if the level of underpricing is „gross‟.  
Overpricing, while increasing the underwriters‟ costs and risks, will reduce demand 
from new issuers who observe the underwriters‟ inability to sell the issues.   
 
As discussed in chapter 2, except for the difference in pricing mechanisms, Australian 
issues that are not underwritten should have characteristics similar to those of best 
efforts US issues.  US best efforts issues are more underpriced than are US 
underwritten issues [Chalk & Peavy (1987); Smart, Megginson & Gitman (2004)].  
The positive sign of the coefficient on UW shows that Australian fixed-price 
underwritten issues are more underpriced than those without underwriter 
participation.  One-tailed tests show UW retains significance at the conventional level 
for RUP and MAUP.  While inconsistent with US results for bookbuild issues, this 
result tends to support signalling theory where issuers use an underwriter to signal the 
quality of the issue and the underwriter influences the offer price downward. 
 
The significance of UW for the RUP and MAUP measures of underpricing and the 
marginal significance for PUP draws attention to the impact of including the return on 
options in the measure of underpricing.  As discussed in section 4.4.4, fewer packaged 
issues are underwritten while most underwritten issues do not include options.   
 
How (1996) reports a significant positive coefficient on OPT in one of her 
underpricing models that uses MAUP as the dependent variable.  Conversely, 
Dimovski and Brooks (2004) report a significant negative coefficient on OPT with 
raw returns as the dependent variable.  Table 4.9 shows issues offering free options 
with shares are significantly (p < 0.001) less underpriced when underpricing is 
measured by RUP and MAUP.  As discussed in section 4.2.4, the mean and median 
values for the distribution of PUP are significantly higher than those for MAUP.  The 
significant negative coefficients on OPT suggest the lower underpricing found for 
                                                 
31
 One study that does include UW (Dimovski & Brooks, 2004) reports a significant positive 
relationship between UW and RUP.   
32
 Logue (1973) identifies competition among underwriters as a potential mitigating factor, and 
concludes that US underwriters behave as monopsonists. 
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packaged issues is attributable to errors of measurement in the dependent variables.  
There is no relationship between OPT and PUP.  These results indicate that RUP and 
MAUP understate the level of underpricing for IPOs making packaged issues.  
Further, they provide evidence to support Chemmanur and Fulghieri‟s (1997) theory 
of options as a signalling mechanism. 
 
Table 4.10  Regression results (transformed data) for 487 IPOs  
 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables RUP MAUP PUP 
constant coefficient 110.845** 108.995** 110.800** 
 t-stat 3.444 3.351 3.144 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
lnDELAY coefficient -27.299** -27.834** -27.949** 
 t-stat -3.010 -3.106 -2.950 
 p (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
tOWN coefficient -2.625 -2.482 -2.627 
 t-stat -1.400 -1.334 -1.339 
 p (0.162) (0.183) (0.181) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 23.251** 23.852** 24.441** 
 t-stat 4.507 4.668 4.548 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 12.625* 14.505* 13.955* 
 t-stat 2.220 2.588 2.213 
 p (0.027) (0.010) (0.027) 
OPT coefficient -23.571** -23.588** -10.074 
 t-stat -3.435 -3.505 -1.221 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) 
AR
2
  0.104** 0.114** 0.100** 
JB  7 680** 8 377** 8 169** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.590 1.632 1.591 
RESET F 15.242** 18.337** 17.489** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for tOWN, UW and OPT and one tailed for lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for tOWN, UW and OPT and one tailed for lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted.  
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  PUP = Market-adjusted 
underpricing including the return on any attaching options.  lnDELAY = log of days from prospectus date to listing date.  tOWN = 
square root of reflected [(shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100].  lnSIGMA = log of standard 
deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  OPT = 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue includes attaching options.   
 
Table 4.10 shows the results for the baseline model using transformed data. The AR
2
s 
are marginally lower for the RUP and MAUP measures of underpricing compared to 
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the raw data regression in table 4.9.  Results for lnSIGMA are highly similar to those 
for SIGMA.  The coefficients on UW and OPT and their associated t-statistics show 
only minor changes when the baseline model includes transformed data.  In contrast 
to the untransformed DELAY variable, the one-tailed significance level for lnDELAY 
is highly significant.  While the sign on the coefficient for tOWN becomes negative as 
the data are reflected in the process of transformation, no significant association 
between retained ownership and underpricing is identified. 
 
The most notable change in results from transformation of the continuous independent 
variables is the impact on the constant.  Significant constants are an empirical 
regularity when transformed data are used in Australian underpricing studies [see 
Finn & Higham (1998); How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How (1996); How & Howe 
(1996)].  Using untransformed variables for DELAY and SIGMA, Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1996) report three from six of their regressions do not have significant 
constants.  The intercepts become significant when the number of variables is reduced 
in subsequent models.  Only the regression that includes all hypothesised independent 
variables in Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) is without a significant intercept.  Dimovski 
and Brooks (2004) do not report intercepts.   
 
4.5.4   Analysis of residuals 
The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics reported in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show residuals 
from all models depart significantly (p < 0.01) from the normal distribution.  Brooks 
(2002, p. 182) argues that OLS, even with non-normal residuals, is superior to other 
methods of estimation that do not assume normality because „its behaviour in a 
variety of circumstances has been well researched‟.  For large samples, test statistics 
are expected to asymptotically follow the normal distribution [Brooks (2002); 
Guajarati (2003)].  Notwithstanding, analysis of residuals is still necessary to 
determine if the OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity, uncorrelated errors and 
regressors uncorrelated with the error term
33
 are met (Kennedy, 1985). 
                                                 
33
 The first assumption of OLS – that the expected mean value of the errors is zero – is met by the 
inclusion of the constant in the regression equation (Brooks, 2002). Kennedy (1985 p. 90), however, 
notes that the assumption can be violated if there are „systematically positive or systematically negative 
errors of measurement in calculating the dependent variable‟. 
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White‟s test rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (p < 0.0001) for all 
versions of the baseline model.  Therefore, the t-statistics presented in tables 4.9 and 
4.10 use White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and 
represent a more conservative test of the coefficients (Brooks, 2002). 
 
Autocorrelation of residuals for sequential data can be assessed using the Durban-
Watson statistic (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  The Durban-Watson d indicates 
significant positive autocorrelation in residuals for each regression irrespective of the 
measurement of the dependent variable and of any data transformations.  The JB 
statistics show that the normality of residuals assumption of the Durban-Watson test 
(Gujarati, 2003) cannot be met in these regressions.  However, graphs of the residuals 
provide support for the existence of positive autocorrelation.   
 
A significant DW statistic in cross-sectional data can indicate model specification 
error as it is consistent with the effects of an omitted variable being captured by the 
residuals [Kennedy (1985); Gujarati (2003)]. Ramsey‟s RESET (regression 
specification error test) is a general test for misspecification of a model‟s functional 
form [Brooks (2002); Gujarati (2003)].   
 
A significant F statistic from the RESET test is indicative of non-linear parameters in 
the model or a relevant variable omitted from the model [Brooks (2002); Gujarati 
(2003)].  OLS estimation produces biased and inconsistent parameter estimates when 
non-linear parameters are assumed linear in the model (Kmenta, 1971).  When the 
specification error takes the form of an incorrect assumption of linearity for a non-
linear parameter, the effects on the OLS results are the same as those for an omitted 
relevant variable [Kmenta (1971); Brooks (2002)].  The specific impact on inferences 
from OLS cannot be ascertained unless the correlations of the omitted variable with 
the included dependent variables are known [Kmenta (1971); Brooks (2002); Gujarati 
(2003)].   
 
The RESET tests the RUP and MAUP regressions in table 4.9 show significant model 
misspecification errors while the RESET for PUP is highly significant.  Those 
reported for transformed data in table 4.10 show highly significant misspecification 
errors, indicating that the specification errors are not the result of non-linearity in 
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these independent variables.  Clearly, the results from a correctly-specified model are 
preferred to those from a model with specification error.  Results from the RESET 
tests provide justification for investigating additional variables to those that have been 
found significant in prior research.   
 
Kennedy (1985) identifies „inertia‟ as a potential cause of autocorrelation in error 
terms.  He states that 
Owing to inertia or psychological conditioning, past actions often have a 
strong effect on current actions, so that a positive disturbance in one 
period is likely to influence activity in succeeding periods (Kennedy, 
1985, p. 99). 
 
While the data used in this sample are cross sectional, the issues are entered in 
chronological order.  Taken together, these points suggest the inclusion of a market 
sentiment variable to improve the baseline model.  This issue will be investigated 
further in chapter 8. 
 
OLS regression relies on the assumption of non-stochastic regressors but stochastic 
explanatory variables are, however, common in economic data (Kmenta, 1971).  
Kennedy (1985) states that the desirable properties of the OLS estimator are 
maintained where the regressors are stochastic but contemporaneously uncorrelated 
with the residuals.  Correlation analysis is conducted to test this assumption for the 
baseline model with each of the three measures of the dependent variable with either 
the untransformed or transformed regressors.  The residuals and SIGMA or lnSIGMA 
have significant negative Spearman‟s rho (p < 0.01) in the order of about 0.2.  DELAY 
and the residuals also have significant negative Spearman‟s rho (p < 0.05) with a 
magnitude of about 0.1
34
.  These results show the OLS estimators for SIGMA, 
lnSIGMA and DELAY are biased because some of the variation attributable to the 
variation in the residuals has been incorrectly identified as the stochastic regressor‟s 
ability to explain variation in the dependent variable (Kennedy, 1985).   
 
Measurement error in the variables is a further potential source of contemporaneous 
correlation of stochastic regressors and residuals (Kennedy, 1985).  SIGMA, lnSIGMA 
and DELAY are good candidates for the errors in variables problems because they are 
                                                 
34
 Pearson correlation coefficients do not show any significant correlations. 
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used as proxies for the unobservable level of informed demand (DELAY) and the level 
of ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA).  Weighted least squares regression and the use of 
instrumental variables can be used to remedy such contemporaneous correlations 
(Kennedy, 1985).  No remedial actions will be taken for this baseline model but the 
issue will addressed if the chapter 8 regressions exhibit significant autocorrelation in 
the residuals. 
 
4.5.5   Selection of the baseline model 
The foregoing analysis discusses the relatively low values of AR
2
 for models using 
both raw data and transformed data.  While econometrics texts state that the AR
2
 
should not be used as the definitive gauge of a „good‟ model [c.f. Kennedy (1985); 
Gujarati (2003)] there is nothing in the AR
2
s to identify which data provide the 
„better‟ model.   
 
The analysis of residuals conducted in section 4.5.4 reveals violations of the OLS 
assumptions in models using either raw or transformed data.  Further, the results of 
Ramsey RESET tests indicate significant model misspecification for all six 




A point in favour for modelling untransformed variables is the lack of a significant 
intercept.  There is no theoretical reason to support a significant constant in the model.  
Although the significant intercept could be remedied in the transformed variable 
models, there are no strong a priori expectations that the constant should always be 
zero.  In such cases Gujarati (2003, p. 168) advises against regression through the 
origin.   
 
Discussion in section 4.2 identified PUP as the more theoretically-correct measure of 
underpricing.  However, comparison of results with most prior Australian literature 
                                                 
35
 Based on prior Australian underpricing research discussed in chapter 2 and the empirical analysis 
presented in chapter 3, size is the main candidate for an omitted variable.  Each of the models was run 
including the natural log of market capitalisation at listing to control for size.  This variable has no 
explanatory power for any of the three specifications of the dependent variable. AR
2
 decreases by 0.002 
in each raw data model and by 0.01in the transformed data models when size is included.  Removing 
size shows minimal impact on the magnitude and significance levels of the coefficients for the 
independent variables in the models.  The significance level for the constant in the transformed models 
changes from p < 0.05 to p < 0.001 when size is omitted.  The addition of size to the baseline model 
does not remedy model misspecification error. 
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requires MAUP.  Further, the decomposition of underpricing into mispricing (chapter 
6) and misvaluation (chapter 7) factors is undertaken without market adjustments to 
the differences between value, offer price and market price.  As such, the baseline 
model will be tested using RUP, MAUP and PUP as alternate measures of the 
underpricing dependent variable.   
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Analysis of the reported level of underpricing in prior Australian research reveals that 
underpricing, consistent with US studies, appears to vary with the sample period 
chosen.  The sample data for this research confirm this feature.  Further, sample 
selection methods also appear to influence the level of reported underpricing.   
 
RUP and MAUP are found to be significantly different measures of underpricing.  The 
classification of IPOs as underpriced, correctly priced or overpriced and hence the 
extent of underpricing is shown to be reliant on the choice of underpricing measure.  
This suggests researchers should take care when comparing their results with those 
from prior Australian research.  Not only can differences in underpricing be attributed 
to different sampling periods and the criteria used for the type of firms included, 
differences in distributions show the choice of underpricing measure as a dependent 
variable is not a trivial matter. 
 
The measures for the continuous independent variables in the baseline model are 
found to have significant skewness and kurtosis.  Transformation of these variables 
did not, however, result in noticeable improvements in the regression results.  Results 
for the baseline model reveal that SIGMA and UW are significant in the explanation of 
underpricing. In contrast to prior research, DELAY is only marginally significant.  The 
measurement error in MAUP is confirmed by the OPT dummy variable‟s significant 
association with MAUP but not for PUP.  OWN does not contribute to the explanation 
of underpricing in this sample.  Correlation analysis suggests that OWN, rather than 
determining underpricing, is associated with the level of ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA) 
experienced by the issue. 
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The disaggregation of underpricing now commences in chapter 5 with analysis of 
intrinsic value and continues with analysis of mispricing in chapter 6 and 
misvaluation in chapter 7.  Chapter 8 then presents extended models of underpricing 
developed by including significant mispricing and misvaluation factors identified 
from the disaggregation of underpricing. 
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CHAPTER 5  
ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF AUSTRALIAN FIXED-PRICE IPOs 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines several different proxies for intrinsic (or fundamental) value 
(V).  The process used to disaggregate underpricing in this research involves the 
identification of mispricing and misvaluation.  Mispricing (MP) is defined here as the 
difference between the offer price (OP) of an IPO share and its intrinsic value (V). 
Misvaluation (MV) is defined as the difference between the market price (P) at the 
end of trading on the day of listing and V.  MP and MV are the dependent variables in 
the models of mispricing (chapter 6) and misvaluation (chapter 7).  The selection of 
proxies for the unobservable intrinsic value of the IPO is pivotal for a reliable 
estimation of the MP and MV dependent variables.  
 
Three theoretical approaches to the valuation of equity (the asset-based approach, 
discounted cash flows and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model) are discussed.  The 
comparable-firms PE ratio approach, which stems from the discount model and is 
widely used by practitioners, is also discussed.  The rationale for selecting the 
comparable-firms approach as the primary proxy for V is given.  A second proxy, 
derived from the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model, is used to estimate V for application in 
robustness checks of the models in chapters 6 and 7.  The implementation of these 
models is then discussed and descriptive statistics are presented for the distributions 
of the comparable-firms PE estimates of value (VPE) and the Edwards-Bell Ohlson 
estimates of value (VEBO).  Section 5.7 describes the relationships between mispricing 
(MP), misvaluation (MV) and underpricing by grouping sample IPOs according to 
observed levels of MP, with each group then classified by the observed level of MV 
and raw underpricing (RUP).  Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Choice of value measures 
While the theoretical concept of intrinsic value is well established, the selection of a 
proxy is somewhat contentious.  Therefore, this section analyses competing valuation 
models.  First, intrinsic value is defined.  Second, the suitability of P as a proxy for V 
is investigated.  The three main theoretical valuation methods available for estimating 
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the unobservable V are the asset-based approach, discounted cash flow (DCF) models 
and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model (White, Sondhi & Fried, 1998).  These 
three theoretical valuation models are discussed, with particular reference to their 
applicability in the IPO setting.  The comparable firms PE approach, which is widely 
used by practitioners, is also discussed.  Figure 5.1 summarises the relationships of 
the valuation models discussed in this section. 
 




5.2.1 Intrinsic value and market price 
This section provides a definition of intrinsic value and compares this to market price.  
There are two main reasons P cannot provide a reliable proxy for V.  First, the 
horizons for P and V do not necessarily correspond.  Second, the day one price for 
listing companies has to be established in an efficient market if P is to provide an 
unbiased proxy for V. 
 
Intrinsic value reflects the rights associated with the ownership of the security over its 
lifetime rather than the investor‟s horizon.  Thus, intrinsic value is the  
… value of an equity investment that is held over the long term, as 
opposed to the value that can be realized by short-term, speculative 
trading (Barker, 2001). 
Intrinsic value 






Comparable firms PE 
approach 
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This definition clearly differentiates intrinsic value (the long term value) from price 
and casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that P is synonymous with V.  In 
their investigation of post-listing trades in the Australian IPO market, Bayley, Lee and 
Walter (2006) report 51.9% of total trades during the first three days are attributable 
to day traders.  This observation provides support for the notion that aftermarket 
prices are heavily influenced by „short-term, speculative trading‟ and that they are 
unlikely to reflect longer-term value. 
 
As noted in chapter 2, the extent of underpricing and mispricing will be equal when 
the market is efficient and P is an unbiased representation of V.  The equivalence of P 
and V relies on the assumption of insignificant arbitrage costs (Lee, Myers & 
Swaminathan, 1999).  Where arbitrage is not possible, P will only incorporate the 
views of optimistic investors as pessimistic investors are unable to take short positions 
(Miller, 1977).  Arbitrageurs are unable to borrow IPO shares prior to listing so they 
are unable to complete both sides of the covered short-selling arbitrage transaction 
(Geczy, Musto & Reed, 2002).  Chapter 7 discusses the institutional features that 
prevent arbitrage activity in Australian IPO markets.  Further, the assumption that P 
instantaneously reflects all available information is required if P is to provide an 
unbiased estimate of V.  This assumption is contrary to the process of continuous 
convergence of P to V described by Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) and Bhojraj 
and Lee (2002).   
 
P is not, therefore, a suitable proxy for V as the aftermarket price is heavily influenced 
by speculative trades and the market for IPO shares is unlikely to be efficient.  
Further, the objective in this dissertation of disaggregating underpricing into 
mispricing and misvaluation components cannot be achieved with the assumption that 
P equals V.   
 
The attractive feature of an assumed equivalence of P and V is that P is readily 
observable while V is unobservable and cannot be objectively verified.  Boatsman and 
Baskin (1981 p. 44) note that, while „… some might be repulsed at the prospect of 
drawing inferences about an unobservable … on the basis of a data set consisting of 
only observables …‟, theories involving unobservable phenomena require an 
observable proxy for testing.  Proxies for unobservable constructs (expected return, 
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terminal value and the market portfolio, for example) are frequently used in both 
academic research and practice.  While market price provides an observable proxy for 
V, P will not necessarily meet the definition of intrinsic value.  As Lee (2001, p. 246) 
states „… fundamental value is concerned with measuring firm value regardless of 
market conditions‟.  The following sub-sections discuss competing models for 
estimating V. 
  
5.2.2 Asset-based valuation approach 
Asset-based models value equity according to the current market value of the firm‟s 
individual assets less the current market value of liabilities (White, Sondhi & Fried, 
1998).  This relationship is shown in equation 5.1. 
 
VAB = assets - liabilities    (5.1) 
 where  VAB  = asset-based value of the firm‟s equity 
  assets = current market value of recognised and unrecognised assets 
  liabilities = current market value of liabilities 
 
Application of the asset-based model requires an effective restatement of the balance 
sheet after collection of current market values for the firm‟s assets (including 
unidentified assets such as intangibles) and liabilities (Penman, 2007).  The pragmatic 
application of the approach is to proxy the assets component in equation 5.1 with 
book value (B) to give a conservative estimate of V (White, Sondhi & Fried, 1998). 
Application of an asset-based approach to the IPO setting has little relevance as most 
of the value in an IPO comes from growth opportunities rather than from assets in 
place (Kim & Ritter, 1999). 
 
5.2.3 Discounted cash flow valuation 
DCF models discount forecasted future cash flows at the required return to calculate 
present value (White, Sondhi & Fried, 1998).  This relationship is shown in equation 
5.2.  The future flows (CFt+i) in the numerator can be measured as expected 
dividends, expected free cash flows or expected earnings (White, Sondhi & Fried, 
1998).  Each of these specifications of CF, discussed in the following sections, gives 















     (5.2) 
where  VDCF  = discounted cash flow value of the firm‟s equity 
CFt+i = future cash flows 
 r = required return on equity 
 
5.2.3.1 Dividend discount model 
The intrinsic value of a firm is frequently defined in finance textbooks in terms of 
discounted future cash flows [c.f. Bodie et al. (2007)].  However, expected dividends 
should include expected share repurchases and equity issues to reflect all distributions 
to shareholders (Lundholm & Sloan, 2004).   
 
Application of the dividend discount model (DDM) requires either forecast dividends 
to infinity or a forecast of terminal value at time t based on forecast dividends from t 
to infinity.  Assumptions about future growth are made to simplify the forecasting 
process.  The DDM becomes a simple perpetuity with the assumption of no dividend 
growth (Penman, 2007).  Alternately, estimation of V can be simplified with the 
assumptions of a constant growth rate or variable growth rates that settle to some 
future constant growth rate.  The zero or constant growth assumptions are unlikely to 
represent the actual future dividend patterns of IPOs.  While Barker (2001) notes the 
conceptual applicability of the DDM for start-up companies, estimating when 
dividends will be initiated, their size and future growth rates are problematic (Curtis 
& Fargher, 2003). 
 
The DDM is difficult to apply to companies that provide returns to shareholders via 
capital gains rather than dividends (Penman, 2007).  Further, while the dividend 
payout ratio affects the capacity for generating returns from retained earnings, 
dividends distribute value rather than create value in the firm (Penman, 2007). 
5.2.3.2 Discounted free cash flow model 
In the valuation context, free cash flows are defined as „… cash available to debt- and 
equityholders after investment‟ (White, Sondhi & Fried, 1998, p. 1059). As the 
forecasting horizon in equation 5.2 is infinite, finite horizons require the estimation of 




.  Firms can increase free cash flow by making fewer investments 
and this method is more suitable for valuing mature „cashcows‟ than it is for firms 
with variable future growth (Penman, 2007).  In addition, it is difficult to forecast free 
cash flows without having first forecast earnings [White, Sondhi & Fried (1998); 
Penman (2007)].  Discounting free cash flows will prove problematic for many IPO 
firms with negative free cash flows over the shorter horizons (Curtis & Fargher, 
2003).  Lack of history also makes implementation of discounted cash flows difficult 
in the IPO setting (Jog & McConomy, 2003). 
5.2.3.3 Earnings based models 
As for the dividend discount and discounted free cash flow models, assumptions 
about future growth and the required return are necessary when CFt+i in equation 5.2 
is measured by earnings.  If we assume no growth in earnings, equation 5.2 simplifies 





VDCF         (5.3) 
where  VDCF  = discounted cash flow value of the firm‟s equity 
E = future earnings 
 r = required return on equity 
 
Under the assumption that P equals V, equation 5.3 demonstrates that the price-to-
earnings (PE) ratio is the inverse of the firm‟s capitalisation rate37 (White, Sondi & 
Fried, 1998).  This relationship is shown in equation 5.4.     
rE
P 1
         (5.4) 
where  P  = market value of the firm‟s equity 
E = future earnings 
 r = required return on equity 
                                                 
36
 Penman (2007, p. 124) states the „continuing value is not the same as the terminal value‟ because the 
latter is the terminal payoff while the former is the value omitted when the forecast horizon is finite.  
Theoretically, the terminal value (or price of the equity at time T) in the dividend discount model is the 
present value of future cash flows from the point of the terminal value to infinity.  Penman‟s 
characterisation of the „terminal payoff‟ as derived from „selling the firm at time T‟ is consistent with a 
finite rather than infinite forecast horizon. From the perspective of valuing a share, continuing and 
terminal value are, therefore, theoretically equivalent. 
37
 The numerator in the PE ratio should, theoretically, represent P + expected dividends.  From a 
pragmatic perspective, the calculation of PE is not materially affected by the omission of the dividend 
component as dividends are normally small compared to price (White, Sondi & Fried, 1998). 
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It is again important to note that the research in this dissertation rejects the assumption 
that P equals V.  Without this assumption, the PE approach loses its theoretical 
underpinning.  Further, research (c.f. Zarowin, 1990) shows the „no-growth‟ 
assumption in equations 5.3 and 5.4 does not provide an adequate representation of 
most observed PE ratios.  A more detailed discussion of the application of the PE 
model is presented in the following sub-section.   
5.2.3.4 Comparable firms approach 
Comparing the theoretical DCF valuation models with the comparable firms 
approach, Bhojraj and Lee (2002) describe the former as „direct valuation‟ as value is 
determined without reference to the prices of other firms.  They identify the latter 
approach as „relative valuation‟ as value is determined after examining the prices of 
comparable assets.  The comparable firms approach to valuation involves the 
identification of a set of companies in a comparable situation to infer the value of 
another firm (Finnerty & Emery, 2004).   
 
Price multiple ratios relate price to an accounting variable such as earnings, sales, 




PE t        (5.5) 
where  Pt  = current market price 
 E = relevant earnings measure 
 
Multiples are calculated for several comparable firms and averaged for the group 
(Damodaran, 2001).  V is then estimated by multiplying the relevant firm-specific 
accounting variable by a price multiple derived from the comparable firms.   
 
Use of the comparable firms approach is documented in the literature [c.f. Boatsman 
& Baskin (1981); Alford (1992); Kim & Ritter (1999); Bhojraj & Lee (2002)] and is 
advocated in fundamental analysis textbooks (c.f. Penman, 2007).  Kim and Ritter 
(1999) posit that theoretical models provide the justification for the value relevance of 
both the PE and price-to-book (PB) multiples.   
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The comparable firms approach avoids the problems of estimating terminal value, 
discount rates and assessing the impact of imputation credits, all of which are 
experienced when applying the DDM (How, Lam & Yeo, 2007).  The popularity of 
price multiples among practitioners can be attributed to the multiple‟s capacity to 
provide a „… convenient valuation heuristic that produces satisfactory results without 
incurring extensive time and effort costs‟ (Bhojraj & Lee, 2002, p. 408).  The 
Australian brokers surveyed by Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) said they utilised a 
comparable firms approach when setting OP. The high correlation of VPE with OP  
(ρ = 0.725) in that study provides corroborative evidence.  Practical issues associated 
with the implementation of the comparable firms approach in the Australian IPO 
context are discussed in section 5.3.2.  The final valuation method considered in this 
research, the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model, is discussed in the following sub-section. 
 
5.2.4 Edwards-Bell-Ohlson valuation 
The Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model is based on an accounting measure of the 
capital invested (book value) and the present value of residual earnings (Frankel & 
Lee, 1998).  Return on equity (ROE) is expected to be close to the typical firm‟s cost 
of equity (r) in a competitive equilibrium, so residual earnings are those in excess of r 
(Frankel & Lee, 1998).  Equation 5.6 shows the EBO estimation of V where forecast 


































1   (5.6) 
 
where  VEBO  = Edwards-Bell-Ohlson measure of intrinsic value 
B = book value per share  
FROE = forecast return on equity 
 r = required return on equity 
 
The EBO model uses the clean surplus relation shown in equation 5.7.  Clean surplus 
earnings (or „comprehensive income‟) include all gains and losses that affect book 
value. 
 
111   tttt DEBB    or    (5.7) 




where  Bt+1 = forecast book value per share 
Bt = current book value per share 
Et+1 = forecast earnings 
 Dt+1 = forecast dividends 
 k = forecast dividend payout ratio 
 
Testing a variety of residual income models (including EBO) with US data, Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan (1999, p. 3) report these models offer „… modest improvements in 
explanatory power over past empirical research using analysts‟ earnings forecasts in 
conjunction with the traditional dividend-discounting model‟.  Whilst it offers a 
different set of limitations (including the identification of the appropriate level of 
persistence in earnings), the EBO model generates valuations that are not biased from 
the selection of comparable firms
38
.   
 
Several studies compare discounted dividends or cash flow models and find higher 
valuation accuracy with the EBO model.  Francis, Olsson and Oswald (2000) show 
higher valuation accuracy with forecast earnings in the EBO model.  Penman and 
Sougiannis (1998) report the EBO model, even with historic earnings, has higher 
valuation accuracy than discount models over finite horizons.  Further, Frankel and 
Lee (1998) argue that the EBO model provides a more precise estimate of V than 
estimates based on multiples.  Practical issues associated with the implementation of 
the EBO model in the Australian IPO context are addressed in section 5.3.3.  The next 
section discusses how the asset-based, discounted cash flow and EBO models are 
related. 
 
5.2.5 Relationships between valuation models 
Asset-based valuation takes a „stock‟ approach, DCF methods utilise the „flows‟ from 
assets and the EBO model includes both stock and flow measures in the valuation.  As 
expected free cash flows, earnings and dividends are generated by the firm‟s assets, 
the three DCF valuation methods are linked via the use of the required return and are 
theoretically equivalent in a perfect information environment (White, Sondhi & Fried, 
1998).  The EBO model is derived from the DDM [Frankel & Lee (1998); Dechow, 
Hutton & Sloan (1999); Lo & Lys (2000); Bhojraj & Lee (2002)].  Discounted 
                                                 
38
 As for PE multiples, EBO valuations based on management forecasts are potentially biased where 
earnings management occurs prior to the IPO and is reflected in the earnings forecast. 
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dividends, cash flows and earnings are equivalent approaches when the payoffs are 
predicted to infinity (Penman & Sougiannis, 1998).  Real world constraints of 
imperfect costly information and finite horizons cause disparities in valuation from 
the application of these models (White, Sondhi & Fried, 1998).      
 
While the models are theoretically consistent, the ease with which the models can be 
applied in practice varies.  The usefulness of a model is dependent on the availability 
of data to implement it (Barker, 2001).  Market professionals use the discounted cash 
flow and comparable firms approaches most frequently to establish the OP for IPOs 
(Jenkinson & Ljungqvist, 2001).  While forecasted earnings are generated by analysts 
regularly, forecast cash flows are less common [c.f. White, Sondhi & Fried (1998); 
Penman (2007)].  Thus, the methods for estimating of V in this research are based on 
valuation theory and the observed behaviour of market participants. 
 
5.2.6 Selection of valuation models 
Based on the foregoing discussion, this section identifies the valuation models that 
will be applied in this research.  The asset-based approach is not considered further as 
it lacks relevance in the IPO context (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  As discussed in section 
5.2.3, the DDM requires assumptions about future growth rates.  These growth 
assumptions can be little more than speculations in the IPO context, especially for 
firms planning to reinvest profits for further investment rather than pay dividends as 
soon as they are listed.  Valuations using discounted free cash flows are more 
appropriate for mature firms (Penman, 2007) than for IPO firms that may have 
forecast negative free cash flows in the shorter term (Curtis & Fargher, 2003).   
 
In the absence of a „perfect‟ valuation model, this research proxies for V with the 
model most used by practitioners (PE comparable firms) and the most theoretically 
sound valuation technique (the EBO model).  The primary measures of V will be 
based on the PE comparable firms approach.  As discussed in the following section, 
the potential for biased valuations from the PE approach can arise from the selection 
of comparable firms.  To determine if such bias drives the results in this research, V is 
also estimated using the EBO model.  While the EBO model is also subject to 
criticism, it will not be biased by the selection of comparable firms.   
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5.3 Implementing the valuation approaches 
This section discusses the implementation of the comparable firms approach and the 
EBO model in the Australian IPO context.  Management earnings forecasts are 
required to implement both valuation methods and practical issues relating to these 
are discussed in the next sub-section.   
 
5.3.1 Selection of earnings measurements 
The value relevance of the type of earnings measure is a potential source of bias in the 
application of PE multiples in the IPO setting (Kim & Ritter, 1999) and, as earnings 
are also a primary input, to the EBO model.  In this section, selection of the specific 
measure of earnings is discussed.  The choice between trailing and forecast earnings 
measures is then examined. 
5.3.1.1 EBIT and EPS 
The choice of the accounting earnings measure is discussed in this section.  Whilst not 
including as much detail as the financial statements for listed firms, the pro-forma 
income statements included in IPO prospectuses normally show a number of earnings 
„line items‟.  Either EPS or diluted EPS are generally found as the bottom line figure 
in the income statement while several alternative earnings measures, including 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA).   
 
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) argue EBITA is a more stable measure of 
profitability than EPS as it is unaffected by non-operating items.  Kim and Ritter 
(1999) consider the advantage EBITDA over earnings per share available to ordinary 
shareholders (EPS) is that the former is not affected by leverage.  However, using 
leverage as a matching criterion for the selection of comparable firms decreases 
valuation accuracy of the PE method (Alford, 1992). The issue of leverage is further 
complicated in the Australian dividend imputation setting as tax shields from debt, 
which are a source of value for investors in the classical tax system, do not benefit 
Australian resident investors.  Thus, the perceived leverage-related benefits of 
EBITDA over EPS are negated.   
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White, Sondhi & Fried (1998) argue the appropriate measure of earnings is 
determined by the valuation objective.  They identify earnings prior to interest 
payments (i.e. net operating income) as the appropriate measure for firm valuation.  
Earnings after interest (i.e. net income) is the appropriate measure for valuing equity 
(White, Sondi & Fried, 1998).  EPS is the most frequently utilised measure of 
earnings in equity valuation [c.f. Boatsman & Baskin (1981); Alford (1992); 
Berkman, Bradbury & Ferguson (2000); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  Earnings before 
extraordinary items are also used to implement the PE comparable firms approach 
[c.f. Kim & Ritter (1999); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005)] and the EBO model 
(Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005). 
 
The valuation objective in this research is equity shares, so EPS is the appropriate 
measure of earnings.  In the EBO context, EPS is closer than EBIT to the clean 
surplus accounting assumption made in the model [Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998); 
Lo & Lys (2000)].  A potential source of valuation bias in both the EBITDA and EPS 
measures arises from earnings management prior to the IPO.  Evidence on the 
existence and extent of this source of bias is beyond the scope of this research and is 
suggested as a potentially fruitful avenue for further research. 
5.3.1.2 Trailing and forecast earnings 
The fundamental choice of earnings measure for valuation is between historic (or 
trailing) earnings and forecast earnings.  Trailing earnings (for both the comparable 
and valuation firms) frequently feature in US PE valuation academic research [c.f. 
Boatsman & Baskin (1981); Alford (1992); Curtis & Fargher (2003); Purnanandam & 
Swaminathan (2004); Zheng (2007)].  Forecast earnings are used in preference to 
trailing earnings in academic studies conducted in countries where forecasts are 
available [c.f. Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); Berkman, Bradbury & Ferguson 
(2000); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  
 
Trailing earnings are less relevant than leading (or forecast) earnings in the IPO 
setting as the former will not reflect the impact of the generally-larger capital base 
achieved by the listing process (Firth, 1998).  Kim & Ritter (1999) criticise the use of 
trailing earnings in the IPO context as historic accounting data do not provide a 
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reliable benchmark for expectations about the firm‟s post-listing performance.  Kim 
and Ritter report that greater valuation accuracy is achieved with the use of forecast 
earnings in the PE approach.  This result is supported by the use of IPO forecasts in 
preference to historic earnings by Australian brokers in setting OPs (Cotter, Goyen & 
Hegarty, 2005).   
 
Implementation of the EBO model with analyst-forecast earnings outperforms the 
historic earnings version of the EBO with respect to explaining prices in the US [c.f. 
Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1999)].  In their international study, Barniv and Myring 
(2006) find the forecast-based EBO has greater explanatory power for prices in 
Anglo-Saxon markets (including Australia and the US), Japan, Germany and three 
Nordic countries while they exhibit similar performance in the remaining sample 
countries. 
 
Table 5.1 (see page 113) shows that 58% of sample industrial IPOs in Australia 
provided positive earnings forecasts in prospectuses issued between 1997 and 2006.  
As forecast earnings are available for a substantial proportion of sample IPOs, 
forward earnings collected from the prospectuses will be used in the application of the 
PE comparable firms approach.  Having established the selection of forecast earnings 
as the appropriate basis for estimating V in this research, the following sub-section 
discusses the length of time to which the forecasts apply and implications for the 
sample. 
5.3.1.3 EPS forecast horizon 
There is substantial variation in horizon used for earnings forecasts in Australian IPO 
prospectuses.  Forecasts for the first financial year post-listing (where available) are 
used to estimate value in this analysis as these reflect a full year of operating using the 
post-listing capital structure
39
.  First post-listing financial year forecasts may be the 
second forecast of earnings provided in the prospectus.  The first forecast normally 
includes an earnings figure for the current financial year that consists of actual results 
up to the prospectus date plus an estimate of earnings to the end of the period.  This 
                                                 
39
 How, Lam and Yeo (2007) state that higher valuation accuracy is achieved with earnings forecasts 
for the first operating year after listing than for either forecasts based on the next fiscal year or for 
historic earnings.  Their methodology and results for valuation accuracy are unreported. 
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practice can result in the release of actual earnings prior to listing where there is a 
relatively short time reflected in the estimated component of earnings or a relatively 
long time between the prospectus date and listing.  In such cases, the current period 
„forecast‟ is not information about the future at the time of listing and does not reflect 
the post-listing capital base for the full period.  IPOs that „forecast‟ for a period 
ending prior to the listing date (and did not include a subsequent period forecast) are 




Fifteen sample IPOs provided part-year forecasts based on the post-listing capital 
structure.  These part-year forecasts are annualised for those IPOs that do not include 
an additional forecast for the first post-listing financial year
41
.  With the discussion of 
earnings measures now complete, the following section discusses the practical aspects 
of applying the comparable firms approach in this dissertation. 
 
5.3.2 Implementing the PE comparable firms approach 
The PE multiple is used most frequently in academic studies (Kim & Ritter, 1999) 
and is commonly used by practitioners (Finnerty & Emery, 2004).  Alford (1992) 
notes the „extensive‟ use of PE valuations for IPOs in the US.  Australian brokers 
identify PE as the main multiple examined when establishing OPs for fixed-price 
issues (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005).   
 
Equation 5.8 demonstrates the calculation of VPE via the application of the PE 
multiple.  It shows that the two major components of the comparable firms approach 
are the choice of matching firms to establish the multiple (Alford, 1992) and selection 
of the earnings measurement (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  Earnings measurement was 
addressed in the previous section, with forecasted earnings identified as being the 
most relevant for value. Although widely used by practitioners and academics, little 
theory is available to guide the application of price multiples and the process remains 
subjective (Bhojraj & Lee, 2002).   
 
                                                 
40
 The period of time covered by the earnings forecast and the time from prospectus date to listing were 
compared to identify IPOs that could have released actual earnings for the „forecast‟ period prior to 
listing. 
41
 One firm stated that annualising its part year forecast would not reflect the operating performance in 
the financial year post-listing.  This firm was excluded from the sample of forecasters. 
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1 tMatchPE EPEV      (5.8) 
where  VPE = PE measure of IPO value 
 PEMatch = mean or median comparable firms‟ PE multiple 
 Et+1 = management forecasted IPO earnings  
 
In addition to the PE, other multiples used in academic research include price to sales, 
price to cash flow and PB.  In the Australian context, How, Lam and Yeo (2007) 
compare V estimates based on PE and PB multiples to both OP and P and report 
lower median prediction errors for PB multiples.  In the US IPO setting, Kim and 
Ritter (1999) also find PB ratios give the highest valuation accuracy.  However, they 
argue this result is driven by endogeneity arising from the inclusion of offer proceeds 
in both the numerator and the denominator of the PB multiple. Considering this 
endogeneity issue and the documented use of the PE multiple in setting Australian 
OPs, the PB multiple it is not a preferred method for estimating V in this research.  
Section 5.3.2.1 now presents discussion of alternatives for the selection of comparable 
firms and provides the rationale for the selection of comparables in this dissertation. 
5.3.2.1 Selection of comparable firms 
The comparable firms approach relies on the identification of a benchmark PE to 
determine the value of the IPO.  Two different approaches for the selection of the 
comparable firms are identified in the IPO literature.  The first involves the 
identification of a set of fundamental criteria that are used to match the IPO to a small 
set of listed comparable firms [c.f. Boatsman & Baskin (1981); Alford (1992); Kim & 
Ritter (1999); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  The second approach matches by industry 
only and includes all listed firms in the IPO‟s industry as the set of comparable firms 
[Berkman, Bradbury & Ferguson (2000); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005)].  These 
two approaches are discussed in the following sub-sections.   
5.3.2.1.1 Few comparable firms with several matching criteria 
The selection of comparable firms generally begins at the industry level with 
additional refinements to remove firms with lower levels of comparability (Bowman 
& Graves, 2004).  Matching firms by industry provides controls for operating risks, 
profitability and growth (Purnanandam & Swaminathan, 2004).  One comparable firm 
matched by industry and historic growth gives higher valuation accuracy than a 
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randomly-selected firm from the same industry in the US market (Boatsman & 
Baskin, 1981).   
 
Also in the US setting, Alford (1992) forms portfolios of at least six comparable firms 
based on industry, firm size and earnings growth.  The findings indicate that the 
valuation accuracy for listed firms, where industry is used as the matching criterion, is 
not improved by including the additional criteria of size (as a proxy for risk), leverage 
or historic earnings growth (Alford, 1992).  He concludes that matching on industry 
subsumes the effects of size and ROE.  Further, selecting comparables based on 
analysts‟ long-term growth forecasts does not add to the predictive ability of those 
selected on industry alone (Alford, 1992).  
 
Kim and Ritter (1999) use a specialist IPO research boutique to select two comparable 
firms.  These comparable firms are selected by matching forecast earnings rather than 
industry matching.  Kim and Ritter (1999) have analysts‟ forecast earnings available 
for 75% of their sample of US IPOs
42
.  While 58% of Australian IPO fixed-price 
offers provide positive management earnings forecasts that will be utilised in this 
research, analysts‟ forecasts for Australian fixed-price offers are the exception rather 
than the rule.  A generous assumption would be that Australian IPOs have a similar 
analyst interest as currently-listed firms.  Such an assumption would still result in 
analysts‟ coverage for very few IPOs43. Therefore, while Kim and Ritter achieve 
higher valuation accuracy for this method, the availability of analyst earnings 
forecasts for the majority of Australian firms precludes its use here.   
In the Australian context, How, Lam and Yeo (2007) select two comparable firms on 
the basis of industry, historic growth rates and size at listing
44
.  They find significant 
associations for the comparable firms‟ PEs and those of IPOs.  However, the 
comparable firms‟ PEs provide little explanatory power for the IPO PEs (where OP is 
                                                 
42
 Chemmanur & Krishnan (2008) report the median number of analysts forecasting earnings for each 
IPO during the 1980s and 1990s is three. 
43
 While 96% of the largest 200 ASX listed firms have analyst coverage, the proportion of the next 
largest 400 firms is less than 50% (ASX, 2006b).  As the number of companies listed on the ASX is 
about 2 000, these figures translate to about 25% receiving any analyst coverage with smaller 
companies neglected.   As discussed in chapter 3, companies listed on the ASX and fixed-price IPOs 
have about the same median size.   
44
 How, Lam and Yeo (2007, p. 104) state that PEs based on two comparable firms are „more 
appropriate‟ than those based on the best comparable firm, three comparable firms or the industry 
mean.  Their methodology and results for these tests are unreported. 
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the numerator).  AR
2
s for three models regressing IPO PEs on average PEs for two 
comparable firms range from 1.75% to 4.43%.  How, Lam and Yeo report median 
prediction errors in the range of -21.54% to -6.44% when V is compared to OP.  
These large prediction errors give support to notion that issuers adjust the comparable 
PE when setting OP
45
 (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005).  
 
Application of the PE comparable firms approach is not guaranteed to result in 
accurate valuations.  Incorrect valuation of comparable firms is a potential source of 
bias in the application of PE multiples in the IPO setting (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  The 
application of an average or median PE multiple derived from a small number of 
overvalued firms will, ceteris paribus, result in an estimation of VPE that is too high. 
The converse also applies if the comparable firms are undervalued.  Analysis of the 
US market PEs shows prices deviate from fundamentals during bull markets but 
return to equilibrium levels during bear markets (Coakley & Fuertes, 2006)
46
.  
Therefore, PE comparables will provide unbiased (biased) estimates of V in bear 
(bull) markets. 
 
Not all IPOs will have a comparable listed firm for matching (Jog & McConomy, 
2003).  The relatively small size of the Australian market severely constrains the 
number of matching firms in the same industry (How, Lam & Yeo, 2007).  This 
constraint on the number of available matching firms increases the risk of selecting 
comparable firms that lack sufficient similarity to the IPO firm to provide a sound 
basis for valuation.  Further, use of a mechanical algorithm for the selection of 
comparable firms does not select the same comparable firms that would be selected 
by analysts (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  Some practitioners consider the selection of 
comparable firms more an „art form‟ that is not replicated in academic research 
(Bhojraj & Lee, 2002). 
 
 
                                                 
45
 Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) report relative size and growth prospects make positive significant 
contributions to the explanation of offer price for Australian fixed-price IPOs 
46
 The market PE is a function of the individual PEs for listed companies.  As such, evidence that the 
market PE is not always unbiased implies that industry PEs and those of individual firms will also be 
biased during bull market phases.   
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5.3.2.1.2 Many comparable firms with industry as the criterion 
Rather than identify several firms using a number of criteria, Berkman, Bradbury and 
Ferguson (2000) use industry as the sole criterion in New Zealand‟s IPO market.  
They identify difficulties when selecting matching firms and attribute these to the 
very small size of New Zealand‟s exchange.  In the Australian context, Cotter, Goyen 
and Hegarty (2005) measure the PE for comparable firms with the median PE for all 
listed firms in the same industry
47.  This „all industry‟ approach reduces the risk of 
introducing valuation bias via the selection of a small number of comparable firms 
that are misvalued in the market or several firms that are unsuitable for comparison to 
IPO firms. 
 
Large variation among the PEs of US firms in the same industry contributes to large 
valuation errors when using historic earnings (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  Thus, there is a 
risk that the application of industry PEs will result in lower valuation accuracy.  This 
risk is lessened by the use of the median PE which reflects the PE for the „typical‟ 
firm rather than the „average‟ firm represented by the mean.  While Australian 
industry median PEs exhibit substantial variation across industries and display 
considerable time-series variation within industries (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005), 
the US PEs reported by Kim and Ritter (1999) are much higher than those observed in 
Australia during the sample period for this research
48
.  The tighter clustering around 
Australian median PEs and the application of forecasted earnings (discussed in the 
next section) in this research reduces the risk of large valuation errors. 
 
The impact on valuation accuracy of the variability of industry median PEs depends 
on the reasons large deviations occur.  The PE ratio for the Australian stock market is 
                                                 
47
 When estimating the abnormal returns for earnings forecasters, Shi, Bilson and Powell (2008) match 
IPOs to the relevant industry index as they consider the number of Australian listed firms too small to 
allow individual matching.   
48
 The mean PE in Kim & Ritter‟s sample is 33.5 and the standard deviation is 26.9.  More than 50% of 
their IPO have PE ratios above 20 where PE is measured using offer price and historic earnings (see 
Kim & Ritter, 1999, figure 2, p. 419).  In the Australian IPO context, How, Lam and Yeo (2007) report 
mean PE of 17.43 and standard deviation of 49.47 for their IPO sample.  Therefore, while the 
Australian mean PE (using offer price and forecast earnings) for IPOs is about half that of those in the 
US, the standard deviation is almost double.  Unfortunately, these results cannot be used to draw 
conclusions about the relative volatility of PEs as the sample periods are not directly comparable. Kim 
and Ritter use two years of data while How, Lam and Yeo use eight years and only one year of the 
former study period is included in the latter research.  Market movements over the longer How, Lam 
and Yeo sample period are the likely explanation of the higher standard deviation. 
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driven by fundamentals, consistent with market rationality (Shamsuddin & Hillier, 
2004). If this result were to hold at the industry PE level and the industry median PE 
is used for comparable firms, valuation accuracy would be of less concern when 
applying this median in the PE approach. However, no research into the relationship 
of industry PEs and fundamentals at the industry level has been identified.  While 
unable to provide protection from the use of inflated PEs attributable to overvaluation 
of an entire industry, industry PEs prevent the inadvertent selection of one or two 
comparable firms that happen to be overvalued.   
 
In summary, selecting two comparable firms using multiple criteria may result in 
biased estimations of V when the comparable firms are incorrectly valued in the 
market.  For example, V will be optimistically biased if the two selected comparable 
firms are overvalued in a bull market.  Using industry as the only criterion, including 
all firms may result in lower valuation accuracy as dissimilar firms are included in the 
comparison.   Prior literature, however, demonstrates the importance of industry as a 
selection criterion for comparable firms.  Given the low number of comparable firms 
available for selection in the Australian context after controlling for industry, industry 
median PEs are used in this research.  Broadly consistent with the approach used by 
Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005), VPE will be estimated by the application of the 
industry median PE to the management earnings forecast in the prospectus.  The 
industry median PE for the year prior to listing is used in this research. 
 
Therefore, the PE comparable firms approach will be implemented in this research by 
using industry median PEs applied to management earnings forecasts to estimate V.  
Industry median PE is based on the historic earnings of comparable firms as forecast 
earnings data are unavailable for all firms in the industry.  The industry median PE for 
the year preceding listing is used to reflect market conditions contemporaneous with 
the preparation of the prospectus and setting of offer price.   
 
5.3.3 Implementing the EBO approach 
As discussed earlier, PE multiples will give biased estimates of VPE when the 
comparable firms are misvalued in the market.  While the use of industry-median PEs 
protects the VPE estimate from errors arising from the selection of one or two 
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comparable firms that are incorrectly valued, it cannot eliminate bias where most 
firms in the industry are misvalued.  Therefore, valuations derived from the EBO 
model are used in this research to test the sensitivity of results to changes in the 
method of valuation.  
5.3.3.1 Two-period expansion of the EBO model 
A two-period expansion of the EBO model is employed in this research.  The EBO 
model shown in equation 5.6 assumes mean reversion in residual income (Dechow, 
Hutton & Sloan, 1999).  This implies that FROE reverts to some specific level within 
a given timeframe.  The speed of reversion for FROE is called the „fade‟ rate.  
Identification of a theoretically-appropriate fade rate for FROE is difficult in the IPO 
setting (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005). Equation 5.9 shows a two-period expansion 
of the EBO model that does not require the identification of a fade rate as it assumes 
that forecast ROE for the coming year (FROEt) is earned in perpetuity (Frankel & 
Lee, 1998).  The terminal value in equation 5.9 is the discounted perpetuity of next 
period‟s residual earnings.   
 



















    (5.9) 
where  VEBO 2 period  = Edwards-Bell-Ohlson measure of intrinsic value 
Bt  = current book value per share 
FROE  = forecast return on equity 
 r  = required return on equity 
 
Frankel and Lee (1998) contend that shorter expansions (such as equation 5.9) 
outperform their longer-horizon counterparts (equation 5.6) because forecast future 
ROEs become less accurate and forecast errors are compounded in longer expansions.  
The implication contained in equation 5.9 is that investors overestimate the 
persistence of abnormal earnings.  This implication is consistent with the empirical 
results in Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1998).   
Curtis and Fargher (2003) compare differing specifications of the EBO model for a 
sample of US IPOs.  Using pre-IPO ROE to proxy FROE, they find estimates of VEBO2 




 than the more complex implementations of equation 5.6.  
Similarly, values estimated from equation 5.9 in the Australian fixed-price setting 
yield higher correlations with both OP and P than are found for a 5-year or 12-year 
expansion of the EBO model shown in equation 5.6 (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005).  
Equation 5.9 will be used to estimate the EBO valuation in this research.  This choice 
is founded on the empirical superiority of the two-period expansion of the EBO 
model
50
.  The two-period EBO model requires estimates of the cost of equity capital 
(r), FROEt and Bt.  These are discussed in the following subsections. 
5.3.3.2 Cost of equity capital 
The cost of equity capital is used to discount future earnings streams in the EBO 
model.  The firm-specific cost of equity capital is the theoretical discount rate in the 
EBO model but there is little consensus in the practical identification of this rate 
(Frankel & Lee, 1998).   
 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999) use the approximate long-run average realised 
return on US securities (12%) as their discount rate for listed companies.  Industry-
specific discount rates have been applied to US data [Frankel & Lee (1998); Ali, 
Hwang & Trombley (2003)]. Lee, Myers and Swaminathan (1999) find time-varying 
interest rates are a critical component of valuation models when predicting the returns 
of large US companies
51
.  Estimates based on short-term bills outperform those using 
long-term bonds [Lee, Myers & Swaminathan (1999); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty 
(2005)].   
 
In the spirit of Frankel and Lee (1998), Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) use an 
industry-based discount rate in the Australian IPO context.  They apply industry 
Scholes-Williams betas and a constant risk premium of 6% to the CAPM to estimate 
                                                 
49
 Curtis and Fargher (2003) report the highest AR
2
 of 61% for the naïve model of offer value where 
value is estimated as the sum of book value and a perpetuity of pre-IPO earnings.  The next highest was 
54.5% for the model in equation 5.11.  AR
2
s of about 45% and lower were reported for alternate 
specifications of EBO models.  The naïve model will not be used to estimate V in this dissertation.  
First, it does not have a strong theoretical basis.  Second, it does not utilize the earnings forecasts 
available in the prospectuses of firms in this sample.  
50
 As future book values are not required in this version, there is no requirement to forecast the 
dividend payout ratio.  This allows a larger sample size as more IPOs forecast EPS alone rather and 
dividends and EPS (see table 5.1). 
51
 Changes in a firm‟s leverage over time are not expected to impact on the EBO measure of V because 
higher leverage increases ROE and increases r at the same time (Lee, 1996). 
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r.  The 90-day bank-accepted bill rate is used to proxy the risk-free rate and results are 
insensitive to longer-term proxies derived from the 180-day bill rate and 5- or 10-year 
bonds
52
 (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005). 
 
In their examination of the historical risk premium in Australia, Brailsford, Handley 
and Maheswaran (2008) highlight the potential impact of the Australian dividend 
imputation system on the estimation of the risk premium post-1987.  They derive a 
series of market-risk premia based on differing assumptions about the value of 
imputation credits to the market.  If imputation credits carry no (50%, 100%) value 
for the market, the historic risk premium over the 90-day bill rate for the 1988-2005 
period is 5.2% (6.1%, 7%) (Brailsford, Handley & Maheswaran, 2008).   
 
Cost of equity in this research will be estimated using the CAPM.  Given the 
empirical links between short-term rates and future returns, the 90-day bank-accepted 
bill rate is used to proxy for the risk free-rate (rf).  The bill rates are sourced from the 
RBA website.  The time-varying nature of interest rates is incorporated into r by using 
the annualised rate relevant to the twelve-month period prior to the IPOs listing date.  
 
Scholes-Williams industry betas are obtained from the Australian Graduate School of 
Management (AGSM).  Scholes-Williams betas are calculated to incorporate the 
effects of thin trading and are, therefore, more suitable for the trading patterns of most 
IPOs in the short- to medium-term.  The industry beta for the year prior to the 
prospectus date will be applied to the relevant Australian historic market risk 
premium estimated by Brailsford, Handley and Maheswaran (2008)
53
.  Given the 
empirical uncertainty associated with the value of imputation credits, three 
specifications of the cost of equity will be derived for application in the EBO model.  
The first is the application of the post-imputation historic risk premium of 5.2%.  The 
next two specifications also use the risk premium of 5.2% (no value for imputation 
                                                 
52
 The Australian government suspended the issue of Treasury notes in December 2002 (Brailsford, 
Handley & Maheswaran, 2008). 
53
 Rather than use the historic risk premium based on all available data (1883-2005) reported in 
Brailsford, Handley & Maheswaran (2008) the historic risk premium used here is for the post-dividend-
imputation sub-period from 1988 to 2005.  Brailsford, Handley & Maheswaran (2008) caution against 
the use of data pre-dating a structural break in the market and the introduction of dividend imputation 
may represent such a break. 
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credits) when forecast dividends are zero and when no dividend is forecast
54
.  For 
those IPOs forecasting dividends, the risk premiums of 6.1% (imputation credits have 
50% value) and 7% (imputation credits are valued at 100%) are used in the alternate 
specifications. 
5.3.3.3 Future ROEs and book values 
Frankel and Lee (1998, p. 288) identify forecasting future ROEs as the „most 
important and difficult task‟ in implementing the EBO model.  They identify prior 
period earnings or analysts‟ earnings forecasts as two ex ante alternatives.  As 
discussed in section 5.3.1, pre-floatation earnings lose relevance in the IPO context.  
Analyst-forecast earnings have greater predictive ability for stock returns in the US 
(Lee, Myers & Swaminathan, 1999).  As analyst following is low for Australian 
firms, reliance on analysts‟ earnings forecasts for IPOs would require a sample size 
more appropriate for a case study approach than for quantitative analysis.  The 
Australian institutional setting facilitates the provision of management earnings 
forecasts (see section 5.4 below) and these are used to estimate the future ROE in this 
study. 
 
While noting the theoretical requirement for beginning-of-year book values, Frankel 
and Lee (1998) use average book values to avoid problems associated with unusually 
low values in one period leading to inflated FROE.  Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) 
use opening book value (Bt) and delete observations where FROE takes an absolute 
value larger than 100% and find this approach does not cause results to change.  In the 
Australian context, Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) use Bt as reported in the 
prospectus pro-forma statements assuming full subscription of the issue. This 
approach will be used to measure Bt here.  Data screening will be conducted to 
identify any firms where FROE has an absolute value greater than 100%.  Forecast 
EPS is used in preference to alternative forecast earnings measures.  Both forecast 




                                                 
54
 It is very unlikely that a dividend will be paid when the prospectus contains a zero forecast or does 
not contain any forecast for dividends (Dimovski & Brooks, 2005).  
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5.4 Institutional setting 
Both the PE and EBO estimates of V utilise earnings in their calculation and the 
Australian institutional setting facilitates the provision of management earnings 
forecasts in prospectuses.   The institutional setting with respect to the provision of 
earnings forecasts is outlined in the first part of this section.  The second institutional 
feature, relevant to the estimation of VPE, is the industry classification system.  
Changes that occurred to the industry classification system over the sample period are 
also discussed. 
 
5.4.1 Provision of earnings forecasts 
Disclosure of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses was completely voluntary prior 
to the introduction of the Corporations Law (now the Corporations Act 2001) in 1991 
(Brown et al., 2000).  Rather than prescribe a list of information for inclusion in 
prospectuses, the Corporations Act places the onus for selecting the type and amount 
of relevant information for investors on prospectus preparers (Law & Callum, 1997).   
 
Section 710 (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 requires that a prospectus contain „… 
all the information that investors and their professional advisers would reasonably 
require to make an informed assessment…‟ about the rights and liabilities of the 
securities and the financial position and performance of the issuer.  There is no 
requirement for forecast information under the Corporations Law (Law & Callum, 
1997) or under the Corporations Act (Chapple, Clarkson & Peters, 2005)
55
.  Forecasts 
or other forward-looking statements should only be included in the prospectus where 
the issuer has reasonable grounds for making the statement (Corporations Act 2001, 
Section 728 (2)).  Companies without a reasonable basis for a reliable forecast will 
not breach the Corporations Act when they do not provide forecasts (ASC, 1997)
56
.  
Further, ASIC (2001) considers that start-up companies, those making substantial 
                                                 
55
 Lee et al. (2003 p 384) contend that earnings forecasts became “de facto” mandatory after changes to 
the Corporations Law that took effect in January 1991 and that „almost 100% of IPO firms‟ provide 
earnings forecasts after this time.  The proportions of industrial issuers providing earnings forecasts 
reported by Brown et al. (2000) and How and Yeo (2001), combined with the low propensity for 
mining IPOs to disclose earnings forecasts (Brown et al. 2000) suggest, with the benefit of hindsight, 
that issuers did not view the provision of forecasts as „de facto mandatory‟. 
56
 ASC (1997) Practice Note 67 was replaced by ASIC (2002) Policy Statement PS 170 (since renamed 
RG 170) in September 2002.  RG 170 states that prospective financial information without reasonable 
grounds should not be included in the prospectus.  Forecasts without reasonable grounds will be 
considered misleading under the provisions of the Corporations Act (RG 170.24) 
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changes to their operations after the capital raising, and research and development 
companies not ready to commercialise their products should refrain from providing 
forecasts.  However, the Corporations Act introduced uncertainty about the type of 
information to be disclosed resulting in an increase in the proportion of prospectuses 
containing earnings forecasts and „… made it easier for issuers and experts to be held 
liable for inaccurate forecasts‟ (Brown et al., 2000, p. 320).   
 
The most recent regulatory change with respect to earnings forecasts is the 
introduction of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (CLERP) 
which came into effect in March 2000.  The CLERP fundraising reforms reduced the 
litigation risk associated with the provision of earnings forecasts (Chapple, Clarkson 
& Peters, 2005).  The regulatory changes discussed in this section are not expected to 
have a confounding influence on the results in the research.  As the sample period 
employed commences with 1997 listings, all forecasters in the sample period have 
made forecasts only where they had reasonable grounds to do so.  While forecast 
frequency decreased after the introduction of CLERP (Chapple, Clarkson & Peters, 
2005), the integrity of the PE valuation model depends on the consistency of earnings 
forecasts rather than the number of forecasters.  Given that Australian legislation and 
regulation do not prescribe the provision of earnings forecasts, factors associated with 
the provision of voluntary forecasts are now discussed.  
 
Earnings forecasts are provided voluntarily by managers expecting improved firm 
performance, those wishing to signal management quality and those aiming to reduce 
the uninformed investors‟ level of ex ante uncertainty (Jog & McConomy, 2003).  
Firm age is positively associated with the provision of earnings forecasts in Australia 
[How (1996); Chapple, Clarkson & Peters (2005); Bilson et al. (2007)].  Larger 
Australian firms provide earnings forecasts more frequently [How (1996); Chapple, 
Clarkson & Peters (2005)] with those forecasting seeking to raise up to three times the 
amount of funds raised by non-forecasters (Bilson et al., 2007).  There is a positive 
association between the provision of earnings forecasts and the level of post-IPO 
managerial ownership (How, 1996) and forecasters are less likely to have past-period 
losses (Bilson et al. 2007).  While the choice of a high-quality auditor is positively 
associated with the provision of earnings forecasts in Australian samples prior to 1991 
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[How (1996); Lee et al. (2003)], no significant relationship is found during the period 
from 1988 to 2002 (Chapple, Clarkson & Peters, 2005).   
 
5.4.2 Industry classification systems 
Industry classification is used as the benchmark for comparable firms in this research.  
Therefore, industry classification systems used during the sample period are discussed 
in this section.  The ASX produced an industry classification system for companies 
until May 2002.  After this date, the ASX adopted the General Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS).  The ASX classification system was divided into the two broad 
areas of resources
57
 and industrials.  While this broad distinction can be seen in the 
GICS
58
, some old sectors have been regrouped and new sectors added.  For example, 
the ASX industry categories of media, retailing and tourism and leisure are now 
included as media, retailing and consumer services industries in the new sector called 
„consumer discretionary‟.  The ASX system included information technology 
companies as „miscellaneous industrials‟.  Information technology now forms a 
discrete GICS sector.  Chemicals and paper and packaging, classified as „industrials‟ 
under the ASX system, are classified as materials in the GICS. 
 
Standard and Poor‟s do not retrospectively reclassify companies so there is no single 
classification system that covers the whole of the sample period.  Therefore, the ASX 
classification is used for listings prior to May 2002 and the GICS is used for the 
remainder of the sample.  The absence of a single classification system presents a 
potential limitation for the research.  While the GICS shares many of the 
characteristic groupings of the previous ASX system, its introduction during the 
sample period potentially results in some quite different classifications for some firms 
listing around the changeover.  
 
In summary, examination of the Australian institutional features shows that the 
CLERP legislative changes introduced during the sample period are not expected to 
impact on the results of this research.  The change to the GICS industry classification 
scheme and the resultant absence of a single classification scheme that covers the 
                                                 
57
 Resources and the energy sector (i.e. oil, gas, coal and uranium exploration and extraction) 
58
 Resources are replaced by the „materials‟ sector. 
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entire sample period do present a potential limitation for the research.  The next 
section describes the data used to calculate V. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
5.5 Sample and data description 
In order to contextualise the sample of earnings forecasters in this research, this 
section commences with a brief comparison of forecasting and non-forecasting IPOs 
during the sample period.   The following two sections then discuss empirical 
considerations associated with calculating VPE and VEBO and the determination of the 
samples used for each of these measures of value.  The final section presents 
descriptive statistics for each value measure.  
 
5.5.1 Characteristics of forecasters and non-forecasters 
Table 5.1 shows the forecasting behaviours of the 496 sample IPOs described in 
chapter 3.  Positive earnings forecasts are presented by 58% of the sample for the 
period from 1997 to 2006.  Negative earnings forecasts are disclosed by about 4% of 
the sample while 189 (or 38%) of prospectuses do not contain forecasts for earnings 
or dividends.  Only three sample firms provided dividend forecasts while omitting 
earnings forecasts for the next financial year.   
 
Table 5.1 Percentage of earnings and dividend forecasters, 1997-2006 
 
 All  
IPOs 
+ EPS  
forecast 
- EPS  
forecast 
+ DPS  
forecast 




Year  n n % n % n % n % n % 
1997 33 26 79 1 3 20 61 20 61 6 18 
1998 26 19 73 0 0 11 42 11 42 7 27 
1999 85 57 67 10 12 33 39 33 39 18 21 
2000 119 72 61 5 4 43 36 42 35 42 35 
2001 30 14 47 1 3 10 33 10 33 15 50 
2002 22 14 64 0 0 9 41 9 41 8 36 
2003 24 13 54 0 0 11 46 11 46 11 46 
2004 64 31 48 1 2 29 45 27 42 32 50 
2005 50 17 34 0 0 15 30 15 30 33 66 
2006 43 26 60 0 0 19 44 19 44 17 40 
                
Sample 496 289 58% 18 4% 200 40% 197 40% 189 38% 
 
EPS = earnings per share.   DPS = dividends per share 
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The proportion of IPOs providing positive earnings forecasts varies across the sample 
period but shows no clear trend.  The proportion of prospectuses providing negative 
earnings forecasts decreases dramatically in the latter sample years, providing some 
support for the Chapple, Clarkson and Peters (2005) argument that CLERP reduced 
litigation risk (with respect to disclosure) for issuers.  While the evidence is not 
unequivocal, there appears to be a trend toward more issuers omitting forecasts from 
their prospectuses. 
  
Explicit forecasts of zero dividends were made by 12.3% of IPOs forecasting positive 
earnings, while 6.25% of earnings forecasters did not make a dividend forecast.  
Dimovski and Brooks (2005) compare realised dividend payments for Australian 
IPOs forecasting zero dividends and those omitting forecasts of dividends.  Only 1.7% 
of Australian IPOs pay a dividend after omitting a dividend forecast in the prospectus 
(Dimovski & Brooks, 2005).  They conclude that an omitted forecast can be 
interpreted as a zero dividend forecast.  Given the effective equivalence of IPOs 
forecasting zero dividends and those omitting dividend forecasts, only positive 
dividend forecasts are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
There are 97 start-up firms
59
 in the sample identified in chapter 3.  The majority of 
these (83.6%) do not forecast earnings while sixteen start-ups (16.4%) provide 
positive earnings forecasts.  95% of IPOs with positive earnings forecasts have an 
operating history.  17.6% of these report losses for either the financial year of the IPO 
or the year preceding it.  In contrast, 40.6% of IPOs with negative or no earnings 
forecasts have prior period losses while a further 39.1% are start-ups. 
 
The first full-forecast year post-listing is used for forecast earnings per share in the 
analysis from this point forward.  Thirteen IPOs that forecast negative earnings for the 
first financial year of operation are excluded from the calculation of value as positive 
forecasts are required to implement both the PE comparable firms approach and the 
EBO method.  There are 289 IPOs during the sample period that provide positive 
earnings forecasts for the financial year after listing.  The mean (median) earnings 
                                                 
59
 Start-ups are defined here as companies without an operating history and historic financial statements 
that include only the costs of establishing the business. 
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forecast per share for this group is $0.095 ($0.081) and the standard deviation of 
forecasts is $0.10.  The range of forecasts is from $0.0006 to $1.11.   
 
 
Table 5.2 shows the forecasting behaviour of IPOs in different industries over the 
sample period.  This analysis is undertaken to identify any propensity for industry 
membership to determine the forecasting behaviour of firms. Further, industry 
membership is used to identify the comparable PE ratio and to determine the relative 
size measure based on market capitalisation.  Comparison of forecasting behaviour 
across industries is constrained by the change of industry classification system in 
2002.  Similar groupings (the ASX group „investment and financial services‟ with the 
GICS group „diversified financials‟, „food and household‟ with „food and drug 
retailing‟, healthcare and biotechnology‟ with „healthcare equipment and services‟ 
and „hotels, tourism and leisure‟ with „tourism and leisure‟) have been combined 
across time to facilitate comparability.  The telecommunications, retailing and 
transportation groupings are fairly consistent in both systems.   
 
Inter-industry comparison of forecasting behaviour is further hampered by the small 
number of listings in some industries (engineering, banks and finance and insurance, 
for example).  Therefore, this analysis is confined to those industries with more than 
ten listings in the sample period.  The highest proportion of forecasters in these 
industries is 78.8% in retailing.  The lowest proportion (12.5%) is found in 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  This result supports the notion that earnings 
predictability plays an important role in the decision to provide earnings forecasts. 
 
While the relative proportions of forecasters increase over the sample period in 
healthcare and retailing, the remaining industries appear to maintain reasonably stable 
proportions of forecasters.  The ASX grouping „miscellaneous industrials‟ represents 
the largest number of listings (114) in the sample, with about 65% of these IPOs 
providing earnings forecasts.  This grouping, however, includes companies from 









Table 5.2 Earnings forecasters (F) and non-forecasters (NF) by industry, 1997-2006 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Industry 
Industry F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF F NF total 
Automobiles & components                  1   1 
Banks & finance       2  1            3 
Diversified financials 1    3 3 7 5 2 1 1 1 3  2 1 2 1 2 2 37 
Insurance                 1    1 
Building materials 1      1              2 
Capital goods             2 2 5 6 5 3 6 1 30 
Developers & contractors 3  1    2              6 
Engineering   1                  1 
Food & drug retailing 1    3  1 2 2       2   1 1 13 
Alcohol & tobacco 2  1 1 1  2  1            8 
Food, beverage & tobacco            1 1 1  1 1  1 2 8 
Healthcare  1 1 1 2 3 5 6 9  7 1 3 1 3 3 4  8  2 60 
Pharmaceuticals & biotech           1   4 1 9  7 1 1 24 
Tourism & leisure 1  1  2 1  2 1  1  1  1 1 1 1 2  16 
Consumer services                    2 2 
Infrastructure & utilities 1    1  1 1 1 1           6 
Media 1  1  6 5 6 5   1    1 2  2   30 
Miscellaneous industrials 9 4 9 2 24 8 24 17 4 6 4 3         114 
Information technology             2  5 2  2 4 2 17 
Commercial services & supplies           4  1 1 2 3 2 5 3 1 22 
Consumer durables & apparel               1     1 2 
Paper & packaging     1  5              6 
Real estate             2  1 2 1  2  8 
Retailing 1  2  5 3 5 3 2      6  3 1 2  33 
Telecommunications 3 2 2 2 7 3 9 3  1     3   2  2 39 
Transportation 1    1  1          1  1  5 
Utilities           1        1  2 
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5.5.2 Sample data for VPE 
Empirical considerations for calculating VPE are discussed in this section.  The first of 
these considerations is the exclusion of „diversified financials‟ from the sample.  This 
industry category includes listed investment companies (LICs) and other investment 
vehicles whose PEs will not provide suitable comparables for other firms in this 
group.  The second sub-section describes the calculation of industry median PEs.   
5.5.2.1 Exclusion the ‘diversified financials’ industry category 
The ASX industry classification „investment and financial services‟ and the GICS 
classification „diversified financials‟ both include LICs.  While sample IPOs do not 
include such funds, it was not possible to obtain sufficiently-fine industry 
classifications to exclude these from the calculation of industry medians.  There is no 
reason to assume the PEs of investment funds will provide meaningful comparable 
PEs for other types of companies (such as stock brokers, for example) in this industry 
grouping.  Therefore, 13 sample IPOs classified as investment and financial services 
and a further 9 classified as diversified financials are excluded from the calculations 
of PE intrinsic value.   
5.5.2.2 Constructing industry median PEs 
Industry median PEs (rather than averages) are used in prior valuation research [c.f. 
Kim & Ritter (1999); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005)].  Visual inspection of the 
distributions of the PEs for listed companies by industry confirms that the median is 
the more appropriate measure of central tendency.  As outliers exert less influence on 
the median than the mean, the choice of median PE also provides some protection 
from valuation bias associated with the misvaluation of some firms in an industry. 
 
Industry median PEs for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999 were obtained for a prior 
study from Aspect Financial.  As these data vendors now focus on the provision of 
databases rather than providing tailored data on request, the median PEs for 2000 to 
2005 are constructed for this research.  Lists of companies in each industry were 
purchased from the AGSM.  The PE for each company was obtained from the 
FinAnalysis database.   
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The range of PEs for comparable-firm industries during the 2000-2005 period is 1 226 
to negative 15 180 and the standard deviation of these is 361.56.  Kim and Ritter 
(1999) deal with outliers by winsorising all values of PE over 100 to 100.  How, Lam 
and Yeo (2007) exclude negative PE ratios and those exceeding 15 when selecting 
comparable firms.  Extreme observations in this sample are trimmed via the removal 
of the highest and lowest 5% of PEs.  The remaining 90% of PEs are within the range 
of 43.62 to negative 32.33.   
 
Some industries exhibit negative median PE ratios for some sample years.  Negative 
median PEs cannot be used to generate values with the comparable firms approach so 
13 healthcare IPOs
60
, three pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
61
, 11 information 
technology
62
 and 18 telecommunications
63
 IPOs were excluded.  In total, negative 
median PEs resulted in the exclusion of 41 sample IPOs from the calculation of PE 
intrinsic value and VPE is calculated for 222 sample firms. 
 
5.5.3 Sample data for VEBO 
FROE is calculated for the 289 earnings forecasters identified from the baseline 
sample.   These are screened for extreme observations exceeding an absolute value of 
100 [Frankel & Lee (1998); Ali, Hwang & Trombley (2003)].  Twenty sample IPOs 
where FROE exceeds 100% are excluded
64
.   Whilst the listing dates of the excluded 
firms are broadly consistent with the distribution of listing dates across the sample, 
the excluded IPOs have significantly larger market capitalisation
65
.   
 
Ten of these exclusions were also removed from the VPE sample as these companies 
have negative median PEs (six) or membership of the diversified financials industry 
group (four).  Four of the remaining exclusions are „miscellaneous industrials, three 
                                                 
60
 The median PEs for healthcare were negative in 1999, 2000 and 2003, so healthcare IPOs in 2000, 
2001 and 2004 are excluded. Healthcare‟s median PE was positive in 1996, 1997 and 2002 and one 
healthcare IPO listing in 1997, 1998 and 2003 is included.  
61
 Negative median pharmaceutical and biotechnology PEs in 2001, 2003 and 2005 led to the exclusion 
of one IPO in this industry in 2002, 2004 and 2006. 
62
 Information technology median PEs are negative for 2002, 2003 and 2005. 
63
 The median PEs for telecommunications are negative for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2005, leading to the 
exclusion of telecom IPOs in 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2006.  The median is positive for 1999, so six 
telecom IPOs listing in 2000 are included. 
64
 No IPO included in the calculation of value has a negative FROE as only positive earnings forecasts 
are included here. 
65
 Mann-Whitney U = 2 135 p = 0.000 and t-test for difference of mean p = 0.003. 
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are „retailing‟, two are „real estate‟ and the final exclusion is the only sample 
representative from the „insurance‟ industry classification.  After these exclusions, 
VEBO is calculated for 269 IPOs. 
 
5.5.4 Descriptive statistics for VPE and VEBO 
This section provides descriptive statistics for values calculated using the PE 
comparable firms and the EBO approaches.  Descriptive statistics for earnings 
forecasts and other components used in the calculation of VPE and VEBO are presented 
here.  As the sample sizes for each value measure differ, descriptive statistics for EPS 
are shown in table 5.3 (VPE descriptives) and table 5.4 (VEBO descriptives). 
 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive statistics for 222 sample IPOs included for the 
estimation of VPE.  While VPE is the key variable of interest, descriptive statistics are 
also presented for EPS and industry median PEs to provide comparative data for 
future research.  The mean and median EPS are quite close at $0.092 and $0.081 
respectively and the hypothesis of a normal distribution is not rejected at the 
conventional level.  The distribution of PE is significantly non-normal
66
.   
 
Table 5.3 VPE descriptive statistics for 222 IPOs 
 
 Mean     Median     S.D. K-S 
(p-value) 
Min Max 
EPS ($) 0.092 0.081 0.064 (0.061) 0.001 0.587 
Industry median PE 9.709 8.629 3.092 (0.000) 2.167 20.840 
VPE 0.900 0.710 0.723 (0.001) 0.005 5.040 
       
 
EPS = earnings per share.   PE = price-earnings ratio.  VPE = comparable firms estimate of value 
 
The lowest industry median PE (2.1665) is provided by the healthcare and 
biotechnology industry during 1996
67
.  The highest (20.84) is reported in the GICS 
classification „healthcare equipment and services‟ for 200568.  VPE ranges from 
$0.0049 to $5.04, with a mean (median) of $0.90 ($0.71).  Figure 5.2 shows the 
                                                 
66
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is 3.004 (p = 0.001) 
67
 The sample contains IPOs listing from January, 1997.  The median PE for 1996 is relevant as the 
prior calendar year is used to estimate VPE.   
68
 All other median PEs in the healthcare industries are negative for the sample period, demonstrating 
the volatile nature of PE ratios.   
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distribution of VPE for the sample, overlaid with the normal curve.  The distribution is 
significantly non-normal
69


























Table 5.4 VEBO descriptive statistics for 269 IPOs 
 
 Mean     Median     S.D. K-S 
(p-value) 
Min Max 
EPS 0.088 0.080 0.060 (0.040) 0.001 0.476 
Bt 0.438 0.333 0.354 (0.000) 0.016 2.494 
FROE 0.275 0.222 0.198 (0.000) 0.002 0.951 
Industry beta 1.186 1.200 0.592 (0.452) 0.200 3.390 
rf 0.056 0.056 0.006 (0.008) 0.043 0.066 
r0  0.117 0.118 0.033 (0.349) 0.050 0.230 
r50  0.125 0.124 0.036 (0.349) 0.052 0.261 
r100  0.132 0.127 0.041 (0.270) 0.053 0.291 
VEBO0 0.906 0.831 0.663 (0.013) -0.145 6.359 
VEBO50 0.857 0.783 0.639 (0.011) -0.145 6.359 
VEBO100 0.815 0.728 0.621 (0.008) -0.145 6.359 
       
 
EPS = earnings per share.  Bt = pro-forma book value of equity per share at listing. FROE = forecast earnings per 
share / Bt.  Industry beta = Scholes-Williams industry beta.  rf  = annual return on 90-day bank accepted bills 
measured at the prospectus month.  r0 = annual return on equity where imputation credits have zero value.  r50 = 
annual return on equity where imputation credits are valued at 50%.  r100 = annual return on equity where imputation 
credits are valued at 100%.  VEBO0 = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  VEBO50 = EBO model value where 
r50 is the discount rate.  VEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.   
 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the 269 sample IPOs included in the 
estimation of VEBO.  Again, while VEBO are the primary measures of interest, 
                                                 
69
 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is 1.962 (p = 0.001). 
70
 The skew statistic is 2.489 and kurtosis is 9.625. 
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descriptive statistics for EPS, Bt, FROE, industry beta and the risk-free rate are 
provided to assist the identification of any potential time-period-specific trends in 
future research.  The mean (median) EPS is $0.0876 (0.80) and the distribution of 
EPS for these IPOs makes a significant departure from the normal distribution
71
.  The 
mean (median) pro-forma book value of equity per share at listing is $0.43 ($0.33), 
exhibits a wide range of values and has a significantly non-normal distribution.  
FROE is also non-normal with a range of 0.19% to 95% and a mean (median) of 
27.45% (22.19%).   
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 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic is 1.399 (p = 0.001). 
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Consistent with higher valuation of imputation credits, the increasing discount rates 
for r50 and r100 result in lower valuations as measured by VEBO50 and VEBO100.  The 
mean value of VPE is very similar to that of VEBO0 while the median for VEBO100 is 
closest to (but higher than) median VPE.  Maxima and minima are identical for each of 
the VEBO measures.  The firms providing these do not forecast dividends so VEBO 
measures are unaffected by the imputation credit assumption used to determine the 
discount rates.  The distributions of the three VEBO measures are shown in figure 5.3.  





5.6 Correlation of value proxies 
Correlation analysis is now used to assess the relationships between the different 
measures of value.  Table 5.5 presents both Pearson (right-hand side) and Spearman 
coefficients (left-hand side) for the 212 sample IPOs for which both VPE and VEBO are 
calculated.  Even given the non-normal distributions of the value measures, the 
Pearson coefficients confirm the results shown by the Spearman coefficients.   
  
Table 5.5 Correlation of VPE and VEBO measures, 212 IPOs from 1997-2006 
 
 VPE VEBO0 VEBO50  VEBO100 
VPE  0.785** 0.768** 0.750** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VEBO0 0.822**  0.998** 0.993** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
VEBO50 0.805** 0.997**  0.998** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
VEBO100 0.791** 0.990** 0.998**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Spearman correlations are shown on the left-hand side of the table and Pearson‟s are on the right. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
VPE = comparable firms estimate of value. VEBO0 = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  VEBO50 = EBO model 
value where r50 is the discount rate.  VEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate. 
 
There are strong and highly significant relationships between each of the value 
measures.  The three EBO proxies for value are expected to have high correlations as 
VEBO0, VEBO50 and VEBO100 will be identical for those IPOs without dividend forecasts 
                                                 
72
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are 1.586, 1.608 and 1.653 for VEBO0, VEBO50 and VEBO100 respectively.  
Skewness (kurtosis) is 2.922 (18.426), 3.197 (21.631) and 3.460 (24.762) for VEBO0, VEBO50 and VEBO100 
respectively.  Compared to VPE, kutosis is even more extreme in the EBO value. 
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(i.e. 40% of the forecasting sample).  The high correlations between VPE and each of 
the VEBO measures provide support for the notion that VPE and VEBO both capture the 
same underlying phenomenon (i.e. the value of a share).  With the description and 
analysis of the value proxies now complete, section 5.7 examines the empirical 
relationships of mispricing, misvaluation and underpricing for the sample. 
 
5.7 Observed relationships of mispricing, misvaluation and underpricing 
In order to contextualise the development of the mispricing and misvaluation models 
in the following two chapters, figure 5.4 shows the range of possible relationships of 
positive and negative mispricing, misvaluation and underpricing.  While all possible 
relationships are included in figure 5.4, classification of IPOs from the sample of 212 
IPOs for which both VPE and VEBO are calculated show that not every possible 
relationship is observed in the data.   
 
MP and MV are measured with VPE in figure 5.4 and underpricing is measured as raw 
underpricing (RUP).  Few differences are observed when VEBO and market-adjusted 
underpricing (MAUP) are used to classify the data so only the VPE measures of MP 
and MV and the RUP measure of underpricing are presented to achieve clarity.  
  
In panel A, mispricing (MP) remains positive (OP<V) while misvaluation (MV) and 
initial returns (underpricing or RUP) vary.  A.1, for example, shows positive MP, 
negative MV and negative RUP with V located between P and OP.   Panel B shows 
scenarios for zero mispricing (OP = V) and panel C shows negative mispricing 
(OP>V).  Again, the directions on MV and RUP vary.  The final column in figure 5.4 
indicates the number of sample IPOs that exhibit the specified relationships of MP, 
MV and RUP. 
 
Positive mispricing is reported for the majority (56%) of sample IPOs.  Roughly 
three-quarters (76%) of IPOs with positive mispricing are also underpriced, indicating 
a positive relationship between MP and underpricing.  However, the majority of IPOs 
with negative mispricing (panel C) are also underpriced, indicating that any 
relationship between MP and underpricing is not constant.  Similarly, positive 
misvaluation does not always correspond with underpricing.   
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Figure 5.4 Underpricing, mispricing and misvaluation, 212 forecasters 
 
Panel A:  positive mispricing (n = 118) 
       MV RUP No. 
A.1  P V OP   -ve -ve  3 
          
A.2   P = V OP   nil -ve  0 
          
A.3   V P OP  +ve -ve  15 
          
A.4   V OP P  +ve +ve 90 
          
A.5   V OP = P   +ve nil 10 
          
Panel B: no mispricing (n = 0) 
          
B.1   OP = V P   +ve +ve 0 
          
B.2   OP = P = V    nil nil 0 
          
B.3  P OP = V    -ve -ve 0 
          
Panel C:  negative mispricing (n = 94) 
          
C.2 P OP V    -ve -ve 19 
          
C.1 OP P V    -ve +ve 39 
          
C.3  OP=P V    -ve nil 10 
          
C.4  OP P = V    nil +ve 0 
          
C.5  OP V P   +ve +ve 26 
          
 
V = value estimated using forecast earnings and the industry median PE multiple.  OP = offer price.  P = market price.  MP 
= OP minus V.  MV = P minus V. 
 
On the whole, IPOs with positive mispricing tend to have positive misvaluation and 
those with negative mispricing tend to have negative misvaluation.  This conclusion is 
supported by the large positive and highly significant correlations between MP and 
MV shown later in table 8.6.  The strong association between MP and MV has an 
important implication for the disaggregation of underpricing:  MP and MV are not 
independent and should not be included in one model of underpricing.  The positive 
relationship observed for MP and MV is investigated further in chapter 7. 
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5.8 Conclusions 
After the examination of three broad approaches to the valuation of equity, two 
earnings-based models have been selected to operationalise value in this research.  
Using both the PE comparable firms and the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson model protects the 
research from potential biases that may arise in either of the valuation methods.  
While much prior research assumes that market price is an unbiased estimate of V, 
this research applies independent estimates of V to determine the extent of mispricing 
(in the next chapter) and misvaluation (in chapter 7) in order to achieve the 
disaggregation of underpricing. 
 
Both selected valuation models are implemented with forecast earnings for the 
financial year following the prospectus date.  The comparable firms approach applies 
industry median PEs for the year prior to listing to forecast earnings to estimate VPE.  
The EBO model uses a two-year expansion with FROE calculated from prospectus 
data and return on equity estimated using the CAPM. 
 
Correlation analysis shows strong but imperfect relationships between the measures of 
value.  This result suggests that while both methods of determining value do, in fact, 
determine value, they do so with error.  The measurement of V with error for each of 
the models demonstrates the importance of assessing the robustness of results with 
alternative measures of value.  The VPE and VEBO measures of value described in this 
chapter are related to OP and P to estimate mispricing and misvaluation in the next 
and subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 6  
MISPRICING OF AUSTRALIAN FIXED-PRICE IPOs 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter takes the first step in the disaggregation of underpricing with the 
investigation of mispricing.  Mispricing (MP) is defined as the difference between the 
offer price (OP) of an IPO share and its intrinsic value (V).  Investors consider the 
relationship of OP to V in their decisions to apply for shares
73
 (Ellul & Pagano, 2006).  
This chapter addresses the second research sub-question: which issuer-related factors 
determine the level of IPO mispricing? 
 
Measures of V have been discussed in chapter 5 and this chapter commences with a 
discussion of OP.  The measurement of mispricing is addressed in section 6.3 and 
relevant institutional features are discussed in section 6.4.  Potential factors associated 
with mispricing are identified and the mispricing model is developed in section 6.5.  
Section 6.6 presents descriptive statistics and measures of association for the 
dependent and independent variables.  The mispricing model is tested in section 6.7 
and robustness checks are discussed in section 6.8.  Conclusions are then presented in 
the final section. 
 
6.2  Offer price and the number of shares offered 
As mispricing represents the divergence of OP from V, the mispricing model is 
developed with reference to factors that are posited to have an influence on OP.  In 
the fixed-price setting, Welch (1992) theorises that issuers with some given number of 
shares reduce offer price to achieve greater certainty with respect to the level of 
proceeds.  Ellul and Pagano (2006) model after-market liquidity and underpricing in 
the UK fixed-price context.  They also posit that the number of shares issued is 
exogenous with issuers setting the highest OP that is consistent with selling the 
number of shares offered.  In contrast, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) report that issuers 
                                                 
73
 Ellul & Pagano (2006, p. 388) identify V as the „expected value of the share‟ to the investor, 
conditional on the information held by the investor. 
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in the US bookbuild setting select the number of shares to generate offer prices within 
pre-specified ranges
74
.   
 
Figure 6.1 provides empirical evidence that Australian OPs cluster around specific 
values.  The earnings forecasting sample of 289 fixed-price IPOs described in chapter 
5 is used to generate this distribution.  Sample offer prices range from $0.20 to $5.00 
with a standard deviation of $0.5934.  The mean (median) offer price is $0.9188 
($1.00) and the distribution is significantly non-normal
75
.   
 
























While there are 481 possible discrete OPs within this range (based on increments of 
$0.01), only 38 are observed in the sample.  Further, 62% of issues have offer prices 
of $0.20, $0.50 or $1.00
76
.  These data suggest issuers set OP with reference to market 
conventions and adjust the number of shares on offer rather than set a clearing offer 
price to ensure the full sale of offered shares.   
                                                 
74
 Standard economic theories of supply and demand, where the interplay of supply and demand 
determines both the price and quantity sold of some product, are somewhat complicated in the equities 
context.  Holding constant the proportion of the company offered, the value of the IPO should not 
depend on the number of shares offered.  The relevant „quantity‟ that should respond to price is the 
proportion of the company sold, not the (arbitrary) number of shares.  Issuing relatively more shares 
facilitates liquidity in the secondary market. 
75
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = 3.927, p = 0.000.  The distribution exhibits significant skewness  
(5.096) and kurtosis (12.413). 
76
 64% of the sample described in chapter 3 have offer prices of $0.20, $0.50 or $1.00.  The main 
difference between the full sample and the earnings forecaster sub-sample is the former contains a 
higher proportion of IPOs with offer prices in the range of $0.25 to $0.50. 
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This evidence is contrary to the expectations of Welch (1992) and Ellul and Pagano 
(2006) with respect to issuers selecting OP rather than the number of shares to offer.  
It is, however, supportive of Habib and Ljungqvist‟s (2001) evidence on issuer 
behaviour with issuers selecting the number of shares to achieve the desired OP.  To 
illustrate this point, consider an IPO where the issuers intend to sell the company for 
$100 000.  Following the expectations of Welch and Ellul and Pagano, issuers may 
select an offer price of, say, $0.80 per share.  The number of shares offered is then 
determined by dividing the sale price of the company by the offer price, resulting in 
the offer 125 000 shares.  Alternately, the issuer may choose to offer 100 000 shares 
to achieve an offer price of $1.  This later approach is consistent with the relatively 
low diversity of offer prices in the Australian fixed-price setting.   
 
While the total amount of mispricing will not necessarily be determined by the 
number of shares offered, the amount of mispricing per share will be affected by the 
method of determining offer price.  This issue is addressed by robustness tests in 
section 6.8.5.  The next section discusses the measurement of the dependent variable 
for the mispricing model developed in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Measuring mispricing  
Grounded in the early IPO literature that relies on market price as the appropriate 
measure of value, the term „underpricing‟ is used when market prices exceed offer 
prices.  Thus, „mispricing‟ is the divergence of offer price from value.  „Mispricing‟ is 
also used in the broader finance literature to indicate the divergence of market price 
from value.  The objective in this research is to disaggregate underpricing via the 
investigation of factors that influence offer price and those that influence market 
price.  Rather than use the term „mispricing‟ to describe these two distinct 
components of underpricing, mispricing (MP) is used here to identify a divergence of 
offer price (OP) from value (V), consistent with the bulk of prior IPO literature.  
Equation 6.1 demonstrates this relationship.  
 
iii VOPMP       (6.1) 
where  MPi = per share level of mispricing 
 OPi  = per share offer price  
 Vi  = per share proxy for value 
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Misvaluation (MV) indicates a divergence of subsequent market price (P) from value 
(V).   The stickiness of OPs, discussed in the previous section, suggests the level 
(rather than the proportion) of MP as the appropriate dependent variable.  Discussing 
the relative merits of dependent variables measured as „levels‟ versus „returns‟, 
Easton and Sommers (2003, p. 51) note that levels „… capture all returns since the 
firm came into existence‟.  Pre-listing prices are non-existent for start-up IPOs and are 
not generally observable for trading firms prior to listing.  Returns should be specified 
as the dependent variable where the research objective is to assess the impact of some 
change over time (Easton & Sommers, 2003). From the IPO investor‟s perspective, 
the IPO effectively comes into existence at listing.  Therefore, levels provide the 
appropriate dependent variable in this research design.  
 
6.3.1 Relating value to offer price 
Prior to investigating the factors associated with mispricing, it is first necessary to 
establish a relationship between OP and V.  This section examines simple regressions 
of OP on V to establish the nature and magnitude of the relationship.  Table 6.1 
reports the results of these regressions. 
 
Consistent with the four methods for estimating value presented in chapter 5, 
regression results for the four estimates of V are shown in table 6.1.  The regressions 
show V explains about 25-32% of the variation in OP.  These results provide 
justification for the investigation of mispricing factors as OP is not determined solely 
in relation to V.  The results also support those of Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) 
who find factors in addition to value are significant in the explanation of OP
77
.  The 
residuals for the VEBO models are symmetric with excess positive kurtosis while those 




The mechanical interpretation of the highly significant constants for each regression 
of V on OP is that they represent the divergence of OP from V when V is zero.  A 
mechanical interpretation is valid when zero values for the independent variable can 
be observed in the sample (Gujarati, 2003).  Thus, this interpretation could be valid  
                                                 
77
 Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) find VPE, relative size and growth prospects are significant 
determinants of OP.  Their model also has a significant constant of the magnitude of 0.327. 
78
 Residuals from the VPE regression have skewness of 3.714 and kurtosis of 27.71. 
 130 
Table 6.1 OLS estimation of the relationship of OP and V 
 
  Dependent variable 
  
OP 
(n = 222) 
OP 
(n = 269) 
OP 
(n = 269) 
OP 
(n = 269) 
constant coefficient 0.551** 0.456** 0.486** 0.515** 
 t-stat 8.885 4.089 4.298 4.570 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
VPE coefficient 0.393**    
 t-stat 5.442    
 p (0.000)    
VEBO0 coefficient  0.493**   
 t-stat  3.345   
 p  (0.000)   
VEBO50 coefficient   0.487**  
 t-stat   3.101  
 p   (0.002)  
VEBO100 coefficient    0.477** 
 t-stat    2.913 
 p    (0.004) 
R
2
  0.315 0.303 0.275 0.248 
JB  37.27 397.52 440.872 479.51 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.870 1.973 1.974 1.974 
RESET F 16.120** 16.238** 17.272** 17.498** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed) 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted 
VPE = comparable firms estimate of value. VEBO0 = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  VEBO50 = EBO model value 
where r50 is the discount rate.  VEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate. 
  
 
when EBO models are used to estimate V as VEBO ranges from -0.1452 to 6.36 (see 
table 5.4).  While the lower range of VPE is a near zero value (0.0049, see table 5.3), 
the exclusion of negative earnings forecasts and negative median industry PEs ensures 
that VPE cannot take a zero or negative value.  In this situation, the constant represents 
omitted variables (Gujarati, 2003).  Highly significant RESET tests confirm that V is 
only one of a set of variables that explain OP. 
 
6.3.2 Distributions and descriptive statistics for MP 
Figure 6.2 shows the distributions of the MPPE, MPEBO0, MPEBO50 and MPEBO100 
measures of MP.  These distributions are constructed from the 180 observations that 
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form the mispricing sample.  The rationale for the final sample size is presented in 
section 6.6.   
 




















































































The distributions in figure 6.2 appear symmetric and centred close to a zero level of 
mispricing.  Table 6.2 shows the proportions of positive and negative mispricing for 
each value proxy.  Broadly speaking, about half the sample IPOs have positive levels 
of mispricing.  The highest proportion of positive mispricing (56.91%) is identified 
with VPE and the lowest (44.2%) occurs when VEBO100 is the value proxy. 
 
The extreme outlier shown in figure 6.2 is Sterling Biofuels Ltd.  This IPO floated in 
2006 and reported the highest forecast EPS ($0.379) for the sample.  In consequence 
of this high forecast, Sterling Biofuels has VPE of $4.21 and VEBO of $6.36.   
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Table 6.2 Proportions of positive and negative mispricing 
 
 Positive MP Negative MP 
VPE 56.91% 43.09% 
VEBO0 44.20% 55.80% 
VEBO50 50.83% 49.17% 
VEBO100 53.59% 46.41% 
   
 
VPE = comparable firms estimate of value. VEBO0 = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  VEBO50 = EBO 
model value where r50 is the discount rate.  VEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate. 
 
Comparison of these values with the OP of $1 shows Sterling Biofuels has substantial 
negative mispricing.  All measures of MP prior to the deletion of this observation are 
significantly non-normal and all follow a normal distribution when this observation is 
deleted from the sample 
 
(see table 6.3).  Therefore, this observation is removed.  
Descriptive statistics for 179 sample IPOs with the four specifications of the 
dependent variable are presented in table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for MP, forecasting IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 Mean Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p- value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
MPPE 0.0467 0.0429 0.4979 -1.84 1.63 1.219 
(0.102) 
-0.382 2.541 
MPEBO0 -0.0063 -0.0461 0.4816 -1.51 1.36 0.802 
(0.540) 
0.158 0.802 
MPEBO50 0.0477 0.0182 0.4793 -1.51 1.42 0.859 
(0.452) 
0.163 0.819 
MPEBO100 0.0942 0.0696 0.4800 -1.51 1.47 0.947 
(0.332) 
0.159 0.361 
         
 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 
is the discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price 
minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.   
 
The low means for MP suggest that issuers, on average, set price close to V.  The 
standard deviation and maximum and minimum values show considerable variation in 
the sample, consistent with the normal distributions shown in figure 6.2.  MPEBO0 
shows a very small negative mean level of mispricing ($0.006) when it is assumed 
that imputation credits are not valued by the market.  The highest mean level of MP 
($0.09) is found when the return on equity used to calculate VEBO is largest (i.e. when 
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imputation credits are fully valued by the market).  The minimum values for each 
MPEBO measure are identical as the IPO generating these values did not pay 
dividends.  The maximum values for MPEBO show the impact of varying the value of 
imputation credits. 
 
6.4 Institutional setting 
Details of the Australian institutional setting and their implications for underpricing 
theories were provided in chapter 2.  This section includes some further discussion of 
institutional features of particular relevance to OP and, therefore, mispricing.  The 
capacity to incorporate demand into the OP when using the fixed-price mechanism is 
discussed.  Differences in underwriter compensation mechanisms for Australia and 
the US are then addressed.    
 
6.4.1  Incorporating demand into offer price  
As discussed in chapter 2, bookbuild offers incorporate elements of demand into the 
setting of the final offer price via feedback received from institutional investors.  
Discussing the value-adding processes of professionals handling issues, Kim and 
Ritter (1999, p. 411) state  
… how much of this improvement in accuracy is due to superior 
fundamental analysis, and how much is due merely to canvassing market 
demand, is an open question. 
 
By restricting the capacity of brokers and underwriters to assess demand formally 
prior to setting the offer price for fixed-price issues, testing for mispricing in the 
Australian institutional setting can shed light on this issue. 
 
Section 736(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 prohibits the „hawking‟ of securities. 
This means that offers cannot be made as a result of unsolicited meetings or telephone 
calls and thus restricts the issuer‟s capacity to incorporate a formal assessment of the 
level of demand in setting the offer price. This prohibition of hawking does not, 
however, preclude the use of bookbuilding in Australia as it does not apply to offers 
made to sophisticated or professional investors (Corporations Act 2001 s736(2)(a) 
and (b)). Relief from this prohibition is also extended to retail clients if the shares are 
offered over the telephone by a licensed securities dealer or to the licensed dealer‟s 
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clients who have traded securities through the dealer in the twelve months prior to the 
offer (Corporations Act 2001 s736(2) (c) and (d)).  
 
Thus, it may be possible for Australian fixed-price issuers to engage in some informal 
price testing.  However, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) consider that investors 
would be unlikely to reveal their costly information without some incentive.  Further, 
an average of only 7.9 of the Top 20 shareholders in Australian fixed-price IPOs are 
institutional investors (see chapter 7).  Combined with a lack of incentive to reveal 
information in the fixed-price setting, the relatively low levels of institutional investor 
activity in the Australian fixed-price IPO market suggest profound differences in 
these Australian data and the US bookbuild context.  Given the Australian 
institutional setting, demand for a specific issue is expected to have little influence in 
setting OP.  Therefore, the Australian fixed-price setting facilitates the assessment of 
issuer behaviour.  In contrast, issuers can be expected to set OP relative to what the 
market will bear when demand can be formally assessed and incorporated into OP. 
 
In addition to the constraints on incorporating issue-specific demand, the lag between 
setting OP and listing means there is less contemporaneity of market conditions at 
listing for Australian fixed-price issues compared to bookbuild issues.  As shown in 
chapter 4, the mean (median) number of days from prospectus issue to listing is 54 
(47).  Thus, in contrast to bookbuild issues, fixed-price OP is set well in advance of 
listing.  This institutional feature is relevant for the identification of any potential 
influence of hot IPO markets on establishing the offer price. 
 
The main implication from the constraint on formally incorporating demand for the 
issue for modelling mispricing is that OP will be determined by reference to firm-
specific characteristics rather than what the market is willing to pay for a share in the 
company.  Thus, fixed-price OPs in the Australian context will be less influenced by 








The „stand-by‟ arrangements of Australian underwriters were discussed in chapter 2.  
Here, the underwriter guarantees the number of underwritten shares that will be sold 
at the offer price.  This approach is effectively „hard underwriting‟ as issue proceeds 
are guaranteed.  Hard underwriting is expected to result in deep discounting of the 
offer price relative to expected market price (Busaba, 2006).  The results in chapter 4 
confirm that underwritten issues are more underpriced.   
 
A second institutional difference occurs in the pricing of underwriting services.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, US underwriters purchase all offered shares from the issuer 
and sell them on to investors.  The spread on the price paid to the underwriter is 
typically 7% of the issue size (Chen & Ritter, 2000).  The spread includes 
underwriting fees, management fees and the selling concession paid to the underwriter 
(Ellis, Michaely & O‟Hara, 2000).  Chen and Ritter (2000) suggest that the 
underwriting spread also purchases analyst coverage post-listing from the issue 
management syndicate
79
.  While the spread represents the primary source of 
compensation, profits are also generated from trading activities associated with acting 
as the market maker and using over-allotment options to manage inventory risk (Ellis, 
Michaely & O‟Hara, 2000).   
 
Australian issuers pay underwriters a fee for underwriting per se, a management fee 
for organising the issue and a brokerage fee (How & Yeo, 2000)
80
.  Here, fees vary 
according to firm-specific variables including offer size, the length of time the offer is 
open and the level of retained ownership (How & Yeo, 2000).  The average gross 
spread, 4.01% of issue proceeds, is substantially lower than that observed in the US 
(How & Yeo, 2000).  Further profits from underwriting trading activities are not 
formally available as the Australian share trading system does not involve market 
makers and over-allotment options are not used for fixed-price offers.  
 
                                                 
79
 As previously discussed in chapter 5, analyst coverage for smaller Australian companies is 
negligible. 
80
 A handling fee is paid to the ASX.  This is paid directly to the ASX by the issuer or is paid to the 
underwriter who then passes it on to the ASX (How & Yeo, 2000). 
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Compared to the US firm commitment contracts, the use of the fixed-price setting 
mechanism and the relatively long time between price-setting and listing increase the 
risk of Australian underwriters holding shares after the offer [How & Yeo (2000); 
Suchard & Woo (2003)].  The inventory risk for Australian underwriters arises from 
the purchase of shares in undersubscribed issues, in contrast to the inventories of US 
underwriters which arise from post-listing market activities or over-allotment options.  
How and Yeo (2000) investigate this issue and conclude that the lower Australian 
underwriting fees either do not correctly price this higher inventory risk or the 
collusion in setting underpricing spreads in the US obscures the pricing of risk in the 
US spreads.  In interviews, Australian brokers indicate that underwriting risk is 
reflected in the underwriting fee rather than the offer price (Hegarty, 1999).  If the 
risk is not correctly priced by Australian underwriters, one would expect underwriters 
to exert a large influence on the setting of the offer price.  This is not the case for 
Australian fixed-price offers (Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty, 2005).   
 
The nature of the underwriting process used in Australia has two main implications 
for modelling mispricing.  First, hard underwriting will constrain the underwriter‟s 
incentive to set offer price relative to expected market price.  Australian underwriters, 
therefore, have less incentive to misprice issues than their US counterparts.  Second, 
underwriters do not have access to over-allotment options in Australian fixed-price 
offers.  This feature removes a potential incentive to misprice in order to profit from 
post-listing trading by the underwriter.  Therefore, underwritten issues are not 
expected to exhibit systematic differences in mispricing
81
.   However, the 
participation of the underwriter in the share allocation process (see section 6.5.3 
below) is expected to be associated with mispricing. 
 
6.5 The mispricing model  
Hypothesised relationships for the factors affecting mispricing are developed in this 
section.  While MP is determined by the divergence of OP from V, the mispricing 
model investigates factors that are predicted to either moderate or exacerbate the level 
of mispricing.  These hypothesised relationships for mispricing are shown in HO2.   
 
                                                 
81
 The potential for a signalling role for underwriters in misvaluation is investigated in chapter 7. 
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HO2 Mispricing in Australia is unrelated to the desired post-listing ownership 
structure, the wealth loss to owners, the disclosed share allocation policy  
and the state of the IPO market. 
 
The mispricing model expresses these hypothesised relationships in the following 
empirical model.   
  
MP =  β0 - β1HOLDERS - β2PTN + β3DTN + β4ALLOC + β5HOTN +  
           β6SIZE + β7GROWTH + ε    (MP model) 
 
Table 6.4 contains a summary of independent variable measurement for the 
mispricing models.  
 








HOLDERS represents the post-listing ownership structure.  It is 
measured as the sum of the number of shares held 
by the top 20 shareholders less the number of shares 
retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of 
shares offered in the prospectus. 
 
negative 
PTN is the participation rate of vendors in the issue.  It is 
measured as the ratio of the number of secondary 
shares offered to the total number of original shares. 
 
negative 
DTN is the dilution factor for vendors.  It is measured as 
the ratio of the number of primary shares offered to 
the total number of original shares. 
 
negative 
ALLOC proxies for the potential agency conflict arising 
when underwriters make the share allocation 
decision.  The dichotomous variable is coded as one 




HOTN represents the state of the IPO market.  HOTN is 
measured as by the number of industrial IPOs in the 
three months preceding the prospectus date. Hot 






SIZE measures the size of the firm post listing relative to 
industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  
Firm size is measured as the total number of shares 
at listing multiplied by the offer price. 
 
indeterminate 
GROWTH GROWTH is captured by 1-(book value of ordinary 




The rationale for including each of these independent variables is discussed in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
6.5.1 Ownership structure (HOLDERS) 
Deliberate negative mispricing (OP < V) may be used by issuers to achieve their 
desired post-listing ownership structure.  Investors who are perceived to be long-term 
holders of shares receive favourable allocations in European IPOs (Jenkinson & 
Jones, 2004).  Around 22% of Australian IPO shares are flipped
82
 in the first three 
days of trading (Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006), providing support for the notion that 
the majority of IPO shares are held for at least more than a few days.   
 
There are distinct markets for controlling blocks and small dispersed shareholdings 
(Mello & Parsons, 1998).  Booth and Chua (1996) argue higher underpricing is 
required to cover information costs of smaller investors.   Pham, Kalev and Steen 
(2003) contend higher underpricing compensates smaller investors for adverse 
selection costs.  As issuers are not expected to have a major influence on market price 
when listing occurs, the underpricing required to encourage a spread of ownership 
will be achieved by negative mispricing.  In contrast to pricing with the bookbuild 
mechanism, private information is not incorporated into the offer price of fixed-price 
issues.  Informed investors use their information in the after-market at the expense of 
uninformed investors (Ellul & Pagano, 2006).  Therefore, IPO investors in fixed-price 
offers require the liquidity associated with a spread of ownership to dampen the 
impact of asymmetric information (Ellul & Pagano, 2006).   
 
Large shareholders, on the other hand, have the informational advantage necessary to 
monitor management and monitoring will increase firm value (Stoughton & Zechner, 
1998).  Using an Australian sample of IPOs, Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003) find 
lower levels of underpricing when issuers pursue a concentrated post-listing 
ownership structure and higher underpricing with greater ownership dispersion
83
.  
Pham, Kalev and Steen‟s (2003) results are robust for different proxies for ownership 
                                                 
82
 „Flipping‟ is the US term for selling IPO shares purchased from the prospectus on the first day of 
trading.  This process is normally referred to as „stagging‟ in Australia. 
83
 The implicit assumption in Pham, Kalev and Steen is that issues are mispriced rather than misvalued 
(i.e. P=V).  Therefore, higher underpricing by issuers to achieve sufficient shareholder diversity for 
liquidity will result from mispricing (OP<V) rather than misvaluation.  
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Companies listing on the ASX are required to provide the names, and numbers of 
shares held by each, of the largest twenty shareholders upon completion of the 
allocation process.  These „Top 20‟ reports collected from the ASX form the basis of 












   (6.2) 
 
where TOP20SHARESk is the number of shares held by each of the top 20 investors.  
Following Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003), the number of shares retained by vendors is 
subtracted in the numerator to achieve a measure of outside interest.  Scaling by 
OFFERSIZE provides a relative measure of outside interest.  
 
Higher values for HOLDERS indicate outside shareholders own large parcels of 
shares and the resultant ownership structure is concentrated.  Large outside 
shareholders will not require as much mispricing to induce them to purchase shares
85
.  
Conversely, lower values show the largest outside shareholders have relatively 
smaller share parcels and indicate a relatively more-dispersed ownership structure.  
As smaller investors will require OP < V, a negative association between mispricing 
and HOLDERS is expected.  A negative relationship indicates issuers with a post-
listing objective of control will misprice less than those with the objective of liquidity.  
 
The numerator of the HOLDERS variable is Top 20 shares minus the number of 
retained shares.  While it is reasonable to expect that vendors would remain amongst 
the largest 20 shareholders at listing, this is not always the case.  Prospectuses were 
rechecked to ensure any negative value of the HOLDERS numerator was attributable 
                                                 
84
 Pham, Kalev & Steen test for the endogeneity of choice of ownership structure by regressing firm-
specific characteristics (size, risk, leverage, growth and proxies for transparency) on each of their 
ownership-structure variables.  They conclude ownership structure is unrelated to firm-specific 
characteristics. 
85
 Large shareholders may even be willing to pay a premium above V that reflects the benefits of 
control. 
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to vendors with shareholdings outside the Top 20.  Some issuers offer secondary 
shares as oversubscriptions but base their retained ownership prospectus figure on 
minimum subscription.  Therefore, the retained ownership amount is adjusted in these 
cases to avoid overstatement if secondary shares are actually sold.  Any shares issued 
to holders of convertible notes within three months of the prospectus date are not 
included in retained ownership. 
 
OFFERSIZE is measured as the number of shares offered in the prospectus for fixed 
size issues.  It is determined by reference to the company announcements made to the 
ASX at listing where the prospectus identifies a variable number of shares offered.  
OFFERSIZE is the maximum number of shares offered for those issues clearly 
identified as oversubscribed.  Where IPOs offer a variable number of shares, 
OFFERSIZE is measured as the minimum number offered when the actual number of 
shares issued is closer to the minimum than it is to the maximum offered.  Where the 
number of shares actually issued is closer to the maximum, OFFERSIZE is 
determined as the maximum disclosed in the prospectus.  This approach is taken to 
minimise the impact of discrepancies between the ASX disclosures and the 
information contained in the prospectuses. 
 
6.5.2 Wealth loss to owners (PTN and DTN) 
The participation ratio and the dilution factor are included in the mispricing model to 
proxy for any impact that the wealth loss to owners may have on the divergence of 
OP from V.  The extent to which issuers care about underpricing depends on the 
number of primary and secondary shares sold in the offer (Habib & Ljungqvist, 
2001).  Leung and Menyah (2006) confirm this result for fixed-price offers in Hong 
Kong. 
 
Issuers may have the capacity to influence market price via the level of promotion 
costs expended on the issue
86
, but the most direct impact they can have on 
underpricing is via the offer price.  Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Zhang (2005) 
argue higher participation ratios and larger dilution factors provide incentives for 
                                                 
86
 Reputation and certification benefits, for example, are gained from the association of „quality‟ 
investment bankers and auditors (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001).   
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issuers to bargain harder with the underwriter for higher offer prices.  Thus, these two 
variables associated with the wealth loss to owners are investigated in the mispricing 
model.    
 
There are two sources of wealth loss to owners, the participation ratio and the dilution 
factor.    Participation (PTN) results from the sale of secondary shares in the offer 
while dilution (DTN) results from the sale of primary shares (Habib & Ljungqvist, 
2001).  Table 6.5 demonstrates how wealth loss is determined by PTN and DTN.  
Assume that vendors own 1 000 shares at the time of setting OP. Each alternative 
offer structure results in 1 500 listed shares when the float is completed.   The IPO has 
an OP = $1 and lists at P = $1.20.    
 
Only new shares (Np) are offered in scenario I.  In this scenario, the wealth loss to 
owners is $67.  Twenty cents is lost on each new share sold (OP – P).  The share of 
this belonging to the original owners is determined by the proportion of shares they 
retain in the post-listing capital structure (da Silva Rosa, Velayuthen & Walter, 2003).   
 
Issuers in scenario II offer 250 of their own shares in addition to 500 new shares.  The 
wealth loss on the sale of 250 secondary shares is $50.  The $100 total wealth loss in 
scenario II demonstrates the higher relative wealth loss on secondary shares compared 
to primary shares.  
 
Table 6.5 Owners‟ wealth losses from issuing primary and secondary shares 
 
 Number of shares Wealth loss 
Scenario I 
Owners‟ retained 1 000  
Secondary  0 0 
Primary 500 [(1.20 – 1) x 500 x  0.67] = 67 
Total 1 500 67 
Scenario II 
Owners‟ retained 750  
Secondary  250 [(1.20 – 1) x 250] = 50 
Primary 500 [(1.20 – 1) x 500 x  0.5] = 50 
Total 1 500 100 
 
The higher the participation ratio, the more issuers are concerned about underpricing 
because wealth loss increases with the level of underpricing and the proportion of 
 142 
secondary shares sold by the issuers.  PTN is included in the mispricing model to 
determine if issuers use OP to influence the level of underpricing.  If they set OP 
relative to an expected market price (E(P)) which, in turn, has a low correlation with 
V, PTN will have an indeterminate relationship with MP because the divergence of 
OP from V will vary with E(P).   Conversely, if they set OP relative to V, and they 
anticipate a high correlation of E(P) with V, MP will have a negative relationship with 
PTN.   
 
PTN, shown in equation 6.3, is the number of secondary shares sold (Ns) normalised 
by the total number of original shares (No).   
 
os NNPTN        (6.3) 
 
Higher dilution is associated with lower underpricing as the wealth loss from selling 
more new shares increases with the level of underpricing. The rationale for including 
PTN, outlined above, is also used for including DTN in the mispricing model.  As 
shown in equation 6.4, DTN is the normalised number of primary shares sold (Nn).  
 
on NNDTN        (6.4) 
 
A negative relationship is expected for DTN and MP.  Some negative correlation is 
expected between PTN and DTN.  As shown in chapter 4, 75% of issuers do not offer 
secondary shares so PTN for these IPOs is zero.  A combination of primary and 
secondary shares is offered by 21.5% of the chapter 4 sample IPOs.  Further, the 
proportion of retained ownership is significantly lower for issuers offering secondary 
shares.  The proportional amount of retained ownership affects the wealth loss to 
owners from both participation and dilution.  Careful consideration of the correlation 
for PTN and DTN will be made to minimise the possibility of multicollinearity when 
determining the empirical model of MP. 
 
6.5.3 Allocation method (ALLOC) 
Reviewing relatively recent IPO literature, Ritter and Welch (2002) consider research 
into the allocation of shares as promising for understanding underpricing.  The 
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different institutional features for allocation methods in Australia and the US were 
discussed in chapter 2.  Whilst the allocation policies of Australian issuers are not 
mandated, only two firms (0.06%) in the earnings-forecast sample indicate they use 
non-discretionary allocation.  As there is insufficient variation in the sample to 
investigate the impact of the type of allocation process, the mispricing model includes 
an indicator variable to identify who makes the share allocation decisions.   
 
Underwriters in the US bookbuild setting benefit the issuer by using share allocations 
to elicit information from informed investors [Benveniste & Wilhelm (1990); 
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2002)].  The more uncertain the issuer is about the value of 
the firm the more valuable the underwriter‟s advice. Hence, the issuer will delegate 
the pricing decision to the underwriter with the result of higher underpricing (Baron, 
1982).  In contrast, Sherman (2000) argues that underwriters allocate shares to regular 
uninformed investors to reduce the amount of underpricing.  Providing some support 
for Baron‟s argument, the underpricing model in chapter 4 shows a higher level of 
underpricing associated with underwritten issues.  
 
Agency conflict may arise in the Australian institutional setting where issuers 
delegate share allocation to underwriters and underwriters are unconstrained by any 
legal requirement to allocate shares in a specific manner.  Underwriters can use 
selective allocation to keep favoured clients content, resulting in increased expected 
revenues from these clients [Benveniste & Spindt (1989); Sherman (2000); Ljungqvist 
& Wilhelm (2002); Loughran & Ritter (2002); Sherman & Titman (2002); Jenkinson 
& Jones (2006); Reuter (2006); Nimalendran, Ritter & Zhang (2007)].  Lee, Taylor 
and Walter (1996) contend that the non-public allocation procedures used for 
Australian IPOs increase the capacity of underwriters to allocate to favoured clients.  
Discretionary allocation generates an agency problem when underwriters act in their 
own best interests rather than the interests of the issuer.   
 
In contrast to discretionary allocation in the US bookbuild setting, legal restrictions 
are placed on the allocation policies for fixed-price offers in the UK, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia (Chowdhry & Sherman, 1996) and Singapore (Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1999).  
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) consider that such legal restrictions favouring small 
investors are in response to the regulator‟s desire for fairness.  As underwriters are 
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responsible for share allocations in the US bookbuilding setting and share allocation 
faces legal constraints in other fixed-price settings, the Australian institutional setting 
affords an unusual opportunity to investigate the participation of the share allocation 
process to an underwriter.   
 
Australian underwriters participating in the allocation of shares have the capacity to 
act in their own (or their investing clients‟) best interests rather than those of the 
issuer.  Given this potential agency conflict, a positive relationship is expected 
between underwriter participation in the allocation process (ALLOC) and mispricing 
(i.e. issues will have OP < V).  The dichotomous variable is coded as one where the 
underwriter participates in the allocation process.  Underwriters participate in the 
share allocation process for around 63% of underwritten issues in this sample.   
 
6.5.4 Hot markets (HOTN) 
The hot markets variable (HOTN) is included in the mispricing model to determine if 
issuers exploit their knowledge of the current state of the IPO market with higher 
mispricing.  Prior research characterises hot markets as those with high underpricing 
at the start of the period followed by high IPO volume (Ritter, 1984a).  The lag 
between underpricing and the volume of new issues is attributed to the administrative 
time required to float a company
87
.  The speed of adjustment for volume is faster 
when social mood becomes pessimistic as issuers can withdraw their issues 
(Nofsinger, 2005). 
 
High levels of optimism in society affect both investors and corporate managers. 
Optimism results in both groups overestimating the probability of success and 
underestimating the riskiness of their actions (Nofsinger, 2005).  Thus, investor 
demand for IPOs increases with investor optimism.  Consistent with firms taking 
advantage of overoptimism (Rajan & Servaes, 1997) and misvaluation (Jensen, 2005) 
in the market, potential issuers respond to higher observed levels of investor demand 
by taking their companies public and therefore increase IPO volume in hot markets 
(Helwege & Liang, 2004).  French underwriters using the bookbuild mechanism set 
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 Brailsford, Heaney & Shi (2001) note that Australian institutional and regulatory requirements 
contribute to their finding that IPO volume does not adjust instantaneously in response to changed 
market conditions. 
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OP higher than V when individual investors are bullish (Derrien, 2005).  US issuers 
also take advantage of investor optimism (Lowry, 2003).  Underpricing in Australia 
leads volume by up to six months (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001).  Further, both 
underpricing and volume are substantially higher in hot periods than they are in cold 
periods (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001). 
 
The characterisation of hot markets in terms of high underpricing and volume and the 
empirical relationship of underpricing and volume suggest proxies for hot markets 
based on either of these measures. Using the number of prior IPOs to indicate a hot 
market is supported by the relationship between underpricing and IPO volume in the 
period from 1976 to 1997 in the Australian market (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 2001).   
 
The number of unseasoned issues made in the three months prior to listing displays a 
highly significant association with raw underpricing in the Australian market (Sharpe 
& Woo, 2005).  The relationship of interest in the mispricing model is the role of 
HOTN in setting the offer price, not on underpricing.  The number of IPOs listing 
after the offer price has been set cannot influence mispricing.  Therefore, the Sharpe 
and Woo (2005) measure is adapted to include the number of industrial IPOs 







iIPOHOTN     (6.5) 
 
The count of IPOs for HOTN is based on the full sample described in chapter 3.  If 
issuers take the state of the IPO market into consideration, a positive relationship 
between HOTN and mispricing is expected.  That is, the greater the number of IPOs 
listing in the three months prior to the prospectus, the more OP will exceed V.  
 
6.5.5 Control variables - relative size (SIZE) and growth prospects (GROWTH) 
Alford (1992) considers that the ideal selection criteria for comparable firms are the 
variables that explain cross-sectional differences in PE multiples.  Two frequently-
used selection criteria for matching firms (in addition to industry) are size and growth 
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[c.f. Alford (1992); Boatsman & Baskin (1981); Kim & Ritter (1999); Purnanandam 
& Swaminathan (2004); How, Lam & Yeo (2007); Zheng (2007)]. 
 
Although Alford (1992) does not find size important in the selection of comparable 
firms, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2005) control for size in their investigation of 
IPO mispricing.  A control for size is also included in this research.  Cotter, Goyen 
and Hegarty (2005) report IPO size relative to industry median size is significant in 
the explanation of offer price for their Australian fixed-price sample.  This relative 
measure of size is shown in equation 6.6.   
 
SIZE = Number of shares at listing x OP (6.6) 
  Industry median market capitalisation  
 
No theoretical justification for an association between size and mispricing in the 
fixed-price setting has been identified from the literature and none is posited here
88
.  
Therefore, no directional relationship is predicted for size and MP. 
 
IPOs have higher growth opportunities than typical listed firms (Kim & Ritter, 1999).  
Further, the IPO‟s historic growth rate does not incorporate the incremental growth 
likely to be achieved with the larger post-float capital base.  Zarowin (1990) finds 
longer-term growth is more important than short-term growth and risk in his 
investigation of the cross-sectional differences in the earnings-price ratio.  Cotter, 
Goyen and Hegarty (2005) infer growth prospects from prospectus data and find their 
measure is significant in the explanation of offer price for Australian fixed-price 
offers.   
 
Equation 6.7 shows the Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) measure of growth 
prospects. GROWTH is estimated as one minus the book value of ordinary 
shareholders‟ equity scaled by OP.   
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 Logue (1973) argues that the US underwriting market is monopsonistic and, as such, the relative 
bargaining powers of the parties (i.e. the underwriter and the issuer) determine the price paid by the 
monopsonist.  Vendors of larger IPOs have greater bargaining power and use this to negotiate higher 
offer prices.  The implication of this relationship for mispricing is unclear as issuers may wish to 





GROWTH 1      (6.7) 
 
A positive relationship is expected between mispricing and GROWTH as high growth 
firms will be inherently more difficult to value.  Having now concluded the discussion 
of model development, the following section specifies the sample data used to test the 
model and presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables.  
 
6.6 Sample and descriptive statistics 
Top 20 shareholder data, required for measuring HOLDERS, are either unavailable 
from the ASX or of poor quality for 28 sample firms
89
.  Missing prospectus 
information about the allocation method result in three further exclusions. A total of 
197 IPO data points for VPE- and 238 for the VEBO-based measures of mispricing are 
available after the exclusion of these companies.  
 
An objective in this research is to ascertain if results from the mispricing model are 
sensitive to the method used to calculate V.  Therefore, only those IPOs that have 
values calculated for both the PE and EBO methods are included in the analysis from 
this point forward.  Following the deletion of the Sterling Biofuels outlier, there are 
186 IPOs with measures for both VPE and VEBO.   
 
6.6.1 Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in the mispricing model were 
presented in section 6.3.  Table 6.6 presents descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables included in the mispricing model.  With the exception of GROWTH, the 
continuous independent variables have distributions that make highly significant 
departures from the normal distribution
90
.  Therefore, median values provide the 
appropriate measure of central tendency.   
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 The Top 20 reports were screened for accuracy by comparing the disclosed number and proportion of 
shares in the Top 20 to the total number of shares listed on the ASX (including restricted securities) 
and to the total number of shares at the completion of the issue disclosed in the prospectus.  The Top 20 
data are considered to be poor quality where these figures diverge by more than 5% of issued shares.   
90
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for tests of normality are significant at p < 0.01 for HOLDERS, PTN, 
DTN, SIZE and HOTN.  GROWTH does not make a significant departure from the normal distribution 
at the conventional level (p = 0.074). 
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Table 6.6 Descriptive statistics for independent variables - 186 IPOs, 1997-2006 
Panel A:  Continuous measures 
 Mean     Median     Standard  
deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skew Kurtosis 
HOLDERS
a
 33.45 37.52 62.79 -320.90 334.51 -1.29 11.64 
PTN % 14.08 0 23.52 0 100 2.04 3.933 
DTN % 48.52 30.07 69.92 0 760.85 6.59 61.43 
HOTN 17.72 15 11.13 0 48 0.69 -0.34 
SIZE 1.78 1.05 2.24 0.004 13.75 2.89 10.13 
GROWTH% 47.66 52.91 30.94 -56.45 94.60 -0.64 -0.18 
        
 
Panel B:  Dichotomous variable 




HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors 
all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  PTN = the ratio of the number of secondary shares offered to the 
total number of original shares.  DTN = the ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  
HOTN = the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the 
IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary 
shareholders‟ equity / offer price).  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ where the underwriter participates in the 
allocation process.  
 
a Negative values are possible as the Top 20 is adjusted for the amount of retained ownership to obtain the measure of ownership 
dispersion.   
 
The mean (median) of 33.45 (37.52) for HOLDERS indicates the level of ownership 
dispersion for the largest new shareholders participating in the issue.  In their sample 
of Australian industrial IPOs listing between 1996 and 1999, Pham, Kalev and Steen 
(2003) report mean HOLDERS of 14.51% for issues with positive market-adjusted 
returns and 24.68% for issues with negative market-adjusted returns.  Thus, this 
extended sample period indicates relatively-narrower ownership structures, on 
average, than those found in Pham, Kalev and Steen‟s shorter sample period91. 
 
As is the case for US IPOs (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001), the median participation ratio 
(PTN) of zero confirms that most sample IPOs do not offer secondary shares in the 
prospectus.  The mean of 14.08% is double that reported by Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001).  Median dilution (DTN), which indicates the wealth loss to owners from the 
sale of primary shares, is 30.07% for this sample.  While mean dilution of 48.52% is 
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 19% of IPOs in Pham, Kalev & Steen‟s sample have negative market-adjusted returns.  The 
proportion in this sample is slightly larger at 23%.  In this sample, mean HOLDERS is 30.25 for IPOs 
with negative market-adjusted returns and 34.37 for IPOs with positive market-adjusted returns.  In 
contrast to the results of t-tests reported by Pham, Kalev & Steen, no significant difference is found for 
the two groups (p = 0.3541, one-tailed). 
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close to the 50% reported by Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), their median of 42% for 
DTN is substantially higher.  The non-normal distribution of DTN constrains the 
ability to draw conclusions from comparisons between this sample and that of Habib 
and Ljungqvist (2001). 
 
As shown in chapter 3, IPOs are about the same size as „typical‟ companies already 
trading on the ASX.  The finer measure, SIZE, (the IPO market capitalisation at listing 
compared to the median market capitalisation of listed companies in the same 
industry) confirms that earlier analysis.  Median SIZE is 1.05, indicating that the 
sample IPOs have very similar market capitalisations to listed companies in the same 
industry.  While „… unseasoned new issue firms are almost invariably small firms‟ 
(Finn & Higham, 1988, p. 347) care should be taken in the interpretation of this 
statement.  Australian IPOs are small relative to the mean market capitalisation of all 
listed firms (see chapter 3) but they are marginally larger than the median firm in their 
respective industries.  Mean and median GROWTH is substantially higher than that 
reported by Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005)
92
.  The median number of IPOs 
occurring in the three months prior to the prospectus date is 15.   
 
As discussed in chapter 2, there are no legal requirements that specify the allocation 
method to be used by Australian issuers.  Discretionary allocation was indicated for 
23.9% of issuers in the earnings forecast sample.  A further 71.7% of this sample 
identified their allocation policy as directors or underwriters (or both) reserving „the 
right to accept or reject applications in full or in part‟.  In contrast to Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm‟s (2002) assertion that pro rata allocations are the default in Australia, no 
prospectus stated that pro rata allocations of shares would be made
93
.    
 
Analysis of the 186 IPOs described in table 6.6 shows allocation is determined solely 
by the directors in 53.6% of issues, solely by the underwriter in 8.3% and jointly by 
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 Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) use the same measure of GROWTH and report a mean (median) of 
30% (28%) for their 1995 to 1998 sample of Australian industrial IPOs. 
93
 The allocation policies of three IPOs excluded from this sample are noteworthy.  Arrow 
Pharmaceuticals indicated that shares would be allocated on a „first-in‟ basis.  The prospectus for 
Colorado Group indicated that shares would be allocated „consistently‟ but with the right reserved to 
reject any application.  Austbrokers Ltd made a fixed-price „institutional offer‟ for a fraction of their 
shares and included a priority offer for their clients.   
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the underwriter and directors in 38.1% of issues.  As noted earlier, the allocation 
methods of three firms could not be determined from the prospectus. 
 
6.6.2 Correlations 
Correlations for the mispricing model‟s dependent and independent variables are 
shown in table 6.7.  Spearman coefficients are presented on the left-hand side of the 
table and Pearson coefficients are to the right.  As noted in the previous section, the 
distributions for HOLDERS, PTN, DTN, SIZE and HOTN exhibit significant 
departures from the normal distribution. Thus, the following discussion focuses on 
Spearman correlations.  
 
Consistent with the strong and highly significant correlations reported for the value 
measures in chapter 5, the four measures of MP are also highly correlated, with the 
highest correlations between the EBO measures.  The number of IPOs listing in the 
quarter preceding the IPO (HOTN) has highly significant positive correlations with 
the mispricing measures.  HOTN also exhibits a low (0.2) but highly significant 
correlation with GROWTH.   
 
The measure of ownership dispersion (HOLDERS) is significantly correlated with the 
two MPEBO estimates of mispricing that take the value of imputation credits into 
consideration and marginally correlated with the MPEBO0 measure.  Combined with 
the lack of significant correlation for HOLDERS and MPPE, these results suggest the 
VPE measure incorporates the desired level of ownership dispersion via the annual 
industry median PE.  An industry median PE that reflects issuers‟ target levels of 
ownership dispersion is consistent with industry-specific share ownership patterns. 
 
The participation (PTN) and dilution (DTN) ratios show a highly significant and 
strong negative correlation (ρ = -0.515).  Both have significant correlations with 
MPPE, with PTN showing a positive relationship and DTN a negative one.  Both 
variables capture components of wealth loss to owners and both were hypothesised to 
have negative relationships with MP.  The expected negative relationship for PTN and 





Table 6.7 Correlations for 186 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 MPpe MPebo0 MPebo50 MPebo100 HOLDERS PTN DTN SIZE GROWTH HOTN 
MPpe  0.708** 0.696** 0.684** 0.055 0.111 -0.134 0.429** 0.258** 0.215** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.463) (0.136) (0.073) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
MPebo0 0.635**  0.998** 0.992** 0.098 0.126 -0.147* 0.320** 0.063 0.182* 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.190) (0.092) (0.048) (0.000) (0.404) (0.014) 
MPebo50 0.613** 0.994**  0.998** 0.104 0.152* -0.156* 0.331** 0.064 0.169* 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.166) (0.042) (0.036) (0.000) (0.390) (0.024) 
MPebo100 0.589** 0.981** 0.995**  0.108 0.173* -0.163* 0.339** 0.066 0.156* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.149) (0.020) (0.029) (0.000) (0.379) (0.036) 
HOLDERS 0.080 0.138 0.157* 0.155*  0.129 0.300** 0.131 0.209** -0.033 
 (0.289) (0.065) (0.035) (0.035)  (0.085) (0.000) (0.081) (0.005) (0.664) 
PTN 0.147* 0.127 0.146 0.148* 0.132  -0.238** 0.218** 0.207** -0.068 
 (0.050) (0.090) (0.051) (0.044) (0.077)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.368) 
DTN -0.170* -0.103 -0.118 -.138 0.125 -0.515**  -0.174* -0.194** -0.122 
 (0.022) (0.169) (0.113) (0.065) (0.097) (0.000)  (0.020) (0.009) (0.102) 
SIZE 0.565** 0.431** 0.443** 0.456** 0.267** 0.256** -0.261**  0.297** -0.044 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.001 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.561) 
GROWTH 0.339** 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.071 0.287** -0.340** 0.330**  0.147* 
 (0.000) (0.600) (0.600) (0.582) (0.345) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.049) 
HOTN 0.194** 0.216** 0.205** 0.193** -0.047 -0.037 -0.063 -0.035 0.200**  
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.528) (0.619) (0.399) (0.642) (0.007)  
 
Spearman‟s coefficients and associated probabilities are shown on the left-hand side of the table while Pearson‟s coefficients and probabilities are shown on the right-hand side. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.  HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the number of shares retained by the 
vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  PTN = the ratio of the number of secondary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  DTN = the ratio of the number of primary shares 
offered to the total number of original shares.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price).  HOTN = the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  
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secondary shares.  The hypothesised relationship with MP is observed for DTN and 
dilution will be the only source of wealth loss for 92% of the sample IPOs.  Further, 
as shown in the next section, PTN is associated with the participation of underwriters 
in the allocation process.  Therefore, PTN is removed from the empirical mispricing 
model in order to minimise the effects of multicollinearity in the model.  
 
Relative size (SIZE) shows highly significant and strong positive correlations with 
each measure of the dependent variable suggesting larger IPOs experience more 
mispricing.   SIZE is positively correlated with HOLDERS, indicating that larger IPOs 
have more concentrated ownership structures with respect to outside shareholders.  
Issuers are less concerned about post-listing liquidity when the floating company is 
large relative to the median company in the same industry as the IPO.  The positive 
correlation between SIZE and PTN suggests that more secondary shares are sold in 
larger IPOs.  The significant and negative correlation for SIZE and DTN is suggestive 
of vendors in larger IPOs suffering relatively less wealth loss from the sale of primary 
shares.  However, as SIZE is also positively correlated with MP, no firm conclusion 
on this matter can be drawn.  
 
GROWTH shows a highly significant positive correlation with MPPE while it is 
uncorrelated with the three EBO measures of mispricing.  This result supports 
Ohlson‟s (1995) claim that growth is captured in the EBO model via the required 
return on equity. 
 
6.6.3 Dichotomous independent variable associations 
Panel A of table 6.8 presents Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in distributions 
where the data are categorised by underwriter participation in the allocation process.   
Issuers that choose to have underwriters participate in the allocation process do not 
experience significant differences in the level of mispricing.  They do, however, have 
significantly higher (p = 0.000, one-tailed) participation levels, consistent with 
vendors of secondary shares being less concerned about the ownership structure post-
listing.  Issuers choosing to have the underwriter participate in the allocation process 
are also significantly larger (p = 0.000, one-tailed) and have higher levels of growth 







Table 6.8  Tests for differences where data are grouped by ALLOC 
 
Panel A:  Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in distribution     






















No ALLOC median 0.042 -0.051 0.015 0.066 33.44 0 34.03 15.5 0.850 46.11 
U 3 377 3 501 3 470 3 408 3 454 2 578 3 462 3 939 2 820 3 140 
Asymptotic sig. (2-tailed) (0.086) (0.175) (0.148) (0.104) (0.136) (0.000) (0.141) (0.930) (0.001) (0.016) 
           
Median test (2-tailed) (0.085) (0.156) (0.085) (0.043) (0.939) (0.000) (0.495) (0.934) (0.000) (0.020) 
           
           
Panel B:  t-tests of means           
ALLOC mean 0.336 0.267 0.327 0.379       
No ALLOC mean 0.211 0.189 0.239 0.282       
t -1.908 -1.184 -1.316 -1.423       
Significance (2-tailed) (0.058) (0.238) (0.190) (0.157)       
           
 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.  HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the number of shares retained by the 
vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  PTN = the ratio of the number of secondary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  DTN = the ratio of the number of primary shares 
offered to the total number of original shares.  HOTN = the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median 
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Panel B presents t-statistics for difference in mean for the four normally distributed 
measures of mispricing.  The lack of association between underwriter participation in 
the allocation process and mispricing shown in panel A is confirmed by the t-tests.  
With the data description and investigation of bivariate relationships now complete, 
the next section tests the mispricing model. 
 
6.7 Testing the mispricing model 
Table 6.9 reports the results for four versions of the mispricing model, each using a 
different specification of the dependent variable.  Analysis of the residuals and 
Mahalanobis statistics from the first pass of the regressions reveals seven multivariate 
outliers
94
.  Deletion of these multivariate outliers and the deletion of the Stirling 
Biofuels mispricing outlier results in a sample size of 179 observations for the 
regressions.  The adjusted R-squared (AR
2
) for the models range from 20.4% 
(MPEBO0) to 25.3% (where MPPE is the dependent variable).  Although not directly 
comparable, these AR
2
s generally higher than those reported in prior Australian 
underpricing research (see table 2.2) and F tests for the overall significance of the 
regressions are significant (p < 0.001).   
 
With the exception of SIZE, theoretical foundations provide the basis for specifying 
directional relationships for all independent variables.  As such, the p-values shown in 
table 6.9 are for one-tailed tests for all coefficients except for SIZE and the constant.  
The regression results show SIZE is the primary explanatory variable for MP.  The 
coefficient on SIZE is highly significant and indicates a positive relationship with MP 
irrespective of the measure of the dependent variable.  The number of IPOs listing in 
the three months prior to the prospectus date (HOTN) also makes significant 
contributions to the explanation of all measures of mispricing.  As predicted, the 
greater the number of IPOs preceding the prospectus, the greater the level of 
mispricing.  This results supports Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist‟s (1994) contention 
that issuers take advantage of „windows of opportunity‟ when making decisions 
                                                 
94
 The chi-squared critical value is determined as p = 0.001, d.f. = 6.  The multivariate outliers, their 
listing dates and industries are as follows:  Austaland (1997, developers and contractors); Australian 
International Carbon (1998, miscellaneous industrials); Strathfield Group (1998, retail); Austal (1998, 
engineering); Tox Free Solutions (2000, miscellaneous industrials);  Infomedia (2000, miscellaneous 
industrials) and Cardno (2004, capital goods). 
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associated with their issue.  One-tailed tests show HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH and 
ALLOC do not have significant relationships with any of the measures of mispricing.   
 
Table 6.9 Mispricing regression results for 179 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.444** -0.279** -0.213* -0.156# 
 t-stat -4.872 -3.099 -2.387 -1.751 
 p (0.000) (0.002) (0.018) (0.082) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.007 0.110 0.119 0.126 
 t-stat -0.115 1.656 1.890 1.926 
 p (1.000) (0.199) (0.144) (0.112) 
DTN coefficient 0.007 -0.063 -0.074 -0.082 
 t-stat 0.133 -1.244 -1.461 -1.636 
 p (1.000) (0.430) (0.292) (0.207) 
ALLOC coefficient 0.0451 0.052 0.060 0.067 
 t-stat 0.681 0.785 0.919 1.032 
 p (0.994) (0.867) (0.359) (0.607) 
HOTN coefficient 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008* 
 t-stat 3.243 3.198 2.897 2.617 
 p (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.019) 
SIZE coefficient 0.118**  0.104** 0.112** 0.117** 
 t-stat 6.013 5.525 5.977 6.085 
 p (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.223 -0.219 -0.221 -0.222 
 t-stat 1.843 -1.838 -1.871 -1.881 
 p (0.134) (0.136) (0.126) (0.123) 
AR
2
  0.253** 0.204** 0.214** 0.221** 
JB  47.824** 48.030** 55.976** 62.223** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.335) (0.387) (0.297) (0.240) 
DW  1.834 1.824 1.817 1.812 
RESET F 4.439* 1.486 1.332 1.194 
 p (0.013) (0.229) (0.240) (0.258) 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is 
the discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus 
the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.  HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 
shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  DTN 
= the ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded 
as „one‟ where the underwriter participates in the allocation process.  HOTN = the number of industrial IPOs in the three months 
preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for 
the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price).  
 
 
These multivariate results support those reported in the correlation analysis, where 
only SIZE and HOTN have significant relationships with MP.  While SIZE has 
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significant correlations with HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH and ALLOC, the magnitude 
of these is low
95
 and the AR
2
s reported in table 6.9 are not high enough to suggest 
multicollinearity is an issue in these models.  Endogeneity results in correlation 
between the independent variables and the error term (Brooks, 2002).  While the 
correlation analysis in section 6.6 indicates that each of the continuous independent 
variables, except for HOTN, are partially determined by SIZE, no significant 
correlations are found for the independent variables and the residuals (results not 
reported).  This provides evidence of the exogeneity of the independent variables. 
 
The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics show residuals from the regressions of each 
measure of MP make significant departures from the normal distribution.  While the 
residuals appear symmetric (none have significant skewness), significant kurtosis 
statistics indicate that they are leptokurtic.  The probabilities for White‟s test 
demonstrate the absence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
 
The Durban-Watson (DW) statistic shows no significant autocorrelation of residuals 
when MPPE, MPEBO0 and MPEBO50 are the dependent variables
96
.  As the DW statistic 
for the MPEBO100 measure falls within the „no decision‟ region for positive 
autocorrelation, a runs test for independence in the residuals was conducted.  This 
showed no significant autocorrelation (p > 0.09)
97
.   
 
Model specification error is indicated by the Ramsey RESET test where the 
dependent variable is measured using MPPE (p < 0.02) but not for the MPEBO 
measures.  The results of the RESET tests confirm those of the DW statistics for the 
MPEBO measures.  The change in the measure of V is the only difference between the 
correctly-specified models using MPEBO as the dependent variable and that using 
MPPE as the dependent variable.   
 
As shown in table 6.6, the measures for the continuous variables HOLDERS, PTN and 
DTN exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis while SIZE is highly leptokurtic.  
These variables and HOTN make significant departures from the normal 
                                                 
95
 Gujarati (2003) provides a rule of thumb of ρ=0.5 to indicate comparatively low correlations in 
multicollinearity diagnostics.   
96
 The critical level is determined as n = 180 and k = 6. 
97
 No significant negative autocorrelation is observed in the residuals for any measure of MP.   
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distribution
98
.  Logarithmic transformations produce normal distributions for DTN, 
HOTN and SIZE
99
.  Although different transformations were trialled, the distributions 
for HOLDERS and PTN continue to make significant departures from the normal 
distribution.   
 
The regressions in table 6.9 are re-estimated substituting the log values for DTN, 
HOTN and SIZE.  Table C.1 of appendix C reports the results from regressing the four 
measures of mispricing on HOLDERS, ALLOC and GROWTH
100
 and the log 
transformations of DTN (lnDTN), HOTN (lnHOTN) and SIZE (lnSIZE).  The AR
2
 for 
the model with MPPE as the dependent variable exhibits largest increase, rising from 
25.3% to 27.7% when transformed variables are included.  While the coefficients 
HOTN with the MPEBO50 and MPEBO100 measures of mispricing are significant in table 
6.9, the coefficients on lnHOTN are highly significant.  Further, the coefficients on 
the constants are no longer significant with the MPEBO50 and MPEBO100 dependent 
variables. 
 
The primary impact of the transformed variables, however, appears in the RESET 
tests.  The significant specification error reported for the MPPE measure of mispricing 
in table 6.9 is attributable to non-linearity in the DTN, HOTN and SIZE variables.  
Significant specification error is indicated by the RESET tests for the regressions of 
MPEBO on the transformed dependent variables, indicating that the relationships 
between DTN, HOTN, SIZE and the MPEBO measures of mispricing are linear.  The 
DW statistics presented in C.1 all indicate the indecision area for autocorrelation, so 
are unable to shed further light on this issue. 
 
6.8 Robustness testing 
Alternative specifications of the mispricing measures and the empirical model are 
discussed in this section.  Specifically, robustness tests assess the sensitivity of results 
to alternative wealth loss to owners‟ variables, alternative definitions of underwriter 
participation in the allocation process, the inclusion of an indicator variable for 
                                                 
98
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the hypothesis of a normal distribution at p < 0.001. 
99
 As DTN, PTN and HOTN have minimum values of zero (see table 6.6), each observed value is 
increased by unity prior to taking the logarithm.  For ease of exposition, this transformation will simply 
be referred to as „log transformation‟. 
100
 ALLOC is an indicator variable while GROWTH is normally distributed. 
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underwriter participation in the issue, the measurement of independent variables in 
levels and controlling for the number of shares issued.  Given the non-linearity of the 
relationships for PTN, HOTN and SIZE, the logarithmic transformations of these 
variables are used in the following regressions where MPPE is the dependent variable. 
Therefore, comparison of results for MPPE relate to those reported in table C.1, while 
comparisons for MPEBO relate to the results reported in table 6.9. 
 
6.8.1 Measuring wealth loss to owners 
The sensitivity of results to the inclusion of a single measure of wealth loss to owners 
(DTN) rather than both the DTN and PTN measures is investigated with the 
regressions presented in table C.2 of appendix C.  The overall results are robust to the 
inclusion of DTN and PTN.  Changes to the size of the coefficients and their levels of 
significance are trivial.   The other change occurs where MPEBO100 is the dependent 
variable.  Here, the constant loses its marginal significance while the strength of all 
other relationships is unchanged.  The inclusion of PTN as an additional variable 
causes an increase of 1% to the AR
2
 for the MPPE dependent variable, while no change 
is identified to the AR
2
 for the MPEBO dependent variables.   
 
The next sensitivity test relates to the selection of the particular measure of wealth 
loss to owners.  The regressions with PTN substituted for DTN are presented in table 
C.3.  These results are broadly consistent for the magnitude of all coefficients and 
their levels of significance.  The only notable changes are to the now highly 
significant coefficients on the constants when PTN is the measure of wealth loss and 
MPEBO50 and MPEBO100 are the mispricing measures.  Changes to the AR
2
s are again 
minimal.  Therefore, the results for the mispricing model are robust to the 
specification of the wealth loss to owners variable. 
 
6.8.2 Measuring underwriter participation in the allocation process 
Robustness to the selection of the particular measure of underwriter participation in 
the share allocation process is now examined.  ALLOC is defined as underwriter 
participation for the mispricing model results reported in table 6.9.  Here, the alternate 
measure (ALLOC1) is a dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the underwriter has 
complete discretion in the allocation process.  For these issues, directors do not 
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participate in the allocation of shares.  The regressions reported in table C.4 of 
appendix C show the results are robust to the change in definition for ALLOC.  The 
only change is to the coefficient on the constant with MPEBO100 as the dependent 
variable which loses significance. 
 
6.8.3 Underwriter participation in the issue versus participation in allocation 
It is argued in section 6.4.2 that underwriter participation in an issue will not be 
associated with mispricing.  Given that ALLOC is not significant in the mispricing 
model, the sensitivity of results to the inclusion of ALLOC rather than an indicator 
variable for the association of an underwriter (UW) with the issue is examined.  As a 
strong positive association is expected between dichotomous variables indicating the 
presence of an underwriter and the participation of the underwriter in the allocation 
process, an indicator variable for underwritten issues was not included in the 
mispricing model.  To test the robustness of the results to this choice, the UW 
dichotomous variable discussed in chapter 4 is substituted for ALLOC in the empirical 
models.  Results for these regressions are reported in table C.5 of appendix C.   
 
The explanatory power of the model is little changed and the coefficient on UW is not 
significant.  Therefore, it is concluded that neither the participation of the underwriter 
in the allocation process nor the underwriting of the issue per se is related to 
mispricing.  The only change is where GROWTH gains marginal significance with the 
MPEBO1000 dependent variable.  The remaining results are consistent with those 
reported earlier.   
 
6.8.4 Sensitivity to measures of mispricing 
The regressions reported table 6.9 show the mispricing model is quite robust to 
changing the measure of mispricing from VPE to VEBO models.  The sensitivity of 
results is tested here by scaling the measures of mispricing included as dependent 
variables in table 6.9.  Two alternate measures of MP, the percentage of mispricing 
(relative to OP) and the ratio of V to OP, are examined in this section.  As OP cannot 
be set below $0.20 in the Australian context, OP is chosen as the scalar for the 
relative measures of mispricing.  In contrast, VEBO can be equal to zero, providing the 
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potential for an indeterminate ratio of OP to V
101
.  Further, comparison of figures 5.2 
and 5.3 (the distributions of the value measures) with figure 6.1 (the distribution of 
offer price) shows the former is relatively more symmetric.  The lack of continuity 
observed for OPs is discussed in section 6.2.  The empirical distribution of OP 
suggests it contains incremental information about issuers‟ pricing decisions.  As 
such, OP is chosen as the scalar for MP and V in the alternate measures of 
underpricing. 
 
Results for regressions with mispricing as a percentage of OP (MP%) and as the VOP 
ratio are reported in tables C.6 and C.7 of appendix C.  In addition to the non-linear 
relationships of DTN, HOTN and SIZE with MPPE, these independent variables are 
also related to the MPEBO percentage and ratio measures in a non-linear fashion
102
.  
Therefore, lnDTN, lnHOTN and lnSIZE are the independent variables employed in 
tables C.6 and C.7.   
 
Lower explanatory power is observed with the scaled MP dependent variables, with 
the lowest reported for the V/OP dependent variables.  Coefficients on the significant 
variables change sign for the V/OP measures of mispricing as overpriced issues have 
a V/OP less than one
103
.  HOLDERS, DTN, ALLOC and GROWTH continue to lack 
significance at the conventional level.  The t-statistics decrease on HOTN, and this 
variable is now significant at the conventional level with the percentage measures of 
mispricing but not with the ratio measure.  In contrast, the t-statistics on GROWTH 
increase with percentage and ratio measures of mispricing, but this variable is not 
significant at the conventional level. 
 
lnSIZE is highly significant in all four regressions with the V/OP dependent variables 
and the MPPE% dependent variable.  As shown in section 6.6, SIZE has significant 
associations with all independent variables other than HOTN.  Scale effects occur 
when variables in the model are influenced by the size of the firm‟s operations (Lo, 
                                                 
101
 The discounting process used in the estimation of VEBO results in negative minimum values in the 
sample.  See table 5.4 in chapter 5. 
102
 Non-linearity is evidenced by the significant RESET tests for the regressions (unreported) of MPEBO 
on the DTN, HOTN and SIZE dependent variables.  No significant specification error is found when the 
transformed variables are substituted in the model. 
103
 The values of MP and MP% become larger with the extent of overpricing.  The coefficients change 
sign for V/OP because the value of this measure decreases as overpricing increases.  
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2005).  Failure to control for scale effects results in coefficient bias [Barth & Clinch 
(2005); Lo & Lys (2000)], R
2
 bias (Lo, 2005) and heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
(Easton & Sommers, 2003).  Three alternatives for controlling for scale effects are the 
inclusion of a scale proxy as an independent variable (Barth & Kallapur, 1996), using 
a scale proxy to deflate scale-affected variables (Brown, Lo & Lys, 1999) or using 
weighted least squares to deflate each variable by market capitalisation (Easton & 
Sommers, 2003).   
 
A natural control for scale is provided in the mispricing model as it contains SIZE as 
an independent variable.  The highly significant coefficients on SIZE reported in table 
6.9 could, therefore, indicate the presence of scale effects rather than indicate a role 
for SIZE in explaining mispricing.   As returns regressions are free of scale effects 
(Easton & Sommers, 2003), the significance of SIZE to MP% provides 
complementary evidence on the role of size for explaining the level of mispricing.  
While the t-statistics on the SIZE coefficients decrease, they continue to be significant 
at the conventional level.  Therefore, it can be concluded that SIZE does have high 
explanatory power for mispricing.   
 
Significant model specification errors are indicated by the RESET tests only for the 
MPPE% dependent variable.   The DW statistics do not indicate autocorrelation in 
residuals.  The results reported in tables C.6 and C.7 show the main results reported 
for the mispricing model are somewhat sensitive to changes in the measurement of 
MP. 
 
6.8.5 Sensitivity to the number of shares offered 
The observed preference for issuers to select the number of shares to achieve the 
desired offer price was discussed in section 6.2.  To assess any potential impact of this 
behaviour on mispricing, regressions are re-estimated using the product of MP and the 
number of shares offered as the dependent variable.  This approach results in all 
variables measured at the firm level with the dependent variable (AMP) indicating the 
aggregate level of mispricing.   
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The results for regressing AMP on the dependent variables are reported in table C.8 of 
appendix C.  Highly significant model specification error is indicated by the RESET 
tests for the regressions when transformed dependent variables are used.  Therefore, 
the untransformed versions of DTN, HOTN and SIZE are used.  White‟s corrected t-
statistics are reported for the AMPEBO measures where significant heteroscedasticity is 
observed.  While the coefficients on SIZE remain highly significant, the t-statistics on 
HOTN decrease and these coefficients are not significant.  HOLDERS, DTN, ALLOC 
and GROWTH continue to lack significance. 
 
Most notable of the changes from using the aggregate level of mispricing as the 
dependent variable are the significant RESET tests.  As using transformed variables 
results in highly significant (rather than significant) indicators of model specification 
error, it is concluded that the specification error is attributable to missing variables 
rather than non-linearity with the AMP dependent variable.  It is not, therefore, 
possible to draw firm conclusions about the impact of the issuer‟s selection of the 
number of shares to offer on mispricing. 
 
6.9  Conclusions 
Results from testing the mispricing model in this chapter show that IPOs with 
relatively larger market capitalisation than the industry median (SIZE) are more 
mispriced.  In addition to the relative size effect, issuers appear to be aware of current 
IPO market conditions (HOTN) and opportunistically increase mispricing during hot 
markets.  The hypothesised positive relationship of GROWTH and mispricing is not 
observed, suggesting issuers do not face greater difficulties valuing their own high 
growth IPO. 
 
While Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003) report that underpriced IPOs have significantly 
lower levels of ownership dispersion (captured by HOLDERS), results in table 6.9 
show this is not due to mispricing.  In contrast to the hypothesised relationship to 
mispricing, wealth loss to owners from the sale of primary shares (DTN) bears no 
relationship to the level of mispricing.  These results are robust to the substitution of 
the participation ratio (PTN) for DTN and to the inclusion of both PTN and DTN in 
the mispricing model.  Issuers do not appear to utilise mispricing to minimise their 
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wealth losses from the issue.  Further, they do not appear to use mispricing to achieve 
their desired levels of dispersion for share ownership.   
 
Underwriter involvement in the allocation process (ALLOC) is also unrelated to 
mispricing.  This result may be attributable to the low proportion of underwriters 
given complete discretion over the allocation process as company directors provide a 
foil to the potential agency costs of complete discretion.   However, re-estimating the 
mispricing regression and substituting a variable that indicates complete underwriter 
discretion in the allocation process for ALLOC again shows that underwriters do not 
exert a greater influence on mispricing when they can allocate shares to their 
preferred clients.  Further, a dichotomous variable indicating the participation of an 
underwriter in the issue rather than ALLOC shows underwritten issues do not 
experience significantly different mispricing from those that are not underwritten.  
 
While these results only provide indirect evidence, they suggest Australian 
underwriters of fixed-price issues do not influence mispricing in response to any 
informal testing of demand.  As ALLOC is unrelated to mispricing, underwriters do 
not appear to be rewarding informed investors for costly information in this fixed-
price setting.  With the development and testing of the mispricing model now 
complete, the next chapter explores misvaluation. 
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CHAPTER 7  
MISVALUATION OF AUSTRALIAN FIXED-PRICE IPOs 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The concept of fundamental analysis (or value investing) is predicated on identifying 
any divergence of market price (P) from value (V) (Greenwald et al., 2001).  The 
disparity between P and V represents misvaluation (MV), the second component of the 
disaggregation of underpricing.  Misvaluation is modelled in this chapter.  This 
chapter addresses the third research sub-question: which investor-related factors 
determine the level of IPO misvaluation? 
 
The relationship of V and P is explored further in the next section.  The measurement 
of misvaluation is addressed in section 7.3 while institutional features of relevance to 
misvaluation in the Australian context are discussed in section 7.4.  Potential factors 
associated with misvaluation are identified and models of misvaluation are developed 
in section 7.5.  Section 7.6 describes the sample and presents descriptive statistics for 
the test sample of earnings forecasters.  The misvaluation model is tested in section 
7.7.  The sensitivity of results to variable measurement is addressed in section 7.8 and 
conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
7.2 Market price and misvaluation 
As misvaluation is defined as the divergence of P from V, the misvaluation model is 
developed by giving consideration to the factors posited to influence the market price 
of IPOs.  Consistent with prior Australian underpricing research, the market price (P) 
is measured at the end of the first trading day for the IPO.   
 
Although V is estimated from prospectus data, it is directly comparable with the non-
contemporaneous P.   As Lee (2001, p. 246) states „fundamental value is concerned 
with measuring firm value regardless of market conditions‟.  Thus, while daily price 
variations of the shares of comparable firms would change the assessment of an IPO‟s 
V if it were measured on listing date, V does not have a short-term focus. The longer-
term focus of V is reflected in the application of median PE multiples or the perpetuity 
of forecast earnings in the EBO measures.   
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Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of P for the earnings forecasting sample of 289 IPOs 
described in chapter 5.  Sample prices range from $0.14 to $7.98 with a standard 
deviation of $0.95.  The mean (median) price is $1.17 ($1.01) and the distribution is 
significantly non-normal
104
.  While the mean P is substantially higher than for OP 
($0.92) the medians for P and OP ($1.00) are very similar.  This highlights the fact 
that IPOs are underpriced on average.  
 






















While P does not display the same degree of „stickiness‟ observed in OP, there is still 
some evidence of clustering around specific values
105
.  Prices ending in a zero or five 
are observed for 32% of sample IPOs.  The expected proportion in a continuous 
distribution of prices with the same range is 20%.  Kandel, Sarig & Wohl (2001) 
provide a behavioural explanation for this phenomenon.  They report that investors in 
Israeli IPO auctions prefer to bid using round numbers (i.e. prices ending in zero or 
five) and attribute this to investors‟ „memory economising‟.   
 
Institutional features pertaining to market prices are examined in section 7.4.  The 
next section discusses the measurement of the dependent variables for the 




                                                 
104
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic = 3.097, p = 0.000.  The distribution exhibits significant skewness  
(6.272) and kurtosis (20.919).  The skewness is at least partially attributable to an outlier. 
105
 There are 785 possible discrete Ps within this range (based on increments of $0.01).  Only 173 (or 
22%) of these are observed in the sample.   
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7.3 Measuring misvaluation 
Mirroring the measure of mispricing (OP – V) in chapter 6, misvaluation is measured 
as the difference between P and V.   Four methods for estimating value were 
presented in chapter 5, and these four value estimates (VPE, VEBO0, VEBO50 and VEBO100) 
are used to determine the dependent variables in the misvaluation model.  Equation 
7.1 shows how misvaluation is estimated.   
 
iii VPMV       (7.1) 
where  MVi = per share level of misvaluation 
 Pi  = per share market price  
 Vi  = per share proxy for value 
 
7.3.1 Relating value to market price 
This section establishes the relationship between P and V and provides evidence on 
the nature and magnitude of this relationship.  The results for regressions of the four 
measures of V on P are reported in table 7.1. 
 
The results show V explains about 12-18% of the variation in P.  As seen in chapter 6, 
V explains about 25-30% of OP.  As no distribution is available for R
2
, it is not 
possible to test the hypothesis that the R
2 
of one model is significantly different from 
that of another model (Brooks, 2002).  Taken together, the results presented in tables 
6.1 and 7.1 suggest that V is more closely related to OP than to P.   This implies the 
extent of misvaluation is greater than the extent of mispricing and provides 
justification for the investigation of misvaluation.  As was the case with OP in chapter 
6, the highly significant RESET tests confirm that V is only one of a set of variables 
that explain P. 
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Table 7.1 OLS estimation of the relationship of P and V  
 
  Dependent variable 
  
P 
(n = 222) 
P 
(n = 269) 
P 
(n = 269) 
P 
(n = 269) 
constant coefficient 0.782** 0.592** 0.629** 0.665** 
 t-stat 8.957 3.256 3.472 3.728 
 p (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
VPE coefficient 0.417**    
 t-stat 5.924    
 p (0.000)    
VEBO0 coefficient  0.602**   
 t-stat  2.729   
 p  (0.007)   
VEBO50 coefficient   0.594*  
 t-stat   2.552  
 p   (0.011)  
VEBO100 coefficient    0.581* 
 t-stat    2.412 
 p    (0.017) 
R
2
  0.116** 0.179** 0.159** 0.143** 
JB  6158** 5279** 5178** 5102** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.823) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.844 2.029 2.034 2.039 
RESET F 5.008** 8.869** 9.966** 10.510** 
 p (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed) 
* Significant at < 5% (two-tailed) 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for the MPEBO  measures of misvaluation. 
VPE = comparable firms estimate of value. VEBO0 = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  VEBO50 = EBO model value 
where r50 is the discount rate.  VEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate. 
 
7.3.2 Distributions and descriptive statistics for MV 
Figure 7.2 shows the distributions of the MVPE, MVEBO0, MVEBO50 and MVEBO100 
measures of misvaluation for the sample of 186 IPOs for which both MVPE and MVEBO 
measures are calculated.  The extreme outlier on the left-hand side of the distribution 
is Stirling Biofuels Ltd.  This firm exhibited severe negative mispricing and was 
deleted from the mispricing sample.  It exhibits severe negative misvaluation and is 
also deleted from the misvaluation sample.   
 
The extreme outlier on the right-hand side is Melbourne IT Ltd.  Melbourne IT 
exhibits positive mispricing with an offer price of $2.20 and VPE of $0.57.  Comparing 
VPE to the price at the end of listing day of $7.95 demonstrates severe positive 
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misvaluation for this IPO.  Although the measures of MV remain non-normal after the 
deletion of Stirling Biofuels and Melbourne IT (see table 7.3), Melbourne IT is 
deleted to remove its influence on the slope of the regression line.  Comparing the 
distributions in figure 7.2 to those for mispricing shown in figure 6.2, misvaluation 
appears to be less symmetric with relatively more observations in the right-hand side 
of the distribution.   
 
















































































Table 7.2 shows the proportions of positive and negative misvaluation for each value 
proxy.  Broadly speaking, about 60% the sample IPOs have positive levels of 
misvaluation.  The highest proportion of overvaluation (66.85%) is identified with 
VPE and VEBO100, while the lowest (58.01%) occurs when VEBO0 is the value proxy. 
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Table 7.2 Proportions of positive and negative misvaluation 
 
 Positive MV Negative MV 
VPE 66.85% 33.15% 
VEBO0 58.01% 41.99% 
VEBO50 62.98% 37.02% 
VEBO100 66.85% 33.15% 
   
 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is 
the discount rate.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus 
the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate. 
 
Descriptive statistics for 184 observations of the four specifications of the dependent 
variable are presented in table 7.3.  Both mean and median values show the market 
tends to set P higher than V.  The highest median level of misvaluation (20.59%) is 
found when the return on equity used to calculate VEBO is largest (i.e. when imputation 
credits are fully valued by the market).  The maximum and minimum values for 
MVEBO are identical as the IPOs generating these values did not pay dividends.  Using 
paired sample t-tests to compare the measures of mean MV (table 7.3) to mean MP 
(table 6.3), misvaluation is significantly higher than mispricing (p < 0.001)
106
.   
 
Table 7.3 Descriptive statistics for MV, forecasting IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 Mean Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p- value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
MVPE 0.2256 0.1640 0.6860 -1.40 3.75 1.652 
 (0.009) 
4.511 8.772 
MVEBO0 0.2035 0.1196 0.6615 -1.54 3.61  1.427 
(0.034) 
4.523 8.662 
MVEBO50 0.2574 0.1675 0.6615 -1.54 3.61  1.461 
(0.028) 
4.502 8.470 
MVEBO100 0.3039 0.2059 0.6634 -1.54 3.61  1.584 
(0.013) 
4.472 8.253 
         
 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount 
rate.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value 
where r100 is the discount rate. 
 
7.4 Institutional setting 
The applicability of underpricing theories, given Australian institutional features, was 
discussed in chapter 2.  The potential impact of the Australian institutional setting on 
                                                 
106
 The mean of MVPE, for example, is 0.2256 while the mean of MPPE is 0.0467. 
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mispricing was described in chapter 6.  This section includes some further discussion 
of institutional features of particular relevance to P and, therefore, misvaluation.  The 
types of investors participating in the Australian IPO market are identified.  Limits to 
arbitrage and restrictions on the sale of vendor shares in the Australian context are 
then discussed.   
 
7.4.1 IPO investors  
The first institutional feature of relevance to misvaluation is the composition of 
investors participating in the IPO.  This section identifies some differences in the 
behaviours of institutional and individual investors
107
, while the impact of the relative 
levels of participation of these investor groups on listing price is discussed in the 
following section.   
 
Prospectuses should include information that is useful to both the „unsophisticated 
investors and market professionals‟ (Law & Callum, 1997, p. 52) as both of these 
groups participate in the Australian IPO market.  Following Shiller‟s (1984) 
nomenclature, market professionals are the „smart money‟ who trade shares in 
response to news about fundamental value.  While a few individual investors can be 
classified as „smart money‟, this term is normally associated with institutional 
investors as these are expected to expend resources on the identification of which 
equities to include in their portfolios. 
 
Unsophisticated individual investors are characterised as „noise traders‟.  Noise 
traders are uninformed retail investors who are less than fully rational (Barber, Odean 
& Zhu, 2005).  Their trading decisions are based on factors other than optimal 
responses to news about fundamentals (Lee, 2001).  Assets become overvalued when 
individuals buy and undervalued when they sell [Brown & Cliff (2005); Barber, 
Odean & Zhu (2005)], providing opportunities for institutional investors to exploit.  
 
Individual investors have greater influence of the prices of small-capitalisation stocks 
than they do on the market at large (Nofsinger & Sias, 1999).  Further, the trades of 
                                                 
107
 Alternative nomenclatures for individual investors found in the literature include sentiment, retail 
and small investors.  They are also known as noise traders. 
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individuals contribute to the explanation of returns in small-capitalisation firms with 
lower prices and relatively low levels of institutional ownership, especially if the 
shares are costly to arbitrage (Kumar & Lee, 2006).  As seen in chapter 3, Australian 
fixed-price IPOs have about the same market capitalisation at listing as the median 
listed firm (approximately $35 million) but are much smaller than the mean listed 
firm (roughly $66 million for IPOs compared to $1 billion for listed companies).  
Therefore, IPO size suggests individual investors will exert influence on price at 
listing in the Australian context. 
 
Institutional investors receive two to three times the number of shares as individual 
investors in France, Germany, the UK, the US (Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2002) and 
Australia (Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006).  They hold an average of 16.7% of shares for 
Australian companies that have been listed for one year (Balatbat, Taylor & Walter, 
2004)
108
.  The importance of the existence of both groups in the IPO market is 
demonstrated in the following section where constraints on arbitrage are discussed. 
   
7.4.2 Arbitrage 
Establishing that constraints on arbitrage exist in the Australian IPO setting is 
important in the explanation of why price deviates from value.  Arbitrageurs are 
characterised as rational investors whose trades are based on fundamental value 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Individual investors (i.e. noise traders or sentiment 
investors) generate misvaluation when there is a systematic component to their trades.  
Jackson (2003) reports strong systematic patterns in the aggregate trading behaviour 
of Australian individual investors.  Arbitrage is normally the preserve of institutions 
that trade to exploit misvaluation resulting from the trades of individuals.  Arbitrage 
trading reduces the price of overvalued shares (Miller, 1977).   
 
The simplest definition of arbitrage is the purchase of an asset in one market 
combined with the simultaneous sale of the same (or similar) asset in another market 
                                                 
108
 Using CHESS data, Bayley, Lee and Walter (2006) report about 25% of IPO shares are held by 
individuals on listing day, while institutions hold the remaining 75%.   Some of this deviation from the 
Balatbat, Taylor and Walter (2004) proportion of institutional ownership is attributable to institutions 
flipping IPOs.  Much, however, will be attributable to the different definitions of institutional investors 
employed in each study.  The former defines institutional investors as non-individuals, while the latter 
uses a definition consistent with that presented in section 7.6.3. 
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to achieve a riskless profit by exploiting price differences (c.f. Brealey & Myers, 
1996).   Riskless arbitrage therefore requires the capacity to take a short position in a 
particular asset or a very close substitute for that asset.    
 
Arbitrage on Australian equities can be achieved by short selling or by creating a 
synthetic short position.  Synthetic short positions are created with low exercise price 
options (LEPOs) or short futures positions.  ASX Listing Rule 19.7.1 allows short 
sales only on companies with more than 50 million shares issued and market 
capitalisation of more than $100 million
109
. Trade in the shares must also be deemed 
to have sufficient liquidity and the company must appear on the list of approved 
products for short sale. There were 345 shares and trust units on this list for 
September 2008 indicating that short selling can occur in the shares of less than 20 
percent of listed companies
110
.  IPO shares do not exist prior to allocation and cannot 
be sold short
111
 (Rock, 1986).  Shares on which short selling is allowed have large 
market capitalisations relative to fixed-price IPOs and do not represent close 




LEPOs were available on around 50 of the largest listed stocks in September 2008
113
.   
Given their capitalisation, none of the stocks covered by LEPOs are close substitutes 
for the fixed-price IPOs in this sample.  Similarly, futures contracts for 37 listed firms 
were listed in March 2005 (SFE, 2005)
114
.  Again, the large capitalisation companies 
covered by futures contracts are not close substitutes for the IPO sample firms.  
Arbitrage is risky when close substitutes are not available for the misvalued asset.  
 
Even if close substitutes were available, selling futures would not constitute a riskless 
arbitrage for several reasons.  First, futures contract dates are fixed and the actual date 
for listing is uncertain.  This exposes the investor to basis risk as the prices of the 
substitute asset and the futures contract do not converge until the end of the contract 
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 As shown in Table 3.2, the median size of IPOs at listing is $35 041 000. 
110
 The current (May, 2009) restriction on shorting financials does not affect the sample period for this 
research.  
111
 As discussed in chapter 2, the over-allotment options that allow underwriters to short sell issues are 
not a feature of Australian fixed-price offers. 
112
 US IPOs are subject to short selling constraints [Miller (1977) and Loughran (2002)]. 
113
 http://www.asx.com.au/products/options/lepos.htm Accessed 5/8/8.  This data was collected prior to 
the October 2008 market downturn. 
114
 The ASX and the SFE merged in 2006 and individual share futures are no longer traded. 
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period.  Second, the number of shares covered by individual share price futures 
contracts is fixed (SFE, 2005) while IPO investors face uncertainty with respect to the 
size of their allocations.  While investors can apply for a number of shares that 
matches the number in a futures position, an exposure to risk from the futures contract 
is created if the investor is allocated fewer shares than the application amount. 
 
Given short selling constraints and the lack of availability of suitable derivatives, 
arbitrage activities are severely restricted for the majority of Australian equities.  
Most Australian IPOs will not meet the capitalisation criterion for short selling post-
listing.  Further, those of sufficient size do not have the required evidence of liquidity 
at listing.  Synthetic short positions are unfeasible given the lack of close substitute 
assets for the IPO shares.  Such limits to arbitrage result in an upward bias in IPO 
prices at listing (Miller, 1977). 
 
7.4.3 Escrow of vendor shares 
The final institutional feature relevant to misvaluation is the escrow of vendor shares.  
To protect the integrity of the market, the ASX listing rules place restrictions on 
securities held by vendors, seed capitalists (in some circumstances), promoters, 
professionals or consultants who are issued shares in return for services, shares from 
pre-listing employee incentive schemes and shares that would have been restricted 
securities if they had not been transferred prior to listing (ASX, 2002).  Leyland and 
Pyle (1977) view retained ownership as a signal of the quality of the IPO on the basis 
that it represents a commitment by the vendors to the future of the firm. The security 
restrictions imposed by the ASX add „… weight to the “commitment” implied by 
retained ownership‟ (Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1996 p. 1193). 
 
US regulators mandate a „lockup‟ period of whereby shares retained by vendors 
cannot be traded for at least 90 days after listing (Jog & McConomy, 2003). US 
vendors sell primary shares in the IPO and sell their secondary shares at expiry of the 
lockup agreement (Aggarwal, Krigman & Womack, 2002).  This preference for 
selling primary shares in the offer leads Gale and Stiglitz (1989) to conclude that 
retained ownership is not a reliable signal as vendors will sell down their ownership 
shortly after listing.   
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In addition to the mandatory lockup requirement, most US IPOs contain voluntary 
provisions as part of the underwriting agreement (Draho, 2004).  These voluntary 
lockups are normally made in response to requests by influential buyers (Mohan & 
Chen, 2001). The usual lockup time is 180 days [Aggarwal, Krigman & Womack 
(2002); Zhang (2005)], with longer periods indicating greater uncertainty about the 
value of the firm (Mohan & Chen, 2001).  Underpricing generates information 
momentum that allows the IPO vendors to receive more for the shares they sell after 
lockup expiration (Aggarwal, Krigman & Womack, 2002). 
 
The company announcements section of the ASX website provides data on exchange-
imposed and voluntary escrow arrangements for each listed company
115
. 49.5% of the 
sample described in chapter 3 was subject to ASX escrow
116
.  The escrow period is 
either 12 or 24 months from the date of listing, depending on the ownership of the 
restricted securities (ASX, 2002)
117
.  Therefore, Australian escrow periods are at least 
twice as long as the average US lockup period.   Australian IPOs also have the 
capacity to enter voluntary escrow agreements that are disclosed in the prospectus.  
16.7% of the sample described in chapter 3 disclosed that voluntary escrow 





US lockup provisions are credited with an observed issuer preference for offering 
primary shares in the prospectus and subsequently selling secondary shares at the 
expiration of lockup (Gale & Stiglitz, 1989).  Primary shares are offered by 96.4% of 
the fixed-price offer sample described in chapter 3 while only 24.3% offer secondary 
shares (with or without an offer of primary shares)
119
.  While Australian issuers also 
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 Announcements relating to either initial escrow requirements or the dates on which escrow 
restrictions could not be identified for 31 of the 510 full sample firms.  30 of these IPOs listed prior to 
the second quarter of 1998, reflecting the higher level of electronic data availability from that time 
onward.  The one remaining IPO for which data were not available occurred in 2002 and did not 
forecast earnings.  
116
 ASX listing rule 9.1.3 indicates that these restrictions do not apply to companies admitted to the list 
under the profits test or to those that are deemed by the ASX to have sufficient profits or tangible assets 
(ASX, 2005). 
117
 Australian escrow requirements are similar to those in Canada.  Canadian vendor shares are released 
in tranches, with 10% typically released 9 months after listing and remaining shares released „… over 
the next several years on anniversaries of the IPO‟ (Jog & McConomy, 2003, p. 160)  
118
 The total number of IPOs with escrow arrangements does not equal the sum of the percentages of 
voluntary and imposed arrangements as 2.1% of the sample had both types of escrow provisions. 
119
 Only secondary shares are offered in the prospectuses of 3.6% of this sample. 
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display a preference for selling primary shares at the float, 64% of issuers cannot sell 
their secondary shares until at least one year after the float.  This feature demonstrates 
the validity of retained ownership as a signal in the Australian setting. 
 
To summarise, limits to arbitrage create conditions in which prices may be influenced 
by factors other than rational expectations, suggesting a role for sentiment-related 
variables in the misvaluation model.  Post-listing restrictions on the sale of vendor 
shares strengthen the signal provided by the post-listing level of retained ownership.  
Having concluded the discussion of relevant institutional features, the misvaluation 
model is developed in the following section. 
  
7.5 The misvaluation model 
Hypothesised relationships for the factors affecting misvaluation are developed in this 
section.  These hypothesised relationships for mispricing are shown in HO3.   
 
HO3 Misvaluation in Australia is unrelated to the demand for the issue,  
the speculative nature of the issue, the participation of institutional 
investors, the participation of an underwriter, the level of retained  
ownership, the level of IPO market sentiment and the level of mispricing. 
 
The hypothesised relationships are expressed in the empirical misvaluation model:   
 
 MV = β0 + β1OS + β2 SPEC - β3 II + β4UW + β5 OWN + β6 HOTU +  
 
 β7MP + β8SIZE + β9GROWTH + ε   (MV model)  
           
Table 7.4 contains a summary of independent variable measurement for the MV 
model.  The rationale for inclusion of these independent variables is discussed in the 
following sub-sections.  
 
7.5.1 Demand for the issue (OS) 
Oversubscription (OS) occurs when there are more applications for shares than there 
are shares to be issued (Smullen & Hand, 2005).  A rational explanation for high 
demand (indicated by OS) is that investors perceive the issue has negative mispricing 
(i.e. OP < V) and they expect to gain when the market prices at V.  In this case, excess 
demand will be observed until P equals V in the aftermarket.   Thus, a positive 
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relationship is predicted for OS and MV until the equilibrium of P equal to V exists.  
An alternate explanation for high demand is that OS is a function of the level of 
individual investor interest in the issue.  In this case, the demand generated by 
individual investors (behaving as noise traders) is a function of sentiment rather than a 
function of negative mispricing
120
.  A positive relationship is again expected for OS 
and MV.  However, any excess demand generated by individual investors will not 
dissipate when P equals V as this demand is not a function of fundamentals.   
 




Variable measurement Predicted 
relationship 
OS Oversubscription is an indicator variable that proxies 
for excess demand.  OS is equal to one if the issue is 




SPEC A speculative issue is defined as a dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the issuer identifies the offer 
as speculative in the prospectus. 
positive 
II is the number of institutional investors identified 
from the top 20 shareholders disclosure. 
positive 
UW indicates the participation of an underwriter in the 
issue.  UW is defined as a dichotomous variable 
equal to one if the issue is underwritten. 
 
positive 
OWN is the proportion of shares retained by vendors.  It is 
measured as [(shares retained by pre-IPO owners / 
number of shares at listing) x 100]. 
 
negative 
HOTU indicates those issues made when the IPO market is 
hot.  HOTU is measured by average underpricing for 








SIZE measures the size of the firm post listing relative to 
industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  
Firm size is measured as the total number of shares at 
listing multiplied by the OP. 
positive 
GROWTH GROWTH is captured by [1-(book value of ordinary 
shareholders‟ equity / offer price)]. 
positive 
 
Excess demand results in quantity rationing once the OP is set (Beatty & Ritter, 
1986).  Therefore, issuers and underwriters may require some level of 
                                                 
120
 Here, the IPO may not exhibit any mispricing or may display positive mispricing. 
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oversubscription to achieve their allocation objectives.  If applications are only 
received for the number of shares offered, the issuer or underwriter does not have any 
discretion in the allocation process.  Issuers will encourage oversubscription to ensure 
broad ownership at listing (Booth & Chua, 1996) or to reduce the size of new 
individual blockholders (Brennan & Franks, 1997).  Underwriters will encourage 
oversubscription and use allocation and underpricing to reward loyal customers who 
pay for other services provided by the underwriter [Bae, Klein, & Bowyer (1999); 
Loughran & Ritter (2002)].  
 
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1999) examine subscription and allocation data for IPOs in 
Singapore and find institutional investors make larger applications for underpriced 
IPOs.  Using the number of times oversubscribed to measure demand, Jelic, Saadouni 
and Briston (2001) report a positive and highly significant relationship between 
oversubscription and underpricing in the Malaysian fixed-price setting.  A high 
correlation for oversubscription and initial returns is also reported in the European 
bookbuild setting (Jenkinson & Jones, 2006).  
 
Data on the rate of subscription for Australian IPOs are not available. Oversubscribed 
issues (OS) are identified from reports in the financial press.  These reports sometimes 
disclose the level of oversubscription.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to use these 
data to construct a continuous measure of excess demand as they are not routinely 
available.  Australian issuers have the capacity to close an issue earlier than the stated 
closing date in the prospectus.  Early-closing issues have sufficient applications for 
shares to fill the issue and meet any allocation objectives of the issuer or underwriter.  
Thus, even if numerical data were available for the level of oversubscription, the data 
for early-closing issues would be biased.     
 
Given these data constraints, a dichotomous variable is included in the MV model to 
represent oversubscription.  OS is coded one where the financial press indicates that 
an IPO was either oversubscribed or closed early.  The limitations of this measure 
include inaccurate reporting and omitted reports.  As such, OS is a fairly crude proxy 
for the measure of oversubscription compared to that examined by Lee, Taylor & 
Walter (1999).  First-day returns have been used to proxy for oversubscription in a 
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model of underpricing (Reuter, 2006) but this proxy will induce endogeneity in 
models of both misvaluation and underpricing.  
 
7.5.2 Speculative issues (SPEC) 
Speculative issues are expected to be associated with greater misvaluation because 
they have greater ex ante uncertainty with respect to their valuations.   ASIC (2008) 
defines speculative as deliberately „… taking a big risk … in the hope of making an 
extraordinary gain‟121.   Similarly, Smullen and Hand (2005, p. 383) define a 
speculation as the „… purchase or sale of something for the sole purpose of making a 
capital gain‟.  In their 2004 prospectus, McMillan Shakespeare Ltd identifies their 
issue as speculative because the shares „…carry no guarantee with respect to payment 
of dividends, return of capital or market value‟. 
 
These definitions characterise speculative investments as high risk with a focus on 
shorter-term capital gains in stark contrast to the rational investor choices made with 
reference to the longer-term concept of value.   By their nature, speculative issues will 
be more difficult for rational investors to value given the higher uncertainty of future 
earnings.  Further, speculative issues are expected to attract bullish individual 
(sentiment) investors who will cause misvaluation. 
 
One proxy for the speculative nature of smaller start-up IPOs, issue proceeds, is used 
in several models of underpricing [Beatty & Ritter (1986); Tinic (1988)].  The number 
of risk factors disclosed in the prospectus [c.f. Beatty & Ritter (1986); Dalton, Certo 
& Daily (2003), Reber, Berry, & Toms (2005) and Chang et al. (2008)] is also used to 
identify speculative issues.  Beatty and Ritter (1986) rationalise the number of 
disclosed uses of proceeds as a proxy because the Securities Exchange Commission 
requires greater disclosure in this area for speculative issues.  Rather than proxy for 
the speculative nature of an issue, Jog and McConomy (2003) use Canadian data 
where clear identification of speculative issues is required by regulation
122
.  They 
argue that this clear identification reduces the level of ex ante uncertainty and find a 
weak positive association for speculative issues and underpricing.   
                                                 
121
 The glossary of terms available on the ASX website does not include a definition for „speculative‟. 
122
 This requirement is specified by the Ontario Securities Commission (Jog & McConomy, 2003). 
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Almost half (46%) of the issues included in the chapter 3 sample are labelled by the 
issuer as „speculative‟, although no specific requirement to do so has been found123.  It 
is, however, probable that investors and their advisors would reasonably require the 
identification of an issue as speculative to make an informed assessment of the 
offer
124
.   More than three-quarters of Australian firms not providing earnings 
forecasts „non-forecasters‟ (78.8%) are speculative issues.  Consistent with the 
Canadian market (see Jog & McConomy, 2003), fewer Australian speculative issues 
contain earnings forecasts.  Relatively fewer issuers with positive earnings forecasts 
(23.2%) are identified as speculative, while 70% of IPOs with negative forecasts 
identify their issues as speculative.   
 
Figure 7.3 shows the percentage of speculative issues per year for the sample 
described in chapter 3.  The percentage of speculative issues for IPOs with positive 
earnings forecasts remains relative stable over the sample period.  In contrast, the 
annual percentage of speculative issues is highly volatile for IPOs with negative or 
omitted forecasts.   
 














































„Positive (negative) forecast‟ indicate issues that include a positive (negative) EPS forecast in the prospectus.  No EPS forecast is 
disclosed in the „forecast omitted‟ group.   
                                                 
123
 Electronic versions of the Corporations Act, ASIC regulations and the ASX Listing Rules were 
searched for the term „speculative‟.  Further, ASIC was contacted by telephone to confirm that there is 
no specific requirement.   
124
 Section 710 of the Corporations Act 2001 identifies this general disclosure test for determining the 
contents of a prospectus. 
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A dichotomous variable (SPEC) is coded as one to indicate those issues identified as 
speculative in the prospectus.  Given the above discussion on valuation difficulty and 
the likely participation of individuals behaving as noise traders in speculative issues, 
speculative issues are expected to be experience greater misvaluation. 
 
7.5.3 Institutional investor participation (II) 
Luplau (1998, p. 149) defines an institutional investor as: 
… an organisation whose primary purpose in investment markets is to 
invest its own assets or those held in trust by it for others.  
 
Examples of institutional investors include superannuation funds, life companies, 
universities and banks (Luplau, 1998).  Rock (1986, p. 187) defines informed 
investors as those „… whose information is superior to that of the firm as well as that 
of all other investors‟.  Compared to individual investors, institutions utilise more 
resources in their investment decisions (Barber & Odean, 2008).  Lee, Taylor and 
Walter (1999) use Singaporean data to show large investors apply for relatively more 
shares in underpriced issues, indicating that they are better informed than small 
investors
125
.   
 
Institutional investors are associated with large IPO share trades (Aggarwal, 2003) 
and their trading behaviour should be broadly consistent with the fundamentals-based 
trading of Shiller‟s (1984) „smart money‟.   Institutions participate in IPO markets to 
exploit sentiment (individual) investors (Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh, 2006) and there 
is a negative association between average trade size and underpricing in the US 
(Cook, Kieschnick & Van Ness, 2006).   
 
Institutional investors in the US sell about 47%of their IPO allocations when the 
company lists (Aggarwal, 2003) while individuals sell around 28%.  Australian 
institutional investors (II) are also more likely to sell their IPO shares at listing than 
are individuals (Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006).  As only 100% of the offer can be 
allocated, there is, necessarily, a negative correlation between the level of institutional 
ownership and the proportion of shares held by small investors.  It is reasonable to 
                                                 
125
 Not all large shareholders are institutional shareholders.  Balatbat, Taylor & Walter (2004), for 
example, segregate large shareholders into „institutional‟ and „independent blockholders‟ categories.  
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expect that individuals purchase shares on the market when they have not received a 
full allocation in the IPO.  Given the influence of sentiment on the trades of 
individuals, the participation of institutional (informed) investors in an IPO is 
expected to have a positive association with the level of MV.   
 
Individuals receive lower allocations in Australian underpriced issues (Bayley, Lee & 
Walter, 2006)
126
.   While institutional investors exhibit symptoms of rational and 
irrational sentiment (Verma, Baklaci & Soydemir, 2008), individuals trade more on 
sentiment and are expected to have a greater influence on P when there is unmet 
demand from investors in oversubscribed issues
127
.  Australian CHESS-registered
128
 
individual investors are less likely to trade their IPO shares on listing (Bayley, Lee & 
Walter, 2006).  While an average of 22% of IPO shares are traded in the first three 
days of seasoning, the average for individual investors is only 1.6% (or an average of 
7.8% of CHESS registered shares held by individuals) (Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006).  
These early trading patterns are consistent with the argument that institutions 
participate in IPOs to exploit individual (i.e. sentiment) investors.  Therefore, the 
predicted relationship for the level of II and MV is positive, with larger numbers of 
institutional investors participating in the IPO when institutions expect to gain from 
selling to individuals in the after-market. 
 
Equation 7.2 shows institutional investor participation (II) is measured as the number 
of institutional investors identified in the Top 20 at the completion of the allocation 






kNALINSTITUTIOII     (7.2) 
Data are collected from the Top 20 reports discussed in chapter 6.   Insurance 
companies, banks, credit unions, listed investment companies, superannuation 
                                                 
126
 Bayley, Lee & Walter (2006) classify all categories other than individuals as institutional investors. 
127
 This suggests an interaction variable including the proportion of shares held by individuals and 
oversubscription.  This variable is not significant when included in the MV model (results unreported).    
128
 During their 1995-2000 sample period, 59% of IPO shares were included in the CHESS database 
(Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006).  The CHESS data are an incomplete record of share ownership because 
share registration is at the option of the investor.  The optional nature of the CHESS records may create 
a bias toward the inclusion of institutional and other large investors and an underreporting of individual 
shareholdings and trading activities. 
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funds
129
 as well as custodial holders and nominees
130
 are included in the measure of 
II, subject to the following screening process. 
 
Searches were conducted in DatAnalysis to determine if listed corporate investors 
identified investing in equities as an operating objective of at the time of the IPO.  
This screen results in the removal of corporations making strategic investments in 
new IPOs or maintaining some investment in subsidiaries at listing.  Further searches 
were conducted in Factiva to identify unlisted investment companies and funds that 
are potentially informed investors. This screen results in the identification of a 
number of offshore corporate investors and nominees that are included in II. The final 
screen was a Google search to identify investment companies that are no longer 
operating
131
.  Details of the activities for some corporate investors and unlisted funds 
could not be located in either Factiva or DatAnalysis. These are included in II when 
they had invested in more than three non-extractive IPOs in the sample period
132
.  As 
repeat IPO investors, these are assumed to be well-informed about the IPO market.  
Top 20 shareholdings of founders and venture capitalists or employee share funds 
associated with a particular IPO are not included in II.  
 
An alternative proxy for the role of institutional investors is the proportion of Top 20 
shares held by institutions.  This proxy is less relevant for testing the hypothesised 
exploitation of individual investors.  A high proportion of institutional ownership 
could be the result of a relatively low number of institutions holding relatively large 
blocks of shares.  If institutions are „smart money‟ one would expect, ceteris paribus, 
that many of them would form similar assessments of the probability of gaining from 
stagging their shares in the after-market.  The proportion of institutional shareholdings 
is examined in robustness testing in section 7.8.1. 
 
7.5.4 Underwriter participation (UW) 
Literature reviewed in chapter 2 indicated mixed results for the role of underwriters 
and underpricing in Australia.  Tests of the baseline model of underpricing in chapter 
                                                 
129
 Excluding self-managed superannuation funds. 
130
 Excluding one nominee who specialised in acting for self-managed superannuation funds 
131
 Adler Corporation Pty Ltd, for example, was operating as an investment company during part of the 
sample period. 
132
 The cut-off point of 3 was determined by the maximum number of unique IPO investments made by 
a self-managed superannuation fund during the sample period. 
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4 show the participation of an underwriter has a positive and significant relationship 
to underpricing.  It was argued in section 6.4.2 that Australian underwriting practices 
provide less incentive for underwriters to underprice fixed-price issues and results 
reported in section 6.8.3 confirm that underwriter participation is not associated with 
the level of mispricing.   
 
UW is included in the misvaluation model to determine if the market views 
underwriter participation as a signal of quality for the issue.  Chemmanur and 
Krishnan (2007) argue that high reputation underwriters work to increase market 
price, generating greater participation of „higher quality market players‟ and obtaining 
more analyst coverage.   They report that the activities of high reputation underwriters 
increase investor optimism and result in overvaluation at the end of the first trading 
day.  Comparing the trading behaviour of institutional and individual Australian IPO 
investors, Bayley, Lee and Walter (2006) find results consistent with individual 




The mixed results from the use of an underwriter reputation variable in the Australian 
setting are discussed in chapters 2.  Therefore, the dichotomous variable used in 
chapter 4 is again employed here, with underwritten issues coded as unity.  A positive 
association is predicted for UW and MV.   More overvaluation is expected if 
underwritten issues are perceived to be of a higher quality than their non-underwritten 
counterparts or if the activities of underwriters result in higher levels of investor 
optimism about the issue. 
 
7.5.5 Retained ownership signal (OWN) 
The influence of owners‟ wealth loss on mispricing was investigated in chapter 6.  
The misvaluation model investigates the potential market response to the level of 
retained ownership (OWN).  Retained ownership is relevant to the establishment of 
market prices in the IPO context [Downes & Heinkel (1982); Klein (1996)].  Ritter 
(1984b) attributes his evidence of a positive association between retained ownership 
and market price to an agency hypothesis.  The positive relationship is observed 
                                                 
133
 This suggests an interaction variable including the proportion of shares held by individuals and the 
presence of an underwriter.  This variable is not significant when included in the MV model (results 
unreported).    
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because lower levels of inside ownership provide incentives for managers to shirk, 
where shirking results in lower cash flows over time.    
 
Signalling theories of asymmetric information posit that issuers convey their private 
information to outsiders by setting OP lower than expected market price (E(P)) and 
use the level of retained ownership to strengthen the underpricing signal [Grinblatt & 
Hwang (1989); Allen & Faulhaber (1989); Welch (1989)].  A larger proportion of 
retained shares in the post-listing ownership structure signals that the issuer is not 
misrepresenting the firm‟s circumstances (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). Credibility is 
added to the signal because issuers forego opportunities to diversify their personal risk 
when they retain a larger fraction of retained ownership (Jog & McConomy, 2003).  
Further, as Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) suggest, the ASX‟s requirement for 
security restrictions enhances the reliability of retained ownership as a signal of the 
quality of the IPO.  In the US context, Zheng, Ogden and Jen (2005) report a stronger 
relationship for retained ownership and underpricing for those IPOs with lockup 
provisions. 
 
Based on the signalling literature, a negative association is predicted for the level of 
retained ownership and misvaluation.  Higher levels of retained ownership give the 
market confidence in the OP by indicating that the issuers will share the consequences 
of any mispricing and reduce the valuation uncertainty for investors.  Consistent with 
the measure used in the baseline model of underpricing, OWN is calculated as the 
proportion of shares held by the original owners at the completion of the issue.   
 
7.5.6 Market sentiment (HOTU) 
Investor sentiment becomes an important determinant of prices when there are limits 
to arbitrage (Shleifer & Summers, 1990).  Lee (2001) develops an asset pricing model 
that includes noise trader (i.e. individual investor) demand and costly arbitrage.  He 
shows that P = V only when arbitrage cost is zero and that the extent of misvaluation 
is a function of both arbitrage costs and the level of noise trader demand. 
 
Noise traders imitate each other when they observe high returns and create „feedback 
loops‟ that result in prices shifting further from fundamentals (Shleifer & Summers, 
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1990).  Investors consider past price changes as a factor in their IPO investment 
decisions (Shiller, 1990).  Underpricing returns are highly correlated across time in 
the US (Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter, 1988) and Australia (Brailsford, Heaney & Shi, 
2001).  This correlation is consistent with investor use of publicly-available 
information about recent IPOs in their current investment decisions.   
 
In a rational framework, information spillovers from recent IPOs facilitate the 
valuation of subsequent issues in hot markets by reducing the marginal cost of 
information acquisition (Merton, 1987).  Alternately, a behavioural framework 
suggests investors use a representativeness heuristic in their current decisions based 
on recent IPO underpricing (Bayley, Lee & Walter, 2006) rather than taking 
advantage of incremental cost savings in information production.  Highly significant 
first-order autocorrelation exists for initial returns in the US [Loughran & Ritter 
(2002); Lowry & Schwert (2004)].  Investigating the bids of institutional and 
individual investors in Taiwanese IPO auctions, Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2008) 
find that the returns on recent IPO auctions significantly influence individuals‟ 
decisions to bid.  Share prices can be expected to diverge from value when investors 
emphasise recent returns and underweight other data (Offerman & Sonnemans, 2004). 
 
The investor sentiment (HOTU) proxy used in the MV model is based on that of 
Loughran and Ritter (2002).  The proxy is adapted from equally-weighted average 
first-day return per month preceding list date to returns per quarter, as the volume of 
Australian IPOs per month is substantially lower than that observed for the US.  Raw 
returns, rather than market-adjusted returns, are used in the averages to capture 
sentiment better. 







 1      (7.3) 
  
A positive relationship is predicted for HOTU and MV, with higher levels of HOTU 
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7.5.7 Mispricing (MP) 
No relationship is expected between MV and MP if market price (P) is determined 
with reference only to intrinsic value (V).   In this case, positive or negative 
mispricing will be ignored by the market.  If, however, P is established using OP as 
the reference point, MV and MP will have a positive relationship for issues that 
experience positive mispricing.  Figure 7.4 demonstrates this relationship in panel A. 
 
The greater the extent of positive mispricing, the higher OP is relative to V.   For 
issues with P > OP, issues with positive mispricing also have positive misvaluation. 
In the US setting, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) find positive misvaluation 
in excess of the level of mispricing.  Zheng (2007), however, argues that their result is 
attributable to methodological biases.  After correcting for the omission of growth and 
matching on pre-listing firm characteristics, Zheng finds that US bookbuild issues do 
not exhibit significant mispricing
134
.  However, the possible co-existence of positive 
MP and MV for an issue indicates that the model of misvaluation requires a control 
for the level of mispricing to isolate the individual effects.   
 
Figure 7.4 Relationships of MP and MV 
 
Panel A: Positive MP and MV 
   







   
Panel B:  Negative MP and MV 
   






   
 
V = value.  OP = offer price.  P = market price.  MP = OP minus V.  MV = P minus V. 
 
                                                 
134
 Zheng‟s conclusion that US IPOs are underpriced in the offer price is based on estimates of V using 
the price to sales ratio, not the price to earnings ratio. 
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A clear positive relationship
135
 between MP and MV is observed for 61% sample 
IPOs.  Panel B of figure 7.4 shows a negative relationship for negative MP and 
positive MV.  Such issues represent about 14% of the sample
136
.  The remainder of the 
sample has either OP > P > V (7%) or V > P > OP (18%).  While a positive 
relationship between MP and MV is not always observed in the sample data and the 
strength of the relationship is not necessarily monotonic, figure 7.5 shows that a 
positive relationship between MP and MV best describes the sample data. 
  
Figure 7.5 Empirical relationship of MP and MV 
 
 
Results in chapter 6 show that mean and median levels of MP are relatively low when 
compared to mean and median OP.  These results confirm those of Cotter, Goyen and 
Hegarty (2005) who do not find systematic positive mispricing for Australian fixed-
price IPOs
137
.  As discussed in chapter 6, a ratio of V and OP is a relative measure of 
mispricing.  Using both the comparable firms approach and the EBO model to 
estimate V, Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) find the ratio of OP to V makes a 
highly significant contribution to the explanation of underpricing.  How, Lam and 
Yeo (2007) confirm the positive association between MP and underpricing using OP 
                                                 
135
 That is P > OP > V, V > OP > P, OP = P >V or V > OP = P. 
136
 That is P > V > OP or OP > V > P. 
137
 Their results are not subject to Zheng‟s criticism as V is estimated using forecast earnings and pro-
forma balance sheets that reflect the IPO capital raising.  They also partially control for growth in their 
V measure via the use of industry median PEs, although GROWTH provides incremental explanatory 
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to V, again with V based on Australian comparable firms‟ PEs138.  Based on this prior 
research and the need to control for the level of mispricing when determining MV, MP 
is included as an independent variable.  The four measures of MP described in chapter 
6 are matched to the relevant measure of MV in the misvaluation model.  A robustness 
test to determine if OP rather than MP influences misvaluation will be reported in 
section 7.8.5. 
 
7.5.8 Control variables - relative size (SIZE) and growth prospects (GROWTH) 
Consistent with the inclusion of SIZE and GROWTH as control variables in the 
mispricing model, the misvaluation model also includes these.  The rationale for using 
the controls is, again, that they are frequently used as selection criteria for matching 
firms in the application of the PE comparable firms‟ approach.  The measures of SIZE 
and GROWTH described in chapter 6 are also used in the empirical model of 
misvaluation. 
 
SIZE is predicted to have a positive association with the level of misvaluation.  
Investors can only purchase shares in companies of which they are aware (Miller, 
1977) and they will be more familiar with the operations of many larger IPO 
companies.  Discussing why investors, on average, hold portfolios that are 
insufficiently diversified, Barberis and Thaler (2003) argue that investors find more 
familiar assets attractive than those of which they have no personal experience.   
Retail (i.e. individual) investors are attention-driven and purchase shares in response 
to news stories (Barber & Odean, 2008).  Larger IPOs are more likely to attract a 
higher level of media attention, alerting potential investors already familiar with the 
company to the opportunity to participate in the IPO
139
.   
 
                                                 
138
 How, Lam & Yeo match several comparable firms while Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty employ industry 
median PEs. 
139
 A media exposure variable was considered for the misvaluation model.  Investigation of Australian 
media reports relating to IPOs revealed that while bookbuild issues receive extensive media coverage, 
relatively little is reported for fixed-price issues.  A simple count of the number of media reports prior 
to listing results in a confounded measure as a relatively high count is sometimes associated with 
problems relating to the issue (the issue of supplementary prospectuses, for example).  A classification 
scheme based on „positive‟ and „negative‟ reports also raises validity concerns - many media reports 
consist of press releases that are essentially marketing for the IPO while very few contain independent 
analysis of prospects. 
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Individual investors, rather than professionals, will be attracted to an IPO on the basis 
of familiarity.  As discussed previously, these noise traders have the capacity to 
influence the extent of misvaluation.  If Jackson‟s (2003) evidence of strong 
systematic patterns in the aggregate trading behaviour of Australian individual 
investors holds in Australian IPO markets, greater misvaluation will be observed for 
larger issues.  This predicted relationship is potentially confounded by the necessity 
for institutional investors to participate in IPOs large enough to accommodate the size 
of their investment without obtaining a controlling interest.  
 
Given the inherent difficulty associated with valuing growth firms, a positive 
relationship is predicted for GROWTH and MV.  GROWTH was also included in the 
mispricing model to capture valuation difficulties associated with growth prospects.  
The expected positive relationship for GROWTH and MP was not significant, 
suggesting vendors of high growth firms do not face greater valuation difficulty.  The 
inclusion of GROWTH in the misvaluation model will ascertain if investors have more 
difficulty valuing firms with high growth prospects.  Having now concluded the 
discussion of model development, the following section specifies the sample data 
used to test the model and presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables.  
 
7.6 Sample and descriptive statistics 
As shown in chapter 6, there are 186 sample firms with estimates of both VPE and 
VEBO.  One company is deleted from the sample as it has an extreme level of 
mispricing and a second is deleted for an extreme observation on misvaluation (see 
section 7.3.2).  No further exclusions are made on the basis of data constraints and the 
misvaluation sample includes 184 IPOs. 
 
7.6.1 Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in the misvaluation model were 
presented in section 7.3.  Table 7.5 presents descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables included in the misvaluation model.  Discussion of the descriptive statistics 
for SIZE, GROWTH and the MP measures was presented in chapter 6.  As shown 
there, SIZE makes a significant departure from the normal distribution.  The 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics in table 7.5 show the distribution of HOTU is 
significantly non-normal
140
.   Therefore, median values provide the appropriate 
measure of central tendency for these variables.   
 
Panel A of table 7.5 shows the mean number of institutional investors in the largest 20 
shareholders (II) after the issue is 7.9.  Ten percent of sample issues did not have any 
institutional investors identified in the Top 20 shareholder reports while 8.6% had 
more than 15 institutional issuers. The mean level of retained ownership (61.2%) is 
similar to that reported for the baseline sample of IPOs (including non-forecasters) in 
chapter 3 (62.25%).  HOTU indicates the level of raw underpricing in the quarter prior 
to listing.  While the average of 27.07% is close to that reported for the baseline 
sample in chapter 3 (25.57%), the median shown in table 7.6 (20.01%) is double that 
for the baseline sample (10%).   
 
Table 7.5 Descriptive statistics for independent variables - 184 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
Panel A:  Continuous measures 
 Mean     Median     S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p-value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
II 7.90 8.00 5.05 0 19 0.799 
(0.546) 
0.17 -0.81 
OWN 61.62 63.07 19.79 0 93.06 0.934 
(0.348) 
-1.05 1.24 
HOTU 27.07 20.10 35.91 -74.29 370.00 2.308 
(0.000) 
5.12 45.41 
         
 
Panel B:  Dichotomous variables 






II = number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO 
owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  OS 
= dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  
SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  UW = 
dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.   
 
                                                 
140
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for tests of normality show II (p = 0.453) and OWN (p = 0.269) do 
not make significant departures from the normal distribution at the conventional level.  As shown in 
chapter 6, the MP measures and GROWTH are normally distributed.  
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Panel B of table 7.5 shows the proportions of oversubscribed (OS), speculative 
(SPEC) and underwritten issues (UW).  While 68% of issues are oversubscribed, only 
18% are classified as speculative by the issuer.  Reflecting the higher incidence of 
earnings forecasts provided by underwritten issues, 82% of this earnings forecasting 
sample is underwritten compared to 68% for the baseline sample in chapter 3.   
 
7.6.2 Correlations 
Correlations for the continuous variables are shown in table 7.6.  Spearman 
coefficients are presented on the left-hand side of the table and Pearson coefficients 
are to the right.  There are only small differences in the magnitude of the correlations 
for the three MPEBO measures with the dependent and other independent variables.  
Therefore, to facilitate the presentation of table 7.6, only the correlations for MPEBO50 
are presented.  As noted in the previous sections, the distributions for MVPE, MVEBO0, 
MVEBO50, MVEBO100, HOTU and SIZE exhibit significant departures from the normal 
distribution. Thus, the following discussion focuses on Spearman correlations.   
 
Consistent with the strong and highly significant associations reported for the value 
measures in chapter 5 and the MP measures in chapter 6, the four measures of MV are 
highly correlated.  The EBO measures again show the highest correlations.  MP has 
the most substantial correlations of the independent variables and the four measures of 
the dependent variable. Each of the four MP proxies has the predicted positive 
coefficient and is highly significant.  The largest of these is for MPPE and MVPE  
(ρ = 0.867) and the smallest is MPEBO100 and MVPE (ρ = 0.519).   
 
Relative size (SIZE) also exhibits highly significant positive correlations with each 
measure of MV.  The positive correlations for SIZE and MP were identified in chapter 
6.  Taken together, these results show that relatively larger IPOs experience more 
positive mispricing, followed by relatively more positive misvaluation in the market.  
Size (measured as market capitalisation) is highly correlated with institutional 
ownership in the US (Gompers & Metrick, 2001). The moderate positive and highly 
significant correlation (ρ = 0.387) between II and SIZE in this sample is consistent 







Table 7.6 Correlations for 184 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 MVpe MVebo0 MVebo50 MVebo100 MPpe MPebo50 II OWN HOTU SIZE GROWTH 
MVpe  0.817** 0.810** 0.802** 0.741** 0.465** 0.200** 0.103 0.019 0.440** 0.352** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.163) (0.793) (0.000) (0.000) 
MVebo0 0.731**  0.998** 0.993** 0.498** 0.742** 0.210** 0.059 0.022 0.363** 0.213** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.426) (0.763) (0.000) (0.000) 
MVebo50 0.719** 0.996**  0.998** 0.484** 0.737** 0.229** 0.043 0.010 0.376** 0.215** 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.562) (0.894) (0.000) (0.003) 
MVebo100 0.708** 0.987** 0.997**  0.470** 0.737** 0.245** 0.029 0.000 0.386** 0.216** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.695) (0.990) (0.000) (0.003) 
MPpe 0.867** 0.619** 0.598** 0.579**  0.584** 0.199** 0.049 -0.040 0.370** 0.291** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.007) (0.512) (0.591) (0.000) (0.000) 
MPebo50 0.535** 0.861** 0.858** 0.850** 0.606**  0.257** -0.056 -0.055 0.262** 0.094 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.452) (0.456) (0.000) (0.201) 
II 0.205** 0.255** 0.275** 0.294** 0.202** 0.251**  -0.430** -0.030 0.319** 0.120 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.681) (0.000) (0.104) 
OWN 0.108 0.029 0.014 0.003 0.090 -0.051 -0.407**  0.109 0.056 0.085 
 (0.144) (0.698) (0.850) (0.963) (0.221) (0.495) (0.000)  (0.141) (0.451) (0.252) 
HOTU 0.121 0.051 0.039 0.028 0.147* 0.036 0.003 0.172*  -0.015 0.195** 
 (0.101) (0.490) (0.598) (0.701) (0.046) (0.626) (0.969) (0.019)  (0.838) (0.008) 
SIZE 0.592** 0.482** 0.491** 0.503** 0.547** 0.401** 0.387** 0.055 0.077  0.280** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.299)  (0.000) 
GROWTH 0.376** 0.139 0.136 0.140 0.343** 0.031 0.132 0.084 0.236** 0.337**  
 (0.000) (0.060) (0.065) (0.057) (0.000) (0.671) (0.073) (0.254) (0.001) (0.000)  
 
Spearman‟s coefficients and associated probabilities are shown on the left-hand side of the table while Pearson‟s coefficients and probabilities are shown on the right-hand side. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate.  II = number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTU = average underpricing for industrial 
IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing 
relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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companies.  It is, therefore, unsurprising that II and the level of retained ownership 
(OWN) are negatively correlated. 
 
While the expected positive relationship for II and MV is observed, none is reported 
for OWN and MV.  Contrary to the expectation that greater positive misvaluation 
would be observed after high levels of underpricing for recent IPOs, the measures of 
MV are uncorrelated with HOTU.  However, HOTU has a significant positive 
correlation with OWN.  II and HOTU are uncorrelated, suggesting that the higher 
levels of OWN observed when market sentiment is high are not determined by a 
change in the number of participating institutional investors.   
 
Consistent with the relationship reported for GROWTH and HOTN in chapter 6, a 
positive association is identified for GROWTH and HOTU.  While significant positive 
correlations were reported for HOTN and the four measures of MP in chapter 6, 
HOTU is uncorrelated with the EBO measures of mispricing.  Spearman‟s coefficients 
show GROWTH has a highly significant and positive correlation with MVPE.  
Consistent with the lack of correlation for GROWTH and EBO-based measures of 




7.6.3 Dichotomous independent variable associations 
Table 7.7 presents Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in distributions and median 
tests where the data are categorised by OS, SPEC and UW.   Consistent with media- 
reported oversubscription indicating higher demand, OS issues experience 
significantly more positive misvaluation.  In contrast to the rational explanation for 
high demand (i.e. OP < V), OS issues exhibit significantly higher levels of mispricing.  
In the fixed-price setting, demand for a specific IPO is not reflected in its OP.   
Therefore, the positive association of OS and MP is consistent with issuers being 
cognisant of hot markets when determining OP and, thus, the explanatory power of 
HOTN in the mispricing model reported in chapter 6.  These results provide support 
for the alternate behavioural explanation of excess demand (see section 7.5.1), where 
individual investor demand is a function of sentiment rather than fundamentals. 
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 Pearson coefficients show significant positive correlations for GROWTH and each measure of MV.  







Table 7.7  Differences in distribution where data are grouped by OS, SPEC and UW 
 MVPE MVEBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 II OWN HOTU SIZE GROWTH 
OS median 0.283 0.167 0.228 0.286 0.102 -0.005 0.068 0.099 8 65.714 20.601 1.143 0.581 
Not OS median 0.052 -0.081 -0.033 0.015 -0.021 -0.238 -0.175 -0.098 7 61.136 18.263 0.960 0.445 
U 2 470 2 532 2 507 2 503 2 692 2 864 2 868 2 849 3 416 3 628 3 206 3 170 2 912 
Asym sig. (2-tail) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028) (0.325) (0.720) (0.111) (0.089) (0.014) 
              
Median test (2-tailed) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.026) (0.057) (0.112) (0.112) (0.900) (0.525) (0.403) (0.153) (0.153) 
              
SPEC median 0.058 -0.024 0.003 0.035 0.012 -0.037 -0.005 0.005 5.5 66.215 17.820 0.490 0.435 
Not SPEC median 0.204 0.129 0.181 0.236 0.048 -0.069 -0.009 0.053 8 63.336 20.381 1.143 0.557 
U 1 947 2 045 1 902 1 808 2 349 2 294 2 412 2 266 1 685 2 437 2 467 1 576 2 179 
Asym sig. (2-tail) (0.077) (0.160) (0.058) (0.022) (0.777) (0.627) (0.960) (0.555) (0.002) (0.645) (0.723) (0.000) (0.169) 
              
Median test (2-tailed) (0.178) (0.178) (0.083) (0.034) (0.563) (0.563) (0.563) (0.847) (0.012) (0.335) (0.847) (0.034) (0.178) 
              
UW median 0.237 0.159 0.225 0.271 0.075 -0.039 0.040 0.094 9 66.447 20.241 1.210 0.566 
No UW median 0.048 -0.058 -0.019 0.003 -0.400 -0.178 -0.152 -0.093 2 77.273 18.390 0.453 0.440 
U 1 793 1 666 1 602 1 559 1 975 1 976 1 880 1 797 828 1 245 2 397 1 430 1 750 
Asym sig. (2-tail) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.096) (0.097) (0.044) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.691) (0.000) (0.007) 
              
Median test (2-tailed) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.335) (0.083) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.847) (0.000) (0.083) 
              
 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  SPEC = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous 
variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  MP = 
offer price minus the relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price). 
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This conclusion is, however, somewhat equivocal as there may be a systematic bias in 
V that affects some types of IPOs where these companies are also more likely to be 
oversubscribed.  The distributions of GROWTH for oversubscribed and not 
oversubscribed issues are significantly different, suggesting GROWTH is a factor in 
the determination of investor demand for IPO shares.  There is, however, no 
significant difference in median GROWTH for the two groups.  GROWTH is 
frequently identified in the literature as a problematic variable for valuation and, 
therefore, presents a likely candidate for valuation bias.  While VPE incorporates 
industry growth rates via the price multiple, no adjustment has been made for the 
expected higher growth rates of sample IPOs.  Thus, the one-period ahead earnings 
are effectively assumed to continue.  This same assumption employed in the two-
period expansion of the Edwards-Bell-Ohlsen model (used to estimate VEBO) where 
the earnings forecast is discounted in the terminal value perpetuity.   
 
If GROWTH is associated with a systematic bias in the measures of V, one would 
expect significant relationships for GROWTH and MP and GROWTH and MV.  
GROWTH is not significant in the MP regressions presented in chapter 6.  This issue 
is investigated further in section 7.9. 
 
It would be reasonable to expect that speculative issues are more difficult for the 
market to value.  Results in table 7.7 do not support this expectation.  Although the 
distributions of MPPE are different, the difference in medians for speculative and non-
speculative issues is not significant at the conventional level.  No significant 
differences are found for the EBO mispricing measures.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that neither issuers of speculative offers nor investors purchasing speculative 
issues experience greater difficulties establishing value.   Significantly fewer IIs  
(p = 0.024, one-tailed) participate in speculative issues, consistent with the 
expectation that these are more attractive to individual investors.  This result is, 
however, equivocal as the distributions of SIZE for SPEC issues are different  
(p = 0.000, one-tailed) from those for non-speculative issues.   There is weak evidence 
that SPEC issues are smaller (p = 0.068, one-tailed) and, as shown in table 7.6, the 
correlation of II and SIZE is low (ρ = 0.387) but highly significant. 
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As expected, underwritten issues display significantly higher misvaluation than do 
non-underwritten issues.  The median level of MV for issues made without an 
underwriter is close to zero (MVPE = 0.048 and MVEBO100 = 0.003) or negative 
(MVEBO0 = -0.058 and MVEBO50 = -0.019).  These results suggest market participants 
are willing to pay a premium for underwritten issues (p = 0.012, one-tailed, for MVPE 
and p < 0.001 for MVEBO).   
 
Underwritten issues are significantly larger and have around four times the number of 
institutional investors participating and have lower levels of retained ownership.  
While the distributions of GROWTH are significantly different for underwritten issues 
and those issues that are not underwritten, there is no significant difference in median 
GROWTH for the two groups.  In contrast to the differences observed for 
misvaluation, UW issues do not exhibit significantly higher median mispricing at the 
conventional level.  Therefore, while underwriters attract a higher number of 
institutional investors to an issue, they do not appear to compensate institutions for 
their participation with lower levels of mispricing.  Given the discretionary share 
allocation process used by Australian issuers, higher market prices for underwritten 
issues (evidenced by positive misvaluation) may be a function of unmet demand from 
individual investors.  This assertion is consistent with Bayley, Lee and Walter‟s 
(2006) evidence that institutional investors flip relatively more of their allocations at 
listing.  
 
Cramér‟s V is used to identify associations between the nominal variables UW, OS 
and SPEC.  The results show that engaging an underwriter in the Australian fixed-
price setting is not associated with a significant difference in the incidence of 
oversubscription
142
.  However, significantly fewer speculative issues are 
oversubscribed
143
 and fewer speculative issues are underwritten
144
.  With the data 
description and investigation of bivariate relationships now complete, the next section 
tests the misvaluation model. 
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 Cramér‟s V = 0.128, p = 0.086 
143
 Cramér‟s V = 0.159, p = 0.033 
144
 Cramér‟s V = 0.184, p = 0.014 
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7.7 Testing the misvaluation model 
Table 7.8 reports the results for four versions of the misvaluation model, each using a 
different specification of the dependent variable.  Analysis of the residuals and 
Mahalanobis statistics from the first pass of the regressions revealed four multivariate 
outliers
145
.  Deletion of these multivariate outliers results in a sample size of 180 
observations for the regressions.  The AR
2
s for the models are relatively high at about 
58-60% and F tests are significant (p < 0.001).  Directional relationships, based on 
theoretical foundations, are specified so the p-values shown in table 7.8 are for one-
tailed tests except for the coefficient on the constant.   
 
The regression results show MP is the primary explanatory variable for MV.  The 
coefficient on MP is highly significant for each of the measures and exhibits the 
expected positive relationship with MV irrespective of the measure of the dependent 
variable.  SIZE also makes a significant contribution to the explanation MV.  The 
larger the IPO firm relative to the industry median listed firm, the greater the extent of 
misvaluation.  The relationship between SIZE and MV is not as strong as that shown 
for SIZE and MP in chapter 6.  As SIZE is highly significant for the explanation of 
MP and MP is included as an independent variable, it is to be expected that some of 
the effect of SIZE is captured by MP in the MV model. 
 
The presence of excess demand (OS), the speculative nature of the IPO (SPEC), the 
number of institutional investors (II), underwriting (UW), mean underpricing in the 
quarter prior to listing (HOTU) and the level of retained ownership (OWN) are not 
significant.  The multivariate results are largely supportive of those reported in the 
bivariate analysis, where MP and SIZE have the strongest significant relationships 
with MV.  The low but significant correlations for II and MV are not reflected in 
multivariate testing. 
 
Section 7.6.3 suggests GROWTH as a potential source of bias in the measures of 
valuation.  The lack of a significant relationship for GROWTH and MV (table 7.8) and  
                                                 
145
 The chi-squared critical value is determined as p = 0.001, d.f. = 9.  The multivariate outliers, their 
listing dates and industries are as follows:  Scanbox (1997, media); Australian International Carbon 
(1998, miscellaneous industrials); Aspermont (2000, media); and Infomedia (2000, miscellaneous 
industrials). 
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Table 7.8 Misvaluation regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MVPE MVEBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.261 -0.254 -0.250 -0.246 
 t-stat -1.452 -1.416 -1.401 -1.383 
 p (0.148) (0.159) (0.163) (0.168) 
OS coefficient 0.098 0.100 0.100 0.100 
 t-stat 1.398 1.414 1.414 1.412 
 p (0.328) (0.319) (0.318) (0.319) 
SPEC coefficient -0.155 -0.152 -0.154 -0.156 
 t-stat -1.804 -1.751 -1.782 -1.810 
 p (0.146) (0.163) (0.153) (0.144) 
II coefficient -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-stat -0.135 -0.134 -0.124 -0.116 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.097 0.101 0.102 0.102 
 t-stat 1.545 1.058 1.065 1.070 
 p (0.248) (0.583) (0.577) (0.572) 
OWN coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 t-stat 1.014 1.473 1.462 1.450 
 p (0.624) (0.285) (0.291) (0.298) 
HOTU coefficient 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 t-stat 1.197 1.163 1.150 1.137 
 p (0.466) (0.493) (0.504) (0.514) 
MP coefficient 0.925** 0.937** 0.933** 0.931** 
 t-stat 12.484 12.956 12.708 12.559 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.043* 0.041* 0.041* 0.042* 
 t-stat 2.424 2.367 2.380 2.389 
 p (0.033) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.172 0.149 0.150 0.150 
 t-stat 1.496 1.321 1.327 1.331 
 p (0.273) (0.376) (0.373) (0.369) 
AR
2
  0.609** 0.580** 0.578** 0.579** 
JB  3 177** 3 193** 3 179** 3 166** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.458) (0.320) (0.291) (0.267) 
DW  1.517 1.520 1.519 1.519 
RESET F 2.050 0.832 0.8512 1.519 
 p (0.132) (0.437) (0.429) (0.340) 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount 
rate.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value 
where r100 is the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as 
„oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as 
speculative in the prospectus.  II = number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = 
dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 
100.  HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  MP = offer price minus the 
relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the 
year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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for GROWTH and MP (table 6.9) does not support this suggestion.  Thus, if VPE and 
VEBO suffer some systematic bias, it is unlikely to be directly associated with growth 
prospects as measured in this research. 
 
While SIZE has significant correlations with MP and II, and II is also correlated with 
MP and OWN, the magnitude of these is low.  High pair-wise correlations between 
individual variables are a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for multicollinearity, 
which may exist even when correlations are comparatively low
146
 (Gujarati, 2003).  
AR
2
s in excess of 90%, combined with several coefficients that individually lack 
statistical significance are indicative of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  While the 
AR
2
s in table 7.8 fall well short of 90% and few of the correlations among 
independent variables are „high‟, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are calculated.  The 
VIF indicates the extent to which each independent variable is explained by the 
remaining independent variables in the model (Hair et al., 1998).  The largest VIF 
(unreported) for any coefficient from the regressions in table 7.8 is 1.685, well below 
the 10 suggested by Hair et al. (1998) to be indicative of problematic 
multicollinearity. 
 
The Jarque-Bera (JB) test statistics show residuals from the regressions of each 
measure of MV make significant departures from the normal distribution.  Significant 
kurtosis statistics indicate that they are leptokurtic.  The probabilities for White‟s test 
demonstrate the absence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals.  The Durban-Watson 
(DW) statistic shows significant positive autocorrelation of residuals
147
.  Model 
specification error, however, is not indicated by the Ramsey RESET tests.  
 
Sensitivity testing is conducted to determine if the results reported in table 7.8 are 
biased by the linear inclusion of non-normal variables.  As reported in table 7.5, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the assumption of normal distributions for HOTU 
and SIZE (see chapter 6).  The logarithmic transformation of SIZE (lnSIZE) is 
normally distributed (p = 0.062).  While a number of transformations for HOTU were 
trialled, none result in a normal distribution for the transformed variable.  In contrast 
to the non-normal distribution of OWN reported in chapter 4 for the full sample of 
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 Gujarati considers ρ = 0.5 as a comparatively low correlation. 
147
 The critical level is determined as n = 180 and k = 9. 
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IPOs, OWN for the earnings forecasters in this sub-sample takes a normal distribution.  
The II and MP variables do not make significant departures from the normal 
distribution.  Re-estimation of the regressions with the transformed variable lnSIZE 
(results unreported) does not affect the results presented in table 7.8.  MP and lnSIZE 
remain the only significant variables.  The AR
2
s do not differ by more than 0.05%, the 
residuals remain non-normal and the RESET tests again indicate there is no model 
misspecification.  
 
7.8 Robustness testing 
This section discusses robustness tests that assess the sensitivity of results to alternate 
measures of institutional-investor participation and market sentiment.   The sensitivity 
of results to alternate measures of misvaluation is also discussed.  The misvaluation 
model is also re-estimated with OP substituted for MP.    
 
7.8.1 Measure of institutional investors (II) 
As described in section 7.5.3, II is measured as the number of institutional investors 
identified in the Top 20 shareholder reports.  Here, the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors is substituted to determine if the result is sensitive to the 
measure of institutional participation.  This alternate measure protects the variable 
from any potential bias induced via relatively few institutional investors holding 

















II     (7.4) 
The MV model is retested with II% and the results are reported in table D.1 of 
appendix D.  The t-statistics on the II% measure of institutional investor participation 
increase substantially and the coefficients are now marginally (p < 0.06) significant.  
Comparison of the AR
2
s from table 7.8 to those in table D.1 shows a slight increase 
(by around 1%) in the explanatory power of the model.  SIZE and MP continue to 
have significant explanatory power where II% is an independent variable.  Results are 
unchanged when logarithmic transformations are applied to II% and SIZE.   
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Although not significant at the conventional level, t-stats for the percentage of shares 
held by institutional investors in the Top 20 report (II%) indicate this is a more 
informative measure of institutional-investor participation than the number of 
participating institutional investors (II).  These results suggest that the exploitation of 
individual investors is not the motivating factor for institutional ownership in 
Australian fixed-price IPOs.  If it were, the number of participating institutions would 
have a significant association with MV.  Rather, the results for II% provide weak 
evidence that some institutional investors successfully identify issues that will be 
misvalued and receive relatively large allocations of shares in these issues.   
 
An alternate explanation of the results is that underwriters allocate more shares to 
their preferred institutional clients, thus increasing the proportion of shares held while 
reducing the number of institutions receiving share allocations.  While the data 
collected for this dissertation do not permit a direct test of this explanation, the 
opportunity for an indirect test is afforded by allocation process data.  Consistent with 
higher institutional-investor participation in underwritten issues, a t-test shows that 
the mean number of institutional investors (9.64) allocated shares in issues where 
underwriters participate in the allocation process is significantly higher (p < 0.000) 
than for issues without underwriter participation in the allocation process (6.46).  A 
Mann-Whitney U test is used to determine if the non-normal II% variable is drawn 
from the same distribution.  There is also a significant difference
148
 in the proportion 
of Top 20 shares held by institutions for these groups.  Median II% for the 
underwriter participation in allocation group is 17.13 which is substantially higher 
than the 7.25 for issues where underwriters do not participate in allocation.  As these 
indirect tests show underwriter participation results in greater institutional 
participation and higher proportions of shares issued to institutions, they do not shed 
light on why higher explanatory power is observed for II%. 
 
7.8.2 Measure of market sentiment 
Average underpricing in the quarter preceding an IPO (HOTU) is included in the MV 
model as a proxy for market sentiment.  The sensitivity of results presented in table 
7.8 to the market sentiment proxy are analysed in this section.  The number of IPOs in 
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Mann-Whitney U = 890.5 and p < 0.000) 
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the quarter preceding prospectus date (HOTN), an indicator variable for issues made 
in bull markets (BULL) and return on the All Ordinaries index for two and four 
months prior to listing are investigated as alternatives to HOTU. 
 
As discussed in chapter 6, HOTN proxies for the state of the IPO market.  Table D.2, 
included in appendix D, presents the results for the misvaluation model with HOTN 
substituted for HOTU as the proxy for the state of the IPO market.  The AR
2
s are 
highly similar to those in table 7.8.  Neither HOTU nor HOTN is significant for the 
explanation of MV and the t-statistics for HOTN are smaller than those for HOTU.  
Again, SIZE is significant at the conventional level, the RESET tests show no 
significant model specification error and a logarithmic transformation of SIZE does 
not change the results.  As shown in chapter 6, HOTN is a significant explanatory 
variable in the mispricing model.  With MP included as an independent variable in the 
misvaluation model, a plausible explanation for the lack of significance of both 
HOTN and HOTU is that any effect attributable to the state of the IPO market at 
listing is captured by MP.   These results suggest that the state of the IPO market is 
priced by issuers when they establish OP and any incremental impact of the state of 
the IPO market on investors is insignificant. 
 
Rather than measure IPO market sentiment, BULL is a dichotomous variable coded as 
unity when the sharemarket is considered to be in a bull-market phase.  Indicator 
variables for market condition have equivocal success in the explanation of 
underpricing in Australia [c.f. How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How (1996)].  These 
prior studies classify market phases by visual inspection of returns on the All 
Ordinaries index.   
 
In this dissertation, BULL is determined by reference to the media.  Keyword searches 
were undertaken in the Factiva database to identify newspaper articles that identify 
the Australian market in a „bull‟ or a „bear‟ phase during the sample period.  Articles 
were analysed to determine the general view of the market.  While relatively few 
articles disagreed on the state of the market for any given period, a minimum hurdle 
of six articles (with different authors) was imposed to classify each market phase.   
 
  203 
This approach results in three phases over the sample period.  The first, a bull market, 
runs from the start of the sample until March 2000.  The subsequent bear market 
continues until March 2003.  The new bull market continues throughout the remainder 
of the sample.  In total, 84 months (74%) of the sample are classified as bulls and the 
remaining 36 months are identified as bears.  Bull market issues represent 76.4% of 
this sample. 
 
Table D.3 reports the results for the MV model where HOTU is replaced by BULL as 
the proxy for market sentiment
149
.   The AR
2
 is increased by around 2% for each of the 
MV measures.  BULL has a highly significant (p < 0.008) positive relationship with 
each measure of MV.  The t-stats on SIZE decrease when BULL is included in the 
models and the variable now lacks significance.  As BULL apparently captures the 
SIZE effect, this result suggests larger issues are associated with bull market 
phases
150
.  GROWTH now shows the predicted positive relationship with MV but the 
relationship is weak.  Contrary to the predicted negative relationship, OWN shows a 
marginally significant positive relationship with MV.  The constants become highly 
significant with each measure of the dependent variable when BULL is the market 
sentiment proxy.   The RESET test is marginally significant when MVPE is the 
dependent variable
151
 but not with the MVEBO dependent variables  
 
Two further proxies for sharemarket sentiment are based on market returns preceding 
listing date.  Brailsford, Heaney and Shi investigate the time series behaviour of the 
US IPO market and provide evidence that underpricing increases when there is a 
„surge in the stock market‟ (2004 p. 131).  The level of value-weighted underpricing 
in Australia is associated with the performance of the stock market four and six 
months prior to listing (Shi, 2003).  The results of this prior research suggest returns 
on the All Ordinaries index for the four months prior to the listing date (RM4) as a 
proxy for market sentiment.  Table D.4 reports the results for the MV model where 
HOTU is replaced by RM4 as the proxy for market sentiment.   As is the case for the 
HOTU and HOTN proxies for market sentiment, RM4 lacks significance for each 
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 As HOTU is a proxy for the state of the IPO market and BULL is a proxy for sharemarket sentiment, 
a theoretical model could include both variables.  As shown in table 7.8, HOTU is not significant in the 
explanation of MV so it is not included in the table D.3 regressions. 
150
 The median test, however, rejects this hypothesis (p = 1.000). 
151
 The RESET test indicates significant (p = 0.045) model specification error for MVPE when the 
model is re-estimated with lnSIZE. 
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measure of MV.   SIZE again demonstrates significant relationships with each measure 
of the dependent variable.   
 
As discussed in chapter 4, market-adjusted returns are typically used to measure 
underpricing in the Australian context to control for the component of return 
attributable to the change in the market from the prospectus date to the date of listing.  
Return on the market index over the delay period has a positive and significant 
relationship with raw underpricing in the Australian context (Dimovski & Brooks, 
2004).  As this time period is roughly two months, the second market return proxy for 
sentiment (RM2) is the return on the All Ordinaries Index for the two months prior to 
the listing date.  Results are presented in table D.5.   
 
The re-estimated regressions that include RM2 as the sentiment proxy are quite 
similar to those reported for BULL in table D.3.  Again, AR
2
s have increased by 
around 2% and highly significant positive relationships are observed for RM2 and 
MV.   While the t-stats on the SIZE coefficients again decrease, they show marginal 
significance with RM2.  The t-stats on the constants increase, but only to marginal 
significance with RM2 compared to being highly significant with BULL.  As was the 
case for the BULL proxy, the RESET test for the MVPE dependent variable shows 
marginal model specification error
152
.  In contrast to the BULL proxy results in table 
D.3, GROWTH and OWN do not show any relationship with MV.   
 
The results in table 7.8 are robust to a change in the proxy for hot IPO markets.  
While Shi (2003) reports sharemarket returns in the quarter prior to listing contribute 
to the explanation of underpricing, they do not contribute to the explanation of 
misvaluation.  However, market returns for the two months prior to listing are 
significant for explaining misvaluation.  This relationship is masked in Australian 
research using market-adjusted underpricing as the dependent variable.   
 
The BULL and RM2 results suggest that IPOs with large market capitalisations 
relative to the industry median choose to list when market sentiment is positive.  The 
coefficients on SIZE, GROWTH and OWN are somewhat sensitive to choice of proxy 
                                                 
152
 RESET for this dependent variable and lnSIZE indicates that the model specification error is not a 
function of the non-linear relationship of SIZE and MVPE (F = 3.189, p = 0.044). 
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for general market sentiment, with GROWTH and OWN showing marginal 
significance only with the BULL proxy.  Overall, results from these sensitivity tests 
suggest that any „hot IPO markets‟ phenomenon in Australia over the sample period is 
distinct from proxies based on broad sharemarket returns.   
 
7.8.3 Sensitivity to measures of misvaluation 
The regressions reported table 7.8 show the misvaluation model is robust to changing 
the measure of misvaluation.  Although regressing MVPE on the independent variables 
results in a marginally higher AR
2
, the same variables are significant for all measures 
of MV. 
 
Consistent with the approach used in chapter 6, the sensitivity of results is tested here 
by scaling the MV dependent variables.  Two alternate measures of MV, the 
percentage of misvaluation and the ratio of V to P, are examined in this section.  
Results for regressions with misvaluation as a percentage of P (MV%) and as V/P are 
reported in tables D.6 and D.7 of appendix D.  Highly significant heteroscedasticity of 
residuals is indicated by White‟s test for regressions of all measures of the dependent 
variable.  Therefore, t-statistics and associated p-values are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity in both table D.6 and D.7.  Models using these scaled dependent 
variables exhibit substantially higher AR
2
s than those reported in table 7.8.  Here, 
AR
2
s range from 84.3% to 87.8% for the MV% dependent variables and from 84.4% 
to 87.8% for the V/P regressions.   
 
MP remains highly significant for both MV% and V/P dependent variables.  SPEC is 
marginally significant for the MVEBO% and VEBO/P dependent variables.  Relative size 
(SIZE or lnSIZE) loses significance when the scaled measures are modelled.  
Significant coefficients on SIZE in table 7.8 may, therefore, indicate the presence of 
scale effects.  As discussed in chapter 6, the inclusion of SIZE as an independent 
variable provides a natural control for scale effects in the levels regressions.  SIZE is 
significant in the mispricing model, even after controlling for potential scale effects.  
The lack of significance for SIZE in the returns regressions is consistent with a scale 
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effect in the misvaluation model, suggesting SIZE does not have explanatory power 
for misvaluation
153
.   
 
Residual diagnostics, however, indicate that this evidence is not unequivocal.  In 
addition to the heteroscedasticity noted earlier, RESET tests indicate model 
specification error for all MV% (table D.6) and V/P (table D.7) dependent variables.  
While the AR
2
s are high and the number of significant coefficients is small, the VIFs 
do not indicate the existence of multicollinearity.  Re-estimation of the regressions 
using lnSIZE produces the same results, indicating that the model misspecification 
errors are not attributable to non-linearities in this variable.  Therefore, the results 
reported in tables D.6 and D.7 are less reliable than the main regressions reported in 
table 7.8.  The latter do not have significant heteroscedasticity and, according to the 
RESET tests, do not exhibit specification errors. 
 
7.8.4 Sensitivity to the number of shares offered 
Consistent with the analysis undertaken in chapter 6, this section investigates the 
robustness of results to the issuer‟s selection of the number of offer shares.  The 
potential impact of this issuer choice is addressed by re-estimating the regressions 
with the product of MV and the number of shares offered (AMV) as the dependent 
variable.  The results for regressing AMV on the dependent variables are reported in 
table D.8 of appendix D.  The mispricing variable is measured as the aggregate level 
of mispricing (AMP) corresponding to the value proxy used to determine the 
dependent variable.  Highly significant heteroscedasticity is reported for all measures 
of misvaluation so White‟s correction is applied to the t-statistics.  Consistent with the 
results in table 7.8, AMP and SIZE are highly significant for the explanation of 
aggregate misvaluation (AMV) for all measures of MV dependent variable.     
 
The RESET tests show marginally significant model specification error in the AMVPE 
regression while indicating the AMVEBO models are correctly specified.  The 
regressions with AMV show the results presented in table 7.8 for MVEBO measures are 
not influenced by the issuer‟s selection of the number of shares offered.   Given the 
                                                 
153
 As was the case for the IPO market sentiment proxy (HOTN), some of the influence of SIZE could 
be captured via the inclusion of MP in the misvaluation model.  However, if this were the explanation, 
one would expect SIZE to also lack significance in the regression results of table 7.8. 
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outcome from analysis of the residuals, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions for 
the AMVPE specification of the dependent variable. 
 
7.8.5 The potential relationship of offer price (OP) and misvaluation (MV) 
A positive relationship between MP and MV was predicted in section 7.5.7 and this 
predicted relationship is observed in table 7.8.  Subtracting the common factor V from 
OP and P to obtain MP and MV respectively will not change any underlying 
relationship.  However, if market prices anchor on OP rather than V, the strong 
relationship between MV and MP would really be attributable to the underlying 
relationship of MV and OP.  In this case, issues with larger OPs would be expected to 
experience higher levels of MV, given that the average issue has P > OP.  Table 7.6 
shows the highly significant and large correlations (around 0.86) between MV and MP 
measures.  OP has highly significant (p < 0.001) but more moderately sized 
correlations (ρ = 0.357 to 0.505) with the measures of MV.  Table D.9 presents 
regressions that include OP rather than MP as an independent variable to investigate 
the potential relationship between OP and MV.   
  
The regressions in table D.9 show that OP has a highly significant positive 
relationship with the MVEBO measures, but not with the MVPE measure of the 
dependent variable.  Oversubscribed issues (OS) have significantly (p < 0.01) higher 
misvaluation for the MVEBO dependent variables and OS is marginally significant with 
the MVPE measure of misvaluation. GROWTH is highly significant with the MVPE 
dependent variable but lacks significance with the MVEBO dependent variables.  OWN 
is marginally significant for the MVEBO50 and MVEBO100 dependent variables.  
Therefore, the results for the model including OP are not robust across estimates of 
MV.  In contrast to the results reported in table 7.8, SIZE is not significant and the 
AR
2
s are about one-third the size of those reported earlier.   
 
The coefficients on the constants become highly significant, consistent with variable 
omission from the MV model.  The RESET tests confirm that the model including OP 
rather than MP has omitted variables
154
.  Given the MV model with OP rather than 
                                                 
154
 These model specification errors are not attributable to non-linearities in the SIZE variable.  Results 
from re-estimating the regressions with lnSIZE (not reported) show the same significant variables, 
marginally higher AR
2
s and no improvement in the RESET statistics. 
  208 
MP as the independent variable is a poor statistical model, it is concluded that MP is 
the relevant explanatory variable for misvaluation.  In addition to not being robust to 
changing from the MVPE to MVEBO measures of misvaluation, OP is not significant 
when the dependent variable is either MV% or V/P and RESET tests indicate highly 
significant model specification errors in these regressions (results unreported). 
 
7.9  Conclusions 
Results from testing the misvaluation model in this chapter show the level of 
mispricing is the primary factor for explaining the misvaluation of forecasting IPOs.  
This result is robust to changes in the measurement of the dependent and independent 
variables.  Although somewhat equivocal, the results also suggest that IPOs with 
relatively larger market capitalisation than the industry median (SIZE) are more 
misvalued.   
 
The state of the IPO market (proxied by HOTU and HOTN) does not exert a 
significant influence on misvaluation.  The lack of incremental explanatory power the 
IPO market state variables can be interpreted in two ways.  First, investors do not 
respond to the state of the IPO market when establishing market price (P).  Second, 
the result could indicate that issuers exhibit a high degree of accuracy when factoring 
the state of the IPO market into offer price.  However, given the relatively small 
amount of MP for the typical issue, this effect is unlikely to be economically 
significant.  In contrast, the prevailing condition of the sharemarket does have a 
significant impact on the level of misvaluation.  Robustness tests reveal that 
misvaluation is greater in bull market phases (BULL) and, consistent with this result, 
MV varies with the return on the market for the two months (RM2) preceding an issue.  
Thus, while the state of the IPO market has a significant relationship with mispricing, 
it is general market sentiment that has incremental explanatory power for the extent of 
misvaluation. 
 
While the number of institutional investors participating in an issue (II) is unrelated to 
MV, robustness tests show larger t-statistics for the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors (II%) and MV.  The weak negative relationship indicates lower 
misvaluation for issues with high levels of institutional ownership at listing, 
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suggesting that institutional investors do not participate in issues in order to exploit 
individual investors in the aftermarket.  Holding the proportion of retained ownership 
constant, higher II% is necessarily accompanied by lower levels of individual investor 
share ownership.  Therefore, the weak negative relationship for II% and MV provides 





In contrast to the prediction that speculative issues (SPEC) will attract bullish 
individual investors, these issues only have lower levels of misvaluation for the scaled 
MVEBO dependent variables.  However, this relationship is not unequivocal as the 
regression results presented in tables D.6 and D.7 exhibit highly significant 
specification errors.   
 
Bivariate analysis shows that media-reported demand for an issue (OS) has significant 
negative relationships with mispricing and misvaluation.  This negative relationship is 
contrary to that predicted.  However, in the multivariate context, results for OS are 
sensitive to the measure of value used to calculate MV and to the inclusion of BULL 
as the market-sentiment proxy.   The coefficient on OS is negative (supporting the 
bivariate results) but it is only marginally significant and only for the MVEBO 
dependent variables.  When OP rather than MP is the independent variable in the MV 
model, OS is highly significant and in the expected positive direction with the MVEBO 
dependent variables and marginally significant with the MVPE dependent variable.  
These results suggest that MP captures the effect of OS.  As shown in table 7.7, 
Mann-Whitney tests indicate that the median level of MP is significantly higher for 
oversubscribed issues for all measures of MP. 
 
Based on signalling literature, a negative relationship for the level of retained 
ownership at listing (OWN) and MV was predicted.  While the escrow requirements of 
the ASX would strengthen any signal implicit in OWN, no relationship is found in the 
bivariate results or in the multivariate MV model.  Underwriting (UW) was also 
hypothesised as a signal of IPO quality in the Australian institutional setting where 
                                                 
155
 It is possible that for some IPOs, lower levels of II% indicate higher levels of OWN rather than 
higher levels of individual investor participation.  This issue is investigated by re-estimating the table 
D.1 regressions omitting the II% independent variable.  While the t-statistics on OWN, UW and the 
constant increase, they continue to lack significance.     
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underwriters have fewer opportunities to earn profits from trading in IPO shares.   
While significantly higher median MV is observed in the bivariate tests reported in 
table 7.7, no significant relationship is identified in the multivariate tests.  The 
hypothesised positive relationship of growth prospects (GROWTH) and misvaluation 
is not observed, suggesting investors do not face greater difficulties pricing high-
growth IPOs.  GROWTH is highly significant with the MVPE dependent variable when 
OP rather than MP is an independent variable.  While this result comes from a model 
with specification errors, it does suggest some further support for Ohlson‟s (1995) 
claim that growth is captured in the EBO model.  The absence of the hypothesised 
relationships for OWN, UW and GROWTH with MV is generally confirmed by the 
sensitivity tests. 
 
The disaggregation of underpricing into mispricing and misvaluation components is 
now complete.  In the next chapter, insights gleaned from modelling MP and MV are 
incorporated into the baseline model of underpricing developed in chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 8  
MISPRICING, MISVALUATION AND UNDERPRICING 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters modelled the mispricing and misvaluation of Australian 
fixed-price industrial IPOs.  Results from these models are incorporated into the 
baseline model of underpricing which was developed in chapter 2 and tested in 
chapter 4.  This chapter addresses the fourth research sub-question:  to what extent do 
issuer-related mispricing and investor-related misvaluation factors contribute to the 
explanation of underpricing?  The following hypothesis is tested: 
 
HO4 The explanatory power of the baseline model of underpricing is  
not increased when mispricing and misvaluation factors are added. 
 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3 discuss theoretical relationships between mispricing, 
misvaluation and underpricing.  As the mispricing and misvaluation sample include 
only companies which forecast earnings, the baseline model of underpricing (chapter 
4) is re-estimated for this sample prior to testing HO4.  Section 8.4 reports these 
results that then provide an appropriate comparison for the extended models of 
underpricing.   
 
The incremental explanatory power of mispricing is determined by adding the MP 
variable to the baseline model.  Similarly, MV is tested in the multivariate context via 
inclusion in the baseline model.  These two models form the basis for two further 
extended models of underpricing developed in section 8.5 and tested in section 8.6.  
Robustness tests are discussed in section 8.7.  The explanatory power of the extended 
models of underpricing is then compared to that of prior research in section 8.8.  
Conclusions are presented in the final section. 
 
8.2 Underpricing and mispricing 
Much of the prior IPO research cited in this dissertation concentrates on underpricing 
rather than mispricing or misvaluation.  Defined as the proportional difference 
between market price and offer price, underpricing can be viewed as compensation 
required for obtaining information from informed investors in the bookbuild process 
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(Benveniste & Spindt, 1989).  Sherman and Titman (2002) argue underpricing is 
required to encourage information production
156
.  Similarly, Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) assume that OP is set relative to expected market price on listing to ensure 
uninformed investors break even.  In contrast, Derrien (2005) suggests that issuers are 
not upset about leaving money on the table because they view their returns relative to 
V rather than what the market would be willing to pay. 
 
Mispricing is equivalent to underpricing in theories relying on the assumption that 
market price at listing is the appropriate measure of IPO value.  This assumption 
avoids the difficulties associated with estimating an unobservable V.  While it 
provides a readily observable proxy for V, the cost of using P is the uncritical 
acceptance of the tenets of market efficiency, even when (as demonstrated in chapter 
7) arbitrage is not possible in the Australian IPO context
157
.  If the market for IPOs is 
efficient, a clear directional relationship cannot be specified for mispricing and 
underpricing.  A negative relationship is expected when issuers set offer price higher 
than value while the market is expected to set price close to value and, therefore, 
lower than offer price.  Conversely, where offer price is set lower than value, 
mispricing and underpricing will have a positive relationship as the market price is 
close to value in an efficient market.   
 
In the US IPO context, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Zheng (2007) 
investigate estimates of V that are independent of the market price of an IPO but 
utilise the market prices of comparable firms.  Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) 
report positive mispricing, on average.  They find a positive association between the 
log of OP/V and initial returns, indicating that issues with the highest levels of 
positive mispricing also tend to have the highest levels of underpricing.  In contrast, 
Zheng makes corrections to the Purnanandam and Swaminathan methodology and 
finds no evidence of positive mispricing.  As previously discussed, results from these 
studies are limited by their reliance on pre-IPO accounting data.  
 
                                                 
156
 Sherman & Titman consider that the level of underpricing required to encourage information 
production will be sufficient to elicit truthful responses from participants in the bookbuild process. 
157
 For discussion of P as a proxy for V, see chapter 5, for limits to arbitrage, see chapter 7. 
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Asymmetric information theories of underpricing predict a negative relationship 
between mispricing and underpricing, where the IPOs with lower positive (or those 
with negative) mispricing experience the highest levels of underpricing (Purnanandam 
& Swaminathan, 2004).  Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) and How, Lam and Yeo 
(2007) report a negative relationship for OP/V and underpricing using forecast 
earnings and pro-forma accounting data that reflect post-listing capital structures.  
How, Lam and Yeo (2007) argue that P should approximate VPE when the market 
uses the comparable firms PE approach, and when OP is high relative to V (i.e. 
positive mispricing) the issue will be overpriced rather than underpriced.  Consistent 
with asymmetric information theories, Australian data show issues with less positive 
(or with negative) mispricing tend to have the highest levels of underpricing. Thus, 
theory and prior IPO research indicate a negative relationship for MP and 
underpricing in the Australian fixed-price setting. 
 
8.3 Underpricing and misvaluation 
Results in chapter 6 show issuers, on average, set OP higher than V.  The measures of 
V identified in chapter 5 are not dependent on the market‟s assessment of the IPO.  
Therefore, consistent with contemporary behavioural literature [Purnanandam & 
Swaminathan (2004); Derrien (2005); Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006)] 
misvaluation is viewed here as a component of underpricing. 
 
Miller (1977) argues IPOs will be underpriced even when issuers set OP relative to an 
E(P) based on the prices of comparable seasoned firms.  He reasons that investors 
purchasing IPO shares on listing date are more optimistic than typical investors and 
this optimism will cause P to exceed E(P).  The typical investor may be pessimistic 
about a particular share and will not make a purchase.  As discussed in section 7.5.2, 
limits to arbitrage prevent the typical investor from profiting by his or her 
expectations.  Pessimistic investors do not hold shares in the IPO, so they have none 
to sell and they are unable to reflect their pessimism by short selling.  Therefore, P is 
determined by a minority of optimistic investors, resulting in overvaluation. 
 
Researchers have uncovered evidence of misvaluation in many equity markets and in 
many time periods.  Frankel and Lee (1998), for example, find the V to P ratio is a 
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good predictor of cross-sectional returns for US listed firms.  While the long-run 
behaviour of stock prices is consistent with fundamentals, behavioural factors such as 
market sentiment affect the short-run evolution of prices (Coakley & Fuertes, 2006).  
Research in behavioural finance attributes these short-run departures from market 
efficiency to a number of sources including the cognitive biases of investors 
(Barberis, Sheifer & Vishny, 1998), overconfidence in private information (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam, 1998) and interactions between fundamental and noise 
traders [Shiller (1984); Shefrin & Statman (1994); Lee (2001)].  Investor sentiment 
does not influence prices in an efficient market because profitable trades by 
arbitrageurs promptly eliminate any sentiment-induced price bias (Shleifer & 
Summers, 1990).   
 
After analysing their US bookbuild IPO data, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) 
conclude that the observed coexistence of mispricing and misvaluation is consistent 
with behavioural theories.  They argue that investors‟ bids for IPO shares reflect 
overconfidence in their private information and this overconfidence affects the OP in 
the bookbuild process.  After listing, misvaluation in the market persists as investors 
underreact to subsequent news.  For his French bookbuild IPO sample, Derrien (2005) 
reports OPs higher than V when individual investors are bullish and, in these 
circumstances, P is higher than OP on listing
158
.  Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) 
develop their theory of underpricing based on the premise that institutional investors 
hold IPO shares in hot markets to exploit the presence of irrationally-exuberant 
investors after listing.  Thus, theory and prior research (albeit limited) indicate a 
positive relationship for MV and underpricing. 
 
8.4 Re-estimating the baseline model 
This section presents the results for the re-estimation of the baseline model using the 
reduced sample of earnings forecasters.  As discussed in chapter 5, management 
earnings forecasts are required to operationalise the two value proxies (VPE and VEBO) 
used in this research.  The sample used to test the extended models of underpricing 
necessarily excludes those IPOs without management earnings forecasts.  Therefore, 
                                                 
158
 Derrien uses bids submitted by institutional investors in the bookbuild process as a proxy for 
intrinsic value. 
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results for the baseline model presented in chapter 4 are not directly comparable to 
those for including MP and MV as independent variables.  The empirical baseline 
model developed in chapter 2 is as follows: 
 
UP = β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5OPT + ε  baseline model 
 
Three alternate measures of underpricing (RUP, MAUP and PUP) are used as the 
dependent variable.  As defined in chapter 4, raw underpricing (RUP) is the change 
from offer price to closing price at the end of day 1 trading divided by the offer price.  
Market-adjusted underpricing (MAUP) is calculated by subtracting the return on the 
market index (from prospectus date to listing date) from the raw return.  The return on 
packaged issues (PUP) includes the return on attaching options.  
 
As shown in table 2.3, the number of days from prospectus date to listing date, the 
proxy for informed demand (DELAY), was predicted to have a negative relationship 
with UP.  The standard deviation of daily returns (SIGMA), the proxy for ex ante 
uncertainty, was predicted to have a positive relationship with underpricing.  No 
directional relationships were predicted for the proportion of retained ownership 
(OWN), underwriting (UW) or for the inclusion of attaching options with the issue 
(OPT).  Measurement details for each of these independent variables, initially 
provided in table 2.3, are reiterated in table 8.5. 
 
8.4.1 Re-estimation sample, descriptive statistics and correlations 
As noted above, the sample used to re-estimate the baseline model is restricted to 
earnings forecasters.  Data requirements for VPE and VEBO (used to measure MP and 
MV), discussed in chapter 5, restrict the sample further.  The inclusion of the 
institutional investors percentage variable (II%) in an extended underpricing model 
imposes another restriction
159
 relating to data availability.  After these exclusions, the 
sample for re-estimating the baseline model consists of the 180 IPOs used in chapter 7 
to test the misvaluation model. 
                                                 
159
 See chapter 7 for discussion of exclusions attributable to poor or unavailable Top 20 shareholder 
disclosure data. 
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Table 8.1 presents descriptive statistics for the baseline model‟s dependent and 
independent variables in this re-estimation sample.  Comparing these descriptives to 
those presented for the full sample in tables 4.1 and 4.5 reveals some interesting 
differences between the two samples.   
 
Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics for variables - 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
Panel A:  Continuous measures 
 
 Mean Median S.D. Min Max K-S 
(p-value) 
Skew Kurtosis 
RUP 25.620 10.330 51.142 -46.000 342.000 (0.000) 3.354 14.729 
MAUP 25.287 12.601 50.371 -33.253 335.374 (0.000) 3.437 15.085 
PUP 25.462 12.609 50.259 -33.253 335.374 (0.000) 3.454 15.191 
         
DELAY 49.888 46.000 18.247 26 203 (0.000) 3.960 27.637 
OWN% 61.531 63.683 19.488 0.000 93.061 (0.348) -1.046 1.323 
SIGMA 3.856 3.206 2.568 0.407 16.306 (0.000) 1.819 4.286 
         
 
Panel B:  Dichotomous variables 
 Proportion of 1s 




RUP = raw underpricing = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = market-adjusted underpricing = RUP – 
return on the market index.  PUP = packaged underpricing = market-adjusted underpricing including the return on any attaching 
options.  DELAY = number of days from prospectus registration to listing on the exchange.  OWN = shares retained by pre-IPO 
owners / number of shares at listing.  SIGMA = standard deviation of the first 20 daily returns (excluding the day one return).  
UW = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when an issue is underwritten OPT = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the 
issue is packaged with options. 
 
Median market-adjusted underpricing (MAUP) is higher for the re-estimation sample 
(12.6%) than that observed for the full sample (10.5%).  Median market-adjusted 
underpricing including the return on attaching options (PUP) is equal to median 
MAUP and is also higher for the re-estimation sample (12.6% compared to 11.7%).  
This result is driven by higher median MAUP for the re-estimation sample combined 
with the very low proportion of earnings forecasts that include attaching options with 
their issues.  While 14.3% of the baseline sample issued attaching options, only 3% of 
the re-estimation sample did so.  Therefore, 97% of the observations on OPT take a 
zero value.  In effect, the very small number of packaged issues (five) are outliers and 
inclusion of this type of independent variable may have undue influence on the 
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ordinary least squares estimates (Brooks, 2002).  Therefore, the independent variable 
OPT is excluded from the re-estimation of the baseline model.  Correspondingly, the 
PUP measure of underpricing is not investigated further. 
 
Next, the distribution of OWN, which is significantly non-normal for the baseline 
sample, is normally distributed in the forecasting re-estimation sample.  This result 
suggests greater homogeneity, with respect to the proportion of retained ownership, 
for earnings forecasters.  The median level of OWN is less for earnings forecasters 
(63.7% compared to 64.7%)
160
.  Lower median DELAY suggests that earnings 
forecasters take less time to list.  Lower median SIGMA is consistent with investors 
facing less ex ante uncertainty when evaluating earnings forecasters
161
.  Finally, a 




Correlations for the dependent and independent variables in the re-estimation sample 
are presented in table 8.2.  Spearman‟s correlations and p-values are presented on the 
left side with Pearson‟s coefficients presented on the right.  Correlations are not 
reported for lnSIGMA and SIGMA as only one of these variables is included in the 
model.  Similarly, as either lnDELAY or DELAY is included in the model, correlations 
between these variables are not reported.  
 
The correlations in table 8.2 are very similar to those reported for the baseline sample 
in chapter 4.  RUP and MAUP make significant departures from the normal 
distribution
163, so Spearman‟s correlations are the focus of discussion for these 
variables.  DELAY again displays negative and highly significant correlations with 
RUP and MAUP.  SIGMA and OWN are not significantly correlated with the 
dependent variables while displaying low but highly significant correlations with each 
other.  DELAY exhibits highly significant but low correlations with both OWN and 
SIGMA. 
                                                 
160
 A dichotomous variable used to differentiate earnings forecasts from non-forecasters is applied in 
the full baseline sample described in chapter 3 to conduct median tests.  The median level of OWN is 
significantly lower for forecasters (p = 0.018). 
161
 Median tests on the full baseline sample confirm forecaster median DELAY (p = 0.001) and SIGMA 
(p = 0.000) are significantly smaller than those for non-forecasters 
162
 Utilising data included in the baseline sample, Cramér‟s V shows more earnings forecasters are 
underwritten (p = 0.000). 
163
 For RUP, K-S = 2.647 and p = 0.000.  For MAUP, K-S = 2.759 and p = 0.000. 
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Table 8.2 Correlations for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 RUP MAUP DELAY OWN SIGMA lnDELAY lnSIGMA 
RUP  0.994** -0.192* -0.110 0.251** -0.206** 0.230** 
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.143) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) 
MAUP 0.957**  -0.201** 0.108 0.252** -0.208** 0.229** 
 (0.000)  (0.007) (0.150) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) 
DELAY -0.233** -0.230**  0.240** 0.250** n.a. n.a. 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) n.a. n.a. 
OWN 0.070 0.044 0.202**  0.189* 0.254** 0.197** 
 (0.349) (0.561) (0.006)  (0.011) (0.001) (0.009) 
SIGMA 0.090 0.063 0.128** 0.210**  n.a. n.a. 
 (0.229) (0.398) (0.006) (0.005)  n.a. n.a. 
lnDELAY -0.233** -0.230** n.a. 0.202** n.a.  0.144 
 (0.002) (0.002) n.a. (0.006) n.a.  (0.057) 
lnSIGMA 0.093 0.072 n.a. 0.122 n.a. 0.112  
 (0.221) (0.340) n.a. (0.138) n.a. (0.138)  
        
 
Spearman‟s coefficients and associated probabilities are shown on the left-hand side of the table while Pearson‟s coefficients and 
probabilities are shown on the right-hand side. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
n.a. No correlations are presented for lnSIGMA and lnDELAY with SIGMA or DELAY as these are not included in the same model. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  lnDELAY = log of DELAY.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares 
offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  lnSIGMA = log of SIGMA. 
 
Table 8.3 presents Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in distributions and median 
tests where the data are categorised by UW.  Consistent with the results for the full 
sample presented in table 4.8, there are significant differences in the distributions for 
DELAY, OWN and SIGMA when earning forecasters are categorised by underwriter 
participation.   
 
Table 8.3  Differences in distribution where data are grouped by UW 
 
 RUP MAUP DELAY OWN SIGMA 
UW median 12.000 13.093 45 61.213 3.045 
Not UW median 7.500 5.772 51 77.273 4.894 
U 2 147 2 015 1 854* 1 170** 1 452** 
Asym sig. (2-tail) (0.302) (0.129) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Median test (2-tailed) (0.563) (0.563) (0.150) (0.000) (0.007) 
      
 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days 
from prospectus date to listing date.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  OWN = 
(shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns 
from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.   
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Again consistent with the results in table 4.8, median tests confirm differences in 
location of the distributions of OWN and SIGMA.  In contrast to the median test for 
the full sample, there is no significant difference for DELAY.  Therefore, it is 
concluded that the underwritten issues of earnings forecasters have significantly lower 
levels of retained ownership and lower post-listing volatility than are observed for 
issues that are not underwritten.  While the distribution of DELAY is different for 
underwritten issues, the distributions have the same location.  Having concluded the 
descriptive and bivariate analysis of the sample, the following section presents results 
for the re-estimation of the baseline model. 
 
8.4.2 Re-estimation results 
Table 8.4 presents the results for the re-estimation of the baseline model.  These 
results will be used to assess the incremental contribution of the significant MP and 
MV variables to the baseline underpricing model (section 8.7).  As DELAY and 
SIGMA make significant departures from the normal distribution, table 8.4 reports 
results for the regressions with and without logarithmic transformations. 
 
Consistent with the results of the baseline model reported in chapter 4, the positive 
coefficient on SIGMA is highly significant.  Results for UW are also consistent with 
those shown in chapter 4, displaying a significant positive relationship (one-tailed).  
While DELAY was marginally significant in the larger sample, it is highly significant 
in the forecaster re-estimation sample.  This result indicates a stronger relationship for 
underpricing and DELAY when issuers provide earnings forecasts.  Similarly, OWN 
lacked significance in the larger sample but is significant at the conventional level in 
this earnings forecaster sample
164




s are substantially higher than those reported in chapter 4, indicating 
that the independent variables provide greater explanatory power for earnings 
forecasters than they do for the extended sample.  In contrast to the larger sample, 
White‟s test fails to reject the hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity in the re- estimation 
sample.  While significant positive autocorrelation of residuals is identified in the 
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 A median test on the full baseline sample shows earnings forecasters have significantly (p = 0.028) 
lower median OWN of 62.6% compared to non-forecasters (68.5%). 
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baseline model, the Durban-Watson statistic indicates the indecision area for the re-
estimation sample.  The residuals, however, remain significantly non-normal.   
 
RESET tests indicate significant model specification error in the regressions reported 
in chapter 4 and indicate highly significant specification error in the re-estimated 
regressions.  To determine if the larger F-statistics on the RESET tests for the re-
estimation are attributable to the omission of OPT, the table 8.4 regressions are re-
estimated including this independent variable (results unreported).  The coefficient on 
OPT is significant (as one would expect if this variable is having an undue influence 
on the estimates) and the F-statistics are higher than those reported in table 8.4.  
Therefore, OPT is not a candidate for an omitted variable.  RESET tests do not 





Comparison of the descriptive statistics, bivariate analyses and re-estimation of the 
baseline model on this smaller sample of earnings forecasters reveals some interesting 
differences from the results presented in chapter 4.  First, earnings forecasters are 
much less likely to choose packaged issues, suggesting a trade-off between the 
provision of forecast information and the issue of „free‟ options.  This conclusion is 
not unequivocal as chapter 4 results revealed that underwritten issues are less likely to 
include options and the proportion of underwritten earnings forecasters is 
substantially higher than that shown for the larger sample.   
 
Second, compared to the full sample, relatively more homogeneity is observed in the 
distribution of retained ownership (OWN) for the forecasting sample as the former is 
not normally distributed while the latter is.   Again, this result may be a function of 
the relatively high proportion of underwritten earnings forecasters.  As shown in table 
4.8, the distributions and medians of OWN are significantly different for issues with 
and without underwriter participation. 
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 lnSIGMA follows a normal distribution (K-S statistic = 0.547, p = 0.926).  lnDELAY continues to 
make a significant departure from the normal distribution (K-S statistic = 1.511, p = 0.021).  As 
reported in table RUP and MAUP are highly leptokurtic and follow distributions that are significantly 
non-normal. 
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Table 8.4 Baseline regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient -6.979 -8.187 129.374** 125.346** 
 t-stat -0.361 -0.432 3.276 3.209 
 p (0.719) (0.666) (0.001) (0.002) 
DELAY coefficient -0.764** -0.774**   
 t-stat -3.715 -3.844   
 p (0.000) (0.000)   
OWN coefficient 0.438* 0.439* 0.451* 0.451* 
 t-stat 2.256 2.311 2.412 2.457 
 p (0.025) (0.022) (0.017) (0.015) 
SIGMA coefficient 6.577** 6.598**   
 t-stat 4.533 4.645   
 p (0.000) (0.000)   
UW coefficient 22.527* 24.009* 23.198* 24.743** 
 t-stat 2.280 2.482 2.551 2.807 
 p (0.024) (0.014) (0.012) (0.006) 
lnDELAY coefficient   -45.928** -45.214** 
 t-stat   -3.928 -3.877 
 p   (0.000) (0.002) 
lnSIGMA coefficient   23.198** 22.980* 
 t-stat   2.945 2.807 
 p   (0.007) (0.011) 
AR
2
  0.152** 0.162 ** 0.133 ** 0.138 ** 
JB  1 351** 1 425** 1 356** 1 292** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.074) (0.072) (0.049) (0.047) 
DW  1.714 1.756 1.712 1.745 
RESET F 6.829** 6.445** 9.959** 9.146** 
 p (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.658 10.616 10.680 10.645 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed for OWN and UW and one-tailed for DELAY, SIGMA lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) 
* Significant at <5% (two-tailed for OWN and UW and one-tailed for DELAY, SIGMA lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) 
# Significant at <10% (two-tailed for OWN and UW and one-tailed for DELAY, SIGMA lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for the regressions including lnDELAY and lnSIGMA. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  lnDELAY = log of DELAY.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  
lnSIGMA = log of sigma.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  UW = dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.   
 
 
Third, a median test on the full baseline sample described in chapter 4 (results 
unreported) indicates that earnings forecasters have significantly lower median 
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DELAY of 46 days compared to the non-forecasting issues (52 days).  This result 
suggests the demand (informed or otherwise) for IPO shares is higher when forecasts 
are disclosed.   
 
Fourth, results for the baseline model in table 8.4 show higher AR
2
s than are observed 
in the larger sample, indicating that the baseline variables provide higher explanatory 
power for the underpricing of earnings forecasters
166
.  Compared to the results for the 
full sample in table 4.9, t-statistics for the coefficients on both DELAY and OWN are 
substantially higher for the earnings-forecasting sample.  While DELAY shows 
marginal significance for the larger sample, it is highly significant in the explanation 
of underpricing for earnings forecasters.  OWN lacked significance in table 4.9 but is 
significant at the conventional level in table 8.4, suggesting any signal provided to the 
market by the level of retained ownership is confirmed by the provision of an earnings 
forecast.  As is the case for the full sample, the coefficient on SIGMA is highly 
significant while UW is significant at the conventional level. 
 
These differences in multivariate associations highlight the importance of re-
estimating the baseline model for the sample of earnings forecasters.  They 
demonstrate that tests of the extended models of underpricing presented in the 
following sections are not directly comparable to the results for the estimation of the 
baseline model on a sample that includes issues that do not disclose earnings 
forecasts.  Therefore, the results for the extended models of underpricing will be 
compared to those in table 8.4 rather than to those for the larger sample presented in 
table 4.9.  Having now completed the re-estimation of the baseline model, the 
following section explores potential relationships and describes empirical 
relationships between mispricing, misvaluation and underpricing.  These observed 
relationships are then used to make directional predictions for mispricing in the 
extended underpricing models. 
 
8.5 The extended underpricing models 
In this section, the baseline model of underpricing is extended by including 
mispricing and misvaluation and variables found to be associated with them.  The 




s are not attributable to the omission of OPT from the baseline model. 
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inclusion of both MP and MV as independent variables in a model of underpricing is 
tautological
167
.  Further, the results from the inclusion of both MP and MV in a model 
of underpricing could be driven by high correlations (see table 8.6) between MP and 
MV for these IPOs.  Therefore, two separate models are developed to isolate the 
effects of mispricing and misvaluation on underpricing. 
 
As a first step, MP is included in the baseline model to identify any incremental 
explanatory power for underpricing.  Model 8.1 is used to assess the relationship of 
MP and underpricing, controlling for the significant variables identified from the re-
estimation of the baseline model.  As was the case for the re-estimation of the baseline 
model, raw underpricing (RUP) and market-adjusted underpricing (MAUP) are the 
dependent variables. 
 
UP = β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5MP + ε (model 8.1) 
 
Next, to investigate the role of MV in underpricing, model 8.2 shows the predicted 
relationship of MV and underpricing.  As with model 8.1, the baseline underpricing 
independent variables are controlled.   
 
UP = β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5MV + ε (model 8.2) 
 
Given the aforementioned tautology of including both MP and MV in one model of 
underpricing, the approach adopted here is to develop two further models of 
underpricing that extend models 8.1 and 8.2.  Model 8.3 extends model 8.1 (baseline 
with MP) by representing the effects of misvaluation with the proportion of 
institutional investor participation and the level of general market sentiment.  Thus, 
misvaluation is indirectly represented by the independent variables that contribute to 
the explanation of misvaluation.   
 
 UP =  β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5MP +  
  β6II% + β7BULL + ε     (model 8.3) 
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 As MP = OP – V, MV = P – V and UP = OP – P, the dependent variable in the underpricing model 
will be fully explained by MP and MV. 
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Neither II% nor BULL were included in the original specification of the MV model.  
Both of these variables were identified from the robustness tests conducted in chapter 
7.  While SIZE was included as a control variable in the original MV model, the 
chapter 7 sensitivity tests indicated that the significance for this variable shown in 
table 7.8 can be attributed to scale effects.  Therefore, SIZE is not included in model 
8.3. 
 
Model 8.4 extends model 8.2 (baseline with MV) by representing the effects of 
mispricing with the level of IPO market sentiment (HOTN) and the size of the listing 
firm (SIZE). Thus, mispricing is indirectly represented by the independent variables 
that make a significant contribute to the explanation of mispricing.  Robustness 
testing in chapter 6 indicates that the significant relationship for SIZE and MP is not 
attributable to scale effects. 
 
 UP =  β0 + β1DELAY + β2OWN + β3SIGMA + β4UW + β5MV +  
  β6HOTN + β 7SIZE + ε    (model 8.4) 
 
 
The dependent variables used in the primary tests of the MV and MP models in 
chapters 6 and 7 were the dollar amounts of mispricing and misvaluation.  Dollar 
measures for these independent variables are also used here with robustness tests for 
scaled MP and MV measures presented in section 8.7.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 reported results for MP and MV based on VPE, VEBO0, VEBO50 and 
VEBO100.  In the interest of parsimony, only the results for the VPE (the primary value 
proxy) and VEBO50 (the alternate proxy) measures of the MP and MV independent 
variables will be reported in this chapter. The remaining independent variables have 
been defined in chapters 2, 6 and 7.  Table 8.4 summarises their measurement and 
identifies the direction of the predicted relationship with underpricing.   
 
As discussed in chapter 2, results for retained ownership (OWN) in prior Australian 
research are mixed so no directional relationship was predicted for the baseline 
model.  OWN did not exhibit a significant relationship with underpricing in the 
baseline model but results reported in table 8.4 show OWN has a positive significant 
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relationship with RUP and MAUP in the earnings forecasting sample.  Therefore, 
OWN is predicted to have a positive relationship with underpricing in the extended 
models.  Similarly, no directional prediction was made for the relationship between 
UW and underpricing in the baseline model.  The empirical results presented in 
chapter 4 and section 8.4 show this relationship to be positive, supporting Logue‟s 
(1973) rationale of underpricing as a mechanism to minimise the underwriter‟s costs 
and risks.  Therefore, the predicted relationship for UW and underpricing is positive. 
 




Variable measurement Predicted 
relationship 
DELAY proxies for the level of informed demand.  DELAY is 
captured by the number of days from prospectus date 
to listing date. 
 
negative 
OWN is the level of retained ownership.  OWN is measured 
by (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / number of 
shares at listing) x 100. 
 
positive 
SIGMA proxies for the level of ex ante uncertainty.  SIGMA is 
defined as the standard deviation of daily returns for 
days 2 to 20 from listing date. 
 
positive 
UW indicates the participation of an underwriter in the 
issue.  UW is defined as a dichotomous variable equal 
to one if the issue is underwritten. 
 
positive 
MP is the level of mispricing.  MP is measured as OP-V. negative 
MV is the level of misvaluation.  MV is measured as P-V. positive 
II% is the proportion of „Top 20‟ shares held by 
institutional investors. 
positive 
BULL is the proxy for market sentiment.  BULL is defined as 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is 
listed during a period identified as a bull market from 
media reports. 
positive 
HOTN represents the state of the IPO market.  HOTN is 
measured as by the number of industrial IPOs in the 
three months preceding the prospectus date. Hot 
markets are indicated by more listings. 
 
positive 
SIZE measures the size of the firm post listing relative to 
industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  
Firm size is measured as the total number of shares at 
listing multiplied by the offer price. 
 
positive 
   
 
 
Robustness testing in chapter 7 identified the percentage of institutional investors 
(II%) identified in the Top 20 shareholder disclosure as marginally significant  
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(p < 0.06) in the explanation of misvaluation.  Using an Australian sample, Bayley, 
Lee and Walter (2006) find institutional investors receive significantly larger 
allocations in underpriced issues
168
.  As reported in chapter 7, institutional investors 
tend to be allocated a relatively larger proportion of shares in issues with listing prices 
in excess of value (i.e. issuers with positive misvaluation) in this sample.  Therefore, a 
positive relationship is predicted for II% and underpricing in model 8.3.   
 
The general market sentiment variable (BULL) was found to be highly significant for 
explaining misvaluation.  BULL, determined by reference to the media, has a positive 
and highly significant relationship with misvaluation.  BULL is included in model 8.3 
and a positive relationship with underpricing is predicted.  Issues with higher positive 
misvaluation are expected to have relatively higher prices at listing and are, therefore, 
likely to have greater levels of underpricing. 
 
The proxy for the state of the IPO market (HOTN) is included in model 8.4.  HOTN 
displays a positive and highly significant relationship with mispricing (see section 
6.7) and is not associated with misvaluation (see section 7.8.2).  Based on prior 
research [c.f. Ritter (1984); Sharpe & Woo (2005)], a positive relationship is 
predicted for HOTN and underpricing. 
 
IPO market capitalisation relative to industry median (SIZE) displays a positive and 
highly significant relationship with mispricing (see section 6.7), so is included in 
model 8.4.  Robustness tests show SIZE remains highly significant in the explanation 
of mispricing after controlling for scale effects.  Prior Australian research (discussed 
in chapter 2) reports mixed evidence on a relationship for various measures of size 
(issue size, total assets and market capitalisation at listing) and underpricing.   Where 
significant relationships are identified in prior Australian research, the measure of size 
has a positive coefficient [How, Izan & Monroe (1995); How & Howe (2001); Cotter, 
Goyen & Hegarty (2005)].  A positive relationship is predicted for SIZE and 
underpricing.  This concludes the development of the extended underpricing models.  
Tests of the models are presented in the following section.  
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 As discussed in chapter 7, the Bayley, Lee and Walter definition of institutional investors is broader 
than that used in this research. 
  227 
8.6 Testing the extended underpricing models  
The sample used to re-estimate the baseline model (see section 8.1) is used here to test 
the extended underpricing models.  The first sub-section provides descriptive statistics 
for the independent variables.  Bivariate associations are analysed and regression 
results are then presented. 
 
8.6.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 8.3 presented descriptive statistics for the dependent variables (RUP and 
MAUP) and for the independent variables from the baseline model (DELAY, SIGMA, 
OWN and UW).  Descriptive statistics for MP (table 6.3), HOTN and SIZE (table 6.6), 
MV (table 7.3) have been presented and discussed in previous chapters.  As discussed 
in chapter 7, around 77% of issues listed during the two bull market phases observed 
in the sample.  As it was identified from the chapter 7 robustness tests, II% is the sole 
remaining variable that requires description.  The mean (median) percentage of shares 
held by institutional investors identified from the Top 20 shareholder disclosures is 
16.58% (12.97%).  The minimum level of II% is zero, while the maximum is 78.22%.  
Although the skewness and kurtosis statistics for II% are not significant, the 
distribution has a large standard deviation and is significantly non-normal.   
 
Table 8.6 presents correlations for dependent and independent variables.  Spearman‟s 
coefficients are presented on the left-hand side of the table while the Pearson‟s 
coefficients are shown on the right. Given the non-normality of variable distributions, 
the discussion focuses on Spearman‟s rho and associated p-values.  Correlations for 
the baseline independent variables and underpricing were discussed in section 5.2, so 
discussion in this section relates to the additional independent variables for the 
extended models of underpricing.   As expected, correlations between the MP and MV 








Table 8.6 Correlations for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
 RUP MAUP DELAY SIGMA OWN SIZE II% HOTN MPPE MPEBO50 MVPE MVEBO50 
RUP  0.994** -0.192* 0.251** 0.110 0.113 -0.137 0.075 0.001 -0.051 0.575** 0.560** 
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.143) (0.132) (0.066) (0.317) (0.987) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000) 
MAUP 0.957**  -0.201** 0.252** 0.108 0.108 -0.129  0.091 0.003 -0.038 0.573** 0.565** 
 (0.000)  (0.007) (0.001) (0.150) (0.148) (0.084) (0.222) (0.967) (0.609) (0.000) (0.000) 
DELAY -0.233** -0.230**  0.250** 0.240** -0.236** -0.306** 0.009 -0.224** -0.267** -0.290** -0.327** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.903) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIGMA 0.090 0.063 0.128  0.189* -0.195** -0.251** 0.171* 0.000 -0.131 0.087 -0.002 
 (0.229) (0.398) (0.087)  (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.021) (0.995) (0.080) (0.244) (0.978) 
OWN 0.070 0.044 0.202** 0.210**  0.030 -0.490** 0.191* 0.026 -0.053 0.093 0.040 
 (0.349) (0.561) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.688) (0.000) (0.010) (0.733) (0.478) (0.214) (0.593) 
SIZE 0.103 0.125 -0.354** -0.241** 0.038  0.148* -0.124 0.354** 0.281** 0.419** 0.376** 
 (0.168) (0.093) (0.000) (0.001) (0.610)  (0.048) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
II% -0.103 -0.073 -0.366** -0.325** -0.490** 0.194**  -0.093 0.112 0.174* -0.002 0.040 
 (0.167) (0.331) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)  (0.213) (0.136) (0.019) (0.981) (0.592) 
HOTN 0.070 -0.043 -0.033 0.176* 0.159* -0.091 -0.049  0.182* 0.166* 0.153* 0.143 
 (0.070) (0.565) (0.661) (0.018) (0.033) (0.224) (0.515)  (0.015) (0.026) (0.041) (0.055) 
MPPE 0.011 0.026 -0.142 0.060 0.070 0.527** 0.099 0.182*  0.650** 0.752** 0.510** 
 (0.882) (0.731) (0.057) (0.422) (0.348) (0.000) (0.187) (0.015)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MPEBO50 -0.102 -0.079 -0.267** -0.116 -0.036 0.409** 0.195** 0.209** 0.650**  0.475** 0.728** 
 (0.175) (0.290) (0.000) (0.122) (0.630) (0.000) (0.009) (0.005) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
MVPE 0.384** 0.391** -0.254** 0.066 0.098 0.573** 0.041 0.144 0.880** 0.544**  0.825** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.378) (0.193) (0.000) (0.584) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
MVEBO50 0.336** 0.350** -0.323** -0.092 0.021 0.490** 0.139 0.170* 0.630** 0.847** 0.732**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.220) (0.778) (0.000) (0.064) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
 
Spearman‟s coefficients and associated probabilities are shown on the left-hand side of the table while Pearson‟s coefficients and probabilities are shown on the right-hand side. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus date to listing date.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing 
date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIZE = size of the firm post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.   II% = the proportion of „top 20‟ 
shares held by institutional investors.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.   MPEBO50 = offer price 
minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.   
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A negative relationship for mispricing and underpricing was predicted but the 
Spearman‟s correlations show no significant relationship for either measure of 
mispricing.  Both measures of misvaluation have moderately-sized (i.e. between 0.336 
and 0.391) positive and highly significant correlations with the measures of 
underpricing as predicted.  This result is interesting in view of the lack of correlation 
between the mispricing measures and underpricing.  Taken together, these results 
suggest investor-related factors (misvaluation) are more important for the explanation 
of underpricing than are issuer-related factors (mispricing).  Further, the correlation of 
MV with underpricing highlights the deficiency of price as a proxy for value.  When it 
is assumed that P equals V, MV is necessarily zero.  The bivariate relationship of MV 
and underpricing suggests important information about MV is lost when it is assumed 
to be zero.   
 
DELAY is the only other independent variable that displays a significant association 
with underpricing.  Market capitalisation relative to industry median (SIZE) was 
predicted to have a positive association with underpricing but no significant 
relationship is observed.  DELAY exhibits highly significant negative correlations 
with SIZE and the proportion of institutional investors (II%).  Thus, consistent with 
Miller‟s (1977) visibility hypothesis, the larger the IPO relative to its relevant industry 
median market capitalisation, the more interest the issue attracts.   The association of 
DELAY with the proportion of institutional investors identified in the Top 20 
shareholder disclosure provides support for the notion that this variable captures the 
level of informed demand and that institutional investors appear to behave as „smart 
money‟.  The significant positive association of DELAY and OWN indicates issuers 
with higher retained ownership take longer to list. 
 
Mispricing, measured with the EBO model, exhibits a low negative but highly 
significant correlation with DELAY
169
.  Contrary to a rational argument for purchasing 
IPOs where issue price is close to value, this relationship suggests that issues with 
greater positive mispricing take less time to fill.  DELAY has negative and significant 
correlations with both measures of MV, indicating that issues taking longer to list are 
less misvalued.   
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 The size of the correlation for mispricing measured with VPE is smaller and only has marginal 
significance. 
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There are at least three possible explanations for this result.  The first is that longer 
DELAY facilitates the incorporation of more information about the listing firm, 
resulting in lower misvaluation.  The second is that positive market sentiment results 
in a shorter time to listing and higher prices for listing firms as demand for shares is 
high.   This explanation is not supported by the comparison of distributions of MV 
variables in bull and bear markets.  As shown in table 8.7 (below) MV does not take a 
different distribution during bull markets.  However, the significant positive 
correlation for HOTN and MVEBO and the weak relationship with MVPE indicates that 
IPO market sentiment (rather than general market sentiment proxied by BULL) 
influences misvaluation.  The third potential explanation for the negative correlation 
of MV and DELAY is that, as a proxy for informed demand, DELAY has a strong 
negative correlation with II%.  This explanation is consistent with the Ljungqvist, 
Nanda and Singh (2006) view that institutional investors participate in issues to 
exploit expected misvaluation generated by individual investors.  This third 
explanation is not supported as II% and the measures of MVPE are uncorrelated, while 
the relationship between II% and MVEBO is positive and weak.  
 
As is the case for DELAY, the proxy for the level of ex-ante uncertainty (SIGMA) also 
has highly significant negative correlations with SIZE and II%.  As discussed in 
chapter 7, SIZE and II% have low but highly significant correlations supporting the 
argument that institutional investors are constrained, to some extent, by the size of 
IPOs in their investment decisions.  These results indicate lower levels of ex ante 
uncertainty for larger IPOs as the market has access to more information about these 
firms.  Further, ex ante uncertainty is lower for IPOs where institutional investors 
hold relatively more shares and are, presumably, more active in the aftermarket.  This 
result, however, is not unequivocal as the association between SIZE and II% may be 
attributable to endogeneity
170
.   
 
The number of IPOs listing in the preceding quarter (HOTN) also has a low but highly 
significant correlation with SIGMA.  This positive association is unexpected as the 
market should have relatively lower search costs when the number of listings prior to 
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 Only SIZE or II% is included in models 8.3 and 8.4. 
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the IPO is higher.  The positive association for SIGMA and OWN indicates higher 
levels of ex ante uncertainty for issues with greater retained ownership. 
 
Correlations in table 7.6 include the number of institutional investors identified in the 
Top 20 shareholder disclosures rather than the II% measure reported in table 8.6.  
Consistent with the relationship for the number of institutional investors and OWN, 
II% and OWN show a moderate negative (ρ = -0.490) and highly significant 
correlation.  Highly significant positive correlations with mispricing and the number 
of institutional investors are shown in table 7.6.  In contrast, table 8.6 shows no 
relationship with II% for the VPE measure of mispricing.   
 
Table 7.6 includes mean underpricing in the three months prior to listing (HOTU) 
while table 8.6 reports the number of IPOs listing in the three months preceding the 
prospectus date (HOTN).  Comparison of these results reveals that both HOTN and 
HOTU have low positive significant associations with OWN.  Further, both HOTN 
and HOTU have significant relationships with the mispricing proxies. 
 
Table 8.7 presents results for tests of differences in distributions and median tests with 
data grouped by the dichotomous variables, underwritten issues (UW) and general 
market sentiment (BULL).  Cramér‟s V test for nominal variables indicates that no 
significant association exists for BULL and UW
171
.   
 
Tests for distribution and differences in medians for the baseline model variables were 
presented in table 8.3 and will not be discussed again here.  Differences in 
distributions and medians for MP, MV and SIZE where issues are grouped by the 
participation of an underwriter were presented and discussed in chapter 7.  The results 
for II% confirm those for the number of institutional investors (reported in table 7.7), 
with underwritten issues having significantly more shares in the Top 20 shareholders 
disclosures held by institutions.  As reported for the HOTU measure in table 7.7, 
issuers do not appear to vary their decisions to engage underwriters in response to the 
state of the IPO market (HOTN). 
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Table 8.7  Differences in distribution where data are grouped by UW and BULL 
 
 RUP MAUP DELAY OWN SIGMA HOTN SIZE II% MPPE MPEBO50 MVPE MVEBO50 
UW median      15  15.850     
Not UW median      14  1.360     
U      2 393  891     
Asym sig. (2-tail)      (0.903)  (0.000)     
             
Median test (2-tailed)      (0.985)  (0.000)     
             
BULL median 15.000 15.234 46 61.356 3.079 29 1.055 14.457 0.011 0.009 0.150 0.156 
BEAR median 3.000 5.500 44 67.401 3.786 12 1.046 9.660 0.215 0.173 0.252 0.181 
U 1 695 1 960 2 652 2 109 2 053 559 2 730 2 569 2 118 2 013 2 640 2 650 
Asym sig. (2-tail) (0.000) (0.002) (0.500) (0.012) (0.007) (0.000) (0.684) (0.338) (0.013) (0.004) (0.475) (0.496) 
             
Median test (2-tailed) (0.000) (0.021) (0.572)  (0.008) (0.110) (0.000) (0.859) (0.110) (0.021) (0.213) (0.374) (0.594) 
             
 
UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  BULL = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when listing date occurs during a bull market.  RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 
100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.  MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  II% = the proportion of „top 20‟ 
shares held by institutional investors.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = size of the firm post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of 
listing.  MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  
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RUP and MAUP follow significantly different distributions in BULL and bear (i.e. not 
BULL) markets, with significantly higher median underpricing during bull market phases 
even after initial returns are market-adjusted.  As one would expect, HOTN is distributed 
differently and is significantly higher during bull markets.  Results from testing the 
mispricing model in chapter 6 show HOTN is a significant factor in the explanation of 
MP.   The difference in distributions for MP during BULL and bear markets is consistent 
with this relationship.  In contrast, there are no significant differences in the distributions 
or medians of the MV measures during bull market phases.  This result is surprising as the 
level of general market sentiment would reasonably be expected to influence the level of 
misvaluation. 
 
Pre-floatation owners retain a significantly smaller proportion of shares in the company 
(OWN) when choosing to list into a bull market.  This result is consistent with Ritter‟s 
(1991) argument that issuers take advantage of windows of opportunity.  There is, 
however, no significant difference in the distributions of DELAY during bull markets 
suggesting that any investor over-optimism does not translate into shorter listing times.  
The distributions for II% do not differ during bull and bear market phases.  While the 
distributions for SIGMA are significantly different in bull markets, lack of difference in 
the median level of SIGMA indicates the location of the distribution is stable.  With the 
presentation and discussion of descriptive statistics and bivariate analyses now complete, 
the following sections test the extended underpricing models. 
 
8.6.2 Mispricing and the baseline model 
Model 8.1 extends the empirical baseline model via the inclusion of MP as an 
independent variable.  RUP and MAUP are the dependent variables, with MPPE and 
MPEBO50 included as alternate measures of mispricing.  Results for these regressions are 
presented in table 8.8. 
 
Coefficients for all independent variables display the predicted sign.  Mispricing, in 
contrast to results reported by Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) and How, Lam and Yeo 
(2007), is not significant for the explanation of underpricing.  Prior research uses scaled 
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(rather than dollar) mispricing which suggests the results are sensitive to the changes in 
the specification of the MP variable.  This issue is investigated with sensitivity testing in 
section 8.7.   
 
Table 8.8  Model 8.1 regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient -6.591 -7.797 -4.378 -5.860 
 t-stat -0.341 -0.412 0.226 -0.309 
 p (0.734) (0.681) (0.821) (0.758) 
DELAY coefficient -0.825** -0.835** -0.836** -0.839** 
 t-stat -3.911 -4.045 -3.972 -4.064 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.463* 0.464* 0.451* 0.451* 
 t-stat 2.375 2.434 2.328 2.376 
 p (0.037) (0.032) (0.042) (0.037) 
SIGMA coefficient 6.697** 6.719** 6.460** 6.494** 
 t-stat 4.613 4.729 4.461 4.576 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 23.809* 25.296* 23.927* 25.262* 
 t-stat 2.401 -2.606 2.419 2.606 
 p (0.035) (0.020) (0.033) (0.020) 
MPPE coefficient -9.642 -9.678   
 t-stat -1.267 -1.299   
 p (0.414) (0.392)   
MPEBO50 coefficient   -11.817 -10.573 
 t-stat   -1.498 -1.367 
 p   (0.272) (0.347) 
AR
2
  0.178** 0.165** 0.158** 0.166** 
JB  1 401** 1 476** 1 414** 1 476** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.317) (0.309) (0.236) (0.236) 
DW  1.702 1.747 1.704 1.743 
RESET F 7.550** 7.476** 6.598** 7.771** 
 p (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
SIC  10.678 10.635 10.674 10.634 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus 
date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  .SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.   MPPE = offer price minus the 
comparable firms estimate of value.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate. 
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Compared to the results for the baseline model in table 8.4, estimation of model 8.1 
provides an increase in AR
2
 of about 2.5% with the MPPE variable and RUP, but no 
change is observed where MAUP is the dependent variable.  Adding the MPEBO50 
mispricing variable to the baseline model only increases AR
2
 by around 0.5%.  The AR
2 
is 
directly comparable for two models with the same dependent variable (Gujarati, 2003).  
As noted previously, it is not possible to test for the statistical significance of any 
difference as AR
2
 does not have an identified distribution (Brooks, 2002).   
 
A penalty for additional variables is used to adjust R
2 
for the effects of additional 
variables, but this penalty may not be optimal (Brooks, 2002).  Compared to that used by 
the AR
2
, larger penalties are imposed by information criteria (such as the Akaike, 
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria) for additional variables (Gujarati, 2003).  While no 
information criterion is necessarily superior to the others (Gujarati, 2003), the Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC) applies the harshest penalty for the inclusion of additional 
variables (Brooks, 2002).  Therefore, the SIC provides an appropriate means for 
comparing the explanatory power of the baseline model and the models tested in this 
chapter.   
 
When comparing models, the lower the SIC the better the model (Gujarati, 2003).  As the 
SICs from the regressions of model 8.1 are higher than those for the baseline model (see 
table 8.4), the baseline model is preferred to model 8.1.  Therefore, including the MP 
variable with those from the baseline model does not produce a model of underpricing 
with higher explanatory power.  Further, RESET tests continue to indicate highly 
significant model specification error indicating that the inclusion MP does not correct the 
specification error.   
 
8.6.3 Misvaluation and the baseline model 
Model 8.2 extends the empirical baseline model by adding MV as an independent 
variable.  MVPE and MVEBO50 are included as the alternate measures of misvaluation.  
Results for these regressions are presented in table 8.9.  Coefficients on the independent 
variables show the predicted relationships with underpricing.  However, the introduction 
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of the MV variables causes substantial changes to the results reported for the baseline 
model (table 8.4).  The AR
2
s are more than double those in table 8.4 and the coefficients 
on the MV variables are highly significant.  Comparing the SICs from model 8.2 with 
those for the baseline model indicates the former as the preferred model. 
 
Table 8.9  Model 8.2 regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient -6.533 -7.756 -13.705 -14.789 
 t-stat -0.450 -0.561 -0.912 -1.034 
 p (0.653) (0.575) (0.363) (0.303) 
DELAY coefficient -0.286 -0.312# -0.270 -0.289# 
 t-stat -1.819 -2.178 -1.783 -2.102 
 p (0.141) (0.076) (0.152) (0.074) 
OWN coefficient 0.171 0.182 0.218 0.223 
 t-stat 1.196 1.277 1.582 1.636 
 p (0.466) (0.407) (0.231) (0.207) 
SIGMA coefficient 4.741* 4.825* 5.548** 5.587** 
 t-stat 2.549 2.653 2.995 3.089 
 p (0.023) (0.017) (0.006) (0.005) 
UW coefficient 9.675 11.594 9.646 11.348 
 t-stat 1.264 1.575 1.306 1.614 
 p (0.416) (0.234) (0.387) (0.217) 
MVPE coefficient 38.191** 36.893**   
 t-stat 3.770 3.670   
 p (0.000) (0.000)   
MVEBO50 coefficient   39.995** 39.313** 
 t-stat   3.941 3.947 
 p   (0.000) (0.000) 
AR
2
  0.368 ** 0.370** 0.374** 0.383** 
JB  491** 563** 398** 475** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.785 1.804 1.775 1.826 
RESET F 31.316** 32.772** 26.981** 27.338** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.388 10.354 10.378 10.333 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
t-statistics are White-corrected. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus 
date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  .SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MVPE = price minus the 
comparable firms estimate of value.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.   
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The OWN and UW independent variables are no longer significant.  While the addition of 
the MP variable has little effect on the results for other variables from the baseline model, 
MV appears to capture some of the explanatory power attributed to DELAY.  DELAY is 
not significant with RUP and has only marginal significance for the MAUP dependent 
variable.  Further, the t-statistics on SIGMA fall and this variable is now only significant 
at the conventional level with MVPE while they remain highly significant with MVEBO. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, Australian underpricing models frequently report DELAY as 
significant for the explanation of underpricing.  In contrast, underpricing models that 
include OPVPE ratio as an independent variable find DELAY lacks significance [Cotter, 
Goyen & Hegarty (2005); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  How, Lam and Yeo (2007) 
attribute this result for DELAY to the relatively fewer available observations when the 
sample is constrained by the provision of earnings forecasts.  As shown in table 8.4, 
DELAY is highly significant in the re-estimation of the baseline model on this reduced 
sample.  DELAY remains highly significant when the mispricing variable is included in 
model 8.1.  Therefore, the loss of significance for DELAY in prior research is not 
attributable to a constrained sample of earnings forecasters nor to the inclusion of a 
mispricing variable.  This issue will be discussed further in chapter 9. 
 
8.6.4 Testing model 8.3 
The rationale for model 8.3 was provided in section 8.5.  In this model, variables that 
explain misvaluation (II% and BULL) are added to model 8.1.  Results for these 
regressions are presented in table 8.10. 
 
Compared to the results for model 8.1, including II% and BULL results in substantial 
increases of around 6 to 8% to AR
2
s.  Although the SICs for model 8.1 indicate that the 
baseline model is preferred, SICs for model 8.3 indicate the inclusion of II% and BULL 
offers higher explanatory power than the baseline.  BULL is highly significant and, as 
predicted, has a positive association with both measures of underpricing.  II% is not 
significant. 
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Table 8.10  Model 8.3 regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient -24.662 -21.509 -23.886 -20.866 
 t-stat -1.072 -0.944 -1.030 -0.910 
 p (0.285) (0.346) (0.305) (0.365) 
DELAY coefficient -0.932** -0.932** -0.925** -0.920** 
 t-stat -4.594 -4.638 -4.558 -4.577 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.458# 0.446# 0.449# 0.435# 
 t-stat 2.21 2.183 2.186 2.136 
 p (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) 
SIGMA coefficient 7.027** 7.182** 7.183** 7.089** 
 t-stat 5.164 5.149 5.087 5.067 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 27.046* 28.343** 26.869* 28.072** 
 t-stat 2.832 2.996 2.814 2.967 
 p (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
MPPE coefficient -4.210 -4.910   
 t-stat -0.574 -0676   
 p (1.000) (1.000)   
MPEBO50 coefficient   -3.089 -2.925 
 t-stat   -0.397 -0.380 
 p   (1.000) (1.000) 
II% coefficient -0.456 -0.436 -0.459 -0.442 
 t-stat -1.759 -1.700 -1.770 -1.720 
 p (0.161) (0.182) (0.157) (0.175) 
BULL coefficient 33.944** 29.102** 33.813** 29.124** 
 t-stat 4.070 3.523 3.976 3.456 
 p (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR
2
  0.236** 0.228** 0.236** 0.226** 
JB  1 407** 1 429** 1 403** 1 419** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.358) (0.310) (0.277) (0.247) 
DW  1.839 1.841 1.840 1.842 
RESET F 10.260** 10.210** 10.297** 10.208** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.623 10.604 10.624 10.605 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus 
date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  .SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MPPE = offer price minus the 
comparable firms estimate of value.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  II% = the 
proportion of „top 20‟ shares held by institutional investors.  BULL = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when listing date occurs 
during a bull market.   
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DELAY and SIGMA remain highly significant when BULL and II% are included in model 
8.1.   However, t-statistics decrease to the point of marginal significance on the OWN 
coefficients.  In contrast, t-statistics on the UW coefficients increase with UW now highly 
significant where MAUP is the dependent variable.  II% follows a significantly different 
distribution for issues with underwriter participation, and median II% is higher for 
underwritten issues compared to issues that are not underwritten (see table 8.7).  
Therefore, the increased significance of UW may be attributable to this association.  The 
residuals for this model remain significantly non-normal and the RESET tests continue to 
indicate significant model specification errors.  The Durban-Watson statistics are 
improved, showing no significant autocorrelation of residuals for the MODEL 8.3 
regressions.   
  
8.6.5 Testing model 8.4 
The rationale for model 8.4 was provided in section 8.5.  In this model, variables that 
have been identified as significant for explaining mispricing (HOTN and SIZE) are added 
to model 8.2.  Results for these regressions are presented in table 8.11.  Compared to the 
results for model 8.2, the model 8.4 regressions show small increases (around 1%) for 
AR
2
s with the MVPE measure of mispricing while there is no notable change with the 
MVEBO independent variable.   Comparison of the SICs from model 8.4 and the baseline 
indicates that the former is the preferred model.  However, the SICs for model 8.2 are 
lower than those of model 8.4, indicating model 8.2 is preferred.    
 
MVPE and MVEBO50 remain highly significant while HOTN does not contribute to the 
explanation of underpricing.  SIZE, contrary to expectations, has a significant negative 
association with the measures of underpricing when MVPE is the measure of misvaluation.  
No relationship between SIZE and underpricing is observed when MVEBO is the measure 
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Table 8.11  Model 8.4 regression results for 180 IPOs, 1997-2006 
 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 1.477 -0.355 -7.880 -9.371 
 t-stat 0.0939 -0.024 -0.494 -0.617 
 p (0.925) (0.981) (0.622) (0.538) 
DELAY coefficient -0.318 -0.343* -0.299 -0.318# 
 t-stat -1.897 -2.269 -1.888 -2.220 
 p (0.119) (0.049) (0.121) (0.055) 
OWN coefficient 0.242 0.244 0.285# 0.284# 
 t-stat 1.863 1.897 2.240 2.257 
 p (0.128) (0.119) (0.053) (0.051) 
SIGMA coefficient 4.416* 4.445* 5.488** 5.460** 
 t-stat 2.337 2.426 2.871 2.950 
 p (0.041) (0.033) (0.009) (0.007) 
UW coefficient 12.415 14.192 11.915 13.564 
 t-stat 1.669 1.971 1.644 1.952 
 p (0.194) (0.101) (0.204) (0.105) 
MVPE coefficient 43.1224** 41.700**   
 t-stat 4.079 3.977   
 p (0.000) (0.000)   
MVEBO50 coefficient   43.236** 42.529** 
 t-stat   4.110 1.952 
 p   (0.000) (0.000) 
HOTN coefficient -0.386 -0.306 -0.381 -0.309 
 t-stat -1.127 -0.895 -1.094 -0.894 
 p (0.522) (0.744) (0.551) (0.745) 
SIZE coefficient -3.557* -3.568* -2.455 -2.577 
 t-stat -2.642 -2.774 -1.722 -1.900 
 p (0.018) (0.012) (0.174) (0.118) 
AR
2
  0.380** 0.380** 0.379** 0.387** 
JB  575** 628** 475** 538** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
DW  1.800 1.811 1.765 1.812 
RESET F 28.906** 30.727** 25.577** 26.295** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.415 10.383 10.416 10.372 
      
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
t-statistics are adjusted for heteroscedasticity using White‟s correction. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus 
date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.   SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MVPE = price minus the 
comparable firms estimate of value.  MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  HOTN = number of 
industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = size of the firm post listing relative to industry median 
capitalisation for the year of listing.   
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8.6.6 Conclusions on the extended models of underpricing 
Prior to undertaking robustness tests in the following section, some conclusions are now 
drawn from the results presented in section 8.6.  Results for model 8.1 show that 
extending the baseline model via the inclusion of a mispricing variable does not increase 
explanatory power.   Results for model 8.3 show the proxy for general market sentiment 
(BULL) is responsible for substantial increases in the AR
2
s reported in table 8.10.  
Although the dollar measure of mispricing was not significant in model 8.1, the inclusion 
of BULL in model 8.3 has the unexpected effect of decreasing the t-statistics on the 
coefficients for MP.   
 
In contrast, results from the estimation of model 8.2 show that extending the baseline 
model by including a measure of misvaluation provides greater explanatory power.  
Including MVEBO50 as an independent variable provides a model with a better fit and 
lower SICs than the alternative MVPE measure of misvaluation.  While the proxy for IPO 
market sentiment does not contribute to the explanation of underpricing, the mispricing 
variable SIZE has an unexpected negative and significant association with underpricing 
when MVPE is included as an independent variable.  This result is puzzling as the 
coefficient on SIZE has a positive relationship with the MPPE variable in the mispricing 
model.   As there is little to differentiate the explanatory power for model 8.4 with respect 
to AR
2
s or SICs, this significant coefficient on SIZE is consistent with VEBO capturing a 
size effect that is not represented in VPE. 
 
8.7 Robustness testing 
This section discusses the robustness tests that evaluate the sensitivity of results reported 
for the extended models of underpricing.  Alternative measures of value, mispricing, 
misvaluation and market sentiment are examined.   
 
8.7.1 Re-estimation with transformed variables 
The model 8.1 regressions in table 8.8 were re-estimated with logarithmic 
transformations of SIGMA and DELAY (lnSIGMA and lnDELAY).  These unreported 
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results show larger F statistics on the RESET tests, lower AR
2
s (around 3%), higher SICs 
and the constants become significant.  The coefficient on MP variable continues to lack 
significance while the other independent variables have around the same levels of 
significance as those reported in table 8.8.  Therefore, the lack of significance for MP in 
the explanation of underpricing is insensitive to the use of transformed variables. 
 
Similarly, the model 8.2 regressions in table 8.9 were re-estimated with logarithmic 
transformations lnSIGMA and lnDELAY.  These unreported results show slightly lower 
AR
2
s (around 1%) and the SICs are slightly higher.  In contrast to the results for 
transformed variables in model 8.1, the F statistics on the RESET sets are similar to those 
reported in table 8.9 and the transformations do not result in significant coefficients on 
the constants for model 8.2.  The only change to the results is that DELAY no longer 
shows marginal significance with the MAUP dependent variables.  Therefore, the 
significant relationship between MV and underpricing is insensitive to the use of 
transformed variables. 
 
The transformed variables (lnDELAY and lnSIGMA) and the square root transformation 
of II% (sqrtII%)
172
 were used to re-estimate the MODEL 8.3 regressions.  With the 
exception of significant coefficients on the constants, results using transformed variables 
(unreported) are highly consistent with those presented in table 8.10.  AR
2
s are slightly 
lower (decreases of 1–2%) and, consistent with this, SICs are slightly higher.  The F 
statistics on the RESET tests increase slightly and show that the model specification 
errors are not attributable to non-linearities in DELAY, SIGMA or II%.   
 
The model 8.4 regressions were re-estimated with the transformed variables lnDELAY, 
lnSIGMA, lnHOTN
173
 and lnSIZE.  These unreported results show higher AR
2
s (around 
2.5%) and lower SICs than for the results reported in table 8.11.  Again, the RESET tests 
show the model specification errors are not attributable to non-linearities in DELAY, 
                                                 
172
 sqrtII% does not make a significant departure from the normal distribution (K-S = 0.840, p = 0.480) 
173
 As shown in table 8.6, the minimum value for HOTN in this sample is 2 so this variable is suitable for a 
logarithmic transformation.  lnHOTN is not significantly different from the normal distribution (K-S = 
1.246, p = 0.089) 
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SIGMA, HOTN or SIZE.   While the coefficient on MV remains highly significant, other 
independent variables are quite sensitive to the application of variable transformations.  
lnSIZE is significant with MVEBO variable and highly significant with MVPE.  While 
lnSIGMA is no longer significant with MVPE, it remains highly significant with MVEBO.  
In contrast, lnDELAY is highly significant with MVPE while and marginally significant 
with MVEBO.   
 
In summary, re-estimation of models 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 are insensitive to the substitution of 
transformed variables.  Results from the re-estimation of model 8.4, in contrast, exhibit 
sensitivity to the transformation of non-normal independent variables. 
 
8.7.2 Sensitivity to the proxy for value 
Results reported for models 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 are insensitive to changing the value proxy 
from VPE to VEBO.  Model 8.4, however, shows some sensitivity to a change in value 
proxy.  SIZE is significant with the MVPE variable while it lacks significance with MVEBO.  
SIGMA is significant with the MVPE while it is highly significant with the MVEBO 
variable.  Where MAUP is the dependent variable, DELAY is significant at the 
conventional level with MVPE as an independent variable while it shows only marginal 
significance with MVEBO50.  DELAY is not significant when RUP is the dependent 
variable.  Although it lacks significance at the conventional level, OWN also shows some 
sensitivity with marginal significance indicated with the MVEBO variables and none with 
MVPE.   
 
Therefore, it is concluded that the overall results for models 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 are robust to 
the changes in the measure of value.  The extended model of underpricing that includes 
MV as an independent variable (MODEL 8.4) does, however, show some sensitivity when 
the measure of value is changed.  As discussed in the following section, model 8.4 is also 
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8.7.3 Sensitivity to the specification of mispricing and misvaluation 
Consistent with the modelling of mispricing and misvaluation in chapters 6 and 7, dollar 
measures of MP and MV have been used in the primary testing for this chapter.  The 
robustness of results from the mispricing and misvaluation models to scaling the MP and 
MV dependent variables by offer price and market price respectively was discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7.  While these results were robust to the changes, the same sensitivity 
tests are now conducted for the four extended models of underpricing. 
8.7.3.1 Models 8.1 and 8.2 
As shown in section 8.7.1, some results for the extended models of underpricing are 
sensitive to the transformation of independent variables that do not follow a normal 
distribution.  Therefore, transformed variables are used in these robustness tests for 
models 8.1 and 8.2.  Table E.1 presents the results for the re-estimation of model 8.1 




s in table E.1 are lower (around 1-3%) than those reported in table 8.8 while the 
SICs are higher indicating that MP% specification does not improve the fit of the model.  
With the exception of the lower AR
2
s and the highly significant constants in all four 
regressions, the results from model 8.1 are robust to the change in specification of 
mispricing.  MP% is not significant in the explanation of underpricing.  The significant 
model specification errors identified in table 8.8 are also observed in table E.1.  
 
Table E.2 presents the results for the re-estimation of model 8.2 where misvaluation is 
specified as a percentage of listing price (MV%).  The AR
2
s in table E.2 are less than half 
those reported in table 8.8 and the SICs are higher, indicating the MV% specification of 
misvaluation results in lower explanatory power for underpricing.  The results for the 
independent variables are sensitive to the change in specification for misvaluation.   
 
The t-statistics on the MV% coefficients decrease and MVPE% is now only marginally 
significant with the RUP dependent variable while it is significant at the conventional 
level with MAUP.  MVEBO% shows marginal significance with the MAUP dependent 
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variable, but lacks significance with RUP.  lnDELAY is now significant at the 
conventional level with both measures of value and both measures of underpricing.  UW 
has become significant with MVEBO% and marginally significant with MVPE% where it is 
not significant in the table 8.9 regressions.  Again, all four regressions have significant 
model specification errors.  Where SIGMA is significant with MVPE in table 8.9, 
lnSIGMA is highly significant in table E.2.  Similarly, where OWN lacks significance 
with the dollar measure of misvaluation, own has marginal significance in three of the 
table E.2 regressions and is significant at the conventional level with MVEBO% and the 
MAUP dependent variable.   
 
While these results suggest that non-linear relationships for underpricing and some 
independent variables has a substantial impact on the results, they are not the cause of the 
sensitivity observed in table E.2.  The SICs using transformed variables and scaled MV 
are higher than those for untransformed variables (results unreported) and than those 
reported for table 8.9.  Therefore, in addition to the sensitivity of the model 8.2 results to 
the transformation of independent variables, they are also sensitive to the specification of 
misvaluation. 
8.7.3.2 Models 8.3 and 8.4 
Model 8.3 is re-estimated with the MP% independent variable and the results are 
presented in Table E.3.  As was the case for the re-estimation of models 8.1 and 8.2, 
models 8.3 and 8.4 are re-estimated with transformed variables. 
 
Results presented in table E.3 show that re-estimating MODEL 8.3 with MP% as the 
dependent variable, lnDELAY, lnSIGMA, sqrtII% and lnSIZE produces marginally lower 
AR
2
s compared to those in table 8.10.  The SICs are a little higher and the regression 
constants become significant.  The most notable change is the effect on the t-statistics for 
the transformed II% variable (sqrtII%) with MPPE%.  These increase to the conventional 
level of significance for RUP and to marginal significance with MAUP.  The sqrtII% 
variable is also marginally significant for MPEBO% and RUP, but not with MAUP.  The t-
statistics for the coefficients on UW increase.  The coefficients on UW were highly 
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significant in three of the table 8.10 regressions and are now highly significant in all four 
regressions.   
 
While the t-statistics on the coefficients for both measures of MP% and both the RUP and 
MAUP dependent variables, these continue to lack significance at the conventional level.   
This result is interesting in light of the significant relationship for MPPE% with both 
measures of underpricing and for MPEBO% with RUP reported in table E.1.  Given the 
highly significant correlations between MP% and MV%, it could indicate that the 
addition of II% and BULL to model 8.1 captures some of the effect of MP%.  Alternately, 
it could reflect measurement error or statistical deficiencies in the model given the 
sensitivity of results to the specification of mispricing.  RESET tests continue to indicate 
highly significant model specification error.    
 
Table E.4 presents results for model 8.4 with the MV% independent variable.  Again, the 
results for MV% and the ratio of V/P are the same and only the former are reported.  
Compared to the results for the model 8.4 regression presented in table 8.11, the results 
show sensitivity to the specification of the MV independent variable.  Most notably, the t-
statistics on coefficients for MV decline to the conventional level of significance for the 
MAUP dependent variables and the coefficients are now only marginally significant with 
RUP.  This result is in contrast to the highly significant bivariate relationship for MV and 
underpricing
174
.  SIZE is no longer significant when MVPE is scaled by market price, 
suggesting scale effects may be responsible for the significance of SIZE in table 8.11.   
 
While OWN continues to lack significance at the conventional level, the scaled 
specification of MV results in marginal significance for the coefficients on OWN with 
MVPE% while MVEBO% remains marginally significant.  UW is not significant in table 
8.11 but is marginally significant in three of the table E.4 regressions and is significant at 
the conventional level for MVEBO% where RUP is the dependent variable.  The 
coefficient on lnDELAY is now significant with MVPE% where it lacked significance in 
                                                 
174
 Spearman‟s rho for MVPE% and MAUP, for example is 0.359 (p = 0.000) while for MVEBO% and RUP 
rho is 0.288 (p = 0.000). 
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the table 8.11 regressions.  The AR
2
s reported in table E.4 are less than half those 
reported in table 8.11.  Correspondingly, the SICs are higher.  The Durban-Watson 
statistics fall within the indecision area for autocorrelation of residuals.  The F statistics 
on the RESET tests decline but these continue to identify significant model specification 
errors.     
 
As a further robustness test for the specification of MV and to facilitate comparison with 
prior literature, table E.5 (appendix E) presents results for model 8.3 with OP/V as the 
measure of mispricing.  Results in table E.5 are broadly consistent with those for the 
dollar amount of mispricing variable in table 8.10.  AR
2
s from table E.5 are slightly lower 
(by about 1-2%) and SICs are a little higher, indicating that the table 8.10 regressions 
provide a better fit to the data. In contrast to the constants from table 8.10, those in table 
E.5 regressions are highly significant.  The OP/V specification of mispricing is not 
significant.   
 
Mispricing (specified as OP/V) is not significant in the explanation of underpricing.  
Therefore, it is concluded that lack of significance for mispricing in the explanation of 
underpricing does not result from the way mispricing is specified.  The significant 
relationship for the OP to V ratio and underpricing reported by Cotter, Goyen and 
Hegarty (2005) and How, Lam and Yeo (2007) is not observed in this more recent 
sample.  The relationship of OP/V and underpricing may be sample-period specific.  
Support for this notion is provided by comparing the median VPE and VEBO reported by 
Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty to that for this sample
175
.  Median VPE lower in this sample 
($0.72 compared to $0.86) while median VEBO
176
 is higher ($0.87compared to $0.74).  
The estimation of both VPE and VEBO in this sample is consistent with that used by Cotter, 
Goyen and Hegarty. 
 
Table E.6 presents results for model 8.4 where misvaluation is specified as P/V.  Again, 
transformed variables (lnDELAY, lnSIGMA, lnHOTN and lnSIZE) are used in the model.  
                                                 
175
 How, Lam and Yeo do not report descriptive statistics for their measures of value. 
176
For consistency with Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty, the measure of VEBO used here reflects zero value for 
imputation credits. 
  248 
DELAY lacked significance with the RUP dependent variable and with MVEBO with 
MAUP in table 8.11.  Table E.6 reports lnDELAY is highly significant in all four 
regressions with misvaluation specified as P/V.  UW was not significant in the table 8.11 
regressions while it is now significant at the conventional level for the four regressions in 
table E.6.  Where SIZE is significant at the conventional level with MVPE in table 8.11, it 
is not significant in table E.6.  Compared to those reported for the dollar measure of 
misvaluation, results for OWN, SIGMA and HOTN are unchanged.  As was the case when 
misvaluation is specified as a percentage in table E.4, the AR
2
s in table E.6 are less than 
half those in table 8.11 and the SICs are correspondingly higher.   
 
Compared to the results for MV% in table E.4, AR
2
s are higher with the P/V specification 
of misvaluation.  The SICs in table E.6 are lower than those in table E.4, indicating that 
the P/V specification of misvaluation provides a better fit to the data than does MV%.  
Results reported in table E.4 are somewhat sensitive to the change in specification of 
misvaluation to P/V.  Most importantly, the t-statistics on the P/VEBO coefficients increase 
and misvaluation is now significant with the RUP dependent variable and remains 
significant with MAUP.  In contrast, the t-statistics on the P/VPE coefficients decrease and 
the VPE misvaluation proxy is no longer significant.  These results indicate sensitivity to 
the value proxy when misvaluation is specified as the ratio of price to value.   
 
The constants from regressions including P/VPE become highly significant while they 
continue to lack significance with P/VEBO.  lnDELAY is highly significant with P/V, while 
it is significant at the conventional level at best with the MV% specification of 
misvaluation.  The t-statistics on lnSIGMA fall with P/VPE and this variable is now 
significant at the conventional level rather than highly significant.  Conversely, the t-
statistics for OWN increase and this variable is significant at the conventional level with 
P/V.  Therefore, in addition to the significance of the misvaluation variable being reliant 
on the choice of value proxy, it is also sensitive to the choice of a dollar amount over 
scaled specifications.   
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In summary, results for MODEL 8.3 are robust to scaling the dollar amount of mispricing 
by offer price and to the choice of value proxy.  Mispricing is not significant for the 
explanation of underpricing in the multivariate context.  In contrast, model 8.4 shows 
sensitivity to changes in the specification of the misvaluation variable.  Further, the 
significance of the misvaluation variable is sensitive to the choice of value proxy with 
scaled specifications of misvaluation. 
 
8.7.4 Sensitivity to the market sentiment proxy 
The sensitivity of results to the proxy for market sentiment is investigated in this section.  
Table E.7 (appendix E) presents results for model 8.3 with the return on the market index 
for the two months prior to listing (RM2).  RM2 was included in the robustness tests of 
the misvaluation model in chapter 7.  AR
2
s are lower (by about 2%) than those for model 
8.3 shown in table 8.10 and the RESET tests continue to identify significant model 
specification error.   
 
Where BULL was highly significant for both dependent variables with both measures of 
mispricing, RM2 is highly significant only with the RUP dependent variable.  More 
noteworthy are the significant coefficients on RM2 where MAUP is the dependent 
variable.   MAUP is the initial return adjusted for the return on the market index over the 
delay period.  Therefore, RM2 was not expected to add explanatory power as an 
independent variable with the MAUP dependent variable.  Comparisons of the SICs from 
table E.7 to those from table 8.10 are also interesting.  While the SICs are lower where 
RUP is the dependent variable, they are slightly higher with MAUP.  This indicates more 
explanatory power for RM2 with RUP, while RM2 and BULL contribute around the same 
amount to the explanatory power for underpricing where MAUP is the dependent 
variable.   
 
As is the case for the model 8.3 results reported in table 8.10, DELAY, SIGMA and UW 
continue to be highly significant.  OWN, MP and II% continue to lack significance at the 
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conventional level
177
.   The robustness of the model 8.3 results to re-estimation with 
transformed independent variables was discussed in section 8.7.1.  Results for the re-
estimation regressions in table E.7 with transformed independent variables (results 
unreported) are also robust.  It is, therefore, concluded that the results of model 8.3 are 
largely robust to the proxy for market sentiment.    
 
8.8  Comparing results to prior research 
In this chapter, the explanatory power of the extended models of underpricing has been 
compared to that of the re-estimated baseline model.  Table 8.12 presents a summary of 
the extended models for comparison with prior Australian underpricing research.  Prior 
research typically reports logarithmic transformations for SIGMA and DELAY.  
Therefore, results from this study reported in table 8.12 are from regressions with 
transformed variables. 
 
The baseline model has the lowest explanatory power of any model in this chapter.  
These AR
2
s are higher than five of those reported in table 2.2 (see chapter 2) from prior 
Australian research [How (1996); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); Lee, Lee & Taylor 
(2003); Dimovski & Brooks (2004); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  While the baseline is 
developed from prior Australian research, it is constructed from a number of different 
studies and does not replicate any particular model.  
 
Model 8.3 with mispricing specified as OP/V is most similar to the models estimated by 
Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) and How, Lam and Yeo (2007).   The Cotter, Goyen 
and Hegarty model with MAUP as the dependent variable has a comparable AR
2
 (20.5%) 
to that reported for this specification of model 8.3.  Further, as their model has the same 
number of independent variables, SICs are less critical for meaningful comparison.  
Modelling raw underpricing and including the OP to VPE ratio, How, Lam and Yeo report 
                                                 
177
 In unreported results, model 8.3 with the MPPE% measure shows II% is significant for explaining RUP 
and highly significant when MAUP is the dependent variable.  II% continues to lack significance with the 
MPEBO50% variable. 
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a substantially lower AR
2
 (9.59%) than in observed for model 8.3 with this specification 
of mispricing (AR
2




s for chapter 8 underpricing models 
Panel A  Baseline model 
 
 Dependent variable AR
2
 SIC 
Baseline RUP 0.133 10.680 
 MAUP 0.138 10.645 
 
Panel B  Extended underpricing models 
 
  Dependent variable 
  RUP MAUP 





Model 8.1 VPE 0.135 10.702 0.139 10.666 
 VEBO 0.139 10.696 0.142 10.663 
Model 8.2 VPE 0.358 10.403 0.357 10.375 
 VEBO 0.362 10.396 0.369 10.356 
Model 8.3 (MP) VPE 0.221 10.642 0.205 10.632 
 VEBO 0.221 10.642 0.205 10.633 
Model 8.3 (MP%) VPE 0.149 10.685 0.148 10.656 
 VEBO 0.143 10.692 0.142 10.663 
Model 8.3 (0P/V) VPE 0.229 10.663 0.211 10.625 
 VEBO 0.223 10.640 0.208 10.628 
Model 8.4 (MV) VPE 0.412 10.362 0.403 10.347 
 VEBO 0.393 10.393 0.394 10.361 
Model 8.4 (MV%) VPE 0.148 10.686 0.150 10.684 
 VEBO 0.158 10.644 0.161 10.640 
 
Of the models using transformed variables, model 8.4 with the dollar measure of 
misvaluation has the highest AR
2
s and lowest SICs of all models in this chapter.  It also 
has greater explanatory power than those reported in prior Australian research.  How and 
Howe (2001) report the largest AR
2
s in an Australian published study with 30.3%.  This 
result is not directly comparable as the sample includes both industrial and mining IPOs.  
Further, the model includes 11 independent variables (eight of which lack significance) 
while model 8.4 includes seven.  It is difficult to make a meaningful comparison to How 
and Howe as they do not report the Schwarz information criterion.  Model 8.2 also has 
higher explanatory power than the models reported in table 2.2.   
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Although the MV% specification of misvaluation results in lower explanatory power than 
the dollar amount of misvaluation, model 8.4 with transformed variables and the MV% 
independent variable has higher explanatory power than 40% of the models in the extant 
literature [i.e.  How (1996); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); Lee, Lee & Taylor (2003); 
Dimovski & Brooks (2004); How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  Thus, comparison with prior 
literature indicates that the inclusion of misvaluation as an independent variable in a 
model of underpricing results in higher explanatory power for the model. 
  
8.9 Conclusions 
This chapter uses the insights gleaned from modelling mispricing and misvaluation to 
determine the extent to which issuer- and investor-related factors contribute to the 
explanation of underpricing.  Results from re-estimating the baseline model in this 
chapter show stronger relationships for underpricing and the independent variables than 
were observed in chapter 4.  Variables identified by the disaggregation of underpricing 
into mispricing and misvaluation are used to extend the baseline model.  When included 
with the baseline variables in model 8.1, the dollar amount of mispricing is not significant 
in the explanation of underpricing.  Results from robustness testing show some sensitivity 
to the specification of mispricing.  However, no significant relationships are reported for 
mispricing and underpricing.  It is therefore concluded that mispricing does not increase 
the explanatory power of the baseline model of underpricing. 
 
In contrast, the dollar measure of misvaluation (MV) is highly significant when included 
with the baseline variables.  This result is sensitive to the specification of misvaluation 
and, to a lesser extent, the choice of value proxy.  MVPE% is significant at the 
conventional level with the RUP dependent variable, while it is only marginally 
significant with MAUP.  MVEBO% is marginally significant with MAUP and lacks 
significance with RUP.  Therefore, evidence for the inclusion of misvaluation in the 
baseline model is somewhat mixed. 
 
Results from testing model 8.3 show that the level of general market sentiment is highly 
significant for the explanation of underpricing.  This result is robust to the choice of value 
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proxy, the use of transformed variables and the specification of the mispricing variable.  
An alternate proxy for market sentiment, RM2, confirms a significant relationship for 
market sentiment and underpricing.   
 
The model 8.4 regression results and robustness testing show the proxy for IPO market 
sentiment and market capitalisation relative to industry median market capitalisation are 
not significant for the explanation of underpricing.  The significance of the relationship 
between DELAY and underpricing is not robust to changes in the specification of 
misvaluation.  OWN and UW also show some sensitivities.  The dollar amount of 
misvaluation is again highly significant.  The percentage measures of misvaluation are 
significant for the explanation of market-adjusted underpricing while the relationship 
with raw underpricing is weak.  When misvaluation is specified as the price to value 
ratio, significant relationships with underpricing are only observed with the VEBO proxy 
for value.   
 
Comparison of the SICs confirms that the addition of the MP variable to the baseline 
model (with or without transformed variables) does not improve the explanatory power of 
the baseline model.  However, the lower SICs from the model 8.3 regressions indicate 
that inclusion of II% and BULL increase the explanatory power of the baseline model.  
SICs from the model 8.4 regressions are lower than are reported for model 8.3 indicating 
the former has higher explanatory power.  Model 8.4 has the lowest SICs for MAUP, 
indicating this model provides the highest explanatory power for market adjusted 
underpricing
178
.  SICs from model 8.2 are the lowest reported for the models in this 
chapter where RUP is the dependent variable.  This indicates that the baseline model with 
the addition of the misvaluation variable has the greatest explanatory power for raw 
underpricing.   
 
Therefore, it is concluded that the disaggregation of underpricing does contribute to the 
explanation of the underpricing.  Unexpectedly, and in contrast to the results from prior 
                                                 
178
 Although the HOTN and SIZE variables are not significant, the t-statistics are greater than one so they 
increase the AR
2
 (Gujarati, 2003) 
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research, mispricing does not have incremental explanatory power over the baseline 
variables.  Further, variables that are significant for the explanation of mispricing (the 
level of IPO market sentiment and the size of the IPO relative to industry median market 
capitalisation) do not contribute to the explanation of underpricing.   
 
While there is evidence that misvaluation contributes to the explanation of underpricing, 
it is somewhat sensitive to the way in which misvaluation is specified.  One variable that 
is significant in the explanation of misvaluation (the level of general market sentiment) 
does contribute to the explanation of underpricing.  With the re-aggregation of the 
mispricing and misvaluation variables now complete, the next chapter offers conclusions. 
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This chapter presents the overall conclusions of the research and discusses the 
contributions made to the literature.  Results from the baseline model (chapter 4) and the 
disaggregation of underpricing via modelling mispricing (chapter 6) and misvaluation 
(chapter 7) are summarised.  Implications from the inclusion of additional variables based 
on these results in the extended models of underpricing (chapter 8) are then discussed.  
Section 9.2 presents conclusions about the hypotheses.  Section 9.3 draws conclusions 
about the research question identified in chapter 1, while the contributions to knowledge 
are presented in section 9.4.  The potential limitations of the research are identified in 
section 9.5 and possible areas for further research are described in the final section. 
 
9.2 Hypothesised and empirical relationships 
This section summarises the results from testing the four hypotheses that address the 
research sub-questions articulated in chapter 1.  Reflections on these results are also 
presented. 
 
9.2.1 Baseline underpricing model 
Prior to assessing the contribution from the disaggregation of underpricing, it is first 
necessary to establish the explanatory power of a „current state‟ underpricing model.  
Therefore, the first research sub-question asks:  which factors explain underpricing in 
Australia?  This issue is addressed by evaluating extant Australian underpricing research 
and identifying empirical regularities in the explanation of underpricing in an Australian 
sample of fixed-price industrial IPOs.  The first hypothesis is: 
 
H01 Underpricing in Australia is unrelated to time from prospectus issue  
to listing, the level of retained ownership, ex ante uncertainty, the  
participation of an underwriter and the inclusion of options at floatation. 
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The hypothesised positive relationships are confirmed for the level of ex ante uncertainty 
(SIGMA) and underwriter participation (UW).  The time from prospectus issue to listing 
(DELAY) has the hypothesised negative coefficient but the relationship with underpricing 
is, in contrast to much prior research, surprisingly weak.  Underwriter participation (UW) 
shows a positive relationship with underpricing.  Consistent with most prior Australian 
underpricing research, the level of ex ante uncertainty (SIGMA) is significant while the 
level of retained ownership (OWN) is unrelated to underpricing.     
 
No directional relationship for the dichotomous variable indicating packaged issues 
(OPT) was predicted.  OPT shows a highly significant negative relationship with raw 
underpricing (RUP) and market-adjusted underpricing (MAUP).  However, when the 
underpricing measure includes the return on options (PUP), OPT is no longer significant.  
Thus, the significant negative relationship with RUP and MAUP is attributed to 
measurement error (i.e. ignoring the return on options) in the dependent variable.  The 
highest AR
2
 (0.122) is reported with MAUP as the dependent variable while the lowest 
(0.100) is observed with PUP.  The low explanatory power of the baseline model 
indicates further research into the underpricing phenomenon is warranted. 
 
The previously discussed results relate to a sample of 496 industrial fixed-price IPOs that 
have not been screened for management earnings forecasts disclosures.  As the proxies 
for intrinsic value rely on management earnings forecasts, the baseline model is re-
estimated on a sample of 180 IPOs that disclose these data.  The re-estimation of the 
baseline model of underpricing shows a better fit for the earnings forecaster sub-sample 
than was reported for the larger sample.  DELAY, for example, is not significant at the 
conventional level in the full sample while it is highly significant in the sample of 
earnings forecasters.  Earnings forecasters take less time to list than non-forecasters and 
the speed at which they list has a negative and significant relationship with underpricing.  
The re-estimated baseline provides the basis for assessing the contribution of mispricing 
and misvaluation variables to the explanation of underpricing. 
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9.2.2 Mispricing model 
The second research sub-question asks:  which factors determine the level of IPO 
mispricing?  Potential explanatory factors for mispricing are identified from domestic and 
international underpricing literature.  The second hypothesis is: 
 
HO2 Mispricing in Australia is unrelated to the desired post-listing ownership 
structure, the wealth loss to owners, the disclosed share allocation policy  
and the state of the IPO market. 
 
The state of the IPO market is proxied by the number of IPOs listing in the quarter 
preceding the prospectus date (HOTN).  HOTN has the predicted positive relationship 
with MP, indicating that issuers exploit IPO market sentiment by setting offer prices in 
excess of value.  Proxies for the post-listing ownership structure (HOLDERS), wealth loss 
to owners (PTN and DTN) and the disclosed allocation policy (ALLOC) are unrelated to 
mispricing.  These results are robust to varying the proxy for wealth loss to owners, a 
narrower definition of underwriter participation in the allocation process and to the 
replacement of the ALLOC variable with a dichotomous underwriter variable. 
 
No directional relationship for the control variable, IPO market capitalisation relative to 
industry median market capitalisation (SIZE), was predicted.  A highly significant 
positive relationship is observed, indicating that larger IPO firms have more positive 
mispricing.  This result is robust when controls for scale effects are considered. A second 
control variable that proxies for growth options (GROWTH) is unrelated to mispricing.   
 
Alternate proxies for value are used to determine the MP dependent variable.  The first of 
these is estimated using the comparable firms PE approach while the second is derived 
from the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson (EBO) model.  Results are reasonably insensitive to the 
choice of value proxy, suggesting both estimates capture intrinsic value.  Further, three 
EBO value proxies are developed based on differing assumptions about the value of 
dividend imputation credits.  Broadly speaking, results are insensitive to changing the 
assumed value of imputation credits.  Therefore, dividend imputation credits do not 
appear to exert a significant influence on IPO mispricing.   
  258 
AR
2
s for the MP model range from 0.204 (where MPEBO0 is the dependent variable) to 
0.253 for the MPPE dependent variable.  Ramsey RESET tests show no significant model 
specification errors for the MPEBO dependent variables.  There is significant model 
specification error for the MPPE dependent variable.  These errors are attributed to non-
linear relationships for some of the independent variables as they are resolved when the 
model is re-estimated with transformed variables.  While lower AR
2
s are reported when 
the dependent variables are scaled by offer price, results for independent variables are 
robust to this change.  
 
9.2.3 Misvaluation model 
The third research sub-question asks:  which factors determine the level of IPO 
misvaluation?  The third hypothesis is developed from extant signalling and behavioural 
theories. 
 
HO3 Misvaluation in Australia is unrelated to the demand for the issue,  
the speculative nature of the issue, the participation of institutional 
investors, the participation of an underwriter, the level of retained  
ownership, the level of mispricing and the level of IPO market sentiment. 
 
The results indicate that MP is the primary factor for the explanation of misvaluation 
(MV).  Thus, issues that experience more positive mispricing also tend to be overvalued 
in the market. An indirect proxy for the level of oversubscription (media reports) 
represents the level of demand for the issue.  Bivariate tests show highly significant 
relationships for oversubscription (OS) and the misvaluation proxies.  However, OS is 
unrelated to misvaluation in the multivariate context.  This somewhat surprising result is 
attributed to other independent variables subsuming the effect of oversubscription.  Also 
contrary to expectations, the speculative nature of an issue (SPEC), the number of 
participating institutional investors (II), underwriting (UW), the level of retained 
ownership (OWN) and the level of IPO market sentiment (HOTU) are unrelated to 
misvaluation.   
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Robustness testing reveals that the percentage of institutional investor participation 
identified from the Top 20 shareholder disclosure (II%) is a more informative measure 
than the number of participating institutions (II) as the former is marginally significant in 
the explanation of MV.  Changing the proxy for IPO market sentiment to the number of 
industrial IPOs in the quarter preceding prospectus date does not affect the results.  
However, replacing the IPO market sentiment variable with proxies for general market 
sentiment show sentiment does have a role to play in misvaluation.  Highly significant 
coefficients are reported when the return on the All Ordinaries index for two months prior 
to listing (RM2) or an indicator variable for bull markets (BULL) is included in the 
model. 
 
While the primary tests show SIZE exhibits the expected positive relationship with MV, 
sensitivity testing suggests that this result is attributable to scale effects.  The second 
control variable, GROWTH, is unrelated to misvaluation.  AR
2
s for the MV model are 
high, ranging from around 0.580 for the MVEBO dependent variables to 0.609 for the 
MPPE dependent variable.  Ramsey RESET tests show no significant model specification 
error.  The high AR
2
s are attributed to the strong positive correlation between MP and MV 
as variance inflation factors do not indicate a problem with multicollinearity.  As was the 
case for the mispricing model, results do not depend on the value proxy used to estimate 
the MV dependent variable.  With the exception of reduced t-statistics on the coefficients 
for SIZE, the results are also robust to scaling the dependent variable by market price. 
 
9.2.4 Extended underpricing models 
The fourth research sub-question asks:  to what extent do issuer-related mispricing and 
investor-related misvaluation factors contribute to the explanation of underpricing?  The 
fourth hypothesis is used to investigate the incremental explanatory power of mispricing 
and misevaluation variables. 
 
HO4 The explanatory power of the baseline model of underpricing is  
not increased when mispricing and misvaluation factors are added. 
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Analysis of results in chapter 8 indicates that investor-related factors are the primary 
drivers of underpricing.   
  
Insights gleaned from modelling mispricing and misvaluation are incorporated into the 
baseline underpricing model.  By definition, the sum of dollar mispricing and 
misvaluation equals the dollar amount of underpricing.  High correlations between MP 
and MV are expected and observed, precluding the inclusion of both of these variables in 
the same model of underpricing.  Therefore, the incremental contribution to the 
explanation of underpricing is first assessed adding either MP or MV to the baseline 
model. The underpricing model with mispricing is then further extended by adding two 
independent variables associated with misvaluation.  Similarly, the underpricing model 
with misvaluation is further extended by adding the two significant independent variables 
from the mispricing model. 
 
In contrast to expectations and to results from prior research, mispricing is not significant 
in the explanation of underpricing.  Incorporating factors representing misvaluation with 
MP and the baseline variables in model 8.3 shows the general market sentiment (BULL) 
is highly significant while the proportion of institutional investors identified from the Top 
20 disclosure (II%) receiving large allocations in the issue does not contribute to the 
explanation of underpricing.  The baseline model variables (DELAY, OWN, SIGMA and 
UW) continue to show significant relationships that are in the expected directions, 
although OWN shows some sensitivity with different measures of MP. 
 
The addition of MV (the dollar measure of misvaluation) to the baseline variables shows 
this variable has a positive and highly significant association with underpricing.  The 
strength of the associations between the baseline variables (DELAY, OWN and UW) and 
underpricing is weakened.  OWN and UW are not significant using either value proxy or 
either measure of underpricing.  DELAY is significant only with VPE and MAUP as the 
dependent variable.  SIGMA, however, continues to make a significant contribution to the 
explanation of underpricing. 
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MV remains significant when the variables representing mispricing are included in model 
8.4.  Consistent with the lack of association between MP and underpricing, the 
representative variables for mispricing (HOTN and SIZE) are not significant.  Model 8.4 
is sensitive to the specification of MV with only weak relationships reported for RUP 
with misvaluation scaled by market price (MV%) and no relationship with the ratio of 
market price to value (P/V).  Significant relationships are observed with MV% and 
MAUP, and for P/VEBO and both measures of underpricing.  Extended models of 
underpricing that include MV as an independent variable have greater explanatory power 
than those including MP and than those in the prior literature.  Overall, the results 
provide evidence of a relationship between misvaluation and underpricing. 
 
9.3 Issuer- and investor-related influences on underpricing 
The primary research question in this dissertation asks:  is underpricing due to mispricing 
(i.e. issuer-related factors), misvaluation (i.e. investor-related factors) or a combination of 
these?  Misvaluation has a significant positive correlation with underpricing and, when 
measured as a dollar amount, is highly significant in multivariate models.  Tests of model 
8.3 reveal the proportion of institutional investors identified from the Top 20 disclosure 
(II%) is not associated with underpricing.  This result suggests misvaluation is primarily 
attributable to individual investors.  While some prior literature provides evidence that 
sophisticated investors are not immune to the effects of market sentiment [c.f. Verma, 
Baklaci & Soydemir (2008)], the majority of researchers consider that individual 
investors are most influenced by sentiment [c.f. Barber, Odean & Zhu (2005); Brown & 
Cliff (2005); Kumar & Lee (2006)].  Combined with the lack of significance for II%, the 
highly significant relationship of BULL and underpricing provides evidence that 
individuals are largely responsible for the misvaluation of Australian fixed-price 
industrial IPOs.  Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) argue that institutions participate in 
IPOs to exploit sentiment (individual) investors.  Support for this argument would be 
provided by a positive significant coefficient on II%.  Therefore, the results in this 
dissertation do not provide evidence of the exploitation of individual investors by 
institutional investors. 
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Mispricing is uncorrelated with underpricing and lacks significance in the multivariate 
models.  Using Australian data, Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty (2005) and How, Lam and 
Yeo (2007) report a negative relationship for their measure of mispricing (OP/V).  This 
relationship may be sample-period specific.  Comparison of the medians for the value 
proxies reported in Cotter, Goyen and Hegarty shows higher VPE and lower VEBO for the 
sample in this dissertation
179
.  The result for mispricing is insensitive when model 8.3 is 
re-estimated with this specification of MP.  Further, while HOTN and SIZE are 
significant for the explanation of mispricing
180
, they are unrelated to underpricing.   
 
Therefore, the analysis conducted in this dissertation provides evidence that underpricing 
is determined by investor- rather than issuer- related factors in the fixed-price context.  
IPOs are more underpriced during bull-market phases and issuers increase mispricing 
when IPO markets are hot.  This result is consistent with a feedback loop with issuers 
increasing offer price relative to value on the expectation that investors will be willing to 
pay relatively more for companies listing during bull markets.  While the level of IPO 
market sentiment is significant in the explanation of mispricing, the median amount of 
mispricing is small (about 4%) compared to the median amount of underpricing (10-
12%).  This indicates that the main influence of market sentiment on underpricing is via 
the listing price. 
 
9.4 Contributions 
This research makes eight major contributions to the extant literature.  The main 
contribution of the research in this dissertation is the capacity to determine separately the 
component of underpricing attributable to issuer-related factors and that attributable to 
investor-related factors.  With the few exceptions discussed below, underpricing research 
is predicated on the notion that market price (P) reflects intrinsic value (V).  The 
difference between offer price and P represents mispricing under this paradigm.  When P 
is not assumed to be the appropriate measure of V, underpricing includes components 
                                                 
179
 The VPE and VEBO measures in this research are directly comparable to those in Cotter, Goyen & 
Hegarty.  How, Lam and Yeo do not report descriptive statistics for their value measures. 
180
 SIZE is significant with the MPPE variable in model 8.3.  This relationship is no longer observed when 
MPPE is scaled by offer price, suggesting that the significance of SIZE can be attributed to scale effects.  
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potentially attributable to both mispricing (offer price does not equal value) and 
misvaluation (market price does not equal value).  The Australian fixed-price setting 
facilitates the estimation of intrinsic value without reliance on investors‟ valuations or on 
the earnings and capital structure prior to the IPO.    
 
The second and third main contributions of this research relate to the development and 
testing of the first models of mispricing and misvaluation.  The mispricing model is 
grounded in the literature with the identification of previously hypothesised issuer-related 
underpricing factors.  The model incorporates underpricing variables from theories of 
ownership and control [c.f. Brennan & Franks (1997); Pham, Kalev & Steen (2003)], the 
wealth loss to owners theory (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001), agency theory (c.f. Benveniste 
& Spindt, 1989) and the exploitation of investor optimism (Rajan & Servaes, 1997). 
 
The misvaluation model is also grounded in the literature with the identification of 
previously hypothesised investor-related underpricing factors.  The model incorporates 
underpricing variables from asymmetric information theories [ex ante uncertainty: c.f. 
Beatty & Ritter (1986) and signalling: c.f. Leyland & Pyle (1977) and Carter & Manaster 
(1990)], noise trader behaviour (Lee, 2001) and the exploitation of individual investor 
sentiment by institutional investors (Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh, 2006).   
 
The fourth major contribution of in this dissertation is the exploration of the relationships 
between mispricing, misvaluation and underpricing.  While five prior published studies 
investigate the relationship between mispricing and underpricing, the results are 
equivocal.  A positive association between mispricing and initial returns is reported for 
French data (Derrien, 2005) and for US data (Purnanandam & Swaminathan, 2004).  
After making methodological corrections to Purnanandam and Swaminathan, Zheng 
(2007) reports that US issues are not mispriced.  Mispricing has a negative relationship 
with initial return in the Australian fixed-price setting [Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); 
How, Lam & Yeo (2007)].  Consistent with Zheng (2007), this research provides 
evidence that mispricing is unrelated to underpricing.  
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Results in this dissertation provide the first evidence on the relationships between 
mispricing and misvaluation and between misvaluation and underpricing.  Mispricing has 
a strong positive relationship with misvaluation, as expected.  However, as discussed in 
section 9.3, investor-related factors are more important for the explanation of 
underpricing than issuer-related factors.  The explanatory power of models including an 
independent variable that captures misvaluation is substantially higher than any 
previously published Australian underpricing study.  The extant underpricing literature 
has its focus on issuer-related factors and, after considerable efforts in this direction, the 
underpricing puzzle has remained unresolved.  The important implication from this 
dissertation is that a change of focus from issuer- to investor-related underpricing factors 
is required to increase understanding of the phenomenon.   
 
Documentation of the Australian institutional setting is the fifth major contribution of this 
research.  The identification of institutional features that facilitate the disaggregation of 
underpricing is important as it will assist international researchers to identify other 
markets where issuer- and investor-related factors can be tested separately.  Further,   
differences in institutional settings in these markets could also contribute to the 
understanding of mispricing and misvaluation factors.  Comparisons of the levels of 
mispricing in markets where earnings forecasts are mandated disclosure or where there 
are legal restrictions on allocation methods, for example, may be able to shed light on 
issuer-related underpricing factors. 
 
The comparison of the Australian and US institutional settings contributes to the 
literature by identifying some implications for the application of US underpricing 
theories and models in the Australian context.  These features include the pricing 
mechanism, lower underwriter incentives to misprice, lack of price support, lack of a 
prescribed allocation mechanism, the allocation of shares to individual investors, the 
clear identification of speculative issues and the voluntary provision of management 
earnings forecasts.  Cognisance of these institutional differences will assist researchers in 
the selection of appropriate theories developed in other settings for testing with 
Australian data.  
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The sixth major contribution is the Australian baseline underpricing model.  This model 
represents a consolidation of prior Australian models.  The independent variables are 
selected for their previously demonstrated explanatory power for underpricing.  The 
baseline model can be used in future research to assess the incremental impact of 
additional factors to the „core‟ underpricing variables.  The baseline model also suggests 
two implications for future research.  First, while the relationships for other explanatory 
variables are insensitive to the application of a market adjustment to the dependent 
variable, the negative relationship of a dichotomous variable for packaged issues is a 
function of measurement error in the dependent variable.  Second, the relationships for 
the independent variables are substantially stronger when the sample is limited to IPOs 
providing management earnings forecasts.  This indicates sample composition is a crucial 
consideration when comparing the results of prior studies. 
 
Evidence that market sentiment is an explanatory factor for both mispricing and 
misvaluation in the fixed-price setting is the seventh major contribution to the IPO 
literature.  IPO market sentiment has a strong positive association with mispricing while 
general market sentiment has a strong positive association with misvaluation and 
underpricing. This finding has an important implication for international research in the 
bookbuild setting – offer prices will be higher when market sentiment is high, but some 
of this effect could be attributable to higher price ranges established by issuers during 
these periods.   
 
The final major contribution to the underpricing literature is evidence on the role of 
institutional investors in the fixed-price setting.  A recent stream of the underpricing 
literature investigates the relative roles of institutional and individual investors [c.f. 
Derrien (2005); Ljungqvist, Nanda & Singh (2006); Ellul & Pagano (2006)].  The 
fundamental premise in this literature is that institutional investors hold IPO shares in hot 
markets to exploit the presence of irrationally-exuberant investors after listing. This 
dissertation provides some contrary evidence showing that II% is uncorrelated with the 
IPO market sentiment proxy (HOTN).  Further, II% follows the same distribution in bull 
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and bear markets.  Therefore, the investment decisions of institutions participating in 
Australian fixed-price IPOs do not appear to be affected by market sentiment.  
Considering this result in light of those of research conducted with bookbuild IPOs, this 
result suggests the pricing mechanism is important in determining the capacity for 
institutional investors to influence underpricing. 
 
With discussion of the major contributions from this research now complete, the 
remainder of this section presents further contributions.  These relate to evidence on 
theories of underpricing provided by tests of key variables in the mispricing and 
misvaluation models, the investigation of demand proxies and the participation of 
institutional investors.  These contributions are discussed in turn below.  
  
This research contributes to the ownership and control IPO literature.  Several theories 
[c.f. Mello & Parsons (1998); Stoughton & Zechner (1998); Pham, Kalev & Steen 
(2003)] predict that post-listing ownership structure and liquidity requirements are 
associated with underpricing.  Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003) report that Australian 
issuers use underpricing (i.e. they misprice) to achieve a diffuse ownership structure.  In 
the sample used for this dissertation, the participation rate of vendors (PTN) and the 
dilution of ownership (DTN) have significant correlations with MPPE.  However, the 
results in chapter 6 show DTN and PTN are unrelated to mispricing in multivariate 
models.  Further, mispricing does not have a significant correlation with the level of 
retained ownership indicating that issuers do not vary the level of mispricing with the 
proportion of the company they are selling. 
 
A contribution is also made to the signalling literature.  The level of retained ownership is 
hypothesised as a costly signal of firm quality [Leyland & Pyle (1977); Chemmanur & 
Fulghieri (1997)].  The proportion of post-listing shares retained by issuers (OWN) is 
expected to have a negative association with underpricing.  While OWN does not 
contribute to the explanation of underpricing in the full sample, it has a positive 
coefficient in the re-estimation of the baseline using the earnings forecaster sub-sample.  
This result suggests the provision of an earnings forecast strengthens any signal provided 
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by OWN.  However, the highly significant negative correlation for OWN and II% 
suggests that the relationship of OWN and underpricing is a function of the level of 
institutional investor participation rather than an effective signal.  OWN is not significant 
in the explanation of misvaluation. 
 
This research also contributes to the asymmetric information theories of ex ante 
uncertainty where issuers and their advisors are assumed to have greater knowledge about 
the value of the firm.  Speculative issues are expected to have higher levels of ex ante 
uncertainty (Beatty & Ritter, 1986).  Proxies for the speculative nature of an issue include 
issue proceeds [c.f. Beatty & Ritter (1986); Tinic (1988)] and the number of risk factors 
disclosed in the prospectus [c.f. Beatty & Ritter (1986); Dalton, Certo & Daily (2003); 
Reber, Berry, & Toms (2005); Chang et al. (2008)].  Clear identification of speculative 
issues is required for Canadian IPOs.  Using this direct indicator, Jog and McConomy 
(2003) do not find a significant relationship with underpricing.  As the speculative nature 
of the issue is unrelated to misvaluation, results in this dissertation indicate that 
Australian investors do not experience greater difficulty when valuing fixed-price offers. 
 
Evidence on potential agency conflict as a cause of underpricing is a further contribution 
to the literature.  Ritter and Welch (2002) identify investigation of the allocation process 
as a potentially fruitful avenue for underpricing research.  While Australian issuers are 
free to choose the allocation method, the data collected for this research show less than 
one percent of earnings forecasters specify a method not involving issuer discretion.  
Agency conflict arises when underwriters allocate shares to achieve their objectives 
rather than those of the issuer   [Benveniste & Spindt (1989); Lee, Taylor & Walter 
(1996); Sherman (2000); Ljungqvist & Wilhelm (2002); Loughran & Ritter (2002); 
Sherman & Titman (2002); Jenkinson & Jones (2006); Reuter (2006); Nimalendran, 
Ritter & Zhang (2007)].  This agency argument predicts underwriters will allocate issues 
with negative mispricing to preferred clients when they participate in the allocation 
process. Results in this dissertation show that underwriter participation in the allocation 
process is unrelated to the level of mispricing.  Further, underwriter participation in the 
issue is also unrelated to mispricing. 
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Finally, this research contributes specifically to Australian underpricing literature with 
evidence on the role of informed demand and the general level of demand in the 
explanation of underpricing.  Much prior research has investigated the role of informed 
demand in the Australian context.  The time from prospectus date to listing (DELAY) is 
hypothesised as a proxy for informed demand [Finn & Higham (1988); How, Izan & 
Monroe (1995); How (1996); Lee, Taylor & Walter (1996); How & Howe (2001); Lee, 
Lee & Taylor (2003); Cotter, Goyen & Hegarty (2005); How, Lam and Yeo (2007)].  It 
was expected that the inclusion of an institutional investor participation (II%) proxy with 
DELAY in model 8.3 would decrease the t-statistics on the latter.  DELAY, however, 
continues to be highly significant.   
 
The first potential explanation for this result is that the proportion of institutional 
investors represented in the Top 20 shareholder disclosures is a poor proxy for the level 
of informed demand for IPOs.  This explanation is not compelling as II% is the more 
direct measure of institutional investor participation.  The second and more plausible 
explanation is that DELAY captures more than the level of informed demand.  DELAY 
could reasonably be expected to indicate the total level of demand for an issue rather than 
simply the level of informed demand.  Results in this dissertation indicate that II% rather 
than DELAY should be used in future tests of Rock‟s winners‟ curse conducted in the 
Australian setting. 
 
Subscription data has been examined in Singapore (Lee, Taylor & Walter, 1999), 
Malaysia (Jelic, Saadouni & Briston, 2001) and Europe (Jenkinson & Jones, 2006) and 
these results indicate a positive association for oversubscription and underpricing.  
Primary subscription data are not available for Australian IPOs so a proxy for excess 
demand (OS) is determined by reference to media reports.  OS does not have a 
relationship with misvaluation. 
 
9.5 Limitations 
Six limitations for this research are identified in this section.  These include the 
assumption that issuers and investors use earnings-based models to determine IPO value; 
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the endogeneity of the decision to provide management earnings forecasts; potential bias 
in management earnings forecasts; lack of an explicit assessment of growth in the value 
proxies; the dominance of bull market phases during the sample period; and the absence 
of a single industry classification system for the sample period. 
 
The reliance on earnings-based valuation models represents a limitation for this research.  
At the most fundamental level, the requirement for disclosure of an earnings forecast 
constrains the sample size.  Further, earnings-based models provide suitable proxies for 
value only when investors use forecast earnings in their investment decisions and when 
issuers use future earnings to establish offer price.  As discussed in chapter 5, relatively 
fewer issuers disclose forecast dividends in their prospectuses.  It is difficult to see how 
investors would be in a better position than issuers to make the reliable dividend forecasts 
required for implementation of the dividend discount model.  Forecasting future free-cash 
flows would provide issuers and investors with an even greater challenge.  Further, if 
investors are valuing IPOs with their own forecasts of future dividends or free-cash 
flows, such forecasts are not available for academic research.  
 
As discussed earlier, the results for the mispricing and misvaluation models are robust to 
the choice of value proxy used to estimate the dependent variables.  The use of two 
methods (VPE and VEBO) for establishing value protects this research from limitations 
arising from the reliance on one particular model.  However, management earnings 
forecasts are the common component for both proxies for value.  Therefore, any potential 
bias in management earnings forecasts presents a limitation for this research. 
 
Second, IPO literature relating to the provision of management earnings forecasts reveals 
some systematic differences in the characteristics of earnings forecasters.  Jog and 
McConomy (2003), for example, note the potential self-selection bias in a sample of 
earnings forecasters as the decision to forecast is endogenous.  The comparable firms PE 
and EBO valuation models applied in this dissertation can only be implemented with 
IPOs that provide earnings forecasts.  Thus, these results may not be generalisable to 
IPOs that do not forecast earnings.   
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Third, investigating the forecast accuracy of dividends and earnings disclosed in 
Australian prospectuses from 1984 to 1997, Brown et al. (2000) find earnings forecasts 
are optimistically biased. They report that 54% of earnings forecasts are „over-predicted‟, 
1% are correctly predicted and 45% are „under-predicted‟.  Using the 1991-97 sub-
sample of the Brown et al. (2000) research, How and Yeo (2001) find 59% of forecasts 
are over-predicted.  Chapple, Clarkson and Peters (2005) also report a significant over-
optimistic bias in forecast errors in their 1998 to 2002 sample.   
 
While the majority of earnings forecasts are optimistic (i.e. 54% reported by Brown et al. 
and 59% reported by How and Yeo), the proportion of pessimistic forecasts (i.e. 45% in 
Brown et al. and 41% in How and Yeo) is non-trivial.  As the forecast bias cannot be 
determined ex ante, it is not clear that a simple deflation of all forecasts by the mean 
forecast error would improve the integrity of the data.  The disparate means and medians 
of forecast errors reported
181
 suggest asymmetric distributions that will invalidate any 
adjustment using the average forecast errors from prior studies. Therefore, no attempt has 
been made to adjust management earnings forecasts when estimating value.   
 
Fourth, the absence of firm-specific growth rates was identified in chapter 7 as a likely 
source of bias in the VPE and VEBO measures of value.  It was argued that evidence of bias 
arising from the omission of growth in the value estimates would be provided by 
significant coefficients on GROWTH in the models of mispricing and misvaluation.  
These coefficients were not significant and it was concluded that growth prospects do not 
represent a source of bias in VPE and VEBO.  While these results eliminate the most likely 
potential source of bias in the estimation of V, they do not preclude some other 
unidentified systematic sources of bias.   
 
The dominance of bull market phases in this sample presents a further limitation.    Brau, 
Ryan and DeGraw (2006) find larger IPOs and growth companies prefer to list during 
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 Chapple, Clarkson & Peters (2005) report mean and median forecast errors as 3.737 and 0.0119 
respectively.  Their mean and median absolute forecast errors are 4.062 and 0.381.  How & Yeo (2001) 
report mean and median absolute forecast errors of 5.95 and 2.63, while mean and median forecast errors 
are -1.19 and 1.51 respectively. 
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bull markets, while liquidity considerations dominate bear markets.  Valuation ratios for 
comparable firms exhibit an upward bias in bull markets (Coakley & Fuertes, 2006).  
Consistent results from VPE and VEBO proxies in the mispricing and misvaluation models 
suggest general overvaluation in the market does not have a substantial influence on the 
results in this research.  As noted in chapter 7, 76% of sample issues are made during the 
two bull market phases.  Bull market phases are present in sharemarket more than half 
(54%) the time (Coakley & Fuertes, 2006) and relatively fewer IPOs are offered during 
bear markets (see figure 3.1 – number of listings on the ASX, 1976-2006 and table 3.1).  
Therefore, this limitation is inherent to all underpricing studies spanning a number of 
market cycles. 
 
The final limitation discussed relates to the lack of an industry classification system that 
spans the entire sample period.  As noted in chapter 5, there are some substantial 
differences between the ASX industry classifications and the GICS system.  These 
differences preclude meaningful comparison of sample firms on the basis of industry.  
Further, the absence of a single classification could potentially result in identical firms 
classified with different industry membership contingent only on listing date.   
 
9.5 Further research 
In addition to the previous recommendation for a shift in focus of underpricing research 
from issuer- to investor-related factors, several suggestions for further research are 
provided in this section.  First, while underwriter participation in an issue is associated 
with higher underpricing, it is not associated with either mispricing or misvaluation.  This 
result is puzzling as some researchers posit that underpricing arises as a result of 
underwriter self-interest [c.f. Baron (1982); Loughran & Ritter (2002)] while others 
consider that underwriters are engaged to provide a signal of issue quality [c.f. Beatty & 
Ritter (1986); Carter & Manaster (1990); Helou & Park (2001); Reber, Berry & Toms 
(2005); Brau & Fawcett (2006)].   
 
Results for the underwriter variable are sensitive to the specification of misvaluation and 
the value proxy used to determine misvaluation.  RESET tests for the extended models of 
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underpricing report significant model misspecification, suggesting these continue to omit 
explanatory variables.  The significant relationship between underwriter participation and 
the underpricing of earnings forecasters is most likely attributable to these omitted 
variables or to the endogenous decision to engage an underwriter.  Provided the results 
from the disaggregation of underpricing are not driven by potential biases in earnings 
forecasts that invalidate the measures of value, they suggest further research into the role 
of underwriters in the fixed-price setting and the endogeneity of the choice to engage an 
underwriter as potentially fruitful. 
 
Second, potential biases in management earnings forecasts may provide a productive 
avenue for future research.  Comparative analysis of management forecasts and analyst 
forecasts and the impact of the forecast source on IPO valuation could shed light on the 
importance of any bias in management forecasts.  Further, US research predominantly 
uses historic earnings and pre-listing capital structures.  The prevalence of management 
earnings forecasts in Australian prospectuses would allow an assessment of the impact of 
the use of historic data in IPO valuation. 
 
Finally, verification of the results in this research could be achieved by replication in 
different markets where issuers also choose the fixed-pricing mechanism.  The mispricing 
and misvaluation models could also be tested in the bookbuild setting to gain greater 
understanding of the roles of both sentiment and institutional investors. 
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Table A.1 Summary of data sources and variable measurements 
 
Data Source Description or measure 
 
Sample selection 
Number of corporate 
listings 
DatAnalysis database Number of corporate listings for each year. 
Stapled securities and 
multiple security offers 
Prospectus Non-detachable securities sold as a package or more than one type of security 
offered in the prospectus. 
Attaching options Prospectus Options allocated with shares for no charge. 
Bookbuild issues Prospectus Offer price not fixed at prospectus date. 
Extractive industries DatAnalysis database or 
tables in „Shares‟ magazines 
Industry classification at listing. 
Listed managed funds Prospectus Offer of shares in a portfolio of financial assets. 
Demutalisations and co-
operatives 
Prospectus Mutual or co-operative structure of business prior to listing. 
Cross-listing DatAnalysis database and 
prospectus 
Listed on foreign exchange prior to Australian IPO. 
Listing on regional 
exchange 
Prospectus and Factiva 
database 
Listed on Australian regional exchange prior to prospectus date. 
Relistings DatAnalysis database and 
Factiva database 
Listed on ASX in same industry prior to prospectus date. 
Restructuring Prospectus and Factiva 
database 
New company created by reorganisation of existing entities where original 
shareholders receive shares in the new company.  Does not include spin-offs with 







Data Source Description or measure 
 
Sample descriptives 
Issue size Prospectus Minimum subscription size (2006 A$‟000).   
Gross proceeds to company Prospectus Minimum received from the sale of new shares (2006A$‟000) 
Gross proceeds to owners Prospectus Minimum received from the sale of vendor shares 
(2006A$‟000) 
Total assets Prospectus Total assets from the pro-forma balance sheet (2006A$‟000) 
Leverage % Prospectus Total liabilities from the pro-forma balance sheet / Total assets 
from the pro-forma balance sheet 
Market capitalisation Prospectus Minimum number of shares on offer multiplied by the offer 
price. 
Prospectus date Prospectus Date the prospectus is lodged with ASIC. 
Listing date DatAnalysis database and Factiva database Date when the IPO shares can be traded on the ASX. 
 
Measures of underpricing 
Offer price (OP) Prospectus Subscription price per share. 
Market price (P) Float.com.au website Observed trading price at the end of the listing date. 
Market return Datastream database Return on the Small Ordinaries Accumulation Index 
Raw UP (RUP) Offer price and market price [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100 
Market adjusted UP (MAUP) Offer price, market price, market return Raw UP – return on the market index. 
Package UP (PUP) Offer price, market price of shares and 
attaching options, market return 
[(Market price of share - offer price + (ratio of shares to 











Data Source Description or measure 
 
Baseline independent variables   
DELAY   Prospectus date, listing date Listing date minus prospectus date. 
OWN  Prospectus (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 
100 
SIGMA  Market price Standard deviation of daily returns for days 2 to 20 from listing 
date. 
UW  Prospectus Dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten. 
OPT Prospectus Dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue includes attaching 
options. 
lnDELAY Prospectus date, listing date Natural logarithm of listing date minus prospectus date 
tOWN Prospectus Square root of reflected value of [(shares retained by pre-IPO 
owners / minimum shares offered) x 100] 
lnSIGMA Market price Natural logarithm of standard deviation of daily returns for days 2 to 
20 from listing date 
 
Value proxies 
EPSt+1 Prospectus Forecast earnings per share for the first financial year after listing 
PE multiple Aspect Financial, AGSM, FinAnalysis Industry median PE for the year prior to listing 
Risk-free rate (rf) RBA website 90-day bank-accepted bill rate 
Scholes-Williams beta (β) AGSM Industry beta for the year prior to the prospectus date 
Market risk premium Brailsford, Handley & Maheswaran (2008) 3 alternate specifications – zero, 50% or 100% value for imputation 
credits 
Book value (Bt) Prospectus Book value from pro-forma financial statements divided by number 
of shares at listing 
VPE  PE multiple x EPSt+1 
VEBO0  EBO value proxy with zero value for imputation credits 
VEBO50  EBO value proxy with 50% value for imputation credits 







Data Source Description or measure 
 
Measures of mispricing and misvaluation 
MP  OP minus value proxy 
MP%  [(OP minus value proxy) / OP] x 100 
V/OP  Ratio of value proxy to offer price 
OP/V  Ratio of offer price to value proxy  
AMP  Aggregate mispricing - the product of MP and the number of 
shares offered 
MV  P minus value proxy 
MV%  [(P minus value proxy) / P] x 100 
V/P  Ratio of value proxy to market price 
P/V  Ratio of market price to value proxy  
AMV  Aggregate misvaluation - the product of MV and the number 
of shares offered 
 
Independent variables for mispricing and misvaluation 
Shareholder dispersion 
(HOLDERS) 
Top 20 shareholder disclosures on the ASX 
website, prospectus 
The sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 
shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors 
all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus 
Participation rate (PTN) Prospectus The ratio of the number of secondary shares offered to the 
total number of original shares 
Dilution rate (DTN)  Prospectus The ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total 












Data Source Description or measure 
Allocation method (ALLOC) Prospectus Dichotomous variable is coded as one where the underwriter 
participates in the allocation process. 
Underwriter discretion in 
allocation (ALLOC1) 
Prospectus Dichotomous variable is coded as one where the underwriter has 
complete discretion in the allocation process. 
IPO market sentiment proxy 
(HOTN) 
Count of industrial IPOs during sample period The number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the 
prospectus date. 
Relative size (SIZE) Prospectus, FinAnalysis database Firm size is measured as the total number of shares at listing 
multiplied by the offer price.  Firm size is divided by industry 
median capitalisation for the year of listing.   
Growth options (GROWTH) Prospectus 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
lnDTN  Natural logarithm of (1+DTN) 
lnHOTN  Natural logarithm of (1+HOTN) 
lnSIZE  Natural logarithm of SIZE 
Oversubscription (OS) Factiva for media reports Dichotomous variable coded one where the issue is reported in the 
financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟. 
Speculative issue (SPEC) Prospectus Dichotomous variable equal to one if the issuer identifies the offer 
as speculative in the prospectus. 
Number of institutional investors 
(II) 
Top 20 shareholder disclosures on the ASX 
website 
Number of institutional investors identified from the Top 20 
shareholders disclosure. 
Proportion of institutional 
investors (II%) 
Top 20 shareholder disclosures on the ASX 
website 
The percentage of shares held by institutional investors identified 
from the Top 20 shareholder disclosure. 
IPO market sentiment proxy 
(HOTU) 
Float.com.au website Average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months 
preceding listing date. 
General market sentiment proxy 
(RM2) 
Datastream database Return on the All Ordinaries Index for the two months prior to the 
listing date. 
General market sentiment proxy 
(RM4) 
Datastream database Return on the All Ordinaries Index for the four months prior to the 
listing date. 
General market sentiment proxy 
(BULL) 
Factiva for media reports Dichotomous variable coded one where the issue is made during a 
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Table B.1 Sample means (medians where available) from prior Australian research 
Authors Sample 
years 
n DELAY OWN SIGMA UW OPT 
Finn & Higham (1988) 1966-78 125 (25) - - - - 
Lee, Taylor & Walter 
(1996) 
1976-89 266 52.81 54.6 15.11 - - 
Lee, Lee & Taylor 
(2003) 







Balatbat, Taylor & 
Walter (2004) 
1976-93 313 - 50.64 
(54.8) 
- - - 
How & Low (1993) 1979-89 523 - 44.83 - - - 







How & Howe (2001) 1979-90 396 ** ** ** - 34* 
How, Izan & Monroe 
(1995) 









- 73 16* 
Sharpe & Woo (2005) 1983-95 983 - 42.67 - 82.4 - 
Da Silva Rosa, 
Velayuthen & Walter 
(2003) 
1991-99 - - 49.63 
(54.3) 
- - - 











Cotter, Goyen & 
Hegarty (2005) 




- 75 - 
Wong (2005) 1996-99 214 - - - 82.2 - 




419 - - 5 - - 
* Includes attaching and sold options 










Table C.1 Mispricing regression results with transformed independent variables 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.479** -0.342* -0.253 -0.177 
 t-stat -3.076 -2.160 -1.615 -1.133 
 p (0.002) (0.032) (0.216) (0.259) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.024 0.097 0.108 0.116 
 t-stat -0.358 1.451 1.28 1.765 
 p (1.000) (0.297) (0.211) (0.159) 
lnDTN coefficient 0.045 -0.123 -0.108 -0.180 
 t-stat 0.355 -0.955 -1.209 -1.416 
 p (1.000) (0.682) (0.457) (0.317) 
ALLOC coefficient -0.008 0.013 0.021 0.027 
 t-stat -0.133 0.196 0.308 0.406 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
lnHOTN coefficient 0.154** 0.163** 0.153** 0.144** 
 t-stat 3.160 3.287 3.117 2.949 
 p (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
lnSIZE coefficient 0.184**  0.152** 0.156** 0.159** 
 t-stat 6.683 5.453 5.641 5.757 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.249# -0.188 -0.195 -0.200 
 t-stat 2.074 -1.543 -1.619 -1.668 
 p (0.079) (0.249) (0.215) (0.194) 
AR
2
  0.277** 0.187** 0.199** 0.208** 
JB  55.370** 23.317** 26.648** 29.246** 
White‟s  p (0.833) (0.304) (0.205) (0.156) 
DW  1.732 1.705 1.704 1.705 
RESET F 1.942 5.444** 5.452** 5.329** 
 p (0.147) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for the MPEBO100  measure of mispricing. 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the 
number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  lnDTN = log of one plus the 
ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ 
where the underwriter participates in the allocation process.  lnHOTN = log of one plus the number of industrial IPOs in the three 
months preceding the prospectus date.  lnSIZE = log of (market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median 




Table C.2 Mispricing regression results with PTN and DTN as independent variables 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.405** -0.285** -0.225* -0.172 
 t-stat -2.931 -3.121 -2.485 -1.913 
 p (0.004) (0.002) (0.014) (0.115) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.022 0.105 0.109 0.112 
 t-stat -0.320 1.553 1.639 1.698 
 p (1.000) (0.245) (0.206) (0.183) 
DTN coefficient 0.009 -0.058 -0.063 -0.068 
 t-stat 0.185 -1.100 -1.216 -1.306 
 p (1.000) (0.546) (0.451) (0.386) 
PTN coefficient 0.031 0.067 0.128 0.179 
 t-stat 0.199 0.430 0.826 1.166 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (0.819) (0.491) 
ALLOC coefficient -0.014 0.044 0.045 0.046 
 t-stat -0.201 0.637 0.660 0.678 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.997) 
HOTN^ coefficient 0.136** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008* 
 t-stat 2.671 3.218 2.966 2.729 
 p (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) 
SIZE^ coefficient 0.182**  0.112** 0.113** 0.115** 
 t-stat 6.606 5.713 5.870 5.958 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.241# -0.223 -0.227 -0.231 
 t-stat 2.025 -1.858 -1.921 -1.958 
 p (0.089) (0.130) (0.113) (0.104) 
AR
2
  0.269** 0.200** 0.213** 0.222** 
JB  55.421** 49.139** 58.071** 65.027** 
White‟s  p (0.763) (0.662) (0.583) (0.524) 
DW  1.735 1.820 1.812 1.805 
RESET F 2.297 1.294 1.095 0.9111 
 p (0.104) (0.277) (0.337) (0.404) 
 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
^ Logarithmic transformations of SIZE and one plus HOTN and are used in with the MPPE dependent variable 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the 
number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  DTN = the ratio of the number 
of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  PTN = the ratio of the number of secondary shares offered to the total 
number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ where the underwriter participates in the allocation 
process.  HOTN = the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of 
the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary 





Table C.3 Mispricing regression results with PTN as an independent variable 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.459** -0.332** -0.275** -0.226** 
 t-stat -3.214 -4.084 -3.425 -2.826 
 p (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.016 0.076 0.077 0.079 
 t-stat -0.261 1.221 1.263 1.289 
 p (1.000) (0.448) (0.416) (0.398) 
PTN coefficient 0.025 0.109 0.173 0.227 
 t-stat 0.169 0.717 1.153 1.524 
 p (1.000) (0.949) (0.500) (0.259) 
ALLOC coefficient -0.012 0.0411 0.042 0.043 
 t-stat -0.177 0.603 0.621 0.636 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTN^ coefficient 0.153** 0.010** 0.009** 0.008** 
 t-stat 3.144 3.363 3.121 2.891 
 p (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
SIZE^ coefficient 0.182**  0.115** 0.117** 0.118** 
 t-stat 6.687 5.912 6.081 6.178 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.234# -0.199 -0.201 -0.203 
 t-stat 2.021 -1.685 -1.726 -1.746 
 p (0.089) (0.187) (0.172) (0.165) 
AR
2
  0.277** 0.199** 0.210** 0.219** 
JB  56.661** 46.328** 54.663** 61.179** 
White‟s  p (0.531) (0.505) (0.425) (0.372) 
DW  1.737 1.799 1.787 1.777 
RESET F 2.040 1.394 1.177 0.981 
 p (0.133) (0.251) (0.311) (0.377) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, PTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
^ Logarithmic transformations of SIZE and one plus HOTN and are used in with the MPPE dependent variable 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the 
number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  PTN = the ratio of the number 
of secondary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ where the 
underwriter participates in the allocation process.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus 
date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 
1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table C.4 Mispricing regression results with ALLOC1 as an independent variable 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.484** -0.261** -0.927* -0.134 
 t-stat -3.147 -2.967 -2.212 -1.540 
 p (0.002) (0.003) (0.028) (0.126) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.023 0.108 0.117 0.125 
 t-stat -0.349 1.631 1.785 1.901 
 p (1.000) (0.209) (0.152) (0.118) 
DTN^ coefficient 0.045 -0.065 -0.075 -0.084 
 t-stat 0.358 -1.273 -1.491 -1.667 
 p (1.000) (0.410) (0.275) (0.194) 
ALLOC1 coefficient 0.010 -0.011 0.002 0.012 
 t-stat 0.077 -0.083 0.013 0.096 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTN^ coefficient 0.154** 0.009** 0.008** 0.008* 
 t-stat 3.150 3.122 2.834 2.565 
 p (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.022) 
SIZE^ coefficient 0.183**  0.114** 0.117** 0.120** 
 t-stat 6.808 5.827 6.033 6.159 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.245# -0.205 -0.207 -0.209 
 t-stat 2.016 -1.682 -1.719 -1.734 
 p (0.091) (0.189) (0.175) (0.170) 
AR
2
  0.277** 0.201** 0.210** 0.216** 
JB  54.300** 43.786** 50.623** 56.095** 
White‟s  p (0.950) (0.499) (0.384) (0.318) 
DW  1.729 1.810 1.799 1.789 
RESET F 1.981 1.681 1.691 1.650 
 p (0.141) (0.189) (0.187) (0.195) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC1) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC1) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC1) 
^ Logarithmic transformations of SIZE, one plus DTN and one plus HOTN are used in with the MPPE dependent variable 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the 
number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  DTN = the ratio of the number 
of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC1 = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ where the 
underwriter has complete discretion over the allocation process.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the 
prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  




Table C.5 Mispricing regression results with UW as a dependent variable 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE MPEBO0 MPEBO50 MPEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.462** -0.310** -0.254* -0.207* 
 t-stat -2.856 -3.067 -2.546 -2.072 
 p (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.040) 
HOLDERS coefficient -0.020 0.100 0.106 0.112 
 t-stat -0.304 1.497 1.611 1.695 
 p (1.000) (0.273) (0.218) (0.184) 
DTN^ coefficient 0.055 -0.071 -0.083 -0.093 
 t-stat 0.427 -1.383 -1.640 -1.849 
 p (1.000) (0.337) (0.206) (0.132) 
UW coefficient -0.037 0.085 0.108 0.128 
 t-stat -0.410 0.948 1.224 1.456 
 p (1.000) (0.689) (0.445) (0.294) 
HOTN^ coefficient 0.156** 0.009** 0.008** 0.007* 
 t-stat 3.167 3.166 2.861 2.576 
 p (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.022) 
SIZE^ coefficient 0.186**  0.111** 0.112** 0.114** 
 t-stat 6.728 5.638 5.791 5.875 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.257# -0.226 -0.232 -0.235# 
 t-stat 2.112 -1.889 -1.954 -1.991 
 p (0.072) (0.121) (0.105) (0.082) 
AR
2
  0.278** 0.201** 0.217** 0.225** 
JB  53.000** 43.285** 50.116** 55.609** 
White‟s  p (0.783) (0.469) (0.370) (0.303) 
DW  1.727 1.812 1.807 1.804 
RESET F 2.148 1.438 1.389 1.315 
 p (0.120) (0.240) (0.252) (0.271) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, UW, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, UW, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, UW, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
^ Logarithmic transformations of SIZE, one plus DTN and one plus HOTN are used in with the MPPE dependent variable 
MPPE = offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MPEBO0 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MPEBO100 = offer price minus the EBO 
model value where r100 is the discount rate. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the 
number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  DTN = the ratio of the number 
of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  UW = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when an underwriter 
participates in the issue.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  SIZE = market 
capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of 
ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table C.6 Mispricing regression results with MP% as dependent variables 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MPPE% MPEBO0% MPEBO50% MPEBO100% 
constant coefficient -65.046* -59.565# -48.128 -38.326 
 t-stat -2.111 -1.725 -1.394 -1.108 
 p (0.036) (0.086) (0.165) (0.269) 
HOLDERS coefficient -5.223 9.836 10.279 10.603 
 t-stat -0.783 1.213 1.296 1.356 
 p (0.869) (0.453) (0.394) (0.354) 
lnDTN coefficient 13.991 -8.125 -9.771 -17.285 
 t-stat 0.540 -0.225 -0.266 -0.298 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
ALLOC coefficient 2.069 13.599 14.001 14.361 
 t-stat 0.295 1.536 1.609 1.668 
 p (1.000) (0.253) (0.219) (0.194) 
lnHOTN coefficient 16.630* 20.474* 18.763* 17.285* 
 t-stat 2.497 2.807 2.619 2.436 
 p (0.027) (0.011) (0.019) (0.032) 
lnSIZE coefficient 27.131**  26.889* 26.307* 25.760* 
 t-stat 3.079 2.592 2.531 2.473 
 p (0.005) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) 
GROWTH coefficient 27.063 -40.192 -41.045# -41.64# 
 t-stat 1.754 -1.972 -2.029 -2.069 
 p (0.162) (0.100) (0.088) (0.080) 
AR
2
  0.241** 0.163** 0.158** 0.152** 
JB  11 085** 6 064** 7 003** 7 778** 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.951 1.928 1.940# 1.951# 
RESET F 1.676 2.258 2.350 2.435 
 p (0.190) (0.108) (0.099) (0.091) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
MPPE% = (offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / offer price. MPEBO0% = (offer price minus the EBO model value 
where r0 is the discount rate) / offer price.  MPEBO50% = (offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate) / offer 
price.  MPEBO100% = (offer price minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate) / offer price. HOLDERS = the sum of the 
number of shares held by the top 20 shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares 
offered in the prospectus.  lnDTN = log of one plus the ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original 
shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ where the underwriter participates in the allocation process.  lnHOTN = log of 
one plus the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  lnSIZE = log of (market capitalisation of the 
IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing).  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 





Table C.7 Mispricing regression results with V/OP as dependent variables 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables VPE/OP VEBO0/OP VEBO50/OP VEBO100/OP 
constant coefficient 2.075** 2.090** 1.959** 1.846** 
 t-stat 8.106 6.928 6.511 6.134 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HOLDERS coefficient 0.043 -0.092 -0.099 -0.103 
 t-stat 0.429 -0.770 -0.819 -0.855 
 p (1.000) (0.885) (0.828) (0.788) 
lnDTN coefficient -0.127 0.058 0.077 0.094 
 t-stat -0.641 0.267 0.333 0.403 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
ALLOC coefficient -0.075 -0.176 -0.181 -0.184 
 t-stat -0.740 -1.468 -1.507 -1.539 
 p (1.000) (0.288) (0.267) (0.252) 
lnHOTN coefficient -0.148 -0.193# -0.176# -0.161 
 t-stat -1.964 -2.170 -1.981 -1.812 
 p (0.102) (0.063) (0.098) (0.144) 
lnSIZE coefficient -0.540**  -0.624** -0.604** -0.585** 
 t-stat -5.268 -5.173 -5.015 -4.857 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient -0.250 0.459# 0.463# 0.466# 
 t-stat -1.326 2.069 2.094 2.105 
 p (0.373) (0.080) (0.075) (0.074) 
AR
2
  0.181** 0.153** 0.146** 0.138** 
JB  16 638** 10 064** 11 337** 12 326** 
White‟s  p (0.056) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) 
DW  1.941 1.988 1.998 2.008 
RESET F 8.370 0.953 0.973 0.987 
 p (0.000) (0.388) (0.380) (0.375) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for lnSIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, lnDTN, GROWTH, lnHOTN and ALLOC) 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
MPPER = ratio of the comparable firms estimate of value to offer price. MPEBO0R = ratio of the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate to offer price.  MPEBO50R = ratio of the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate to offer price.  MPEBO100R = ratio 
of the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate to offer price. HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 
shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  lnDTN = 
log of one plus the ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous 
variable coded as „one‟ where the underwriter participates in the allocation process.  lnHOTN = log of one plus the number of 
industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  lnSIZE = log of (market capitalisation of the IPO post listing 




Table C.8 Mispricing regression results with AMP as dependent variables 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables AMPPE AMPEBO0 AMPEBO50 AMPEBO100 
constant coefficient -7 725 816** -4 471 111# -3 694 086 -3 026 713 
 t-stat -2.944 -1.799 -1.473 -1.189 
 p (0.004) (0.084) (0.143) (0.236) 
HOLDERS coefficient -986 616 657 631 938 124 1 175 272 
 t-stat -0.511 0.511 0.741 0.933 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (0.920) (0.704) 
DTN coefficient 360 619 -1 520 326 -1 546 679 -1 561 573 
 t-stat 0.244 -0.950 -1.017 -1.070 
 p (1.000) (0.687) (0.621) (0.572) 
ALLOC coefficient -1 545 949 128 500 756 220 1 30 439 
 t-stat -0.809 0.071 0.405 0.670 
 p (0.839) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTN coefficient 174 814# 152 927 126 524 104 088 
 t-stat 2.044 1.693 1.348 1.067 
 p (0.085) (0.184) (0.359) (0.575) 
SIZE coefficient 4 503 305**  3 547 877** 3 917 428** 4 227 199** 
 t-stat 7.870 4.574 4.700 4.751 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 376 696 -4 307 259# -4 189 326# -4 080 534# 
 t-stat 0.108 -2.066 -1.995 -1.900 
 p (1.000) (0.081) (0.095) (0.118) 
AR
2
  0.270** 0.232** 0.261** 0.279** 
JB  1 140** 107.538** 140.808** 176.015** 
White‟s  p (0.902) (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
DW  1.996 1.950 1.940 1.930 
RESET F 2.910* 3.223* 3.224* 3.124* 
 p (0.049) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) 
 
** Significant at <1% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
* Significant at <5% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
# Significant at <10% (two tailed for SIZE and one tailed for HOLDERS, DTN, GROWTH, HOTN and ALLOC) 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for MPEBO measures of mispricing. 
AMPPE = number of shares offered times (offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value). AMPEBO0 = number of shares 
offered times (offer price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate).  AMPEBO50 = number of shares offered times 
(offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate).  AMPEBO100 = number of shares offered times (offer price 
minus the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate).  HOLDERS = the sum of the number of shares held by the top 20 
shareholders less the number of shares retained by the vendors all scaled by the number of shares offered in the prospectus.  DTN = 
ratio of the number of primary shares offered to the total number of original shares.  ALLOC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ 
where the underwriter participates in the allocation process.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the 
prospectus date.  SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  





























Table D.1 Misvaluation regression results with II% as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE MVBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.107 -0.100 -0.097 -0.094 
 t-stat -0.621 -0.581 -0.563 -0.546 
 p (0.535) (0.562) (0.574) (0.586) 
OS coefficient 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.100 
 t-stat 1.449 1.452 1.450 1.448 
 p (0.298) (0.297) (0.298) (0.299) 
SPEC coefficient -0.156 -0.154 -0.156 -0.157 
 t-stat -1.860 -1.820 -1.846 -1.868 
 p (0.129) (0.141) (0.133) (0.127) 
II% coefficient -0.005# -0.005# -0.005# -0.005# 
 t-stat -2.216 -2.207 -2.197 -2.090 
 p (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) 
UW coefficient 0.001 0.136 0.136 0.136 
 t-stat 1.441 1.473 1.450 1.481 
 p (0.303) (0.285) (0.298) (0.280) 
OWN coefficient 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 t-stat 0.551 0.538 0.529 0.520 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTU coefficient 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 t-stat 1.420 1.389 1.377 1.366 
 p (0.315) (0.333) (0.283) (0.374) 
MP coefficient 0.936** 0.951** 0.949** 0.948** 
 t-stat 12.894 13.434 13.198 13.059 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.047*  0.045* 0.045* 0.045* 
 t-stat 2.738 2.684 2.689 2.691 
 p (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.157 0.134 0.135 0.135 
 t-stat 1.352 1.204 1.209 1.213 
 p (0.356) (0.461) (0.457) (0.454) 
AR
2
  0.620** 0.592** 0.590** 0.590** 
JB  3 015** 3 024** 3 007** 2 993** 
White‟s  p (0.476) (0.267) (0.252) (0.240) 
DW  1.455 1.459 1.458 1.458 
RESET F 2.069 0.881 0.938 0.973 
 p (0.130) (0.416) (0.394) (0.380) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II% 
= percentage of shares held by institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable 
coded as „one‟ when an underwriter participates in the issue.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  
HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  MP = offer price minus the relevant 
estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  
GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table D.2 Misvaluation regression results with HOTN as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE MVBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.248 -0.243 -0.239 -0.235 
 t-stat -1.370 -1.344 -1.332 -1.316 
 p (0.143) (0.181) (0.185) (0.190) 
OS coefficient 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.110 
 t-stat 1.529 1.548 1.549 1.548 
 p (0.256) (0.247) (0.246) (0.247) 
SPEC coefficient -0.152 -0.148 -0.150 -0.152 
 t-stat -1.753 -1.699 -1.730 -1.758 
 p (0.163) (0.182) (0.171) (0.161) 
II coefficient -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-stat -0.176 -0.169 -0.155 -0.144 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.087 0.092 0.092 0.093 
 t-stat 0.914 0.961 0.969 0.977 
 p (0.724) (0.676) (0.668) (0.660) 
OWN coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 t-stat 0.749 1.468 1.457 1.446 
 p (0.910) (0.288) (0.294) (0.300) 
HOTN coefficient 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 t-stat 0.242 0.244 0.238 0.229 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
MP coefficient 0.927** 0.935** 0.931** 0.927** 
 t-stat 12.237 12.583 12.373 12.258 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.044*  0.035 0.043* 0.043* 
 t-stat 2.396 2.354 2.369 2.380 
 p (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.198 0.174 0.175 0.175 
 t-stat 1.742 1.561 1.565 1.569 
 p (0.167) (0.241) (0.239) (0.237) 
AR
2
  0.605** 0.577** 0.575** 0.576** 
JB  3 381** 3 394** 3 379** 3 364** 
White‟s  p (0.762) (0.672) (0.638) (0.609) 
DW  1.500 1.504 1.503 1.503 
RESET F 2.164 0.936 0.954 0.962 
 p (0.118) (0.394) (0.387) (0.384) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = 
number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the 
issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTN = number of industrial IPOs in the 
three months preceding the prospectus date.  MP = offer price minus the relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the 
IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price). 
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Table D.3 Misvaluation regression results with BULL as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE MVBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.513** -0.506 -0.506** -0.506** 
 t-stat -2.665 -2.637 -2.643 -2.643 
 p (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
OS coefficient 0.114 0.110 0.111 0.112 
 t-stat 1.682 1.617 1.635 1.648 
 p (0.189) (0.215) (0.208) (0.202) 
SPEC coefficient -0.144 -0.147 -0.146 -0.146 
 t-stat -1.723 -1.743 -1.738 -1.737 
 p (0.173) (0.166) (0.168) (0.168) 
II coefficient -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-stat -0.191 -0.216 -0.237 -0.223 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.092 0.093 0.093 0.004 
 t-stat 0.998 1.006 1.008 1.011 
 p (0.640) (0.631) (0.630) (0.627) 
OWN coefficient 0.004# 0.004# 0.004# 0.004# 
 t-stat 2.167 2.158 2.157 2.154 
 p (0.063) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
BULL coefficient 0.255** 0.262** 0.260** 0.259** 
 t-stat 3.305 3.314 3.298 3.288 
 p (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
MP coefficient 0.975** 1.007** 1.000** 0.994** 
 t-stat 13.302 13.743 13.474 13.309 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.034  0.0.032 0.032 0.032 
 t-stat 1.936 1.840 1.870 1.873 
 p (0.109) (0.135) (0.130) (0.126) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.229# 0.222# 0.222# 0.222# 
 t-stat 2.090 2.063 2.059 2.057 
 p (0.076) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
AR
2
  0.629** 0.602** 0.600** 0.601** 
JB  3 521** 3 495** 3 502** 3 505** 
White‟s  p (0.928) (0.766) (0.759) (0.753) 
DW  1.604 1.614 1.612 1.610 
RESET F 2.817# 0.789 0.793 0.794 
 p (0.063) (0.456) (0.454) (0.454) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = 
number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the 
issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  BULL = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ 
if listing date is during a bull market.  MP = offer price minus the relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO 
post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price). 
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Table D.4 Misvaluation regression results with RM4 as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE MVBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.255 -0.250 -0.247 -0.243 
 t-stat -1.405 -1.380 -1.369 -1.354 
 p (0.162) (0.170) (0.173) (0.177) 
OS coefficient 0.110 0.112 0.112 0.111 
 t-stat 1.573 1.584 1.587 1.587 
 p (0.235) (0.230) (0.229) (0.229) 
SPEC coefficient -0.151 -0.148 -0.150 -0.152 
 t-stat -1.752 -1.704 -1.731 -1.757 
 p (0.163) (0.181) (0.170) (0.161) 
II coefficient -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-stat -0.183 -0.178 -0.165 -0.154 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.097 0.101 0.102 0.102 
 t-stat 0.998 1.041 1.047 1.541 
 p (0.639) (0.598) (0.593) (0.588) 
OWN coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 t-stat 1.579 1.562 1.552 1.541 
 p (0.233) (0.240) (0.245) (0.251) 
RM4 coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 t-stat 0.478 0.481 0.474 0.468 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
MP coefficient 0.934** 0.942** 0.938** 0.934** 
 t-stat 12.520 12.934 12.663 12.497 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.042*  0.041* 0.041* 0.041* 
 t-stat 2.350 2.307 2.323 2.335 
 p (0.040) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.193 0.172 0.173 0.173 
 t-stat 1.701 1.551 1.554 1.557 
 p (0.181) (0.245) (0.244) (0.243) 
AR
2
  0.606** 0.577** 0.575** 0.576** 
JB  3 414** 3 426** 3 411** 3 396** 
White‟s  p (0.967) (0.927) (0.902) (0.914) 
DW  1.496 1.500 1.499 1.489 
RESET F 2.478# 0.906 0.909 0.906 
 p (0.087) (0.406) (0.405) (0.406) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = 
number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the 
issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  RM4 = return on the All Ordinaries index 
for the four months prior to the listing date MP = offer price minus the relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the 
IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price). 
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Table D.5 Misvaluation regression results with RM2 as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE MVBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.323# -0.307# -0.305# -0.302# 
 t-stat -1.833 -1.747 -1.744 -1.737 
 p (0.069) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) 
OS coefficient 0.118 0.116 0.116 0.116 
 t-stat 1.739 1.702 1.706 1.707 
 p (0.168) (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) 
SPEC coefficient -0.134 -0.133 -0.135 -0.136 
 t-stat -1.596 -1.579 -1.600 -1.619 
 p (0.224) (0.232) (0.223) (0.215) 
II coefficient 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 t-stat 0.042 0.370 0.379 0.387 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.098 0.101 0.102 0.103 
 t-stat 1.060 1.097 1.102 1.108 
 p (0.581) (0.548) (0.544) (0.539) 
OWN coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 
 t-stat 1.670 1.631 1.624 1.616 
 p (0.195) (0.210) (0.213) (0.216) 
RM2 coefficient 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 
 t-stat 3.299 3.226 3.221 3.217 
 p (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
MP coefficient 0.929** 0.959** 0.955** 0.952** 
 t-stat 12.900 13.560 13.286 13.120 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 0.037#  0.034# 0.035# 0.035# 
 t-stat 2.116 2.007 2.020 2.030 
 p (0.072) (0.093) (0.090) (0.088) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.203 0.181 0.181 0.181 
 t-stat 1.856 1.669 1.687 1.689 
 p (0.130) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) 
AR
2
  0.629** 0.601** 0.599** 0.600** 
JB  3 338** 3 323** 3 315** 3 305** 
White‟s  p (0.859) (0.732) (0.852) (0.725) 
DW  1.597 1.601 1.600 1.600 
RESET F 2.473# 0.906 0.909 0.906 
 p (0.087) (0.406) (0.405) (0.406) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = 
number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the 
issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  RM2 = return on the All Ordinaries index 
for the two months prior to the listing date MP = offer price minus the relevant estimate of value. SIZE = market capitalisation of the 
IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ 
equity / offer price). 
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Table D.6 Misvaluation regression results with MV% as dependent variables 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables MVPE% MVBO0% MVEBO50% MVEBO100% 
constant coefficient -0.207 3.757 3.235 2.647 
 t-stat -0.016 0.290 0.255 0.219 
 p (0.988) (0.772) (0.799) (0.817) 
OS coefficient 5.802 5.587 4.925 4.369 
 t-stat 1.007 1.093 0.895 0.807 
 p (0.631) (0.552) (0.744) (0.842) 
SPEC coefficient -11.579 -13.711# -13.309# -12.941# 
 t-stat -1.869 -2.206 -1.989 -1.996 
 p (0.127) (0.057) (0.097) (0.095) 
II coefficient -0.413 -0.592 -0.557 -0.524 
 t-stat -0.831 -1.018 -1.126 -1.104 
 p (0.815) (0.620) (0.523) (0.542) 
UW coefficient 12.031 11.676 11.525 11.414 
 t-stat 1.791 1.690 1.594 1.599 
 p (0.150) (0.186) (0.226) (0.223) 
OWN coefficient 0.076 0.054 0.056 0.058 
 t-stat 0.617 0.392 0.462 0.495 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTU coefficient 0.056 0.020 0.025 0.031 
 t-stat 0.455 0.205 0.227 0.276 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
MP% coefficient 0.958** 0.989** 0.994** 0.997** 
 t-stat 7.723 32.019 10.457 10.446 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient -0.459  -0.287 -0.329 -0.359 
 t-stat -0.416 -0.230 -0.325 -0.367 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.385 4.292 3.842 3.439 
 t-stat 0.064 0.527 0.558 0.508 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AR
2
  0.843** 0.869** 0.873** 0.878** 
JB  1 277** 335.928** 416.949** 505.869** 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.653 1.560 1.575 1.591 
RESET F 44.915** 23.061** 24.155** 25.204** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
MVPE% = (price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / price. MVEBO0% = (price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the 
discount rate) / price.  MVEBO50% = (price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate) / price.  MVEBO100 = (price minus 
the EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate) / price.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in 
the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the 
offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = 
dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  
HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  MP% = (offer price minus the relevant 
estimate of value) / offer price. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the 
year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table D.7 Misvaluation regression results with VP ratios as dependent variables 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables VPE/P VBO0/P VEBO50/P VEBO100/P 
constant coefficient 0.047 -0.026 -0.024 -0.021 
 t-stat 0.212 -0.127 -0.125 -0.113 
 p (0.832) (0.899) (0.901) (0.910) 
OS coefficient -0.057 -0.058 -0.051 -0.045 
 t-stat -0.997 -1.027 -0.923 -0.832 
 p (0.640) (0.612) (0.715) (0.813) 
SPEC coefficient 0.124 0.142 0.138# 0.134# 
 t-stat 1.900 1.971 1.995 2.000 
 p (0.118) (0.101) (0.095) (0.093) 
II coefficient 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 t-stat 0.793 1.107 1.058 1.044 
 p (0.858) (0.575) (0.553) (0.596) 
UW coefficient -0.125 -0.125 -0.123 -0.121 
 t-stat -1.852 -1.607 -1.752 -1.753 
 p (0.131) (0.164) (0.163) (0.163) 
OWN coefficient -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 t-stat -0.647 -0.516 -0.539 -0.562 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTU coefficient -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 t-stat -0.446 -0.281 -0.327 -0.370 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
V/OP coefficient 0.968** 0.993** 0.997** 1.000** 
 t-stat 7.695 10.526 10.488 10.486 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnSIZE coefficient 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 t-stat 0.744 0.436 0.476 0.501 
 p (0.915) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
GROWTH coefficient -0.007 -0.045 -0.041 -0.037 
 t-stat -0.109 -0.643 -0.595 -0.548 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AR
2
  0.845** 0.869** 0.874** 0.878** 
JB  1 223** 311** 389** 476** 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DW  1.677 1.585 1.600 1.615 
RESET F 43.881** 23.032** 24.109** 25.146** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
MVPER = comparable firms estimate of value / price. MVEBO0R = EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate / price.  MVEBO50R = 
EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate / price.  MVEBO100 = EBO model value where r100 is the discount rate / price.  OS = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  SPEC = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = number of institutional 
investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  
OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  lnHOTU = log of the average underpricing for industrial IPOs in 
the three months preceding listing date.  MPratio = relevant estimate of value / offer price.  lnSIZE = log of the market capitalisation 
of the IPO post listing relative to industry median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary 
shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table D.8 Misvaluation regression results with AMV as dependent variables 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables AMVPE AMVEBO0 AMVEBO50 AMVEBO100 
constant coefficient -4 306 885 -4 264 271 -3 888 818 -3 688 021 
 t-stat -0.835 -0.830 -0.755 -0.713 
 p (0.405) (0.408) (0.451) (0.477) 
OS coefficient 2 772 853 3 049 786 2 958 071 2 884 515 
 t-stat 1.352 1.481 1.434 1.398 
 p (0.356) (0.281) (0.307) (0.328) 
SPEC coefficient -2 738 867 -2 461 325 -2 624 148 -2 740 823 
 t-stat -1.084 -0.971 -1.036 -1.083 
 p (0.560) (0.665) (0.603) (0.561) 
II coefficient 132 510 156 728 156 777 154 578 
 t-stat 0.566 0.669 0.667 0.655 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 610 630 508 340 558 738 609 583 
 t-stat 0.218 0.182 0.200 0.217 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
OWN coefficient 4 841 163 -2 757 -3 676 
 t-stat 0.867 0.003 -0.049 -0.065 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
HOTU coefficient 25 457 24 593 24 238 24 049 
 t-stat 0.655 0.635 0.624 0.618 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AMP coefficient 0.907** 0.874** 0.897** 0.917** 
 t-stat 12.010 10.822 11.201 11.628 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 2 171 420** 2 127 073** 2 121 252** 2 103 617** 
 t-stat 4.008 4.111 4.038 3.954 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH coefficient 4 482 062 4 409 954 4 403 276 4 386 715 
 t-stat 1.355 1.339 1.333 1.326 
 p (0.354) (0.365) (0.369) (0.373) 
AR
2
  0.609** 0.542** 0.574** 0.603** 
JB  2 243** 2 359** 2 330** 2 306** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.214) (0.368) (0.371) (0.379) 
DW  1.870 1.877 1.876 1.874 
RESET F 2.879# 0.857 0.276 0.020 
 p (0.059) (0.426) (0.759) (0.980) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed). 
AMVPE = shares offered times MVPE. AMVEBO0 = shares offered MV EBO where r0 is the discount rate.  AMVEBO50 = shares offered times 
MVEBO where r50 is the discount rate.  AMVEBO100 = shares offered times MVEBO model value where r100 is the discount rate.  OS = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or „closed early‟.  SPEC = 
dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = number of institutional 
investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the issue is underwritten.  
OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTU = average underpricing for industrial IPOs in the three 
months preceding listing date.  AMP = shares offered MP. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post listing relative to industry 
median capitalisation for the year of listing.  GROWTH = 1-(book value of ordinary shareholders‟ equity / offer price). 
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Table D.9 Misvaluation regression results with OP as an independent variable 
  Dependent variable 
Independent variables MVPE MVEBO0 MVEBO50 MVEBO100 
constant coefficient -0.801** -0.952** -0.894** -0.843** 
 t-stat -3.158 -4.227 -4.033 -3.848 
 p (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OS coefficient 0.205# 0.271** 0.265** 0.259** 
 t-stat 2.115 3.544 3.587 3.611 
 p (0.072) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
SPEC coefficient -0.068 0.062 0.031 0.005 
 t-stat -0.560 0.743 0.384 0.062 
 p (1.000) (0.917) (1.000) (1.000) 
II coefficient 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 t-stat 0.869 0.657 0.632 0.608 
 p (0.773) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
UW coefficient 0.047 0.069 0.071 0.072 
 t-stat 0.352 0.700 0.737 0.768 
 p (1.000) (0.969) (0.924) (0.887) 
OWN coefficient 0.004 0.005# 0.004# 0.004 
 t-stat 1.692 2.091 1.979 1.874 
 p (0.185) (0.076) (0.099) (0.125) 
HOTU coefficient 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 t-stat 1.509 1.288 1.183 1.091 
 p (0.266) (0.399) (0.477) (0.553) 
OP coefficient 0.137 0.400** 0.439** 0.472** 
 t-stat 1.238 3.578 3.977 0.000 
 p (0.435) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE coefficient 5.036  0.056 0.056 0.055 
 t-stat 1.650 1.403 1.450 1.489 
 p (0.202) (0.325) (0.298) (0.277) 
GROWTH coefficient 0.088 0.063 0.065 0.068 
 t-stat 3.543 0.484 0.512 0.591 
 p (0.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AR
2
  0.257** 0.226** 0.251** 0.273** 
JB  202.456** 324.244** 368.748** 408.750** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.095) (0.026)* (0.023)* (0.020)* 
DW  1.589 1.580 1.571 1.567 
RESET F 10.711** 10.622** 10.437** 10.043** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
** Significant at <1% (one-tailed).  * Significant at <5% (one-tailed).  # Significant at <10% (one-tailed).  
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for MVEBO measures of the dependent variable. 
MVPE = price minus the comparable firms estimate of value. MVEBO0 = price minus the EBO model value where r0 is the discount rate.  
MVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  MVEBO100 = price minus the EBO model value where r100 is 
the discount rate.  OS = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issue is reported in the financial press as „oversubscribed‟ or 
„closed early‟.  SPEC = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when the issuer identifies the offer as speculative in the prospectus.  II = 
number of institutional investors identified from the top 20 shareholders disclosure.  UW = dichotomous variable coded „one‟ if the 
issue is underwritten.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / shares offered) x 100.  HOTU = average underpricing for 
industrial IPOs in the three months preceding listing date.  OP = offer price per share. SIZE = market capitalisation of the IPO post 































Table E.1  Model 8.1 regression with MP%  as the mispricing measure 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 162.596** 153.258** 162.441** 150.786** 
 t-stat 2.986 2.856 2.928 2.758 
 p (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) 
lnDELAY coefficient -55.644** -53.377** -55.159** -52.316** 
 t-stat -3.998 -3.891 -3.898 -3.751 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.490* 0.482* 0.474* 0.468* 
 t-stat 2.486 2.485 2.405 2.408 
 p (0.028) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 22.998** 22.818** 22.034** 22.090** 
 t-stat 3.812 3.838 3.620 3.681 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 25.336* 26.539* 25.346* 26.395* 
 t-stat 2.544 2.704 2.532 2.675 
 p (0.024) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) 
MPPE% coefficient -0.109 -0.091   
 t-stat -2.038 -1.738   
 p (0.086) (0.168)   
MPEBO50% coefficient   -0.088 -0.068 
 t-stat   -1.741 -1.359 
 p   (0.167) (0.352) 
AR
2
  0.149** 0.148** 0.143** 0.142** 
JB  1 286** 1 322** 1 300** 1 340** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.113) (0.080) (0.174) (0.147) 
DW  1.701 1.734 1.703 1.733 
RESET F 11.879** 12.836** 10.290** 11.259** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.685 10.656 10.692 10.663 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.    
MPPE% = (offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / offer price.  MPEBO50% = (offer price minus the EBO model 




Table E.2  Model 8.2 regression with MV%  as the misvaluation measure  
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 88.859 80.814 82.243# 72.142 
 t-stat 1.596 1.482 1.869 1.644 
 p (0.112) (0.140) (0.063) (0.102) 
lnDELAY coefficient -34.091* -32.203* -32.634* -30.208* 
 t-stat -2.379 -2.295 -2.733 -2.521 
 p (0.037) (0.046) (0.014) (0.025) 
OWN coefficient 0.397# 0.392# 0.410# 0.404* 
 t-stat 2.014 2.023 2.261 2.277 
 p (0.091) (0.089) (0.050) (0.048) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 22.916** 22.678** 23.909** 23.791** 
 t-stat 3.798 3.837 3.023 3.063 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) 
UW coefficient 20.037# 21.269# 19.555* 20.631* 
 t-stat 1.998 2.165 2.298 2.522 
 p (0.095) (0.063) (0.045) (0.025) 
MVPE% coefficient 0.106# 0.116*   
 t-stat 2.023 2.270   
 p (0.089) (0.049)   
MVEBO50% coefficient   0.102 0.115# 
 t-stat   1.739 2.085 
 p   (0.167) (0.077) 
AR
2
  0.148 ** 0.158** 0.150** 0.161** 
JB  1 273** 1 651** 1 253** 1 330** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.090) (0.091) (0.033) (0.033) 
DW  1.733 1.767 1.740 1.781 
RESET F 14.350** 15.399** 15.442** 16.757** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.686 10.644 10.684 10.640 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted where MVEBO50% is the measure of mispricing. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MVPE% 
= (price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / price.  MVEBO50% = (price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the 




Table E.3  Model 8.3 regression results with MP% as the mispricing measure 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 184.213** 176.094** 177.315** 167.376* 
 t-stat 4.241 3.985 2.971 2.813 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) 
lnDELAY coefficient -65.747** -62.729** -63.757** -60.349** 
 t-stat -5.036 -4.726 -4.554 -4.324 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.469# 0.452# 0.459# 0.444# 
 t-stat 2.214 2.162 2.225 2.159 
 p (0.056) (0.064) (0.055) (0.064) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 25.670** 24.998** 25.247** 24.775** 
 t-stat 3.265 3.176 4.223 4.157 
 p (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 31.951** 32.715** 31.501** 32.162** 
 t-stat 3.280 3.367 3.167 3.243 
 p (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
MPPE% coefficient -0.079 -0.066   
 t-stat -1.218 -0.969   
 p (0.450) (0.668)   
MPEBO50% coefficient   -0.049 -0.034 
 t-stat   -0.990 -0.687 
 p   (0.647) (0.986) 
sqrtII% coefficient -4.334* -4.086# -4.251# -4.003 
 t-stat -2.418 -2.250 -1.986 -1.876 
 p (0.033) (0.051) (0.097) (0.125) 
BULL coefficient 33.140** 28.592** 33.520** 29.177** 
 t-stat 4.016 3.474 3.916 3.420 
 p (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
AR
2
  0.231** 0.212** 0.225** 0.206** 
JB  1 316** 1 311** 1 337** 1 337** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.043) (0.028) (0.107) (0.087) 
DW  1.780 1.794 1.804 1.801 
RESET F 12.213** 13.330** 11.194** 12.322** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.630 10.624 10.637 10.630 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted for the MPPE% measure of mispricing. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MPPE% 
= (offer price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / offer price.  MPEBO50% = (offer price minus the EBO model value where 
r50 is the discount rate) / offer price.  sqrtII% = square root of the proportion of „top 20‟ shares held by institutional investors.  BULL = 




Table E.4  Model 8.4 regression results with MV%  as the misvaluation measure 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 94.331 82.592 86.705 73.113 
 t-stat 1.610 1.440 1.457 1.256 
 p (0.218) (0.304) (0.294) (0.211) 
lnDELAY coefficient -35.564* -33.322* -33.613# -30.840# 
 t-stat -2.421 -2.316 -2.244 -2.105 
 p (0.033) (0.044) (0.052) (0.074) 
OWN coefficient 0.413# 0.398# 0.421# 0.406# 
 t-stat 2.034 2.003 2.080 2.051 
 p (0.087) (0.094) (0.078) (0.084) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 22.277** 21.948** 23.681** 23.472** 
 t-stat 3.577 3.599 3.813 3.863 
 p (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 20.832# 21.857# 20.045 20.917# 
 t-stat 2.042 2.187 1.958 2.088 
 p (0.085) (0.060) (0.104) (0.077) 
MVPE% coefficient 0.115# 0.123*   
 t-stat 2.073 2.276   
 p (0.079) (0.048)   
MVEBO50% coefficient   0.105# 0.116* 
 t-stat   2.107 2.388 
 p   (0.073) (0.036) 
lnHOTN coefficient -0.288 0.895 -0.593 0.523 
 t-stat -0.055 0.176 -0.114 0.102 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
lnSIZE coefficient -1.741 -1.493 -0.911 -0.645 
 t-stat -0.527 -0.461 -0.285 -0.206 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AR
2
  0.140** 0.149** 0.140** 0.152** 
JB  1 312** 1 359** 1 282** 1 331** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.255) (0.256) (0.150) (0.160) 
DW  1.753 1.784 1.749 1.787 
RESET F 15.785** 16.84** 15.984** 17.527** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.742 10.700 10.749 10.697 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.  UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MVPE% 
= (price minus the comparable firms estimate of value) / price.  MVEBO50% = (price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the 
discount rate) / price.  lnHOTN = log of one plus the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  




Table E.5  Model 8.3 regression results with OP/V as the mispricing measure 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 151.021** 147.945** 152.447** 147.326 
 t-stat 2.696 2.651 2.703 2.628 
 p (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
lnDELAY coefficient -57.235** -55.505** -58.600** -56.665** 
 t-stat -4.373 -4.257 -4.478 -4.356 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.499* 0.480* 0.455# 0.440# 
 t-stat 2.400 2.319 2.205 2.141 
 p (0.035) (0.043) (0.058) (0.067) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 26.397** 25.622** 26.701** 26.138** 
 t-stat 4.476 4.361 4.474 4.405 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 31.384** 32.319** 30.972** 32.254** 
 t-stat 2.954 3.283 3.117 3.266 
 p (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
OPVPE coefficient -2.936 -2.660   
 t-stat -1.328 -1.207   
 p (0.372) (0.458)   
OPVEBO50 coefficient   1.100 1.479 
 t-stat   0.698 0.945 
 p   (0.972) (0.692) 
sqrtII% coefficient -3.822 -3.634 -4.199 -3.992 
 t-stat -1.779 -1.698 -1.960 -1.875 
 p (0.154) (0.183) (0.142) (0.125) 
BULL coefficient 34.091** 29.298** 37.028** 32.684** 
 t-stat 4.064 3.506 4.260 3.782 
 p (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR
2
  0.229** 0.211** 0.223** 0.208** 
JB  1 352** 1 354** 1 340** 1 414** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.196) (0.173) (0.248) (0.233) 
DW  1.817 1.807 1.858 1.861 
RESET F 12.525** 13.405** 11.401** 11.423** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.633 10.625 10.640 10.628 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  OPVPE 
= comparable firms estimate of value / offer price.  OPVEBO50 = EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate / offer price.  sqrtII% = 
square root of the proportion of „top 20‟ shares held by institutional investors.  BULL = dichotomous variable coded as „one‟ when 





Table E.6  Model 8.4 regression results with P/V as the misvaluation measure 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 130.109** 120.689** 117.386# 107.214 
 t-stat 3.091 2.922 2.076 1.939 
 p (0.002) (0.008) (0.079) (0.108) 
lnDELAY coefficient -45.53** -44.010** -43.175** -41.463** 
 t-stat -4.161 -4.060 -3.101 -3.046 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) 
OWN coefficient 0.340# 0.327# 0.046# 0.401# 
 t-stat 2.040 2.003 2.059 2.029 
 p (0.086) (0.093) (0.082) (0.088) 
lnSIGMA coefficient 19.545* 19.297* 23.397** 23.157** 
 t-stat 2.777 2.800 3.781 3.826 
 p (0.012) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 19.069* 20.256* 25.057* 26.449* 
 t-stat 2.330 2.551 2.351 2.661 
 p (0.042) (0.023) (0.029) (0.017) 
PVPE coefficient 7.899 7.881   
 t-stat 1.334 1.346   
 p (0.368) (0.360)   
PVEBO50 coefficient   3.656* 4.011* 
 t-stat   2.351 4.011 
 p   (0.040) (0.018) 
lnHOTN coefficient -0.4912 0.772 -1.585 -0.551 
 t-stat -0.101 0.159 -0.302 -0.107 
 p (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
lnSIZE coefficient -2.922 -2.502 -1.013 -0.743 
 t-stat -0.888 -0.761 -0.319 -0.239 
 p (0.752) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
AR
2
  0.172** 0.179** 0.146** 0.158** 
JB  876** 917** 1 128** 1 167** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.000) (0.000) (0.163) (0.184) 
DW  1.803 1.834 1.742 1.816 
RESET F 9.169** 8.678** 7.200** 6.850** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
SIC  10.704 10.665 10.735 10.690 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
All t-statistics are White‟s heteroscedasticity adjusted. 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  lnDELAY = log of days from 
prospectus date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  lnSIGMA = log of the 
standard deviation of 20 daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  PVPE = 
price minus the comparable firms estimate of value.  PVEBO50 = price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  
lnHOTN = log of one plus the number of industrial IPOs in the three months preceding the prospectus date.  lnSIZE = log of the size of 




Table E.7  Model 8.3 regression with RM2 as an independent variable 
  Dependent variables 
Independent variables RUP MAUP RUP MAUP 
constant coefficient 5.454 5.229 7.160 6.875 
 t-stat 0.255 0.246 0.335 0.323 
 p (0.799) (0.806) (0.738) (0.747) 
DELAY coefficient -0.890** -0.896** -0.883** -0.886** 
 t-stat -4.345 -4.397 -4.305 -4.340 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OWN coefficient 0.282 0.297 0.268 0.282 
 t-stat 1.375 1.457 1.313 1.388 
 p (0.342) (0.294) (0.382) (0.334) 
SIGMA coefficient 7.024** 6.896** 6.815** 6.691** 
 t-stat 4.950 4.888 4.803 4.743 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UW coefficient 29.498** 30.154** 29.185** 29.795** 
 t-stat 3.043 3.130 3.012 3.092 
 p (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
MPPE coefficient -8.734 -8.748   
 t-stat -1.585 -1.197   
 p (0.229) (0.466)   
MPEBO50 coefficient   -7.816 -7.314 
 t-stat   -1.017 -0.957 
 p   (0.621) (0.680) 
II% coefficient -0.417 -0.414 -0.422 -0.421 
 t-stat -1.585 -1.584 -1.603 -1.606 
 p (0.229) (0.230) (0.222) (0.220) 
RM2 coefficient 2.688** 2.005* 2.597** 1.918* 
 t-stat 3.498 2.624 3.358 2.495 
 p (0.001) (0.02) (0.002) (0.027) 
AR
2
  0.218** 0.204** 0.217** 0.202** 
JB  1 275** 1 320** 1 281** 1 322** 
 p (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
White‟s  p (0.221) (0.225) (0.164) (0.159) 
DW  1.758 1.749 1.754 1.743 
RESET F 7.415** 8.086** 8.005** 8.296** 
 p (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIC  10.611 10.607 10.486 10.624 
 
** Significant at <1% (two-tailed).  * Significant at < 5% (two-tailed).  # Significant at < 10% (two-tailed). 
RUP = [(Market price - offer price) / offer price] x 100.  MAUP = RUP – return on the market index.  DELAY = days from prospectus 
date to listing date.  OWN = (shares retained by pre-IPO owners / minimum shares offered) x 100.  SIGMA = standard deviation of 20 
daily returns from listing date.    UW = dichotomous variable equal to one if the issue is underwritten.  MPPE = offer price minus the 
comparable firms estimate of value.  MPEBO50 = offer price minus the EBO model value where r50 is the discount rate.  II% = the 
proportion of „top 20‟ shares held by institutional investors.  RM2 = return on the All-Ordinaries index for the two months prior to 
listing. 
 
 
